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The ranging course of terrorism banishing peace and security prospects of today’s Pakistan is 
seen as a domestic effluent of its own flawed policies, bad governance, and lack of social justice 
and rule of law in society and widening gulf of trust between the rulers and the ruled. The study 
focused on policies and performance of the Musharraf government since assuming the mantle of 
front ranking ally of the United States in its so called ‘war on terror’. The causes of reversal of 
pre nine-eleven position on Afghanistan and support of its Taliban’s rulers are examined in the 
light of the geo-strategic compulsions of that crucial time and the structural weakness of military 
rule that needed external props for legitimacy. The flaws of the response to the terrorist 
challenges are traced to its total dependence on the hard option to the total neglect of the human 
factor from which the thesis develops its argument for a holistic approach to security in which 
the people occupy a central position. Thesis approach is also shown to hold the solutions for 
eliminating the causes of extremism on which terrorism feeds and grows. In sum the study 
deconstructs Musharraf’s regime’s response to terrorism by examining the conceptual mould of 
the strategic players in the country and postulates a holistic and integrated security framework to 
deal with terrorism on a pro-active and sustainable basis. An approach such as this would 
logically entail the redefining of the role of the state vis-à-vis its people as the fulcrum and 
medium of ensuring traditional and non traditional security of the country.  
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INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS, AIMS AND 
STRUCTURE 
―For some time Pakistan has been the main contender for the title of most dangerous 
country on earth,‖ 1 warned The Economist while the Musharraf regime was still in 
power. Pakistan‘s approach to the War on Terror remains enigmatic not only for the US-
led international community but also for the people of Pakistan. On the eve of 9/11 
Pakistan perceived an immediate military threat from the United States if it chose not to 
side with the US in its war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. When General 
Musharraf led Pakistan into the US camp in its war against terror, his decision to side 
with the US-led NATO forces in their attack on Afghanistan was seen as a U-turn of 
Pakistan‘s policy toward Afghanistan. Thereafter, Pakistan became the ―most allied ally‖ 
of the US in its war against terror. But despite public declarations of the strength of US-
Pakistan relationship during General Musharraf‘s rule, there existed deep-rooted 
suspicions on both sides.  
 Within the US there was a sense that Pakistan continued to distinguish between 
―good Taliban‖ and ―bad Taliban‖, and that General Musharraf was running with the hare 
and hunting with the hounds. The peace deals concluded between General Musharraf‘s 
government and tribal militant groups (later to join hands under the banner of Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan) irked the US and was seen as evidence of the policy of duplicity being 
pursued by General Musharraf in relation to the US policy  in Afghanistan and Pakistan‘s 
tribal belt. Pakistan-US differences over strategies and tactics to be employed in fighting 
                                                 
1 The Economist, 5th January, 2008. 
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the war on terror have only grown overtime. After a decade of US war in Afghanistan 
wherein Pakistan continues to function as a formal ally, the mutual suspicion in US-
Pakistan relationship is at an all time high.  
 While the US administration has continued to push Pakistan to ―do more‖, policy 
makers within the US have been openly debating a range of options from direct military 
strikes within Pakistan‘s tribal areas to military and economic sanctions against Pakistan 
to protect what is seen as US interest in the war raging across Afghanistan and within 
Pakistan‘s tribal areas. On the other hand, there has been an entrenched perception within 
Pakistan that despite being an ally of the coalition forces fighting against Al-Qaeda and 
Taliban, Pakistan remains under direct external military threat due to US presence in 
Afghanistan.2 Notwithstanding the worst case scenarios under contemplation in the US 
and Pakistan, Pakistan-US relationship has been tense and tenuous due to differences 
over Pakistan‘s commitment and approach toward fighting terrorism.  
 Within Pakistan over the last decade there has been an intense debate on whether 
the war on terror is Pakistan‘s war or if Pakistan is acting as a mercenary to promote US 
security interests. One school of thought argues that US presence and its war in 
Afghanistan has destabilized Pakistan and has resulted in proliferation of violence and 
terrorism in the country. Cited as evidence are the post 9-11 military operations with 
Pakistan‘s tribal areas, the simultaneous break-down of traditional structures of 
governance within these areas, and the advent and escalation of suicide bombings within 
Pakistan against citizens and security agencies. The adherents of this argument have held 
that the decision to engage Pakistan with the US war on terror has imported and spread 
                                                 
2 According to a poll conducted by Gallup in June 2008, 4 in 10 Pakistanis (40%) thought US military 




terrorism within Pakistan, and terrorism within this region and inside Pakistan will not 
subside until Pakistan disassociates from the US war on terror and US troops leave 
Afghanistan.  
 On the other side is a school of thought that believes that it is Pakistani state 
policies and priorities and essentially indigenous factors that explain the growth of 
terrorism and violence in Pakistan. While Pakistan‘s involvement with the US war on 
terror in Afghanistan might have been a contributory factor, Pakistan‘s problem of 
terrorism will not end with US departure from Afghanistan. The argument is that non-
state infrastructure of violence already existed in Pakistan as a consequence of Pakistan‘s 
traditional national security policy and Pakistan‘s changed foreign policy in response to 
9/11 only pitted part of this infrastructure against the Pakistani state and triggered 
incidents of violence and terror across Pakistan. Thus, even if the US war in Afghanistan 
comes to a halt Pakistan‘s interface with terrorism will not end till such time that the 
state‘s policies and priorities change and non-state actors are no long rationalized as 
strategic assets within Pakistan‘s national security mindset. 
 Notwithstanding which school of thought seems more persuasive, there is general 
agreement that the choices Pakistan has made in response to 9-11 have cost it dearly. 
Pakistan has lost over 35,000 civilians and soldiers to militancy and violence and may 
more have been injured. The economic loss inflicted upon Pakistan due to its 
involvement with the war on terror is estimated to be more than $70 billion. There are 
also intangible costs: greater religious polarization, emergence of militant groups, and 
disintegration of traditional social and political governance structures within the tribal 
areas and mass internal dislocations and creation of refugees due to internal military 
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operations. Coupled with a crumbling system of governance, limited financial and 
material resources, these external and internal security challenges have transformed 
terrorism into an existential crisis for the Pakistani state. 
 Before 9/11, Pakistan did not have a well-defined counter terrorism strategy and 
had scarcely felt the need to develop one. The post-9/11 Musharraf government was 
required, for the first time in the country‘s history, to devise measures to counter the 
evolving menace that was threatening national security, destroying both economic 
development and domestic law and order. While Pakistan had witnessed its fair share of 
internal violence and the 1990‘s saw growth of sectarian and ethnic violence to such 
extent that the state was forced to initiate military-led enforcement actions against 
militants, causes of internal insecurity and external insecurity could be placed in separate 
compartments and it was arguable that the state had succeeded in retaining a firewall 
between them. In the aftermath of 9/11 this firewall collapsed as a consequence of the US 
war on terror, the changing geo-strategic realties of the region and Pakistan‘s own 
response to terrorism.  This research postulates that terrorism is a complex phenomenon 
cannot be dealt with by piecemeal steps and needs a holistic, multi-dimensional and pro-
active/sustainable counter-terrorism policy that may entail redefining the role of the state 
as facilitator of both traditional and non-traditional security concerns of the people of 
Pakistan.  
 This study aims to assess Pakistan‘s response to terrorism under the military-led 
regime headed by General Musharraf from 2001 to 2008 in both a descriptive and an 
analytically. The central question this study aims to answer is, ―How did the Musharraf 
government respond to terrorism in post 9/11 Pakistan, and did its response amount to the 
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continuity of or a change in the country‘s traditional national security policy?‖ Several 
questions stem from this larger inquiry: Why did Pakistan evolve as a national security 
state with religion playing a predominant part its policies? What are the primary aims of 
Pakistan‘s national security doctrine and has the threat of terrorism over the last decade 
changed them? Why did Pakistan ally itself with the US in its war on terror, and is this 
alliance a continuation of Pakistan‘s traditional national security doctrine and interests? 
What security, political, social, economic and cultural reforms were introduced by the 
Musharraf regime as part of his internal security policy and reform agenda? Was there 
congruence between Pakistan‘s external security policy and internal security policy 
contrived to fight the threat of terrorism?  What specific steps did the Musharraf 
government take to ensure citizen security, to combat terrorism within the state, and to 
remodel foreign policy? In efforts to counter terrorism, did the Musharraf government 
create new state policies and bring about institutional reform or did it continue with 
traditional institutions and policies? What is Pakistan‘s traditional national security 
doctrine, how did it evolve during the first 50 years of the country‘s existence and what 
policies and strategies were pursued by the state to give it effect? And finally, did 9/11 
and the emergence of threats to international peace perceived by the international order 
from non-state actors inform and change Pakistan‘s traditional national security doctrine? 
The security referent throughout this study remains the ―state‖ around which the 
successes and failures of various practical measures devised to interpret policy have been 
mapped. 
 An abundance of academic inquiries have already been made into the 
effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies created and enacted during the Musharraf 
6 
 
years. Studies have typically viewed these through two lenses—considering either their 
ramifications on American politics,3 or tracing them to be the direct consequence of 
American politics.4 The Musharraf government‘s counter-terrorism policies have been 
frequently critiqued on various grounds. Within Pakistan, they have come under fire for 
being for being too pro-American.5 Externally, they have long been considered 
duplicitous, with Musharraf accused of playing both sides with the hounds6. Other 
analyses have dismissed the Musharraf government‘s counter-terrorism efforts as being 
knee-jerk reactions.7 Critics have also accused General Musharraf for using the war on 
terror to leverage the longevity and legitimacy of his own coup-induced government, 
following the precedent set by military dictators before him.8 
 While much has been written on the Musharraf regime‘s response to terrorism, a 
majority of the indigenous comment comprises event-based narration of Pakistan‘s 
response to the US war on terror and its consequences within Pakistan. Non-Pakistani 
analysts have largely attempted to determine how Pakistan figures within the US world-
view and whether or not it promotes the US-crafted security goals of the West. Given that 
9/11 is a contemporary event, no scholarly effort has yet been made to study and describe 
                                                 
3See for example, Ashley J. Tellis, ―Pakistan‘s Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised 
Performance,‖ The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 6 (2008) pp: 7-32. 
4 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos, USA: Penguin Group, 2008. 
5 See for example, Charles H. Kennedy, ―Pakistan in 2004: Running Very Fast to Stay in the Same Place,‖ 
Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan-Feb 2005) pp:105-111; Also See; Somini Sengupta, ―Pakistan‘s Leader 
Faces Increasing Political Challenges,‖ The New York Times,3, 18 August, 2006. 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/world/asia/18musharraf.html?pagewanted=all) 
6See for example, Ashley J. Tellis, ―Pakistan‘s Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised 
Performance‖, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 6 (2008) pp: 7-32; Eben Kaplan, ―The ISI and 
Terrorism: Behind the Accusations,‖ Council on Foreign Relations, 19 October, 2007 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11644/.  
7S.K. Saini, ―Storming of Lal Masjid in Pakistan: An Analysis‖, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 
New Delhi. 26 September, 2008. http://http://www.idsa.in/event/lalmasjid_sksaini_260908. 
8See Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism,  New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005; Husain Haqqani, 





Pakistan‘s external and internal security policies, nor its socio-political, economic and 
institutional initiatives over the decade of General Musharraf‘s rule. Certainly, no study 
has yet analysed the first half-century of the country‘s policies to determine whether 9/11 
was an epochal event for Pakistan that changed the state‘s outlook to security in general. 
Thus, despite the abundance of literature and the continuing debate on Pakistan‘s role in 
countering terrorism within and without, a critical gap in the discussion of Pakistan‘s 
post-9/11 response to terrorism exists the absence of an indigenous, holistic vision of 
security from which to rethink policymaking in Pakistan. The present study aims to fill 
this gap by deconstructing and analyzing the actual steps taken by the Musharraf regime 
to combat the evolving menace of terrorism. In doing this, it aims to provide a vantage 
for assessing and planning future policy on countering terrorism. 
 This study draws on the (on-record) interviews of one hundred and twenty four 
personnel involved in policy making during the post 9/11 Musharraf years. These include 
a broad cross section of interviewees, among whom were General Musharraf himself, and 
his close aides (including Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz), security advisers, personal 
friends, politicians (both belonging to Musharraf government and his opposition), key 
ministers, academicians, media analysts, religious clerics, members of the legal fraternity, 
serving and retired bureaucrats, intelligence officials, community and youth activists. 
These interviews allow insight into the linkages and information flow between and within 
policy-making communities during the Musharraf years and they also reveal crucial 
missing links in Pakistan‘s counter-terrorism policies. Consequently, this study adds to 
the existing body of literature on the government policy making process by giving a 
broadened and practical understanding of the subject based on ground realities. 
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 Like any other research work the present study cannot be free from certain 
weaknesses, particularly given its dependence partly on human sources of information 
and the strong likelihood of subjectivity involved in a human source. The circumspection 
of the interviewees and their deliberate ambiguity in view of their being part of the 
Musharraf regime was given due consideration and all along an effort was made to rectify 
this weakness by employing the historiographic lens and using the medium of the primary 
and secondary sources available on the subject. In other words, an effort was made to tap 
all primary sources all individuals who over the decade had a significant role in either 
crafting Pakistan‘s response to 9/11 and the scourge of terrorism or analyzing it and 
corroborate them against information available through secondary sources in order to 
diminish inconsistencies and address the problem of lack of verifiable information that 
can impair the study of contemporary events. As a result the thesis fills in the gaps in the 
published accounts of the Musharraf government on the issue of terrorism. That is, the 
present study not only deconstructs the Musharraf narrative but also evaluates the 
usefulness of employing a holistic framework of security in Pakistan.   
 The key themes that surround the exploration of the central and ancillary research 
questions raised by this research are as follows: 
a. What is the state‘s concept of security? Security and insecurity come from within.  
The state remains an essential player in the realm of security decision-making 
with the focus on the people comprising the state. That is, for a stable, moderate 
and prosperous Pakistan all dimensions of national power military, economic, 
political, and human need to be strengthened equally. This study explores the 
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extent to which the security policies created and enacted under the Musharraf 
regime have placed citizen security concurrent with national security.   
b. Was the immediate response to the post-9/11 attacks a departure from previous 
national security policies or was it a continuation of the state‘s traditional security 
policy? The Musharraf government‘s reaction to 9/11 has been widely accused of 
being a military driven approach based on reactionary or short-term fixes. This 
paper studies whether the state‘s immediate short-term reactionary response 
actually departed from its traditional security policy or whether it was a 
continuation of the same old policy. 
c. To what extent has the changing geo-strategic environment of the state created a 
corresponding change in its national security policies? Given the dramatic ways in 
which 9/11 altered both Pakistan‘s geo-strategic worth in the eyes of its powerful 
ally and the entire landscape of US-Pakistan relations, this study examines 
whether a long-term shift in Pakistan‘s national security policy has, in fact, 
occurred as a consequence. This research elucidates the Musharraf government‘s 
reform efforts since 9/11 including legal, social, political, and Madrassa reforms 
to study their lasting value in contributing to a shift in national policy in general 
and their effects on security in particular.  
d. What was the nature of terrorism in Pakistan that the Musharraf regime aimed to 
confront? Does terrorism pose an existential threat to the state? The study 
explores whether Pakistan can, in fact, survive the nature of terrorism that have 
rocked its streets and cities in the post 9/11 era. Recognizing that terrorism is a 
phenomenon of many dimensions, this paper aims to query the traditional concept 
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of terrorism as defined by the United Nations, i.e. ―criminal acts intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public for unjustifiable 
political purposes, whatever the consideration of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to 
justify them.‖ 9 
 This study does not attempt to redefine the term ―terrorism‖, while appreciating 
that the problem of defining it has been examined extensively.10Jeffrey Simon has 
highlighted at least 212 different definitions of terrorism being used around the world.11 
Others such as Alex P. Scmid, Albert J. Jongman, Laonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahuzar 
and Sivan Hirst-Hoefler have made extensive analyses of existing definitions to craft 
their own.12 And thus a debate rages on whether the terrorism that we witness in the 
contemporary world is an inherently new phenomenon with new characteristics in 
comparison to the old concept of terrorism as used and understood in the last century.13 
Niall Ferguson appreciates the similarities between the ‗old‘ and ‗new‘ terrorism such as 
the political aspects of their religious ideologies, their transnational character and also 
                                                 
9 See for example, H.H.A Cooper, ―Terrorism – The Problem of Defining Revisited‖, American Behavioral 
Scientist, Vol. 44, No. 6 (2001), pp: 881-893; Alex P. Schmid, ―Frameworks for Conceptualizing 
Terrorism‖, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, No. 2, (2004), pp. 197-221; Boaz Ganor, ―Defining 
terrorism: Is One Man‘s Terrorist Another Man‘s Freedom Fighter?‖ Police Practice and Research, Vol. 3, 
No. 2 (2002), pp: 287-304. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p: 29. 
12 Alex P. Schmid & Albert J Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, 
Databases, Theories and Literature, (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1988), pp. 28; and 
Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur & Simon Hirsch-Hoefler, ―The Challenges of Conceptualizing 
Terrorism‖, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 16, No. 4, (2004), p: 786.  
13 See for example, Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini & 
Brian M. Jenkins, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999); Walter Laqueur, 
―Postmodern Terrorism‖, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5, (1996), pp: 24-36; Stephen M. Aubery, The New 
Dimension of International Terrorism, (Zurich: Vdf Hochschulverlag, 2004) 
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compares the Sudanese revolt of the Mahdi against the British Empire in the 1880s with 
Osama bin Laden‘s fight against the US.14 
 While not oblivious to this debate over the definition and characteristics of 
terrorism in the 21st century, its evolution as a predominant threat to state security in the 
international arena and consequent impact on interstate relations, this study does not set 
out to reassess the role of terrorism or argue that the nature of terrorism confronting ought 
to be treated differently because of its unique characteristics. As Pakistan remains the unit 
of analysis for this research, it is not the aim of this thesis to reconsider the fundamental 
tenets of the realism or Westphalian state sovereignty and nation-state system in view of 
the growing preeminence of terrorism in international relations. However, the debate 
surrounding the role and character of such terrorism is duly considered in forming an 
estimate of the evolving geo-strategic realities and how they affect the region surrounding 
Pakistan as well as the impact of global focus on terrorism in pulling down the erstwhile 
divide between domestic terrorism and cross-border terrorism and thus compounding the 
grave threat terrorism constitutes for the Pakistani state and society. 
 This study explores the extent to which terrorists who are active in Pakistan pose 
an existential threat to the state since, as is now widely thought, their aim is to acquire 
control over the organs of the government and establish their rule through religious 
parties and groups who see no hope of coming to power through electoral politics, and 
who nurture this hope on the strength of the precedent of the Taliban rule in Afghanistan 
and the defeat of the Soviet Union a superpower of its day at the hands of the Mujahedin. 
The problem of terrorism in Pakistan is more serious than the terror tactics of some group 
                                                 
14 Niall Furguson, ―Clashing Civilization or Mad Mullahs: The United States between Formal and Informal 
Empire‖, in Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chand (eds.), The Age of Terror: America and the World after 
September 11, (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp: 115-141. 
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trying to attract attention to its cause. Keeping this in view, the study purports to explore 
the gravity of terrorism as a threat to the very viability and cohesiveness of Pakistan in 
future and pose questions for further analysis: Given the reach and depth of extremism, 
does Pakistan not need a comprehensive plan to weed out terrorism to secure and 
safeguard its own future? Would such aim not call for a re-orientation of Pakistan‘s 
national priorities and a move from its present defense-based approach to national 
security to a multidimensional policy focused on the citizens and encompassing all facets 
of national life? Until this is achieved in practice, will terrorists not continue to use 
Pakistan as a base and a sanctuary, and challenge the vulnerable state apparatus that lacks 
sustained features of democratic governance and broad public support? 
 The conceptual framework proposed by this study is based on the critical analysis 
of the existing literature on the subject of security at the international, regional and 
national levels, while staying within the Westphalian system of Weberian states. Thus, 
state remains the unit of analysis and referent object of security, and in starting out to 
understand the behavior of the Pakistani state it is assumed that threats are conceived in 
state-centric military terms and that the independence and territorial integrity of the state, 
as a legally sovereign and equal entity in interstate relations, remains a rational object of 
the national security policy. Further, while remaining cognizant of the ‗failing state‘ 
debate, this study does not rest on the assumption that terrorism in weak states 
fundamentally changes how states think about and deal with the concepts of security and 
insecurity or poses a serious analytical challenge to the theory of realism or the 
Westphalian concept of nation-state sovereignty and security.  
13 
 
 But while relying on realism and the Westphalian model of sovereignty to 
understand and explain how Pakistan continues to conceive national security policy and 
strategies, this study conceives an integrated framework of security with an added 
emphasis on the citizen as the prime consumer and beneficiary of the state‘s national 
security framework  not only to critique Pakistan‘s traditional national security policy but 
also to consider whether reliance on such framework might help bridge the growing gap 
between state security and citizen security and result in conception of a comprehensive 
policy to confront the threat of terrorism. It has been argued that no singular theoretical 
discourse (as discussed in detail in the part comprising literature review) can wholly 
evaluate Musharraf regime‘s response to the issue of terrorism. Hence a systemic 
framework of analysis is proposed charting the west-dominated security discourse at the 
global level since the end of the Cold War, drawing its linkage to the security analysis of 
the developing states, and finally dwelling on the utility of specific works on security in 
order to explain Pakistan‘s present security challenges – primarily, terrorism and the 
state‘s response to it.  
 In this context the following has been examined: whether Musharraf 
government‘s response towards terrorism was in fact ―holistic‖; whether there was any 
substantive change during Musharraf‘s time in the mindset about ‗security‘ perceived in 
terms other than military and external; whether Musharraf regime had the capacity and 
political will to liquidate the terrorist networks; and what were the implications of his 
policy on terrorism at the domestic, regional and international levels. This last aspect is 
given particular attention as General Musharraf‘s decision to align with the United States 
gave a critical twist to Pakistan‘s security policy and cultivated the impression the 
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country‘s earlier policy toward Afghanistan had been altered. More specifically, this 
decision galvanized the gap in perceptions of what constituted national interest in the 
eyes of the state and the extremist elements at home. The sub-state organizations or 
networks that had been nurtured and tolerated by the state for more than three decades as 
low-cost tools of its external security both in Kashmir and Afghanistan emerged as a 
formidable challenge to its very survival. As General Musharraf himself claimed, ―threats 
to state security are more of internal nature than external…extremists need to be 
cleared… the aim is to have a moderate, progressive, and dynamic Pakistan.‖15  
 The research methodology of the present study is a mix of empirical analysis with 
historical, critical, and qualitative research signposts. Applying an open-ended and 
flexible research methodology, the thesis uncovers the complex folds of government 
policymaking and highlights the contextual, personal and institutional role on the security 
front. The thesis is essentially a qualitative analysis of the primary and secondary sources 
relating to the central research question. The research techniques employed in the present 
study followed a multi-track research strategy as follows: 
 Data gathering by conducting interviews across the broad spectrum of 
stakeholders affected and involved (directly or indirectly) in the state‘s 
policymaking, implementation and evaluation process. The interviews varied 
from structured and semi-structured pattern depending upon the respondent‘s 
position and his/her preference of the mode of communication while keeping a 
focus on making the study more meaningful.   
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 Numerous  participatory and interpretive research initiatives undertaken by the 
researcher through field trips, seminars, dialogue, and roundtable discussions with 
panels of intellectuals, media persons, students, civil society organizations, 
researchers, religious scholars and political groups from time to time. The 
inferences obtained from these initiatives helped to understand the complexity of 
the terrorism threat. 
 A flexible approach to the interpretation of evidence was applied to offset the 
limitations of the empirical data, such as limited access to primary (particularly, 
official) sources of information on grounds of ‗confidentiality and secrecy‘. This 
required recourse to a broadened and integrated research methodology in view of 
the complexity of the threat and the response, which helped in yielding multiple 
conclusions from the research query.  
 Critical appreciation of historical and contemporary (primary and secondary) 
sources of information such as government reports, policy statements, laws and 
ordinances promulgated, national, regional and international think tanks briefs, 
assessments, opinion surveys, and documentary evidence, in addition to statistical 
data both from the public and private or semi-public sources that informed the 
methodological framework. 
 The aim of employing this open-ended research methodology was to underscore 
the relative nature of the problem that needs in-depth appreciation of the subject from 
multi-dimensional standpoints. The study is divided into four parts and composed of 
seven chapters that attempt to draw a realistic picture of Pakistan‘s complex interaction 
with terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, to determine whether this interaction amounts to a 
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continuity of or change in Pakistan‘s national security doctrine and finally, to propose a 
framework to critique the response to terrorism and what it says about Pakistan‘s national 
security policy. 
 Part One of the thesis entails the literature review and theoretical framework and 
forms Chapters Two and Three of the thesis. Chapter Two surveys the key empirical and 
historical accounts of Pakistan‘s experience with violence/terrorism, locates the study in 
the biographical history of General Musharraf‘s rule and the main studies of his tenure, 
identifies the historiographical schools and gaps in the existing literature, and shows how 
the present study addresses these gaps. Chapter Three describes why the delineated 
theoretical framework has been construed and used to analyze Pakistan‘s response to 
terrorism in comparison to alternative approaches to addressing the central research 
question. The limitations and the possible shortcomings of the adopted approach are also 
discussed side by side. 
 Chapter four examines the historical background to the problem of terrorism and 
reflects upon the multiple variables and factors that contributed to the origins and growth 
of a militant mindset and infrastructure within Pakistan. The chapter details how state 
policies at the domestic and bilateral level have contributed to the infrastructure of 
violence in the country, what are the bases, strategic outlook, character and behavior of 
multiple variables of violence operating within and beyond the country, while sketching 
the contextual parameters of General Musharraf‘s October 1999 coup and discussing the 
security outlook of Pakistan versus Afghanistan, India and the western world. The 
analyses is based on the thesis proposition that security and insecurity comes from within 
and that security perceived in holistic terms can decisively reshape the fragmented 
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character of the nation in Pakistan and ensure the viability of its statehood. It further 
argues that the cost of non-investment in human capital does sow the seeds of extremism 
and radical behavior.  
 Part Two of the thesis focuses on General Musharraf‘s internationally appreciated 
U-turn on Afghanistan to embrace the role of US ally in the War on Terror (WOT) that 
began with the Operation Enduring Freedom operation against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda 
in November 2001. This section comprises two chapters of the study. Chapter Five 
undertakes the discourse analysis to trace the reasons stated or otherwise to be on the side 
of the US against the Taliban government in Afghanistan. It also examines the nature of 
support that Islamabad extended to the US in this regard and the implications of this 
decision on Pakistan‘s domestic security. This chapter considers how Pakistan‘s internal 
security and external security and foreign policy are entwined and how policies crafted in 
relation to one may lead to a positive or negative outcome that can complicate the 
management of the other. 
 Chapter Six of the thesis looks into the Musharraf regime‘s employment of 
military and coercive means at the domestic level, particularly in Federal Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA), in an attempt to enforce the writ of the government. Statistical data 
in relation to the peace deals struck by the Musharraf Government with militant groups in 
FATA derived from military sources and printed materials informs this chapter to a great 
extent. The gaps and implications of these military operations on the rest of the country 
are also highlighted. The chapter brings forth the role of the state as the prime regulator 
of security policy and the minimum role of the individual citizen as a referent or 
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beneficiary/casualty of security on this plane. The institutional and constitutional 
ambiguities that have led to this state of affairs are also discussed. 
 Part Three of the thesis comprises the critical analysis of the Musharraf regime‘s 
counterterrorism strategy through reforms. Chapter Seven looks into the proposed reform 
measures introduced by the Musharraf regime within the realms of education, law, 
politics, culture, economics, and institutional design. Here, the human security lens is 
employed to assess the achievements and failures of the state. The gap between General 
Musharraf‘s rhetoric of reform and his debilitated policy implementation is documented 
and analyzed.  
 Events and Developments  such as Lal Masjid fiasco, the continuous rise of terror 
related incidents across the country, a shaky economy, the surge in Baluchistan 
insurgency, the institutional differences primarily between the judiciary and the 
executive, the widening distrust between US and Pakistan, have been described and 
analyzed to determine how General Musharraf‘s strategy to cling onto power and sell 
himself as the best option to rein in the growing threat of terrorism within and beyond 
Pakistan influenced Pakistani state‘s policies. This chapter explores whether regimes 
confronted with lack of political legitimacy end up projecting the rulers‘ personal 
interests as vital national interests, and whether in such milieu the state itself becomes a 
source of insecurity to its people.   
 Finally, chapter eight summarizes and synthesizes the main findings of the thesis. 
It highlights the utility of following an integrated and holistic vision of security in 
Pakistan and suggests that the roles of the state and the citizens both ought to be treated 
as critical referents of national security. And it further argues that the state‘s response to 
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terrorism can only be meaningful if it driven by a sustained, proactive, and multi-
dimensional strategic outlook. In short, the thesis describes, explains and analyzes 
Pakistan‘s response to terrorism and the national security doctrine it stems from while 
proposing that an effective counterterrorism policy would not only need to be the product 
of a comprehensive conception of security with primary focus on the citizen, but that a 





LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Pakistan‟s experience with violence and terrorism can be understood by analyzing 
linkages between history, changing domestic and international political environment and 
intervening factors such as religion, and conceptions of national security and terrorism. All these 
factors help understand state behavior in terms of strategic preferences and actions. An attempt 
has been made in this chapter to review the available literature that identifies and analyzes the 
various concepts and components that help understand and analyze the juggernaut of terrorism 
and how it impacts Pakistan, its policies and responses. To undertake an analysis of threats 
clouding the security environs of Pakistan, the key empirical and historical studies of Pakistan‟s 
experience with violence and terrorism have been discussed. And an attempt has been made to 
locate this study in the biographical literature on Musharraf and the main studies on his years in 
power.  
There is abundance of literature published in and over Pakistan‟s response towards 
terrorism in the post 9/11-scenario. This literature largely reflects on events that took place 
during Musharraf regime in the aftermath of 9/11 incidents, followed by the Zardari government 
and developments in his era. Some writers like Zahid Hussain1, Ahmad Rashid2 and others 
preferred to confine their work in the light of post 9/11 developments. Others such as Hussain 
Haqqani3 and Hassan Abbas4 have rooted their analysis in history narrated noteworthy events 
and policies since the independence of Pakistan. Still others have focused on Jihadi 
                                                 
1 Zahid Husain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard, 2007. 
2Ahmed Rashid Descent into Chaos, USA: Penguin Group, 2008. 
3 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005. 
4 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005. 
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organizations, their infrastructure and role they played to polarize Pakistani society, as well as 
the role of religion, the trends amplifying extremist mindsets and the social construct of the State 
contributing to and explaining the incidence of violence and terror5.  Though all these works are 
important and shed light on major developments in Pakistan and in the Pakistani context, they 
lack a holistic framework of analysis that the present study follows.  
The following review covers the broad canvas of concepts, actors and events, and the 
state‟s response to them. 
Farzana Shaikh, in Making Sense of Pakistan (2009), analyzes the origin of Pakistan‟s 
problems and identifies the nation‟s identity crisis as the root of all the ills facing Pakistan.6 She 
identifies that Pakistan is struggling constantly to forge a consensus about the role of Islam in 
Pakistan and what it means to be a Pakistani. She addresses the political, economic and strategic 
implications of Pakistan‟s uncertain national identity. According to her, these uncertainties have 
deepened the country‟s divisions and discouraged plural definitions of the Pakistani. In her 
opinion, the country‟s problematic relationship with Islam has most decisively frustrated its 
quest for a coherent national identity and for stability as a nation state capable of absorbing the 
challenges of its rich and diverse society. According to her, this fundamental confusion and 
uncertainty has hindered the process of integration and progress, kept the masses confused, 
enabled the ruling elite to exploit the religious sentiments of people, and make self-serving 
choices and policies in disregard of the people and their needs and wishes. 
 She explains that the aspired role of Islam in the new country created confusions 
regarding what role it should play. This confusion was further heightened with the demise of 
                                                 
5 See for example Muhammad Amir Rana. Jihad aur Jihadi. Lahore: Mashaal Books. 2003; Amir Mir. A to Z of 
Jihadi Organizations in Pakistan. Lahore: Marshal Books Publisher. 2001; and Syed Saleem Shahzad. Inside Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11. London: Pluto Press. 2011. 
6 Farzana Sheikh , Making Sense of Pakistan. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 
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founding father Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. In addition, these confusions delayed the 
process of constitution making in the country, which further delayed the process of resolving this 
core issue. In the mean time, divisions became more apparent while religious parties pressed for 
Islam to have a greater role in the state‟s affairs, while the secular class wanted religion to be 
part of the national culture, which had nothing to do with state‟s affairs. While it took ten long 
years for the first constitution to be promulgated while the core issue remained unresolved, that 
army merely took three years after its promulgation to openly step in and assume state control. 
This development introduced a cycle of military and civilian governments in Pakistan each 
trying to use Islam for their own objectives. Islam became a slogan in the hands of the power 
elite, whether civilian or military, to be exploited. 
 She narrates the debates regarding the identity issue during different regimes in power 
and highlights the policies adopted by them according to their perceptions over the issue. While 
military‟s position was dominant due to its influence, it forged alliance with the Islamists for its 
own domestic and regional needs and objectives. But this approach proved disastrous as it 
emboldened religious forces. These state policies fomented sectarianism in Pakistan and 
radicalized the society as evident by the fact that Pakistan army is now engaged in a fierce battle 
against the militant forces it helped create. But despite such critical analysis, the author tries to 
find a silver lining in dwelling upon the future of Pakistan due to recent trends and societal 
changes i.e. an emancipated media, a newly galvanized legal fraternity, a vibrant artist 
community and human rights activists who are ready to raise their voices to be more receptive to 
new ways of imagining their country‟s identity. 
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Stephen Philip Cohen, in The Idea of Pakistan (2004), reflects on the dilemmas faced by 
the Pakistan today.7 The book unfolds the conceptual and theoretical debate focusing on the very 
basis of Pakistan‟s creation in 1947 on the name of Islam and knits this idea with the historical 
account of political and socio-economic developments and the role of military and civil 
bureaucracies from 1947-2004. It combines the historical analysis with the empirical data to 
dispel the worst case scenarios conceived about Pakistan‟s future in India and the West. Cohen 
thus puts together a realistic picture of Pakistan, as an indigenous state with its own identity, 
logic and future.  
 The Idea of Pakistan is a panoramic view of an extremely complex country that continues 
to balance its multi-based identities and aspirations with the ever-changing needs of the 
international and regional politics. Cohen‟s analysis is a well-balanced effort to acquaint the 
reader with the extremely complex themes, each of which can (and have) consumed a multiple 
analyses of their own. In this endeavor, Cohen skillfully puts together a fairly complete picture 
of Pakistan‟s past, present and future trends in one go. 
 While travelling through the various facets of Pakistan‟s evolution both as an idea and the 
state development since its inception, Cohen poses and analyses the key questions such as: how 
the Two Nation Theory (that formed the basis of Pakistan‟s creation) was conceived and shaped 
through the events dating back from the early arrival of Muslims in the sub-continent through the 
periods of the Muslim rule and British Raj, and finally the emergence of Pakistan); what are the 
ideological and organizational moorings and imperatives of Pakistan‟s major social and political 
structures; why economic, educational and demographic prospects of Pakistan are far from being 
stable and require sustained and comprehensive efforts on part of government as well as major 
                                                 




powers primarily the United States; and against the backdrop of challenges, capabilities, and 
constraints, what can be the various plausible “futures” for Pakistan? The final chapter closes 
with the policy advice for the United States.  
 Cohen argues that while Pakistan is inundated with problems and challenges it can still be 
redeemed, and advises the US policymakers to stay engaged with Pakistan given its strategic 
position, capabilities and uncertainties. Thus his work is equally relevant for Pakistan‟s 
leadership (political, military, and Islamists), intellectuals and civil-society actors should they 
wish to make the dream and idea of its founding fathers come true. To resurrect the state 
institutions, political, economic, educational and social fabric of an extremely complex and 
multi-dimensional Pakistan, as a moderate Islamic state, at peace with itself and beyond is 
definitely an uphill task, but not an impossible one. 
 In short, The Idea of Pakistan should be read as both an analytical effort and historical 
account meant to sensitize the reader with the challenges and opportunities that needs to be 
tapped for making the ideal or dream of Pakistan come true. In this well-balanced, informative 
and insightful tale about a “dangerously flawed but not failed state”, the delicate linkage between 
the present internal and external dynamics imperatives is well sketched.  
The historical analysis of D.Reetz outlines four major strands of Islamic view and activity 
in British India that together formed the Islamic tradition as part of the political culture of 
Pakistan in its early phase: “Mass agitation such as the Khilafat movement and Hijrat movement 
(1920- 24); institutions of Islamic learning such as at Deoband, Breilly and Lucknow, provided a 
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framework for the Muslim self-statement about classical values and norms of Islam and the 
contemporary response of Muslim societies to Western domination.”8 
In analyzing the role of religion in Pakistan, Mohammad Waseem, observes: Islam in 
Pakistan has represented all four trends represented by street agitation, anti-Western intellectual 
discourse, religious scholarship of madrassas and the potential for a xenophobic tribal rebellion 
in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), respectively.9 Pakistan‟s decision makers‟ world 
view characterized by “an Indo-centric foreign policy, suspicions of the West, and a world of 
Islam perspective” was shared by a whole new generation of mujahedeen graduating from the 
mushrooming madrassas in Pakistan who were to rid Kashmir of Hindu rule.10  
Waseem explains this in the following words: 
The involvement of Islamic militants in the wars in 
Afghanistan and Kashmir contributed to privatization of 
foreign policy and militarization of Islamic activists. The 
international Islamic networks finally provided a global 
agenda for the movement in terms of endemic anti-
Americanism...State policies,  regional instability and non-
resolution of conflicts involving Muslims in the region and 
in the world at large are the leading determinants of the 
nature and direction of Islamic organizations in Pakistan.11   
 
In his interesting work entitled Pakistan: Social and Cultural Transformation in a 
Muslim World, Mohammad Ayub A Qadeer presents an overview of social and cultural 
transformation in Pakistan since independence12. This narrative explains how tradition and 
family life continue to contribute long term stability to the society and examines the areas where 
                                                 
8 D. Reetz, “Muslim Concepts of Local Power and Resistance: Islamic Militants in the Indian Frontier Province 
before Independence” paper presented at the Fourteenth European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies, 
Copenhagen, 21 – 24 August 1996, p: 2. Available at: http://www.zmo.de/dietrich/Reetz%201998.pdf. 
9 M Waseem, Professor of Political Science at LUMS (Lahore University of Management Sciences) Author‟s 
Interview, 4 May 2006, Lahore. 
10 Mohammed Waseem, “Sectarian conflict in Pakistan,” op.cit, pp: 55-59. 
11 Mohammad Waseem, “Origins and Growth Patterns of Islamic Organizations in Pakistan”, op.cit, p: 33. 




very rapid changes are taking place: large population increase, urbanization, economic 
development, and the nature of civil society and the state. It offers an insightful view into 
Pakistan, exploring the wide range of ethnic groups, the countryside, religion and community, 
and popular culture and national identity. Qadeer‟s analysis is most useful for he tracks the role 
of religion as the raison d‟etre of Pakistan‟s creation, the interaction between elites and religion 
during the life of Pakistan, and how modernity, societal influences, power-elites, and the identity 
of actors who emerged as the vanguard of religion and Pakistan‟s ideology influenced the role 
that Islam has come to play in Pakistan. According to him: 
“The Islamic discourse lays claim to its own form of modernity. It locates the origins of 
human rights, social justice and even scientific progress in Islam and the civilization it spawned. 
The conflation of westernization and modernization in Islamic critiques of modernity allows 
Islamists to play on Pakistan nationalism and cultural pride. From the early days, Islamic 
political parties, Ulama (Islamic scholars) and Mullahs have claimed ownership of the ideology. 
Getting the Ahmadis declared as non-Muslims in 1974 laid a legislative path for turning rival 
sects into minorities. By the 1990‟s they had come to form a fearsome group in Pakistan society. 
Splinted into small groups, Islamic militants and Jihadis operated from, different platforms 
outside the political arena.”13 
Mariam Abu Zahab makes a similar point about the politicization of religion analyzing 
sectarianism in Jhang when she contends that, “a conflict which was largely due to socio-
economic factors was given a religious twist by politico-religious Sunni entrepreneurs, and 
encouraged by the Zia regime, to counter Shias‟ new assertiveness.”14 
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The role of Islam in legal system of Pakistan, by Martin Lau is an effort to describe 
interpretation of religion in legal system.15 Starting in 1947, it examines the way Pakistani judges 
have dealt with the controversial issue of Islam in the past 50 years. The book's focus on reported 
case-law offers a new perspective on the Islamization of Pakistan's legal system in which Islam 
emerges as more than just a challenge to Western conceptions of human rights.  
The authors Eamon Murphy & Ahmad Rashid Malik explain the historical linkages of 
Jihad in Pakistan since the 1980‟s. They go back to the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union 
from 1978-88, backed by the United States, and its social, political and economic fallout that 
paved the way for extremism, militancy and terrorism in Pakistan. They further claim that 
authoritarianism and the political and social decay in the 1980s and 1990s played its part in the 
growth of fanatical outfits prone to violence.16  
There is also some literature critical of Pakistan military‟s role as the most powerful state 
institution that continues to play a predominant role in shaping the country‟s policies and 
priorities.  
The book Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy, by Ayesha Siddiqua is a 
distinct effort that analyzes the multipronged institutional interests of Pakistan army and how 
protecting such self-defined interest encourages the armed forces to interfere with and influence 
almost all aspects of national policy17. 
Brian Cloughley book A history of the Pakistan army: Wars and Insurrections is a 
welcome addition to the literature on Pakistan Army.18 The book explains the history of Pakistan 
itself, which illustrates how deeply involved the military has been over the past 50 years in 
                                                 
15 Martin Lau , The role of Islam in legal system of Pakistan, The Netherlands: Koninikljhe BRILL, NV, 2006. 
16 Eamon Murphy & Ahmad Rashid Malik, “Pakistan Jihad:  The Making of Religious Terrorism,” Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute (IPRI), Journal IX, no.2, Summer 2009. 
17 Ayesha Siddiqa. Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, London: Pluto Press, 2007. 
18 Brian Cloughley, A history of the Pakistan army: Wars and Insurrections, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
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matters of State. Cloughley discusses in detail the wars fought by the Pakistan army, the tactics it 
evolved in the process and the result that ensued. He particularly mentions the 1965 and 1971 
wars, delving into the circumstances that led to them, their outcome and the effects that lingered 
in the aftermath. The author elucidates the initial history of the Pakistan Army; however is given 
a broad brush treatment and the British Indian Colonial social and military legacy is totally 
ignored. 
Crossed Swords by Shuja Nawaz is a profound, multi-layered historical analysis of the 
nature and role of the Pakistan army in the country's polity as well as its turbulent relationship 
with the United States. Nawaz examines the army and Pakistan in both peace and war. Using 
many unpublished materials from the archives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the 
General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army, as well as interviews with key military and political 
figures in Pakistan and the United States, he sheds light not only on the Pakistan Army and its 
US connections but also on Pakistan as a key Muslim country in one of the world‟s toughest 
neighborhoods. This groundbreaking work offers unique insights into Pakistan‟s most important 
and powerful institution.19  
In the book Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan,20 taking an explicitly comparative 
theoretical approach, Saeed Shafqat presents a comprehensive exploration of civil-military 
relations in Pakistan. He begins by describing the history of military hegemony in this volatile 
South Asian country and then examines the breakdown of military control, assessing the rise of 
the Pakistan People's Party and the changing configuration of party-military relations. The author 
explains the checkerboard concept of choices and options between democratic or military rule in 
Pakistan. 
                                                 
19 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords, Oxford University Press, 2008. 
20 Saeed Shafqat, Civil Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto, United States of 
America: Western view Press, 1997. 
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The book Military Control on Pakistan, by Mazhar Aziz examines the role of the 
military, the most influential actor in Pakistan, and challenges conventional wisdom on the 
causes of political instability in this geographically important nuclear state. It rejects views that 
ethnic and religious cleavages and perceived economic or political mismanagement by civilian 
governments triggers military intervention in Pakistan.21  The study argues instead that the 
military intervenes to remove civilian governments where the latter are perceived to be 
undermining the military?  The author discussed that the Pakistani military has become a parallel 
state, and given the extent of its influence, will continue to define the nature of governance 
within the polity. Military Control in Pakistan highlights the need to refocus attention on the 
problem of an influential military and its potential to adversely impact democratic norms, 
political representation and civilian-military relations. 
It has been argued that Pakistan military has also played a significant role by imposing 
religious notions in policy and practice. According to Suroosh Irfani, “inevitably, the alliance of 
Zia‟s military dictatorship with the Deobandi stirred up primordial passions and empowered the 
semi-literate mullahs as commissars of the state and distributors of its largesse through zakat 
(wealth tax) funds to the poor.” 22 And that the government‟s decision to provide zakat funds to 
madrassas led to their mushrooming growth and the government accommodated (these madrassa 
students and members of religious political parties) as functionaries of the various government-
funded institutions.23 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Suroosh Irfani, “Pakistan‟s Sectarian Violence: Between the “Arabist Shift” and Indo-Persian Culture”, in Satu P 
Limaye, Robert G. Wirsing, Mohan Malik, edit, Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, op.cit, pp: 147 – 
169. 
23 Suroosh Irfani, op.cit, pp: 155-161. 
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The book by Hassan Askari Rizvi, Military State and Society in Pakistan24 offers a 
comprehensive study of the dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan. It asks how and why 
the Pakistan military has acquired such a salience in the polity and how it continues to influence 
decision-making on foreign and security policies and key domestic political, social and economic 
issues. It also examines the changes within the military, the impact of these changes on its 
disposition towards the state and society, and the implications for peace and security in 
nuclearized South Asia.  
The book Contemporary Pakistan25 by Veena Kukreja, an Indian author gives a distant 
observer view on Pakistan political discourse and its impact on state behavior. This book broadly 
discusses the political processes in contemporary Pakistan with the aim to understand the crises 
the country is confronted with. The author provides insights into Pakistan's traumatic political 
history - one that exemplifies a long-drawn battle between authoritarianism and constitutionalism 
and an enduring ideological conflict between Islamic nationalism, regionalism and elite 
pluralism. 
Muhammad Amir Rana, in The Seeds of Terrorism (2005), narrates the events from the 
Afghan jihad started in 1979 upon Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which caused the alliance 
between the CIA and ISI to defeat Communism26. This alliance needed irregular forces to fight 
against Soviet forces and, therefore, US and Saudi-funded jihad infrastructure was created in 
Pakistan. According to him, the success against the Soviet forces provided new agenda to the 
militants to free Muslims from their perceived American, Israeli and Indian oppressors. He 
highlights the Pakistan‟s Taliban policy and argues that the Taliban were created by the ISI and 
that the CIA was equally involved in this affair. He also covers important developments in 
                                                 
24 Hasan Askari Rizvi, Military State and Society in Pakistan, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 
25 Veena Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan, India : Sage Publications, 2003 
26 Muhammad Amir Rana, The Seeds of Terrorism, London: New Millennium, 2005 
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Pakistan and Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. The focus of his work is on various 
militant organizations operating in Pakistan. He highlights the jihadist infrastructure in Pakistan, 
its links to Pakistan‟s ISI, and religious political parties and transnational links with the Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda. 
 According to him, post 9/11 policy of General Musharraf was a transformation from pre 
9/11 policies of tolerating militant groups. In his views, this policy shift was perceived as 
occurring under international pressure which caused resentment among the religious political 
parties and militants towards the state of Pakistan.  
In terms of analyzing the roots of terrorism in Pakistan, Vali Raza Nasr (a leading expert 
on the sectarian groups of Pakistan) elucidates causes and happenings between sectarian groups. 
He claims that for groups such as Sipah-e-Sihaba Pakistan (SSP), murdering Shias was pure 
Jihad and overtime it forged ties with the drug traders and local criminals to do the “needful”. 
This reproduced relationships between the militant groups and drug traffickers that had already 
evolved in Afghanistan.27 
Hussain Haqqani, in Pakistan between Mosque and Military (2005), provides an 
overview of important events taking place in Pakistan since independence28. The subject of his 
work is the alliance between Islamists and the military in Pakistan and he identifies these two 
important institutions empowered to shape the events in Pakistan throughout its history. Haqqani 
highlights the traditional concept of national security of Pakistan military which led to the certain 
choices, including the use of religion as a sole source of cohesion in a multiethnic society like 
Pakistan, which empowered the religious parties and role of clergy in the society. According to 
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him, “emphasis on Islamic unity was seen as barrier against the political tide of ethnic 
nationalism.”29  
 While over viewing the history of Mosque-Military alliance since independence, Haqqani 
identifies the exploitation of religious sentiments of people by the Pakistani leaders as an 
instrument of strengthening Pakistan‟s identity. Similarly, according to him, “Islam, hostility to 
India and Urdu language were identified as the cornerstone of the new national identity.”30 
Emphasis on Islam empowered Islamists on the one hand and created nexus among them and 
military establishment, civilian bureaucracy and intelligence apparatus on the other hand. 
Hostility to India led to maintain large army, which in turn resulted in a strong and dominant 
military in the country.  He also claims that, “Islamist groups have been sponsored by the state 
machinery at different times to influence domestic politics and to support the military‟s political 
dominance.”31 He further analyzes how those policies adopted by the different regimes, at 
different times led the country into chaos while concluding that the main cause of the problem in 
Pakistan is the alliance between the Mullah and the military.  
Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, by Hassan Abbas (2005), provides insightful 
information about the important events that took place in Pakistan throughout its history. The 
author thoroughly analyzes the formation of Pakistan in the early years of independence. He 
discusses the anti-communist bias of Pakistani leadership, and the country‟s security and 
economic needs as important factors for Pakistan‟s alignment with the US. This convergence of 
interest between US and Pakistan meant that the “army became the major recipient of US 
financial aid.”32 Similarly, he counts the failure of Pakistani politicians and Kashmir conflict as 
                                                 
29 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005, p: 15. 
30 Ibid, p:15 
31 Ibid, p: 3. 
32 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism” New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005, p: 9. 
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two important factors for the army to assert its influence in the country. According to him, “as 
the army grew in strength, it frequently took over the task of governance…and weakened all the 
other institutions including judiciary and political parties.”33 He also highlights the factors which 
contributed to the strength of religious parties and their collaboration with military establishment 
in Pakistan.  
 In the context of extremism, his examination of how religious extremism emerged in 
Pakistan, how it took the militant form, and for what purposes were they sponsored by local, 
regional and an international patron is enlightening. He, like other writers on Pakistan, 
acknowledges the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as a watershed development for 
Pakistan. According to him, Pakistan‟s policy of that time led to the emergence of jihadist groups 
and strengthening of ties between Jihadi groups and the country‟s intelligence agencies and 
radicalization of state institutions and society. Similarly, religious extremism flourished in the 
era of 1980s.  
  Abbas gives the details of the developments associated with Pakistan that took place 
with the events of 9/11, how Musharraf‟s decision to join US WOT fomented anti-US and anti-
Musharraf demonstrations across the country and how military operations against Al-Qaeda 
operators in Waziristan initiated a terror campaign against Pakistan military itself. With 
reference to success or failure of Musharraf, Abbas contends that, “Musharraf slid rapidly into 
the mold of his military predecessors who had stepped in to save their country.”34 He notes that, 
“Musharraf failed to establish a mechanism to monitor the progress of implementation of his 
directives, so that all he decrees…[were] bereft of benefits that ought to follow.”35 
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Zahid Hussain, in Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (2007), analyzes 
the difficult situation emerged for Pakistan, right after the 9/11 attacks. He explains how the 
incidents that took place in New York and Washington directed tremendous pressure towards 
Pakistan and how the difficult decisions that were reached by the then president of Pakistan, 
General Pervez Musharraf. According to Hussain, “the dramatic turn of events in the aftermath 
of 9/11 pushed Pakistan into a new spotlight. From being an international outcast for its 
longstanding support of the Taliban and militant cross-border insurgents in Kashmir, Pakistan 
became the key strategic partner of America‟s WOT.”36 Pakistan became indispensible for 
America‟s War on Terror and Pakistan‟s policy shift from supporting Taliban and militant 
organizations to abandonment of them under US pressure caused intense domestic pressure and 
severe backlash from militant and extremist forces. 
 While discussing the factors that added to the strengthening of the ISI as an intelligence 
organization, Hussain highlights the ties between militant jihadist organizations and country‟s 
intelligence agencies. Similarly, he talks about the role of madrasas in the generation of 
extremism in the country and throws light on the origin of sectarian conflict in Pakistan. While 
discussing the longstanding issue of Kashmir in the post 9/11 period, he gives details of 
American pressure on Pakistan to sever ties with militant groups operating in Kashmir and 
initiate a peace process with India, which Pakistan eventually did. Hussain reports that many 
Islamist leaders described the peace process as the beginning of the end of Kashmir jihad37 and 
perceived the shift in policy as a betrayal to Kashmir cause.  
 Hussain analyzes how Taliban and Al-Qaeda fugitives crossed border and escaped 
American attacks in Afghanistan, explained Pakistan‟s limitations to stop that movement due to 
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absence of any framework to administer the remote tribal regions. Hussain contends that 
fugitives from Afghanistan found safe heavens in tribal areas which led to the American 
reconnaissance operations in adjacent tribal areas to Afghanistan. Things became worse in the 
following years and as these fugitives and local militants caused havoc in the tribal region, 
finally in 2004, Musharraf, under US pressure, ordered the biggest offensive against Al-Qaeda 
fugitives in Waziristan. And by doing this he moved a step further “to a full-scale military 
conflict.”38 According to Zahid Hussain, Musharraf‟s government failed to deliver on pledges to 
contain the growth of jihadist network and “religious extremism in Pakistan continued to pose a 
threat to domestic, regional and international security.”39 
Ahmed Rashid, in Descent into Chaos (2008), criticizes the American policies towards 
South and Central Asia.40 According to the author, these policies caused the rise of extremism in 
both the regions. His analysis highlights that sponsorship of authoritarian and ostracized regimes 
in the regions by United States has estranged the liberal segment of society and as a consequence 
militants got more room to operate. At the same time, he criticizes Pakistan‟s Afghan policy, 
which according to him caused establishment of unholy alliance between the state, religion and 
non-state actors which exploit religion for their cause. 
 Owen Bennett Jones, in Pakistan: The Eye of the Storm (2002), highlights the nature of 
problems Pakistan is facing and provides firsthand knowledge of many events that took place 
during the period of 1998 to 2000.41He begins with Musharraf‟s challenges and subsequently, 
throws light on various issues confronted by Pakistan. He highlights the history of Kashmir 
dispute, problems of sub-nationalism in ethnically diverse Pakistan, covers the crisis of East 
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Pakistan, the three wars with India, the nuclear tests in 1998, the fragile democracy, the role of 
the army in the state and its policy making, and its changing role from supporting the Taliban to 
chasing them out. He also presents the drastic division in the perceptions of the modernist and 
fundamentalists in Pakistan as two conflicting worldviews. 
 Jones narrates the events of 9/11 and the US approach to Pakistan for its assistance 
against Taliban regime, followed by Pakistan‟s acceptance of US demands. In the first chapter he 
highlights the challenges faced by Musharraf in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks. According to him, 
Musharraf‟s decision to join America‟s WOT was well calculated. While he was aware that his 
decision to join the US war would provoke a furious reaction from religious circles, he was also 
aware that throughout Pakistan‟s history no religious leader had been able to lead a mass-based 
Islamic revolutionary movement into reality. 
 Jones observes that being a modernist, Musharraf tried to modernize Pakistan. He 
confronted religious extremism but he feared that “Pakistan state institutions could not survive a 
confrontation with the militant elements of Pakistani society.”42 He tried to reform the 
Blasphemy Law in early 2000 but backed down upon the opposition of religious parties. He tried 
to sensitize the religious clerics about the Pakistani image due to militancy and subsequently, 
made an effort to control sectarian violence in the country by banning various sectarian outfits 
even prior to 9/11. Post 9/11, according to Jones, Musharraf found himself in a better position to 
impose his agenda to modernize Pakistan and strike against radicals, but that Kashmir remained 
an obstacle in the way. In face of tremendous Indian pressure over the Indian parliament attack 
in December 2001, Musharraf banned two Pakistan based militant groups operating in Kashmir, 
and announced that, “from now on, no organization will be able to carry out terrorism on the 
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pretext of Kashmir.”43  By analyzing Musharraf policies till 2002, Jones observes that, “despite 
all his bold pronouncements, [Musharraf] failed to convince many that he will prove any more 
capable than his military predecessors of leading the country to a higher level.”44 
Benazir Bhutto, Reconciliation offers a counter narrative to the „Radical Islam‟45 
discourse. That is, dialogue at all level between Muslim and the Western world is a way forward 
for lasting peace. Reflecting on Musharraf-ruled Pakistan, Bhutto stresses that, “extremism 
thrives under dictatorship and is fueled by poverty, ignorance, and hopelessness.” Consequently 
Benazir Bhutto stressed that, “Only a democratic Pakistan can eradicate the forces of extremism, 
militancy and terrorism.”46 Commenting on the International community support to the 
Musharraf „guided democracy‟ in the post 9/11 phase, Bhutto chides that, “depending on military 
regime backed by hardliners is like banking on an arsonist to put out the fire.”47  
The book by Pervaiz Musharraf in his memoir, In the Line of Fire (2006), gives details of 
his personal and professional life. This book is an important source of information because it was 
written by the then sitting president of Pakistan, who accepted the role of front line state for his 
country in the War against Terrorism. Musharraf highlights the circumstances in which he took 
over. He presents himself as an ambitious leader who wanted to put things right for Pakistan. He 
draws attention to the domestic problems Pakistan was facing at the time he took over and 
stressed his seven point agenda to solve those problems. According to him, “the events of 9/11 
and its aftermath came to distract us from these issues. I was forced to pursue security ahead of 
restructuring.”48 He also highlights the political challenges Pakistan faced during the East 
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Pakistan crisis. He contends that “a brief political history of Pakistan shows how we have failed 
to create a true democracy.”49 He rightly identifies that “our main political parties have in reality 
been no more than family cults.”50  
 He addresses the “War on Terror” and documents his firsthand experiences related to 
War on Terror. He narrates the subsequent developments in Pakistan, in the aftermath of 9/11 
attacks, and acknowledges the significant American pressure to collaborate with US and abandon 
Taliban. But he is of the view that his decision was well calculated and was in the best interest of 
Pakistan. He states that the “US was not the only casualty of 9/11, the attacks hit Pakistan 
differently, but with equally savage force.”51 He gives details of militant‟s response to Pakistan‟s 
altered Afghan policy, and the consequent initiation of a terrorist campaign against Pakistan in 
2002. 
 He examines the geographic landscape of Pakistan‟s tribal areas, Pakistan‟s geopolitical 
compulsions in terms of its proximity to Afghanistan, and its role in the WOT. He also gives 
details of early military operations in tribal areas, the hardships Pakistan army faced there and to 
overcome those hardships, the subsequent collaboration of US and Pakistan forces in the area. 
 He stresses more than once that, “despite our best efforts, we were not given timely 
access to modern technology for intelligence gathering, surveillance, and target acquisition. Our 
army operations remain dependent on technical intelligence provided through US resources.”52 
He also counters the accusation that Pakistan is not doing enough in the WOT by giving details 
of Pakistan‟s efforts in the WOT and sacrifices made by its people and forces, thus rejecting such 
notion. Lawrence Ziring, in Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History (2003), provides an excellent 
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account on the history of Pakistan from its origin to War on Terror. He discusses the events and 
developments in pre-independence India that led to the emergence of Pakistan movement and 
origin of the idea of Pakistan. According to him, “Pakistan was an idea, or, more accurately, an 
experience,” while the Muslim League as a parent party and contender of this idea “failed to 
outline the structure or character of the new entity.”53 Thus, this lack of future plan for the new 
country coupled with other contributory factors led to the confusion and true parliamentary 
system could not be accomplished. He finds that Pakistan has been in search of political stability 
since the beginning and, due to ongoing political instability, the “army assumed the primary 
responsibility for country‟s preservation.”54 He also discusses the causes which culminated in the 
alliance between civil and military bureaucracy and finally derailed the constitutional roadmap 
for the state.  
While providing an insightful overview of the history of Pakistan and analyzing the 
policies of different regimes in power he contends that, “democracy is nothing more than a sham 
in Pakistan.”55 Upon Musharraf‟s military coup he states that, “since independence … Pakistan 
was still in search of a political framework to contain its errant society.”56 He analyzes the 
reforms of Musharraf‟s regime in various sectors in order to counter terrorism and to transform 
the society from extremism to modernity. With reference to the War on Terror and Pakistan‟s 
role in it, he highlights the domestic challenges to Musharraf‟s regime and geo-political 
compulsions for Pakistan. 
After giving a detail account of Pakistan‟s history, its search for identity and for genuine 
political system to deliver Ziring argues that, “politicians, bureaucrats, and soldiers all failed to 
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deliver on their promises.57 He finds a lack of national unity in the country and is also of the 
view that national identity remained elusive for Pakistan at the beginning of the new millennium. 
Thus, according to him, Pakistan still finds itself at the crossroads of history, not sure which way 
to choose while keeping in views the historic challenges and failures. 
Gaps in existing literature on National Security, Terrorism and Pakistan:  
Despite the scholarly literature that largely aims to delineate the differences and 
similarities between terrorism and organized crime, there are few empirical studies available on 
the subject. The foremost gap in the existing literature is that while different studies identify and 
analyze the individual components that contribute to the infrastructure of violence and how the 
Pakistani state conceptualizes and responds to such components, there isn‟t a single study that 
explains how a week state, a military-dominated state-centric national security doctrine, the role 
of religion in radicalizing and polarizing the society, and international and regional security 
challenges confronting a distraught, largely poor, uneducated and economically ravaged polity 
create a toxic mix that further weakens the ability of the state to protect itself and its people, and 
in turn comes to be perceived as  a source of international insecurity. This study thus attempts to 
identify the various state, societal, regional and international factors and influences that 
contribute to the problem of violence and terror in Pakistan and weaves together the story of how 
Pakistan responds to it and why. The second obvious limitation of the existing literature on 
terrorism in the post-9/11 phase of world history and Pakistan‟s response to it is that given the 
contemporary nature of the events being analyzed, the existing narratives are descriptive and 
journalistic as opposed to being analytical and scholarly. While the various treatises, 
monographs, journal articles and public debates document the evolution of Pakistan‟s national 
security doctrine from a historical perspective on the one hand and analyze Musharraf regime‟s 
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response to 9/11 and the US war on terror on the other, they do so in a piecemeal fashion. The 
scholarly studies are limited to an analysis of Pakistan‟s traditional national security doctrine, 
how it evolved and why. And the post-9/11 literature is focused on what was Musharraf‟s 
response to 9/11 and how it amounted to a sudden U-turn on Pakistan‟s Afghan policy. There is 
not a single study that identifies that identifies the contours of Pakistan‟s traditional national 
security doctrine and its foreign policy components, and then locates Pakistan‟s response to 9/11 
under Musharraf within this framework to determine whether such response was geared to 
realize the key goals of Pakistan‟s traditional national security doctrine or if it marked a 
fundamental change in Pakistan‟s perception of its national security and the threats to it. And in 
this sense, this study compares Pakistan‟s national security doctrine as evolved and implemented 
during the first five decades of its existence with the manner in which it has been perceived and 
defended over the last crucial decade. And this is how the present study addresses questions 
about how terrorism and Pakistan‟s response to it fits within the country‟s security paradigm, 
that have not been raised or answered before in a scholarly study.    
 1. In most of the works on Pakistan‟s response towards terrorism the Human security 
lens is used to explain the factors such as poverty, unemployment, poor governance that provide 
basis for young minds turning to political violence within and beyond. The indirect linkage 
between terrorism and human security is often recognized but the need to revisit the very concept 
of security at the policymaking level is ignored.   
 2. The key question of how people as a parallel referent of security have not been 
deliberated upon. The historical (both of western and non western) accounts trace how state used 
people as “low cost” tool in furthering its national security objectives beyond its frontiers. The 
impact analysis of such privatization of security on the domestic plane is not undertaken in most 
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of the western and non-western accounts on Pakistan. The present study attempts to highlight 
how militants and non-state actors deemed agents of national security became a threat to the 
social cohesiveness of the society itself. This study fills in this vacuum by discussing the 
evolution and structures of major militant groups and tracing the links between the domestic and 
























This chapter discusses the theoretical framework of the study, using analytical concepts 
developed by Western scholars in combination with indigenous thinking to deconstruct 
Pakistan‟s response to terrorism. The fractured and fragmented nature of global, regional and 
national security discourse focusing on traditional and non-traditional issues offers multiple 
lenses to explain Islamabad‟s response to terrorism. The unresolved debate on security – in terms 
of its object, referent and means – provides an opportunity to understand Pakistan‟s security 
predicament as a weak and developing state and Musharraf‟s counterterrorism policy after 9/11. 
 In order to construe a framework that enables us to understand Pakistan‟s response to 
terrorism while also endowing us with the tools to critique it, an effort has been made here to 
first review relevant theoretical literature to highlight the various theses that can be utilized to 
approach the subject matter of this study in Part one of this chapter. This is followed by Part two, 
which identifies the specific theoretical models that are explained, assessed and proposed to be 
synthesized in order to develop a framework of analysis to understand and critique Pakistan‟s 
response to terrorism.  
Part One: The Wider Debate around the Concept of “Security” 
The theoretical and conceptual discourse on the key question as to what security means 
and implies and how it figures in international politics continues to grow. Notionally, it remains 
a contested concept between the perspectives of traditionalists and non-traditionalists1 or 
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positivists and post-positivists.2 “Positivist Perspectives, realism/neo-realism, peace studies, 
policy-oriented studies and some forms of feminism are empirically based and specify the 
referent of security in the analysis. In contrast, Post-Positivist Perspectives represent post-
positivist feminism, post-modernism, critical theory and constructivism and emphasize 
methodology over the empirical identification of the specific referent to be secured.”3 
 The theoretical approaches as to definitions and analysis at the micro and macro levels 
are multiple. The diversity of perspectives in fact fragments and broadens the parameters of 
academic enquiry focusing on what is security, what is to be secured against whom, and through 
what means? Interestingly, the competing narratives do not dispute the validity of security as a 
concept, but question the specifications and referents of security. Hence, there is need to look 
more deeply into the fundamental question of the security referent in the diverse approaches and 
find a composite responsive answer. In the words of Arnold Wolfers, “Security is the absence of 
threats to the acquired values.”4 The security referent can be categorized according to its target, 
whether it is against the state, the individual, the society or the environment. 
 Similarly, the context of analysis or the structure of focus can vary from national, local, 
and regional to international.  The means to achieve security can be from coercive measures like 
use of force or war to use of conciliatory strategies like negotiation and cooption etc., that 
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Traditionalist / Positivist Perspective on Security 
Traditionalists or positivist perspectives are state-centric in assumptions about security and world 
politics. Security is perceived solely in military terms and ensuring territorial integrity, 
sovereignty and independence from external threats remains a prime driver of national security. 
 In the words of Steven E. Miller,  
The end of the Cold War meant the close of an era 
in the world and in the field, but the new era with its 
ongoing blight of political violence...War and 
violence remain with us. The intentional use of 
organized force for political ends remains a 
common phenomenon, one with large political, 
social, human, and economic costs and 
consequences.5  
 
 The dominant perspective on security, Realism/Neo-Realism is “the one that can [be] 
said to hold the high ground, focuses on state as the unit to be secured and on issues relating to 
the threat, use and management of force and coercion in world politics. The other perspectives 
either expand on or directly challenge this traditional understanding of security.”6 It is critical to 
note that there is no single “theory of realism” and realism per se cannot be tested, confirmed, or 
refuted.7 Realism is a research program that contains a core set of assumptions from which a 
variety of theories and explanations can be developed.8 The key assumptions are: the 
international system is anarchic and there is no central authority to control state behavior; states 
are central actors on the world stage; although states are rational, there will always be room for 
miscalculation; uncertainty, leading to lack of trust inherent in the international system, and, as a 
result, development of offensive military capabilities, where survival becomes a basic force 
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driving the state‟s behavior.9 In short, statism, survival and self-help define the international 
security landscape. 
 Several variants of the traditional approach have emerged over the past decade or so 
namely, the theories of hegemonic competition. The first is balance-of-power theory developed 
most explicitly by Kenneth Waltz10 and second is the balance-of-threat theory developed by 
Stephen Walt;11 the “clash of civilization” thesis by Samuel Huntington;12 the “Democratic 
Peace” theory associated with the writings of Michael Doyle13and Bruce Russett;14 the “complex 
interdependence” argument by Keohane and Nye;15 and the “Collective Security” approach led 
by Charles and Clifford Kupchan.16 
 Kenneth Waltz argues that “states seek to balance power, and thus the preponderance of 
power in the hands of a single state (i.e. the United States) will stimulate the rise of new great 
powers, and possibly coalition of powers, determined to balance the dominant state.”17 Another 
analyst, Christopher Layne, writes: “In Uni-polar systems, states do indeed balance against the 
hegemon‟s unchecked power.”18 Carrying this theme forward with some variance, Stephen Walt 
suggests that “Power and threat overlap, but are not identical... Geographic proximity, offensive 
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capability, and aggressive intentions are also relevant considerations... States that are viewed as 
aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against them.”19 
 Michael Mastanduno, analyzing both the balance-of-power and balance-of-threat theories 
of Waltz and Walt respectively against the US security policy behavior in the post-Cold war 
phase concludes that, “evidence neither fully supports nor fully refutes either one... Eventually 
power will check power... Balance-of-threat theory reminds us to appreciate the classical realist 
insight that statecraft matters.”20 Taken together, traditionalists or positivist perspectives are 
state-centric in assumptions about security and world politics. In Mearsheimer‟s words, “security 
competition among states always continues with war, like rain, always a possibility... 
Cooperation can and does occur between states but has its limits.”21 
 At this juncture, the two main divisions within the discourse of Positivist security, termed 
as bounded state-centric and unbounded state-centric22 based on what the state as security 
referent is to be protected from are critical to note. Bounded state-centric perspectives (that is, 
Realists/Neo-Realist, Neo-Liberalism/Neo-Institutionalism – the early variants of peace studies) 
define security in terms of the state and threat in military terms of another state. That is, it is 
external aggression or its threat that the state needs to counter. However, Neo-Liberals within 
this group believe in the capacity of institutions to moderate the anarchic character of 
international politics. 
 In contrast, unbounded state-centric approaches, led by Barry Buzan and others, see the 
state as the central referent of security to be protected, but expand on the nature of threats other 
than military to be guarded against. Buzan bases security of a state on military, political, 
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economic, social and environmental factors. Threats to state security may arise from interaction 
between the various dimensions of security, that is, military as well as non military. The threats 
to state security cannot always be externally generated; they may be the product of its internal 
dimensions.  With regard to the generation of threats and the locus of violence, unbounded state-
centric perspectives ranging from environmental, economic, migratory to transnational criminal 
agree that security challenges can arise at both domestic and international levels at the same 
time. Likewise, along with the state, the security referent can be individual, societal and 
environmental as well, and the state‟s security is affected by these parameters too. In sum, the 
security of the state can be at stake if its individuals, groups, or environment becomes a threat to 
its very survival. Thus, the security referent requires focusing on the internal as well as the 
external dynamics of the state in world politics. In other words, the Positivist view of the security 
debate is broadened in its analytical scope and policy discussion. 
  Samuel Huntington in his “Clash of Civilization” thesis predicts international politics 
dominated by conflicts of power between the contending civilizations will be more acute than 
between states. Huntington argues that future conflicts and schisms will have a cultural 
orientation and be less state-centric in nature. Ethno-nationalists and civilizations, he argues, 
“can be just as ruthless in pursuing their survival as sovereign states, even if their physical 
boundaries are less precise.”23 Another “liberal” approach to international security, the 
Democratic Peace Theory, developed by Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett emerged in the 
1980s. The key argument was that democracy would lead to greater international security and 
war between democracies was less likely. This argument continues to generate debate among 
scholars. Steve Chan in his work assembled data from 1816 to 1980 to demonstrate that 
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democracies have been associated with more, not less, interstate conflicts.24 Similarly, Zeev 
Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, in a work that analyzes linkage between regime form and 
international security from 1816 to 1976, conclude: “Even though democratic states have never 
gone to war with one another, they are neither more nor less prone to conflict than 
nondemocratic states.”25 In contrast to the above arguments, John Baylis observes: 
Democratic Peace Theory is based on a Kantian 
logic - emphasizing three elements republican 
democratic representation; an ideological 
commitment to human rights; and transnational 
interdependence... Supporters of democratic peace 
ideas do not reject the insights of realism, but they 
reject realism‟s preoccupation with the idea of war 
of all against all. They argue that internal norms and 
institutions matter.26 
  
 Parallel to this, proponents of Interdependence and Collective Thought argue that states 
are becoming more inter-connected with one another through the forces of globalization add to 
the greater prospects of stability and security in an anarchical world. Joseph Nye and Robert 
Keohane argue that through complex interdependence, traditional maxims of self-help and 
relative gains as the basis of state behavior can be managed.27 Collective security theorists add 
“ideas” as another key element in the international security calculus along with power and real 
politics. They contend that, at present, states have the capabilities to broaden their national 
interests and aim for collective good of the international community, creating a more benign 
international system. 
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 Non-Traditionalist proponents of the “globalist society” school of thought argue that the 
traditional focus on national security (and sovereignty) no longer reflect the radical changes 
which are taking place. What is required, according to this argument, is a new politics of global 
responsibility, designed to address issues of global inequality, poverty, and environmental stress, 
as well as human rights, minority rights, democracy, and individual and group security which cut 
across the dominant interests on the world scale as well as within just every state.28 In the words 
of John Baylis: “The result of this fracture of statehood has been a movement away from 
conflicts between the great powers to new forms of insecurity caused by nationalistic, ethnic, and 
religious rivalries within states, and across boundaries.”29 Thus, the more the international 
security perspective gets complicated, the hazier becomes the traditional lens of locating the 
security referent.  
Non-Traditionalist / Post-Positivist Perspective on Security 
 Post-Positivist or Non-Traditional Approaches, that include perspectives ranging from 
post-modernists, and critical theories, refrain from choosing a single referent of security (that is, 
the state) at the expense of ignoring other referents such as the individual, the society, and 
environment. Instead, the post-positivists argue that knowledge of the world is a social 
construction and all referents are equally important to this process. The state is conceptualized as 
part of society and its institutions are woven into an ever-changing societal fabric. The Post-
positivists maintain that the positivist emphasis on objective reality “obscures social and power 
relationships that form structures of inclusion and exclusion… and privileging of the state has 
obscured such structures.”30 Instead, the post-positivist writers focus on the hidden or silent 
structures that configure multiple levels of analysis.  Thus, in some of the approaches, the level 
                                                 
28 John Baylis, op.cit.pp:211-214. 
29Ibid. 
30Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James, Patrick M. Morgan, Security Studies Today, ibid, pp: 182-184. 
51 
 
of analysis or object of security is the individual as in domestic analysis and their interaction 
with other levels results in structures that need to be explored. 
 The last few decades have seen the emergence of writings grouped under Post-Modernist 
views on international security that question the ability of Realism to explain security as an 
objective truth and term it as a dangerous discourse, which is the main obstacle in establishing a 
new and more peaceful hegemonic discourse.31 Post-modernists32 have argued that there can be 
no single interpretation of global reality. Knowledge is subjective in nature. Ideas and discourse 
as put forth by experts and academics can transform language and discourse about international 
politics. This argument aims at replacing the debate of realism with a “communitarian discourse 
which emphasizes peace and harmony.”33 By focusing on the key role of individuals that are 
termed “epistemic communities,”34 the nature of international politics can be altered and non-
military security issues long ignored by traditionalists can be addressed effectively. Peter Haas 
defines the epistemic community as:  
A network of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain 
and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue area. 
Although an epistemic community may consist of 
professionals from a variety of disciplines and 
backgrounds, they have a shared set of normative 
and principled beliefs…shared causal 
beliefs…shared notions of validity…and a common 
policy enterprise.35  
 
                                                 
31John Baylis, op.cit.pp:215-218. 
32 Ibid.  
33Ibid. 
34 Note: Peter Haas reintroduced the concept of „epistemic community‟ in early nineties that was previously 
introduced by authors such as Holzner (1968), Foucault (1970) and Ruggie (1972). You need to provide the 
complete citations for these works. 
35 M Haas, P, “Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination”, International 
Organization, Vol: 46, No.1, 1992, pp:1-35.  
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 Haas maintains that in a crisis situation or new policy arena where uncertainty is high, 
policymakers frequently seek information and advice from other sources.36 Thus to understand 
policy decisions one has to look into the complex web of relationships between an epistemic 
community and the policy makers at the multiple levels of policy thinking, crafting and 
implementing. Colin Hay37 observes “postmodernism‟s principal contribution is to challenge the 
stated and, above all, unstated assumptions of conventional international relations theory (realist, 
idealist or constructivist).”38 Calling all knowledge claims as partial and power-serving, 
postmodernists39 stress the usefulness of discourse analysis, deconstruction and celebration of 
diversity and plurality as key to understanding an ever-changing world.   
Realists counter the post-modernists views on knowledge as subjective in nature, calling this 
enterprise as meaningless. In the words of John Mearsheimer,  
 whereas realists see a fixed and knowable world, 
post-modernists see the possibility of endless 
interpretations of the world around them...there are 
no constants, no secure grounds, no profound 
secrets, no final structures or limits of history...there 
is only interpretations imposed...History itself is 
grasped as a series of interpretations imposed upon 
interpretations none primary, all arbitrary.40  
 
 Likewise, Colin Hay points out the following missing elements marking the 
postmodernist‟s arguments: 
Tendency towards nihilism, fatalism and passivity 
an abstention from judgment; is not 
postmodernism‟s normative respect for „difference‟ 
in the end self-defeating precluding the taking of 
action to protect difference? Are its implications not 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction, UK: Palgrave, 2002.p:22. 
  38 Ibid, p: 23. 
  39 For detailed discussion of postmodernism see seminal works of: David Campbell‟s writing Security (1992); R. J.  
Walker‟s Inside/Outside (1993), and; Cynthia Weber‟s Simulating Sovereignty (1995). 
40John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Relations”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 
1994/5. pp: 5-49 
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profoundly conservative deconstruction without the 
possibility of the reconstruction of an alternative? 
Internal contradictions is not postmodernism itself 
the meta-narrative to end all meta-narratives and 
hence a contradiction in terms, tends towards pure 
descriptive narrative as opposed to political 
analysis.41 
 
 Similarly, another group of theories under the school of thought known as Critical Theory 
object to the post-modernists idea of using analysis to advance normative aims, terming it a 
conservative social movement.42 Critical Theory, encompassing diverse perspectives on security, 
probes the basis of power relationships to understand the concept of security, seen as holistic in 
nature. Critical43 Theory points out that key structure of international politics are social rather 
than essentially material, and by changing the way we think about international relations can 
fundamentally enhance international security.  In his study, Anarchy is what States make of it, 
Alexander Wendt argues: “security dilemmas and wars are the result of self-fulfilling 
prophecies... policies of reassurance can also help to bring about a structure of shared knowledge 
which can help to move states towards a more peaceful security community.”44 Thus the 
departure point of critical theorists enfolded within the broad spectrum of post-positivists is 
grounded in “emancipation” by adopting an all-inclusive approach to security. 
 Keith Krause‟s six foundational claims form the basis of critical theorizing in security 
studies: First, the principal actors (subjects) in world politics – whether these are states or not are 
social constructs, and products of complex historical processes; second, “these subjects are 
constituted (and reconstituted) through political practices that create shared social understanding; 
                                                 
  41 Colin Hay, op.cit, p: 27. 
42 Quoted in, Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James, Patrick M. Morgan, op.cit, p: 184. 
43On social constructivism, see A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of it”, International Organization, Vol. 
46, No. 2, (1992); F. Kratochwill, Rules, Norms, and Decision, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 
and; N. Onuf, A World of or Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations, Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1989. 
  44 Alexander Wendt, Ibid, pp: 391-425. 
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this process of constitution endows the subjects with identities and interests (which are not 
“given” or unchanging); third, “world politics is not static or unchanging, and its “structures” are 
not determining, since they are socially constructed; fourth, “our knowledge of the subjects, 
structures and practices of world politics is not “objective”; fifth, “the appropriate methodology 
of social sciences is not that of natural sciences. Interpretive methods that attempt to uncover 
actors‟ understandings of the organization (and possibilities) of their social world are the central 
focus of research; and finally, “the purpose of theory is not prediction (control) of the 
construction of trans-historical, generalize casual claims; contextual understanding and practical 
knowledge is the appropriate goal.”45 
 Thus, the stream of perspectives on how to approach the notion of security in 
international politics continues to flow since the end of the Cold War. This is not to say that 
perceptions of threat, state, and interests have become irrelevant, but parallel questions are how 
these threats and interests are constructed, how the actors involved are constituted, and the 
process may change.46Against this backdrop, a number of scholars have called for a more 
comprehensive and systematic approach to security, beyond the narrow preoccupation with the 
state and examine more general threats to human existence and ways to overcome them.47 These 
approaches have refined the concept of human security48, predating the Cold War era.  
                                                 
45 Keith Krause, “Critical Theory and Security Studies”, YCISS Occasional Paper, No 33, 1996, pp: 5 – 10. 
46Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, edit., Critical Security Studies: Concept and Cases, UK: UCL Press, 
1997, pp: 33-59. 
47Among the most notable are Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1983; 
Colin S. Grey, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment, London: Aldwych, 1982; Edward Kolodziej,AWhat is 
Security and Security Studies? Lessons form the Cold War, Arms Control, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1992), pp: 1-31; and 
Krause and Williams, Critical Security Studies, UK: UCL Press, 1997. 
48 Human Security specialists defines security as related to, “the needs of people, for many of them security 
symbolizes protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression 
and environmental hazards” - United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1994, New 
York: 1994, pp: 22. Also interesting accounts on the subject are, Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States, and World 
Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, Millennium 10, Vol. 10, No.2 (Summer 1982), pp: 126-155; 
Johann Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 8, No.1 (1971), pp: 81-
117, and; Jorge Neff, Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability, Toronto: IDRC, 1995. 
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At this juncture, the plausible question is how one can locate and analyze Pakistan‟s 
security and insecurity imperatives within the western dominated security landscape. And what 
one can infer from the key empirical and historical works on Pakistan‟s experience with 
terrorism? To dwell more deeply into the complexity of the challenge of terrorism confronting 
Pakistan the following discussion is critically needed. 
Part II: Proposed Framework to Understand and Critique Pakistan‟s Response to Terror 
 To conceptualize and critique Pakistan‟s response to terrorism in the post- 9/11 period, 
this study proposes an integrated framework based on three different theoretical models of 
security propounded by Barry Buzan – the integrated and holistic perspective on security – 
involving socio-economic as well as internal and external dimension of security; Buzan and 
Weaver‟s Regional Security Complex theory (RSCT) underscoring divergence of perception on 
external threat to regional security; 49 Mahbub-ul Haq‟s human security approach focusing on 
people‟s security 50 and Mohammed Ayoob‟s subaltern realism emphasizing constraints on a 
weak state.51 
 The end of the Cold War between the US and former USSR, marked an end to the 
international security discourse being seen through the lens of super-powers rivalry only. This 
stimulated debate on very basic questions about the security both in military and non-military 
realms. The earlier dormant views of constructivists about widening the horizons of security 
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framework, gained renewed emphasis to understand the changing nature of security threats in the 
post-Cold War area, especially in case of the developing world. As a corollary, the literature on 
security gave up its Eurocentric focus and became “more concerned about the rise of Asia both 
as a pivotal arena in world affairs and as region in which serious security problems are most 
likely to emerge.”52  
 This study tried to explore alternative theoretical paradigms in the field of security that 
gained prominence at the end of Cold War, so as to assess their relevance for Islamabad‟s 
response to terrorism after 9/11. These included assumptions of “critical theory” and in particular 
the “constructivist” approach but found both inadequate in explaining Musharraf‟s response to 
terrorism. The main assumptions of critical theory are that “actors are inherently social, that their 
identities and interests are socially constructed, the product of inter-subjective social 
structures.”53  Thereby, the critical theorists called for interpretive modes of understanding, in 
tune with the unquantifiable nature of many social phenomenons and inherent subjectivity of all 
observation.54 Normatively, they condemned the notion of value neutral theorizing, arguing all 
knowledge flows from the interests and that theorists should be explicitly committed to exposing 
and dismantling structures of domination and oppression.  
Tested against Musharraf‟s counterterrorism response, it appears that he was not 
inherently a social actor; rather his interests, decisions and actions stemmed from his perception 
of his individual interest to stay in power as well as the traditional security paradigm that the 
state of Pakistan followed throughout its post-independence life, driven largely by the threat 
perceived from India, which in turn stemmed from the perceived weakness of the state Pakistan. 
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Thus, normatively, a subjective appreciation and analysis of the phenomenon of terrorism as 
conceived in Pakistan (and largely ignored in the West) is of limited utility in explaining General 
Musharraf‟s response to terrorism post 9/11 in comparison to the nature of Pakistani state, its 
perceived national security interests and the long standing tradition of military rule in Pakistan 
where issue of legitimacy of the military ruler and sustenance of military rule are at the heart of 
actions taken by actor in power. 
  Similarly, constructivist approach was explored to examine alternate explanatory 
perspective on Musharraf‟s response to terrorism after 9/11.  As an extension of the critical 
theory, the main theoretical premise of constructivism is that humans are “socially embedded, 
communicatively constituted and culturally empowered.”55 The three major propositions 
forwarded by constructivists are:  
 One, “normative or ideational structures are just as important as material structures.” 
Constructivists argue that “systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values also have structural 
characteristics, and that they exert a powerful influence on social and political action.” They 
stress on the importance of “normative and ideational structures because these are thought to 
shape the social identities of political actors.”56      
 Two, constructivists contend that understanding how non-material structures condition 
actors‟ identities is important because identities inform interests and, in turn, actions.‟   
 Third, constructivists argue that, “agents and structures are mutually constituted. 
Normative and ideational structures may well condition the identities and interests of actors, but 
those structures would not exist if it were not for the knowledgeable practices of those actors.” 57 
Thus, institutionalized norms and ideas define the meaning and identity of the individual actor 
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and the patterns of appropriate economic, political, and cultural activity engaged in by those 
individuals and it is through interaction with the social structures that identities and interests get 
defined. Further, constructivists see “normative and ideational structures” as “shaping actors” 
identities and interests through three mechanisms: imagination, communication and constraint.  
 In the 1990s, three different forms of constructivism evolved: systematic, unit level and 
holistic constructivism. The systemic constructivism like realist “third image perspective” 
focuses on interaction between unitary state actors as to how states relate to one another in the 
external or international domain. Wendt‟s argues that identity of the state informs its interests 
and in turn, its actions. He draws distinction between social and corporate identities of the state. 
The social identity refers to the status, role or personality that international society ascribes to a 
state while corporate identity refers to internal human, material, ideological or cultural factors 
that make a state what it is.  The unit level constructivism on the other hand, concentrates on the 
“relationship between domestic social, legal norms and the identities and interests of states.”  
This enables explanation of variations of identity, interest and actions across states that systemic 
constructivism tends to ignore. Finally, “holistic constructivism” tried to bridge the gap between 
the international and domestic domains.   To subsume the entire range of factors conditioning the 
identities and interests of states, they brought in the corporate and social together into a unified 
analytical perspective that treats domestic and the international as two faces of a single social 
and political order. 58 The holistic constructivism has the ability to explain the development of 
the normative and ideational structures of the present international system, as well as the social 
identities they have engendered. 59 Besides, Constructivism calls for more interpretive, discursive 
and historical modes of analysis.  
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 The constructivist approach, however, has its own limitations when it comes to 
explaining Pakistan response to terrorism after 9/11.  The core assumptions of constructivism 
emphasize    normative or ideational structures having powerful influence on social and political 
action of political actors. In case of Musharrarf as a political actor, the normative and ideational 
structures played a far less important role in his political actions regarding war on terrorism, 
instead he tried to use the ideational structures to advance his own personal interest which was in 
fact legitimizing and perpetuating his rule. So “agents and structures” as constructivists argue 
were not mutually constituted but were rather mutually exclusive. Thereby, ideational structures 
neither shaped his social identity nor defined his interest. Further regarding three forms of 
systematic, unit level and holistic constructivism have their own inherent weaknesses. The 
systemic constructivism emphasizes social and corporate identities of the state. In case of 
Pakistani state as an actor the disconnect between the social identity that “international society” 
ascribed to the Pakistani state and its material identity created a perception gap between Pakistan 
and the West which led to great misunderstanding about Pakistan‟s response to terrorism in the 
West. The unit level constructivism is equally inadequate to explain Pakistan‟s actions on 
terrorism, as the relationship between Pakistan‟s domestic social, legal norms and the identities 
and interests of state was subservient to Musharraf‟s personal will and interests. He was wearing 
two hats and controlled the state in his capacity as a Chief of Army Staff and President of 
Pakistan. And finally, “holistic constructivism” which attempt to bridge the gap between the 
systemic and unit level constructivism becomes less relevant as these two levels had inherent 





Expanded Conception of Security: An Integrated Framework for Pakistan‟s Response to 
Terrorism 
 Having explored different theoretical precepts to analyze the Pakistan‟s unique case, this 
study proposes a theoretical framework based on expanded conception of national security of 
Pakistan that shaped Musharraf‟s response to terrorism in the wake of 9/11. The integrated 
framework draws on Buzan‟s conception of holistic perspective on national security;  Buzan and 
Weaver‟s Regional Security Complex theory (RSCT); Mahbub-ul Haq‟s notion of human 
security Mohammed Ayoob‟s subaltern realism of a weak state. It attempts to incorporate the 
internal and external dimension of the Pakistan‟s national security in the South Asian security 
complex where state is the primary referent of security and a weaker state where processes of 
state building are incomplete is even more susceptible to follow the traditional security approach. 
The traditional view seemingly gets even more exaggerated when the survival of the regime in 
charge is projected as imperative for the security of the state, thus leading to total 
marginalization of the citizens of the state. This in turn has grave consequences especially when 
it comes to dealing with non-traditional threats like that of terrorism. Thus interface with human 
security approach is essential to understand and simultaneously be able to critique Musharraf‟s 
policy towards terrorism. Here, Mehboobul Haq‟s human security dimension that covers 
terrorism is most relevant in describing how absence of the citizen as the referent of national 
security created a disconnect between the state and the citizen giving rise to fundamental 
contradictions within Musharraf‟s response to terrorism.   
 Barry Buzan‟s work on security offers critical insights as one tries to forge a nexus with 
the security imperatives of the states in South Asia, particularly Pakistan, within the 
classification of international system. Buzan argues that security challenges to the state can be 
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both external and internal in nature and can be understood by talking of other dimensions of 
security like economic, social and environmental along with the military concerns. This is 
paralleled by the arguments of experts that regard “individual” as the primary focus of security 
instead of the state, to achieve ultimate world peace. This implies that once we remove the state 
from the center of security thinking, and begin to think of people instead, the whole notion of 
security becomes open to change.  
 The centerpiece of this shift was the 1994 Human Development Report of the United 
Nations Development Programme. Finally, there is the stream of literature authored by the third 
world specialists who point to the varied meanings of terms like “state” and “threats” etc. as 
conceived within the realm of the developing world, in sharp contrast to what these terms imply 
in the developed western world. Thus, to understand security dynamics of the developing states, 
 Mohammed Ayoob maintains,  
Substantial differences define the state in the 
developing world such as „search of legitimacy‟ for 
itself and what is defined as „national security‟ may 
be the perception of the regime in power than the 
people of the state as whole.60  
 
 We will discuss the integrated conceptual framework of Pakistan‟s national security one 
by one to deconstruct the central research question: How to explain Musharraf regime‟s response 
towards terrorism? 
A: Barry Buzan - A Holistic View of Security 
 To understand security challenges of the South Asian states in general and Pakistan in 
particular, Buzan‟s work offers a very useful conceptual tool box, giving insights to the inter-
connected nature of security imperatives of Pakistan. By adopting a holistic and integrated 
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approach toward security, one can note the three levels of analysis – individual, state, and 
international – and underscore the contradictions that prevail there, at the same time. This leads 
to analysis of security problems from a broader perspective and add depth to the understanding 
of the subject.  
 Buzan defines national security as systemic enquiry encompassing the military and non-
military dimensions, with the state, individual and international system not as three distinct 
categories but as inter-connected and interdependent tiers of the same enterprise. He argues: 
 Major security phenomenon like terrorism and 
deterrence, cannot be understood properly without 
the full appreciation of their sources, effects and 
dynamics at and among all the three levels. Only 
when all the three levels are in play can the 
contradictions which connect them be exposed 
sufficiently to be brought into analysis…From this 
reintegrated, holistic perspective the three levels 
appear more useful as viewing platforms from 
which we can observe the problem from different 
angles, than they appear as self-contained areas for 
policy or analysis…Systemic security carries the 
requisite sense of parts, and the relationship among 
them, forming an analytical whole.61 
 
 The notion of national security as a multi-layered concept is particularly relevant in case 
of Pakistan. Terrorism is a systemic challenge threatening the state, as well as individual security 
within and beyond Pakistan. To understand Islamabad‟s response towards terrorism the nexus 
between the internal and external dynamics of security predicament must be understood. That is, 
Pakistan, driven by the threat it perceived from India and consequent sense of insecurity, 
invested minimum in the internal sources of security such as education, health and development. 
National security became excessively militarized and externalized resulting in the piling up of 
domestic areas of insecurity: poverty, radicalization, terrorism, ethnicity, sectarianism, drugs, 
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smuggling, weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, energy shortfalls and so on. As a 
result, the state is both a provider of individual security as well as the source of insecurity to its 
citizens simultaneously. This results in exposing the contradictory role of state in creating and 
sustaining the roots of terrorism on the one hand and struggling to be a part of its solution on the 
other by discharging its law and order functions. Musharraf regime‟s counterterrorism policy 
also exhibits the same contradictory pattern marked by reactionary measures and short-term 
goals accompanied with some pro-active steps.  
 By focusing on the individual level of analysis in Pakistan, one can understand the mind 
frame, support structure and context that have resulted in turning human capital as threat to the 
state as well as regional and international security. However, unless the nature of interaction 
between the people, government, regional and international level is probed the understanding of 
Musharraf‟s regime policy versus terrorism remains shallow. By adopting the notion of „holistic 
security‟ one can fully grasp the complexity of the Musharraf‟s government policymaking as 
“heavily politicized activity, bounded by numerous pressures and restrictions.” 62 This line of 
thinking injects empirical value to this research study.  
 Another critical input of Buzan‟s contribution to the debate on security has been the 
division of the security agenda of a state into five sectors. The state can face threats from each of 
these sectors that are military, political, societal, economic, and ecological.63 At times, the 
military threat can overwhelm threats from other sectors, through the application of violent force. 
Similarly, political threats can range from pressure for political change to attempts to secede 
from the state, or even foment a revolution.  
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 Closely tied to the political threats is what Buzan calls „societal threats‟; those threats that 
threaten the cohesion of a society, even if the organizational integrity of the state itself is not a 
risk. The lines of distinction between the societal and political threats to the state are very fuzzy 
and overlap between them and other sectors do exist in practice. Economic threats according to 
Buzan can threaten the integrity of the state and should be considered problems of security. The 
final sector in Buzan‟s analysis is what he terms as „ecological‟ i.e. threats from the degradation 
of environment, threats which can affect their organization stability, legitimacy and economic 
security.  
 In case of Pakistan, terrorism is a multi-dimensional threat resulting in the political, 
social, economic, military and environmental insecurity. It is important to note that the focus of 
Buzan‟s concern is still the security of the state and his contribution to the security debate is to 
broaden the agenda, rather than change it fundamentally.  
B: Mehboob-ul-Haq‟s Human Security Framework  
 The term, “human security,” is most often associated with the 1994 United Nations 
Human Development Report on Human Security drafted by Mahbub-ul-Haq. To probe more 
deeply, why societal insecurity exists and how to provide security for the people of the state, 
human security proponents stress the need to focus on the “people” rather than the “state”, as 
referent of security studies. The report broadening the security debate observed: 
The concept of security has far too long been 
interpreted narrowly, as security of territory from 
external aggression, or as protection of national 
interests in foreign policy or as global security from 
the threat of nuclear holocaust. It has related more 
to nation-states than to people...Forgotten were the 
legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought 
security in their daily lives. For many of them, 
security symbolized protection from the threat of 
disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social 
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conflict, political repression and environmental 
hazards.64 
 
 This signified that narrow definition of security where state is primary referent is not 
sufficient to understand the conception of national security. The report postulated the concept of 
“human security” by highlighting its essential elements: human security is a universal concern; it 
is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor; the components of human security are 
interdependent; human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later 
intervention; it is less costly to meet these threats upstream than downstream; human security is 
people-centered; it is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they 
exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities – and 
whether they live in conflict or in peace.65 Further, the twin concept of “Freedom from fear” and 
“Freedom from want” formed the critical premises of the UNDP 1994 report. The seven 
dimensions of human security included: personal, environmental, economic, political, 
community, health, and food security.66 
 This report articulated the broadened notion of security, setting in the debate of how to 
rethink conception of security within the parameters of the existing international system. The 
trilateral argument of defining individuals as “rights-bearing persons, as citizens or members of 
society, or as members of a transcendent global community (humanity), challenges the concept 
of state sovereignty as held by neo-realists.”67 It raises the question: why and in what ways are 
individuals responsible for each other and how are these responsibilities institutionally 
expressed? To explore such central concerns one is again drawn into the problematic realm of 
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the contract theory, leading one to look into the role of states. And further raises a plausible 
question how is this wide-ranging and maximalist form of human security to be realized? And, 
what is the role of state as a provider of security particularly in case of South Asia?  
 South Asian security experts like Rajesh Basrur regard “state role” as the critical building 
bloc of human security in the region.68  Stressing the co-equality between the state security and 
the individual security, Mahbub-ul-Haq observed: 
State security cannot be achieved without ensuring 
the security of people…Without human security, 
territorial security becomes ineffective and 
ultimately self-defeating…National security is still 
paramount, but its attainment is linked more and 
more with human security. It is widely recognized 
that national security cannot be achieved in a 
situation where people starve but arms accumulate; 
where social expenditure falls and military 
expenditure rises.69 
 
 This clearly establishes that an imbalance between state and peoples‟ security would 
undermine the national security of a state. Similarly, Kanti Bajpai underlines the existence of 
coeval relationship between the individual and state security in a highly complex security milieu. 
He argues:  
There are threats to individual security that go 
beyond the capacity of the state to manage. These 
threats may be transnational or internal. Thus, the 
state may be safe from other states, but may be 
gradually “hollowed out” from within as individual 
security declines. Transnational forces or actors 
may so threaten individuals that the state gradually 
weakens from within. 70 
                                                 
68 Rajesh M. Basrur, edit, Security in the New Millennium: Views from South Asia, Colombo: Regional Center for 
Strategic Studies, 2001, pp: 167-200. 
69Quoted in Human Development in South Asia,, op.cit .pp: 7- 25. 




 At this juncture, it would be useful to reflect upon the utility of using the „human 
security‟ lens to understand Pakistan‟s security imperatives in the post-9/11 phase. This 
reasoning will be useful in deconstructing the contextual parameters- physical as well as non-
physical- of the strategic landscape of the country. Equating individual security with national 
security exposes the vulnerabilities, gaps and contradictions at the policymaking and policy 
implementation levels. This approach helps one to understand the strategic mindset of General 
Musharraf and his cohorts in keeping the system as it is, which suits the vested interests of 
personal and institutional stakeholders and explains why they segregate the internal and external 
threats in the security arena.   
            The human security approach also infuses optimism in the present research study by 
reinforcing the „faith in human goodness‟. That is, no body is born a terrorist; it‟s the 
environment that shapes an individual and society at large. Here, the state has a critical role in 
reframing national security as an inclusive process by investing in across the board sustainable 
human development and progress of the people. This line of thinking brings out the negative cost 
of using citizens as a „strategic tool‟ versus external adversaries and erecting an artificial firewall 
between the internal and external security dynamics. It is to be understood that security cannot be 
compartmentalized into insular „internal‟ and „external‟ threats that are interdependent. 
Excessive focus on external factors often generates a „denial mode‟ about the indigenous sources 
of terrorism resulting in reactionary and short-term policy outputs. The Musharraf regime also 
exhibited this trend in framing its response towards terrorism.  
 The human security framework enables an analytical evaluation of the terrorism threat, 
its causal factors and suggest the need to redistribute responsibilities To understand why states 
like Pakistan allocate minimum resources for human development while continuing to spend a 
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major portion of budgetary resources on defense (35 % in case of Pakistan), one needs to 
understand the dominance of the “state-centric” mindset at the policymaking end. In other words, 
blending the human security concept within the holistic conception of security narrative enables 
us to highlight the vulnerabilities of society that policy makers have been ignoring for long.  
 The human security approach aids in critical analysis of the reforms Musharraf 
introduced for the development of the social, legal and institutional sectors as part of his pro-
active counterterrorism package. By using this perspective, the study unpacks the complexity of 
the terrorism challenge that calls for a proactive counter terrorism strategy at the societal level. 
The missing links in the Musharraf counterterrorism scheme such as “credibility deficit of the 
state” at the popular level, lack of consensus building and engagement through dialogue are also 
highlighted alongside. In short, the human security perspective allows discussing the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats to Pakistan‟s security defined in a holistic manner.  
 Having discussed the viability of the “holistic and human security” approach in assessing 
the Musharraf government‟s response to terrorism, the present research explores regional 
security complexities that helps understand the divergence of security perceptions prevalent in 
the region encompassing the issue of terrorism. This resulted in Musharraf‟s securitization of the 
threat of terrorism, which consequently dominated his policy actions against terrorism. 
Buzan‟s concept of „Regional Security Complex‟ 
 To understand the contextual parameters, Buzan‟s concept of „regional security complex‟ 
offers a useful tool by focusing on “local sets of states.... whose major security perceptions and 
concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security perceptions cannot be 
considered apart from one another.”71 Taking this theme forward, laid in the work titled, 
                                                 
71 Barry Buzan, “A Framework for Regional Security Analysis” in Barry Buzan and Gohar Rizvi, ed., South Asian 
Insecurity and the Great Powers, London: Croom Helm, 1986, p:8. 
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Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Buzan and Weaver in their study, Regions and 
Powers: The Structure of International Security,72 explain „regional security complex theory 
(RSCT)‟ to understand the regional level of security, “that has become more autonomous and 
more prominent in international politics, and that the ending of the Cold War accelerated this 
process...Without superpower rivalry intruding obsessively into all regions, local powers have 
more room for maneuver.” 73 This highlighted the importance of local security dynamics in each 
region which play important role in shaping the security policies of the regional states.  
 Is this the case in South Asia after the US launched the “Global war on Terror” focusing 
on Afghanistan in October 2001? And how did Regional Security Complex shape Mushrarraf‟s 
response to US campaign against terrorism in the region? Musharraf joined American war on 
terrorism and hence Pakistan became a key ally of the United States. As a result, the US has 
become actively involved in South Asia as a broker between India and Pakistan.74 RSCT 
blending the materialist (neorealist) and constructivist (that focus on the political processes by 
which security gets constituted) approaches to security, explain the ideas of „bounded 
territoriality‟ and distribution of power and patterns of amity and enmity as key to behavior of 
states, interacting within the changing international security dynamics. Buzan and Weaver argue: 
Security complexes may well be extensively 
penetrated by the global powers, but their regional 
dynamics nonetheless have a substantial degree of 
autonomy from the patterns set by the global 
powers…One needs to understand both of these 
levels independently, as well as the interaction 
between them.75 
 
                                                 
72Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, pp: 3-124; 443-483.  
73Ibid, p: 3. 
74Ibid, p: 127. 
75Ibid, p: 4-5. 
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 However, the RSCT argument is not only restricted to the focus on regional and global 
level only, but at the same time emphasizes the domestic (state level) and the inter-regional 
levels. That is:  
 In Cold War South Asia was a standard complex 
with a bipolar essential structure rooted in mutual 
securitizations between India and Pakistan...All of 
the states in the region can be classified to some 
degree as weak states, though India‟s robust 
democracy pushed it towards the middle of the 
weak-strong state spectrum...there is strong 
interplay between domestic and regional levels in 
South Asian insecurity.76  
 
 This pattern of domestic-regional linkage, complemented with the inter-regional and 
global influences, continues to define Islamabad‟s counterterrorism policy behavior. Buzan‟s 
concept of „securitization‟ is of critical value while analyzing Musharraf‟s views and actions on 
terrorism. Securitization refers to the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the 
game and frames the issue as either a special kind of politics or as something above politics. That 
is:  
In theory, any public issue can be located on the 
spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the 
state does not deal with it and it is not in any other 
way made an issue of public debate and decision) to 
politicized (meaning the issue is a part of public 
policy, requiring government decision and resource 
allocations or, more rarely, some other form of 
communal governance) to securitized (meaning the 
issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring 
emergency measures and justifying actions outside 
the normal bounds of political procedure).77 
 
                                                 
76Ibid, p: 104. 
77Ibid, pp: 23-24. 
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 Following a discourse analysis using the „securitization‟ lens this study unravels how 
President Musharraf securitized the issue of terrorism as threat to Pakistan‟s national security as 
well as to the regional and international peace. Security is, therefore, a self-referential practice 
and the best way to study securitization is to study the discourse and political constellations. 
Thus, by probing the securitization of a particular issue, one can gain an insight into, “who 
securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what result, and, not 
least, under what condition.”78 Applying it to the Pakistan situation, it becomes quite obvious 
that Musharraf securitized the threat of terrorism by treating state as the primary referent of 
security. This was done essentially to get US support for legitimizing his regime that resulted in 
duplicity in his actions against terrorism.     
 The discussion of RSCT is intrinsically rooted in the nature of weak state of Pakistan that 
influences its threat perception vis-à-vis stronger neighbour in the region as well as its internal 
security. This became a critical factor in influencing Musharraf government‟s response to 
terrorism. This is well explained by Ayoob‟s concept of “Subaltern Realism”79 that elucidates the 
transitory, immature and weak nature of „state‟ in the developing world, and most aptly for 
Pakistan. 
D: Concept of “Subaltern Realism”   
 This perspective brings out the stark differences in the nature of security problematic of 
the developed and the less developed world respectively. Mohammed Ayoob argues that the very 
notion of „state as a unitary actor‟ as in case of the developed world is open to debate in South 
Asia. The problem of security in South Asia is multi-dimensional and multi-faceted in its nature 
                                                 
78Ibid, p: 32. 
79“Subaltern Realism” is a combination that denotes primarily political and state-centric character and its sensitivity 
for the concerns of the large majority of states - the less powerful and therefore, of „inferior rank‟.  For details see, 
Mohammed Ayoob, “Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective”, in Keith Krause and Michael C. William, 
eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, op.cit, pp: 121-146. 
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and outlook. In contrasts with the developed world where the „state‟ has gone through and 
completed the legitimacy and state-making process, whereas most of the developing states are in 
the process of state-making and the question of legitimacy remains unresolved. 
 Following the similar line of argument, Barry Buzan introduces a division between weak 
and strong states.80 He contends that „weak‟ and „strong‟ do not refer to the amount of power a 
state has, but rather how stable and coherent its political institutions and society are. Essentially, 
„strong states‟ are the ones in the north and the west, coherent states that are not fundamentally 
challenged and whose legitimacy is sound. „Weak states‟ are generally found in the third world, 
where there is substantial conflict over the control of the state, where the legitimacy of the state 
is a subject for political contest.81 Musharraf‟s phase fits well within this conception of „weak 
state‟ that had limited capacity to reign in terrorism and whose basis of legitimacy remained 
highly questionable. 
 Amitav Acharya, another expert of the Third World security contends: 
A notion of security rooted firmly within the realist 
tradition, and developed as an abstraction from the 
Eurocentric states system. It does not provide an 
adequate conceptual framework for understanding 
the security problematic of those states that entered 
the system at a later stage. A framework that 
captures the significantly broader range of 
issues…internal as well as external, can contribute 
to a greater integration of Third World security 
issues into international security studies.82 
 
 Thus, while analyzing the security problems of the developing states like, Pakistan an 
analyst should be mindful of the fact that in majority of the Third World developing states, the 
                                                 
80Barry Buzan, People, State and  Fear, op.cit. pp: 65-69. 
81Ibid. 
82 Amitav Acharya, “The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and Security Studies”, in Keith Krause and 
Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, op.cit, pp: 299-327. 
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survival of regime may be equated with the security or national interests of the state. “The people 
who are opposed to the regime in control are seen as „threat‟ to the state.”83 In other words, it 
must be recognized that „security and insecurity‟ in case of Third World is defined “in relation to 
vulnerabilities, both internal and external, that threaten to, or have the potential to, bring down or 
significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and regimes.”84 Pakistan as 
a state has been facing similar situation where regime stability was equated with state security 
and became a critical factor in Musharraf‟s counterterrorism policy.  
 Within this context, the twin concept of “security software and security hardware”85 in 
the hands of state becomes very relevant as Musharraf regime tried to use it as a means of control 
and assertion of his power. The variables such as legitimacy, stage of integration at the societal 
level, fall under the purview of the „security software‟, while the coercive capacity of the state 
expressed through military, police, etc is referred to as „security hardware‟. Such classification of 
the concept of security adds richness and depth to the policy analysis as well as delimits the 
scope of the term, thus making it “intellectually manageable and analytically useful.”86 This line 
of reasoning is extremely helpful in explaining the fuzzy and piece-meal approach of the 
Musharraf regime versus the challenge of extremism brewing inside Pakistan. Through this 
perspective, the particular weaknesses of the Pakistani state – ranging from legitimacy crises, 
political instability, societal cohesion, and territorial disputes – are knitted into the research 
study.  In addition, the imbalance in the nature of civil-military relationship that has always tilted 
in favor of army vis-à-vis security policymaking is also factored in the analysis.   
                                                 
83 M Ayoob, op.cit.pp:135-157. 
84Ibid. 
85 Edward E Azar and Chung-in Moon, “Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The „Software‟ Side of Third 
World National Security,” in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, eds., National Security in the Third World: The 
Management of Internal and External Threats, College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict 
Management, University of Maryland, 1988, pp: 77 – 101.  
86 M Ayoob, op.cit, p: 131. 
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  Ayoob‟s definition of security in political terms and the state being a central referent of 
security is quite explicit in the Musharraf era. Why? Because it is the state that is engaged in the 
authoritative allocation of social values within territorially defined political and administrative 
units. This categorization of security as politically charged phenomenon explains Musharraf‟s 
rhetoric and policy to confront terror or extremism within and beyond Pakistan. One of the key 
uses of  „subaltern realism‟ lies in explaining the underlying motives of Musharraf‟s policy 
during his nearly decade long rule such as legitimizing and perpetuating his grip on power, 
marginalizing political opponents, winning international support for himself in the garb  of his 
counterterrorism policy. 
 Ayoob argues that issues whether military or non-military become securitized and 
identified as „threats‟ when they threaten state boundaries, political institutions, or governing 
regimes. They may have immediate political consequences or become a part of the state‟s 
security calculus. In sum, the perspectives of third world scholars call for fresh thinking to 
understand and analyze the black-box of  „state‟ and understand its policy underscoring the 
differences that distinguish the state in the developing world from the developed world. This also 
helps in understanding the perception and policy gaps between the US/West and Pakistan on the 
contours of counter-terrorism strategy which continues to be central in Pakistan-US policy 
differences on the issue of fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistan and in the region, 
especially vis-à-vis India.  
Operationalising the integrated framework 
 The study is conceptually anchored in the „integrated framework‟ based on the „holistic‟ 
notion of security, „human security‟ combined with conception of regional security complex, and  
„subaltern realism‟ that allows an in-depth analysis of the Musharraf‟s regime response towards 
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terrorism. The conceptual models incorporated in the theoretical framework attempt to analyze 
Musharraf‟s response to terrorism in an integrative manner. It would examine Musharraf‟s policy 
and actions in terms of Pakistan‟s specific nature of the state as developing and weak state where 
conception of national security is not peoples-centric but state-centric with territorial state as 
primary referent of national security and regime legitimacy at stake; more so when a military 
regime is in power.   
 Provided at the end here is a chart summarizing the key assumptions of the four 
theoretical models comprising the proposed integrated framework and contrasting them with 
Musharraf regime‟s counterterrorism policy in post-9/11 Pakistan. This has been done to project 
in tabular form a model that (i) identifies the various components of security for the concept to 
be relevant and useful for the people of the state and thus conceives the concept of security in a 
holistic manner, (ii) identifies and explains Musharraf regime‟s response to terrorism in the 
context of the key assumptions of the theoretical models comprising the integrated framework 
proposed by this study, and (iii) by contrasting the key assumptions of each theoretical position 
and the practice of Pakistan under the Musharraf regime, provides a basis not only to understand 
Pakistan‟s response to terrorism but simultaneously critique it as well. 
 As the primary research question that this study seeks to address requires a description of 
Pakistan‟s response to terrorism post-9/11, while comparing it with Pakistan‟s traditional 
national security policy to determine whether Musharraf‟s counterterrorism policy amounted to 
continuity or change, the proposed framework weaves together theoretical models that can 
support a narrative that is primarily descriptive but not without being analytical. The expanded 
notion of security, represented by the figure below, is therefore a snapshot of the proposed 
theoretical model that provides a descriptive summary of Musharraf‟s counterterrorism policy, 
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while highlighting the limitation of such approach to security and terrorism. Thus, it not only 
helps address the questions that this study sets out to address, but in exposing the limits of 
Musharraf‟s approach to terrorism also identifies areas for further research. 
 
Expanded Conception of National Security: 
An Integrated Framework for Understanding Musharraf‟s Response to 
Counterterrorism 




Integrated, holistic perspective on 
security: 
a) inclusive security 
b) multidimensional-
economic,social,political, 
ecological-levels of security- 
individual, state, regional & 
global  
a) Used holistic security i.e., 
three-tiered  
Strategy-military, political & 
socio-economic to fight 
terrorism. 
b) Disconnect between peoples 
needs & the State action 
continued-regional & state 
level dominated individual 
security. 
Mehboobul Haq Human Security: 
a) peoples as referent of 
security 
b) six dimensions of human 
security as bench mark  
a) State continued to be 
referent of security. 
b) Absence of human security 
breaded more terrorism. 
Buzan & Weaver Regional Security Complexes 
Theory 
a) relevance of local security 
dynamic in each region  
b) who securitizes, for what 
reasons and for whom 
a) RSCT dominated 
 Musharraf‟s policy actions 





a) weak state-state making 
process incomplete 
b) legitimacy of the state subject 
of political contest 
  
a) Weak state constraints were 
used to legitimize and 
perpetuate rule 










 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the complex nature of terrorism in Pakistan as a historical 
construct. It is divided into two broad sections. The first part goes into the factors that 
have resulted in Pakistan being in western perceptions as a “potential base of Islamic 
Radicalism.”1  It also attempts to explain the evolution over the years of these extremist 
networks and how these are organized and what is their operational methodology. An 
effort has been made to explore the role of the state and external influences in the growth 
of these organizations and their possible employment by the former in the conduct of its 
security policy. 
The second part of the chapter dwells on the pre 9/11 situation in Pakistan with 
regard to the level of political violence and terrorism and analyses of General 
Musharraf‟s take on the issue. The regime‟s security misgivings and policies versus India 
and Afghanistan are discussed in the backdrop of terrorism seen as a „home grown affair‟ 
nurtured by sections in Pakistan‟s society, government policies of appeasement and 
external influences. 
 The chapter argues terrorism2 per se has been a significant challenge to Pakistan 
even before the events of September 11, 2001. It can certainly be called as a “home 
grown” reality with  dozens of groups that despite the so-called crackdowns on their 
activities by the state continued to function and flourish while a state of denial and lack of 
                                                 
1 Stephen Philip Cohen, “The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan”, The Washington Quarterly, summer 2003, pp: 7 
– 25. 
2 Terrorism is defined “as an act or threat of violence against non-combatants with the objective of exacting 
revenge, intimidating or otherwise influencing an audience” For a detailed analysis, see Jessica Stern, The 
Ultimate Terrorists, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp: 11 – 30. 





political will allowed security issues to reach their present critical stage. This raises the 
question: Has the state been a threat to the individual or have individuals been a threat to 
the state?3  Pakistan like other developing states is a “weak” state, unable to seek 
legitimacy through commitment of its energies to nation building.4 Human development 
is essential for stability and peace at home and abroad.5 Late Dr Mahbub-ul-Haq6 
recognizing the critical value of human development observed, “Human investment is 
likely to give us a political and economic pay-off which no other investment can promise 
at present”7 The same line of argument has been expressed by Pakistan‟s former Army 
Chief, General (retd) Jahangir Karamat, in the following words: 
The strongest motivation for peace through negotiations 
stems from the state of the economy and the imperative 
need to divert resources for human development. Military 
competition, if replaced by economic co-operation, can 
give hope to millions of South Asians for a better future.8 
  
Hence, what Pakistan needs is a, „comprehensive approach‟9 to security. A noted 
Pakistani defense and security analyst Ikram Sehgal argues, “national security must be 
evaluated more in terms of human, economic and cultural terms than in the securing of 
                                                 
3 Barry Buzan, People, State and Fear, UK: Harvester Wheat sheaf, 1983. Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver 
and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework of Analysis, London: Lynne Rienner, 1998.pp:21-33. 
4 M Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International 
System, Bolder, Colo: Lynne Reiner, 1995.pp:132-145. 
5 Note: The Concept of Human Security implies protecting the needs of the people as the key focus of 
security, both as a concept and policy of nation states.   
 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, 1994, New York: 1994.   
6 Dr Mahbub Ul Haq (1934 – 1998, Pakistan) was a leading architect of the concept of Human 
Development adopted by the UNDP in early 1990s. These reports established a new index, called „Human 
Development Index‟, which measures development by the wellbeing of the people rather than by income 
alone.  In short, “Human development is about putting people at the centre of development. It is about 
people realizing their potential, increasing their choices and enjoying the freedom to lead lives they value”, 
UNDP: Human Development Report, 2010. 
7 Mahbub Ul Haq, “A National Agenda: Critical Choices for Pakistan‟s Future”, 1993.  
8 General Jahangir Karamat, “Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan”, Henry L. Stimson Center Asian 
Security Luncheon Series, April 12, 1999. 
9 The Idea of Comprehensive Security implies an infusion of non-traditional (political, economic, social, 
environmental, human security) security issues into the national security policy (originally focusing on 
traditional that is territorial integrity) of the state. 





territorial space by the military.”10 Similarly, Ahmad Faruqui11calls for thorough revision 
and rethinking of Pakistan‟s national security policies as the prudent way out of the 
present security dilemmas. He contends:  
One cannot rely on hard military assets to prevail in a 
strategic conflict; the soft assets pertaining to political, 
social, economic factors may in fact be the decisive 
ones…An integrated approach involving social cohesion, 
political strength, economic development, diplomatic 
support and military readiness offers an alternative national 
security perspective.12 
 
Here, it may be asked if Pakistan has been following a holistic, comprehensive 
and an integrated security approach (as suggested by this study). And why has the state 
been unable to balance its resources with the strategic perceptions?  To have an 
understanding of this, the evolution of the non-state violent actors has been traced. They 
were initially regarded as “low-cost strategic tool” of state security policy in a hostile 
neighborhood.  Parallel to this, the negative impact of militancy on the domestic 
landscape is discussed.  
Part One: Genesis of Extremism and Political Violence in Pakistan  
1.1:  Islam as Strategic Tool in State Policy 
How did the state itself create conditions that were conducive to the rise of 
religion as a “strategic asset” remains a subject of inquiry both for the policymakers and 
policy analysts alike? Here, one cannot overlook the evolution of Pakistan‟s “strategic 
culture” that conditions the policymakers‟ worldview and adoption of security policies 
                                                 
10 Ikram Sehgal, “Concept of National Security”, The News, November 13, 2008. 
11 Ahmad Faruqui specializes in South Asian defense and energy issues and  has widely published on these 
topics in RUSI Journal (February 2002, April 2000), Asian Affairs (Oct 2001), Defense Journal (August 
2001), Strategic Review (Winter 2001), Asia Pacific Military Balance (2000/2001), Asian Profile, The 
Asian Times, The Friday Times (Lahore), The News (Karachi).    
12 Ahmad Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia, (UK: Ash gate 
Publishing Ltd, 2002), pp: 113 – 117. 





overtime. Rizvi, defines strategic culture as: “A perceptual framework of orientations, 
values, and beliefs that serves as a screen through which the policymakers observe the 
dynamics of the external security environment, interpret the available information and 
decide about the policy options in a given situation.”13  
 
In this scenario, the official Islam focused on the “two-nation theory” and later 
Pakistan ideology as sources of state legitimacy and profile of national destiny.14 In other 
words, Islam has been one of the critical elements of Pakistan‟s strategic culture. To 
quote Rizvi again the following attributes of Pakistan‟s strategic culture shaped 
Pakistan‟s foreign and security policy options: 
An acute insecurity developed in the early years of 
independence due to troubled relations with India and 
problems with Afghanistan; A strong distrust of India and a 
history of acrimonious Indo-Pakistani relations reinforced 
by the historical narratives of the pre independence period 
and the troubled bilateral interaction in the post-
independence period;  aversion to an India-dominated 
regional power arrangement for South Asia; an active 
search for security to maintain its independence in deciding 
about foreign policy options and domestic policies; a close 
nexus between Islam and strategic thinking, leading to 
connections between Islamic militancy and foreign 
policy.15 
To translate the preceding strategic underpinning into the foreign and security 
policy options, successive governments in Pakistan  relied on diplomacy and partnerships 
specifically with the United States, Western Europe, and with China aiming at 
strengthening its position in the region. This also resulted in the excessive allocation of 
resources to defense, weapon procurement from technologically advanced nations and 
                                                 
13 Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi, interview with the Author, 26 August, 2008, Islamabad. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi, interview with the Author, 26 August, 2008, Islamabad. 





finally acquiring the overt nuclear status.16 Pakistan‟s national security was conceived, in 
short, in external terms only. The critical referent of the security remained the “state‟s 
territorial integrity” with minimum investment into economic, political, social, cultural, 
educational and technological advancement of the people of the country. Interestingly, 
human capital assumed the role of “low-cost strategic tool” for ensuring the country‟s 
strategic aims versus Afghanistan and India respectively. But these strategies have not 
yielded the expected results. Pakistan‟s former foreign secretary, Najmuddin A Sheikh 
debunking the so called “strategic depth” says:   
Support for the Taliban…led to large swathes of our tribal 
areas and cities like Chaman into strongholds of the Pak-
Afghan Taliban where the government‟s writ did not run. 
The support for the freedom struggle in Kashmir with or 
without official support –gave fresh impetus to forces based 
in Pakistan that boasted an agenda for overthrowing all 
secular or moderate regimes in the Muslim countries.17 
 
1.2: Jinnah’s Idea of Pakistan Vs Reality 
The reliance on religion as an instrument of security policy of the state policy was 
in sharp contrast to the country‟s founder, Quaid-I-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah‟s “idea 
and vision of Pakistan” spelled in his address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan  
on 11 August, 1947: 
If you change your past and work together in a spirit that 
everyone of you, no matter what community he belongs, no 
matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter 
what is his color, caste or creed, is first, second and last a 
citizen of the state with equal rights, privileges and 
obligations there will be no end to the progress you will 
                                                 
16 From 1947 to 1970, Pakistan‟s defense spending averaged around 3 percent of GDP. After the loss of 
East Pakistan in 1971, the ratio of defense expenditure to GDP doubled to 6 percent. During the 1970s, it 
averaged 6.5 percent. It went up to 7.5 percent during 1980s. In 1990s it averaged 6 percent. In the last 
decade its recorded in between 3 to 4 percent of GDP.  At the same time, health and education spending has 
stagnated at 1 percent and 2 percent of GDP. For details see, Ahmad Faruqui, op.cit, p: 153. 
17 Najmuddin A. Sheikh, “Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan‟s Foreign Policy”, Margalla Papers, 
Islamabad: National Defense College, 2004, pp: 1-12. 





make...We are starting with this fundamental principle that 
we all are citizens and equal citizens of one State.18 
 
In line with this, Jinnah envisioned Pakistan‟s foreign policy to be based on 
peaceful co-existence, honesty and fair-play within and beyond. Particularly, his ideas on 
the role of Islam in the state, continue to be debated between the “modernists and the 
radicals.”19 Successive governments and competing power contenders‟ have cited 
Jinnah‟s different statements, often out of context, to legitimize their particular security 
policy decisions from time to time.   
The fact that Jinnah relied on Islamic identity as the basis of the demand for a 
separate homeland and as key element to forge unity among the Indian Muslims, has 
been debated over the decades among sundry sections of secular modernists and religious 
conservatives. Pakistan‟s creation was based on the „two-nation theory‟20 which Jinnah 
explained at a mass meeting in Lahore on March 23, 1940: 
The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different 
religious philosophies, social customs, and 
literatures…Their aspects on life and of life are 
different...Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, 
and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap.21 
Was Pakistan simply a state for the Muslims to live in or was it, in fact, an Islamic 
state? This question remains a key dividing line between the liberals and radicals within 
                                                 
18 Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Speeches and Statements as Governor General of Pakistan 1947 – 
1948, Islamabad, 1989, p: 46. 
19 Note: Modernists connotes diverse group of policymakers, politicians, intellectuals, civil society actors 
that recognize Islam as source of unity in diversity, and as the basis of Democratic system and scientific 
learning and advancement.  On the other hand, Radicals constitute plethora of the extreme religious 
organizations, political groupings and, sectarian bands that advocate a return to a medieval-style theocracy. 
20 Note: „Two-Nation Theory‟ is based on the distinctiveness of Muslims from Hindus (and from other 
religions) with regard to all aspects of personal, social, religious, and political life. It evolved through the 
various stages of intellectual discourse within the British subcontinent. Various leading Muslim thinkers 
concerned about the backwardness and discrimination in British India tried to mobilize Muslim population 
by stressing their unique religious outlook. Three key figures are: Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817- 98); 
Allama Iqbal, and; Mohammed Ali Jinnah.  
21 Quoted in Latif Ahmed Sherwani, Partition Schemes Leading to the Pakistan Resolution, Islamabad: 
Quaid-I-Azam Academy, 1990, p: 10. 





Pakistan to date. Farzana Shaikh in her recent research study, Making Sense of Pakistan, 
explores the history of the creation of Pakistan to examine why and how Islam was used 
as a medium of mobilization and unification to achieve a nation-state for the Muslims of 
the Indian sub-continent. However, after the establishment of Pakistan, the religious 
slogan sank in the background since Muslim League, the party which led the Pakistan 
movement under Jinnah‟s leadership, was not a religious party. In fact the major religious 
parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Jamiate Ulema Islam had opposed the creation of 
Pakistan on the ground that it would divide the Indian Muslim community. But once 
Pakistan had become a reality the very same religious groups jumped on the bandwagon 
and reinvented themselves as champions of Islam claiming Pakistan was created for the 
implementation of „shariah‟, the Islamic law. However in the earlier years this campaign 
did not carry much weight with the general public and could not transform itself into 
electoral strength over the decades till the Musharraf years when, in order to divide the 
mainstream political parties the regime helped create the Mutahida Majlis-e- Amla 
(MMA), a united alliance of the religious parties. Yet, aside from the religious parties, 
Islam was used to achieve, remove, sustain, and legalize regimes and governments of 
civilian and military rulers. This resulted in the growth of sectarianism even as demands 
for shariatization of law kept gaining strength over time. Paradoxically, Islam, which was 
to forge unity among the Muslims became a source of division and discord among the 
different sects. Sheikh argues: “It is the country‟s problematic and contested relationship 
with Islam that has most decisively frustrated its quest for a coherent national identity and 
for stability as a nation state capable of absorbing the challenges of its rich and diverse 
society.”22 
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This view is also shared by a majority of liberal observers of Pakistan‟s history 
who believe that Jinnah favored what has come to be described as „moderate Islam‟ and 
his aim was to create a „nation‟ within this state that was above all religious differences 
and establish a system based on justice and toleration which are key elements of an 
Islamic society. In sharp contrast, radicals refer to various remarks of Jinnah as evidence 
that the country was always intended to be an Islamic state. A leading cleric, Maulana 
Shabbir Ahmed Osmani, addressing the Constituent Assembly in 1949 maintained: 
Islam has never accepted the view that religion is a private 
matter between man and his creator and as such has no 
bearing on the social or political relations of human 
beings…The late Quaid-I-Azam marked in his letter to 
Gandhi in August 1944: The Quran is a complete code of 
life. It provides for all matters, religious or social, civil or 
criminal, military or penal, economic or commercial.23  
As earlier mentioned, Pakistan‟s creation was opposed by some key Islamic 
groups and parties led by Jamiat Ulema Hind (JUH). Later on, some of these groups 
assumed the role of in-built religiously grounded pressure groups within the post-
independence state system. Radicals argue that Pakistan represents an incomplete dream 
of its founder, Jinnah and thinker Iqbal, who envisioned a “state for the Muslims to 
practice their faith (that is, Islam) without fear – on the basis of two-nation theory.” The 
radicals interpret this in terms of an Islamic state based on “Shariah.”24   
  Akbar S Ahmed argues that Jinnah‟s vision of Pakistan lies in between the two 
extremes that is a secular state versus an Islamic (theocratic) state. He advocated a “more 
compassionate and tolerant form of Islam, one in accordance with the most scholarly 
thinking within the religion yet embracing all humanity, nor a rigid Islam in confrontation 
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with the other religions.”25 What is worth noting here is how opportunist leaders (both 
civilian as well as military) belonging to liberal and religious parties or groupings have 
manipulated Jinnah‟s vision of Pakistan and Islam for political expediency and power 
seeking in the country.  
In this tug of war between the conservative and liberal sides of Pakistan‟s politics 
the vision of Pakistan‟s founder to create a just, moderate, and democratic state has been 
lost. This apparently ideological tussle has actually a very mundane and ulterior core.  
The “Islamic card” has been used by the establishment to counter the demands for 
provincial autonomy which the „strong center‟ has all along resisted.  Under successive 
parliamentary governments (1947 - 58) followed by General Ayub‟s military – and later 
presidential – rule (1958 – 69), the ruling elite adopted various strategies to control and 
co-opt Islamist elements to bolster the centrist power structure. In 1962, General Ayub 
accepted the demand of the religious parties to change the name of the country from 
“Republic of Pakistan” to “Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”26 The 1970 elections under 
another military government headed by General Yahya Khan (1969 –70) have been 
described by analysts as an era of political Islam in Pakistan. General Yahya backed 
Islamist elements in both wings of the country to stem the tide of anti-establishment 
trends. To quote Hussain Haqqani: 
The well-funded Islamists confronted the PPP (Pakistan 
People‟s Party) in West Pakistan and Awami League in the 
eastern wing and, judging by their visibility in the media, 
were quite powerful. Their attacks on the PPP focused on 
the “un-Islamic lifestyle” of the party‟s popular leader, 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto...The Awami League was accused of 
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close ties with Bengali Hindus, and it was alleged that the 
party was funded by India.27 
 
Similarly, on the security front, the military portrayed the growing conflict in East 
Pakistan as „Hindu versus Muslim‟ war and troops were “presented as mujahideen 
fighting the enemies of Islam.”28 Islamists belonging to Jamaat-e-Islami were raised as a 
razakaar (volunteer) force called Al-Badr (the moon) and Al-Shams (the Sun). “Al-Badr 
composed of well-educated students from colleges and madrasas and were trained to 
undertake “Specialized Operations”, while the remainder was grouped under Al-Shams, 
which was responsible for the protection of bridges, vital points and other areas.”29 In a 
nutshell, the role of religiously motivated civilians as “low-cost strategic tool” became a 
part of national security policy. The secession of East Bengal with the Indian military 
assistance solidified the political and strategic value of Islam plus the institutional (that is, 
military) distrust of Hindu India in Pakistan  
Likewise, in 1974 Z. A. Bhutto obliged Islamists by declaring Ahmadis as non- 
Muslim,30 and continued using Islamic ideology and military advancement as the basis of 
security within and beyond. The 1973 constitution31 declared Islam to be the state 
religion (Article 2), provided that all existing laws were to be brought into conformity 
with the injunctions of Islam (Article 227) and said that it would take steps to teach 
Islamiat and Quran in schools (Article 31). The Council of Islamic Ideology was tasked 
                                                 
27 Ibid. p: 55. 
28 Ibid, P: 76. 
29 Ibid. p: 79. 
30 Ahmadi faith is linked with the Mirza Ghulam Ahmed (1835 – 1908), who in 1857 claimed to be prophet 
and Messiah without book after Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) who was the seal of the prophets. According 
to a great majority of Muslims, Mirza Ghulam Ahmed‟s declarations were contrary to the basic tenets of 
Islam. In 1953, anti-Ahmadi riots broke in Lahore leading to the imposition of first Martial law in the 
country.  For more details see, Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 
2005, p: 10. 
31 “Text of 1973 Constitution”, Library of National Assembly, Islamabad. 





to identify laws repugnant to Islam and make recommendations to bring these laws in 
conformity with the Islamic injunctions (Articles 228 31). Here, the political dynamics 
also played a critical role in Bhutto‟s adoption of an “Islamic face.” That is, some of the 
actions to “Islamize” the state were essentially legitimacy gimmicks by Bhutto to gain 
political clout and reclaim popular support in the face of allegations of massive electoral 
rigging. Such moves amounted to “opening a Pandora‟s box for the genie of divisiveness 
to crawl out and afflict a people whose very fate depended on unity.”32 Bhutto‟s demise 
was a product of political mismanagement, mass agitation led by religious parties 
(Islamist groups) paving the way for another stretch of military rule. Thus, when General 
Zia seized power in a military coup d‟état against Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 
1977, Islamism was readily available as the best means to secure legitimacy of his 
regime. Zia used the “Islamic card” and religious political groupings as his tools to 
legitimize his rule while the Islamic political actors (as in the past) used the military as 
the means to secure dominant role in the political set up of the country.  
To have a clearer understanding of the evolutionary process of Islamic militancy, 
the role of the state in the late 1970s at the domestic and external front is critical to note. 
The circumstances which led to Pakistan‟s slide into sectarian violence, the emergence of 
extremist networks with the global “Jihad” agenda may be seen as the upshot of several 
intertwining factors, including domestic politics, regional upheavals and the Cold War. 
1.3: General Zia’s Islamization program  
Analysts across the board agree that it was General Zia‟s Islamization program 
that sowed the seeds of sectarian terrorism at home and prepared the ground for setting 
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up “seminaries” that ultimately turned into training camps for a whole generation of 
radicals with a “jihadist mindset”. A noted analyst Zahid Hussain reflects on General 
 Zia‟s fusing of security and religion in the following words: 
 Previously, the military was seen as the ultimate guarantor 
of the country‟s territorial integrity and internal security. 
But Zia expanded its role as the defender of Pakistan‟s 
ideological frontiers as well… Preservation of the country‟s 
Islamic character was seen to be as important as the 
security of the country‟s geographical frontiers.33 
General Zia castigated democracy as an importation from the West and used 
Islam as a source of legitimacy. In 1984, he held a referendum in which the choice placed 
before the Pakistani electorate was: Do you want Islam? Those who voted yes would be 
deemed to have simultaneously endorsed also Zia‟s Islamization. Predictably, the result 
was overwhelmingly in Zia‟s favor. The official results showed that out of the 62 per cent 
who had voted, 97.7 per cent had voted in favor of Zia. This was described by the 
Opposition – the MRD or Movement for the Restoration of Democracy as “an 
unprecedented fraud,” maintaining that only between 5 and 10 per cent of the voters had 
expressed their choice.34 
The major Islamic parties Jamat-i-Islami joined the military government‟s 
Islamization agenda in line with the Deobandi35 perception of an Islamic state. This was 
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revolutionary change in the Muslim world, the toppling of the un-Islamic governments, the reconstruction 
of a purist Islamic state, the gathering of Muslim economic and military power to defend this unitary and  - 
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against the humanist traditions of Sufism followed by Brelvis36 and shared by majority of 
the Sunni population in Pakistan. As a result, the socially destructive, divisive process of 
sectarianism along the lines of minority (Shia) and majority sects, and further 
fragmentation  within the majority (that is Sunnis) into mutually hostile factions of their 
own, was set in motion.  
Inevitably, the alliance of Zia‟s military dictatorship with the Deobandi stirred up 
“primordial passions and empowered the semi-literate mullahs as commissars of the state 
and distributors of its largesse through zakat (wealth tax) funds to the poor.” 37 Moreover, 
in rural areas the mullahs became collectors of the ushr (farming tax) and this changed 
their status by turning them into instruments of local government.38 Furthermore, the 
government‟s decision to provide zakat funds to madrassas led to their mushrooming 
growth, even as their graduates became cadres of the religio-political parties and 
functionaries of the various government-funded institutions.39 
In-depth analyses of the Islamic policies introduced by General Zia reveal that it 
exerted a negative influence on the two communities. The Sunni religious parties led by 
JUI and JUP became active against the Shia minority, and demanded the establishment of 
                                                                                                                                                 
more details see, Mohammad Waseem, “Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan”, in K. M. de Silva, ed., Conflict 
and Violence in South Asia, Kandy, 2000, pp: 71 – 74. 
36 Brelvis have a moderate and tolerant interpretation of Islam. They trace their origins to pre-partition 
town of Bareilly, where a leading Muslim scholar Mullah Ahmad Raza Khan Barelvi, developed a large 
following. Jamiat Ulema Pakistan (JUP) is the leading Barelvi party. JUP has generally kept a low profile, 
except during the 1977 anti-Bhutto movement. As an offshoot of JUP in Karachi, the Sunni Tehrik 
represents a diehard approach to the Sunni agenda. 
 
37 Suroosh Irfani, “Pakistan‟s Sectarian Violence: Between the “Arabist Shift” and Indo-Persian Culture”, 
in Satu P Limaye, Robert G. Wirsing, Mohan Malik, edit, Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, 
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a “Sunni Islamic State” on the pattern of the Shiite Islamic state in Iran --which the Shia 
feared. This made Shias defensive and in 1979 the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-Fiqh-Jafrriya (TNFJ) 
was formed as a political organization to protect their rights. This was in response to 
the„Zakat Ordinance‟ that had made the deduction of zakat (a charity tax that all Muslims 
must pay as a religious duty) compulsory through banks. The law provided for a 2.5 per 
cent annual deduction from the money resting in someone‟s (Pakistan‟s Muslims) bank 
account on the first day of Ramadan. This was objected to by the Shia minority sect of 
the country that considers payment of Zakat obligatory for all Muslims but not through 
state enforcement.40 They believed the enforcement repugnant to Islam and opposed the 
measure through massive protest demonstrations in Islamabad, led by TNFJ. This forced 
the government to compromise with the Shia sect on this issue. Accordingly, Shias could 
hand in a declaration to the bank stating their sect and get exemption from the 
compulsory zakat deduction. 
Likewise a number of other laws introduced under the so-called Islamic drive 
were found discriminatory to the minority communities and further aided the country‟s 
slide into extremism. One such law, notorious for being “open to malicious abuse and 
arbitrary enforcement”41 was the Blasphemy Law42, which carried a mandatory sentence 
of death for anyone using derogatory remarks against the sacred person of Prophet 
Mohammad (PBUH). It is reported that this law has been misused on a number of 
occasions against the Christian (minority) and Ahmadi communities. In 2000, General 
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Musharraf proposed to reform the procedural aspects of the Blasphemy Law but backed 
down in the face of threat of street agitation by the religious parties. Another law against 
minorities was aimed specifically against the Ahmadi community. In April 1984 Zia 
inserted sections 298-B and 298-C into the Pakistan Penal Code, which made it a 
criminal offence for Ahmedi‟s to “pose” as Muslims, to “preach or propagate” their faith, 
or to use Islamic terminology or Muslim practices of worship.43 The Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) records 4,000 people who were accused under the 
Blasphemy law and 560 formally charged between 1997 and 2004. They were mostly 
Ahmadis and Christians.44 
 External events such as the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Iran-Iraq war and 
Iran-Saudi rivalry for the leadership of the Muslim world intersected with what was 
going on in Pakistan and fuelled the fires of sectarian conflict in the country and 
promoted the forces of extremism. But the external factor that could be called the main 
driving force and central reason that opened the flood gates of extremism and violence in 
the country was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1990).To quote Professor 
Muhammad Waseem: “A historical root of sectarianism notwithstanding, the sectarian 
conflict in a contemporary Muslim society such as Pakistan has to be understood in terms 
of power politics in the locality, the constellation of powers at the state level, and the 
regional and international politics.”45 
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Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan SSP‟s founder, demanded 
the Pakistan government to declare the Shias as non-Muslims and  asserted that Pakistan, 
with its majority Sunni population, be declared a Sunni State, as Iran was a Shia state 
with its Shia majority. Reflecting on the meshing of internal and external fault lines in 
this case, Hassan Abbas observes: 
The 1979 Iranian revolution emboldened Pakistani Shias, who in 
turn became politicized and started asserting their rights. Iranian 
emissaries started financing their organization Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-
Fiqh-i-Jafaria (TNFJ) and providing scholarships for Pakistani 
students to study in Iranian religious seminaries… this clashed 
with Zia‟s attempts to impose the Hanafi Islam (a branch of Sunni 
sect) … For Saudi Arabia, the Iranian revolution was quite scary, 
for its ideals conflicted with that of a Wahhabi monarchy… Saudi 
Arabia was concerned about the expansion of Shia activism in any 
Muslim country. Hence, it was more than willing to curb such 
trends in Pakistan by making a financial investment to bolster its 
Wahhabi agenda… The flow of these funds was primarily routed 
through the Pakistan military and the ISI.46  
Thus, the policies pursued by Zia‟s military regime in the name of Islamization 
aggravated the sectarian divide leading to use of violence to secure sectarian agendas.  
Pakistan began increasingly to be called an „ideological state‟- that in practice put 
“bigotry and intolerance at a premium. Not only did it divide the country along the lines 
of minority and majority sects, it divided the majority into mutually hostile factions of 
their own.” 47 But General Zia‟s ideological bogey could not have lasted long and would 
have been exposed but for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which helped him to 
project   his „Islamization at home and Jihad across borders‟ to legitimize and extend his 
tenure.  Pakistan‟s entanglement in the Afghan jihad combined with the insurgency that 
erupted in Indian-held Kashmir changed the sectarian issue into a supra national conflict. 
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Gradually, the relationships between religious parties, sectarian and militant outfits, 
religious seminaries and jihadis operating across frontiers began to evolve into a complex 
web giving more muscle to the radicalized sections of society in Pakistan.  
Three developments that need further explanation are: Pakistan‟s involvement in 
Afghanistan; Jihad in Kashmir, and the impact of Islamabad‟s Afghan and Kashmir 
policy on the cohesion and stability of the country. Each one will be discussed to 
understand how the external policy led to repercussions on the internal front – making the 
state‟s integrity and solidarity shaky. 
4.4: Genesis of Pakistan’s Involvement in Afghanistan after Soviet Occupation of 
Kabul in 1979  
The Afghanistan crises that began with the Soviet‟s occupation of Kabul in 1979 
came as a blessing  for General Zia. It provided a shortcut to legitimacy and recognition 
on the international front. Pakistan opted to become a tool of the United States in its 
proxy war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. By playing the card of “Islamic solidarity.” 
Pakistan became a front-line state against the Soviets who were dubbed as “infidels” at 
that time. The Western states were not upset with this terminology, as they were infinitely 
more concerned with frustrating the Soviets in Afghanistan. As a result, General Zia was 
dubbed as “a knight in shining armour at the forefront of a war in defense of freedom and 
democracy”.48 The resistance fighters called Mujahedeen were trained, sheltered and 
launched from border areas adjacent to Afghanistan. The state intelligence agency ISI in 
nexus with its American counterpart CIA, coined slogans like “Islam in Danger” and 
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“Holy War” as apt motivation for the Afghan resistance against a godless foe that was 
Soviet Union.    
By committing to become a front-line state versus the Soviets in Afghanistan, the 
Pakistan military warded off an external security threat posed by the Soviet presence in 
its neighborhood. The age-old Russian desire for access to the “warm waters of the 
Arabian sea” had become a very “real” possibility. The policy also lay to rest the long-
held Pathan irredentist claim to Pakistan‟s Northwest Frontier Province (called 
Pakhtunistan) where the Pathans form the largest ethnic group.  Ijaz Khan observes that 
Islamabad‟s pro-Taliban Afghan policy has been tailored, 
To counter Secular Nationalist Pashtun historically allied 
with Indian National Congress and an Afghanistan that 
refused to accept Durand Line and was friendly with India 
and Soviet Union. A Shia Iran could be countered by a 
Sunni Afghanistan …This was a continuation of Pakistan‟s 
earlier Afghan Policy with increased effectiveness in the 
wake of western withdrawal from Afghanistan after Soviet 
withdrawal and collapse.49 
 
 To recall the events of mid- 1973, when Sardar Daud, had overthrown his cousin 
King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, Pak-Afghan relations took a turn to the worse. Daud 
was a Moscow man, as pro-India as he was anti-Pakistan. He immediately revived the 
dormant „Pakhtunistan issue‟50, started to aid the rebels in Baluchistan, and refused to 
accept the Pak-Afghan border (the Durand Line) as drawn by the British. Concurrently 
with all this, he arranged for large quantities of arms to be smuggled from Afghanistan 
into Pakistan in addition to the bomb blasts that took place in NWFP.51 Islamabad‟s 
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response to Afghan belligerence was to organize an anti-Daud resistance around religious 
groups opposed to the anti-communist secular government in Kabul. To quote an 
Islamabad based strategic analyst Salma Malik: 
 Islamabad did this first by backing the fundamentalist 
warlord Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, both before and during the 
Soviet occupation; and thereafter by supporting the 
Taliban. Pakistan remains keen to prevent Afghanistan 
breaking up along ethnic lines. Such a development would 
generate pressures for a new pan-Pathan state.52 
Thus General Zia‟s military regime aided (financially) by the United States and 
other Western states and Saudi Arabia against the Soviets took ideological politics into its 
militant mode. This led to the internationalization of the Afghan jihad turning Pakistan 
into a frontline state and center of what Iqbal Ahmed has aptly termed as “Jihad 
International Inc”53. The Islamic parties particularly Jamat-i-Islami (JI) and also Jamat-i-
Ulma Islam (JUI)54 with its base among the tribal Pathan population close to Afghan 
border grew in terms of manpower, institutional set –up and financial resources. They 
gained international exposure and got hold of lethal weapons in large quantities. The 
Afghan jihad favored the Wahhabi Sunni parties of people like Gulbuddin Hikmatyar 
Hizb-e-Islami over others; the idea was to marginalize Iran (a Shia state) in a post-Soviet 
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Afghanistan that was to be dominated by forces friendly to their U.S.-Saudi-Pakistani 
benefactors.55 
All these trends externalized the agenda of Pakistan‟s radical Islamic groups from 
not only the narrow confines of electoral politics but also the territorial limits of the state. 
In the words of eminent scholar, Iftikhar H. Malik, local and regional patronization of the 
madrassas and jihadi training camps “and support for groups like Taliban and al-Qaeda 
by elements of the Pakistani state and society were crucial in transforming the Shia-Sunni 
conflict in to a parallel supra national, supra ethnic sectarian conflict.”56 This remained 
the trend for eleven years after the Afghan resistance movement, which finally led to 
Soviet retreat from Afghanistan in early 1989. The eclipse of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the Cold War resulted in sweeping changes in the global political system. Pakistan 
was “politically isolated as it was no longer required as a conduit of US supplies to 
Mujahideen.” 57   
Despite the departure of General Zia, Pakistani politics (in the wake of his death 
on 17 August 1988), remained tied to the concept of “strategic depth” versus India. 58 
Former Chief of Pakistan‟s Intelligence Agency Lt. General (retd) Hameed Gul terms the 
“strategic depth” policy of the establishment versus Afghanistan as “strategic necessity” 
as “we cannot afford two-war fronts on our eastern and western borders at the same 
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time.”59  As a result, with the departure of the common foe (the Soviet Union), “the 
religious war cries could not conceal the complexity of the Afghan situation – the shifting 
rivalries and coalitions among the Afghan groups, between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns, 
between Shias and Sunnis, and within the Pashtuns themselves, between Durranis and 
Ghilzais; the whole witches‟ brew was further stirred up by regional tensions involving 
Iran and Saudi Arabia and, later, some of the Central Asian republics. The continued 
fighting was not even a regular civil war between two clearly identifiable sides but a 
many-sided contest for advantage, turf, and spoils, as well as a proxy war for external 
interests.” 60 
 Pakistan‟s state agencies, primarily ISI, remained a guiding force for the conduct 
of pro-Islamabad and pro-Saudi-Arabian Afghan elements for another decade or so. The 
Taliban government in Kabul was hailed as a victory of the Sunni-Islamic element that 
was supposed to serve Islamabad‟s strategic aims in the region. To quote again Hameed 
Gul: 
During Jihad in Afghanistan we were supporting religious 
elements. Taliban government though traditional in 
approach never attacked us. Our border was peaceful…This 
was a soft border and Taliban were helping us in Kashmir 
(Indian occupied part) against Indian hegemony.61 
 
However, the facts on ground also point to the limited nature of Islamabad‟s 
influence on the Taliban regime in Kabul. Most pertinent examples were Islamabad‟s 
growing frustration with the Taliban in not being able to deter them from destroying the 
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Bamiyan Buddhas and failing in its efforts for extradition of „Lashkar-I-Jhangvi‟ (a 
banned militant outfit) fugitives who were wanted for targeted killings in Pakistan.62   
Thus, General Zia‟s domestic policy of Islamization stretched to Afghanistan in 
the name of Jihad against the Soviets for almost a decade and laid the foundation of the 
Jihadi culture within Pakistan. The boundary lines between the religious organizations, 
political parties, sectarian groups, and Jihadist elements and state security planners 
became increasingly blurred.  Moscow‟s defeat at the hands of the Afghan jihad gave 
birth to a new doctrine of „proxy war‟ or „low-intensity war‟ to be waged by non-state 
actors in the name of „Jihad‟. 
1.5: ‘Jihad’ in Kashmir since 1989 
  Pakistan‟s decision makers‟ world view characterized by “an Indo-centric foreign 
policy, suspicions of the West, and a world of Islam perspective” was shared by a whole 
new generation of mujahedeen graduating from the mushrooming madrassas in Pakistan 
who were to rid Kashmir of Hindu rule.63 Thus successive governments after Zia, 
whether democratic or military, remained committed to pro-Taliban policy in 
Afghanistan and pro-mujahedeen policy in Kashmir.  
In 1989, the long-standing Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan took a 
new turn with the outbreak of an indigenous Kashmiri uprising against India which was 
sparked by blatant election rigging in the 1987. Most of the analysts including Indian 
writers describe it as an indigenous revolt with generational, political, economic and 
religious roots.  In its first phase, the insurgency was largely in the hands of Kashmiris; 
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Suamantra Bose calls this period of the Kashmir struggle as the “intifada phase.” This 
freedom or independence (azadi) movement was a conflict between state power and the 
popular insurrection: in January 1990, Bose notes that “massive demonstrations calling 
for Kashmir‟s azadi from India erupted in Srinagar and other towns in the valley.” The 
Indian response was to unleash their paramilitary forces on the unarmed demonstrators; 
three days of protests left 300 demonstrators  dead in Srinagar.64 On 24 January 1990 
JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front) gunmen responded to the Srinagar 
massacre by killing four unarmed Indian air force officers on the outskirts of the city. 
Thereafter, „the Valley was caught up in an escalating spiral of violence and reprisal.‟65  
To quote Cohen, 
 
Kashmir is both cause and consequence of the India-
Pakistan conundrum. It is primarily a dispute about justice 
and people, although its territorial dimensions are 
complicated enough. Like many intractable problems, it is 
hard to tell where domestic policies end and foreign policy 
begins and the dispute has become firmly wedged in the 
internal politics of both countries.66 
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To date, India - Pakistan relations remain hostage to the unresolved nature of the 
Kashmir dispute67 and military establishments on both sides of the border insist that 
control over Kashmir is critical to the defense of their respective countries. Pakistan‟s 
choice of proxy war tactics since 1980s is dictated as much by the political hope of a 
Kashmiri uprising as it is the result of military necessity.68 Add to that the image of 
„Kashmir‟ in the minds of politicians, strategists, and scholars -- a place where national 
and sub-national identities are ranged against each other.69 Thus conflict in Kashmir is as 
much a clash between competing ideas and strategies, as it is a conflict over territory, 
resources and peoples. The images of the self and the other have given rise to policies 
that are diametrically opposed to each other. 
 Pakistan maintains that violence in Indian-held Kashmir is an indigenous 
“freedom struggle for right of self-determination” of the Kashmiri Muslims in response to 
“state-terrorism” of the Indian forces. Thus, it is a justified cause and Pakistan remains a 
party to an un-resolved “Kashmir dispute” (as stipulated in the United Nations resolutions 
on Kashmir)70 and is committed to extending moral, diplomatic and humanitarian support 
to its Kashmiri brethren. The Pakistan government has raised the Kashmir issue at all 
possible international forums like the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) which 
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has adopted resolutions and called for the resolution of Kashmir issue in accordance with 
the principle of “self-determination” as envisioned in the UN resolutions on this issue.71 
Similarly, Islamabad has repeatedly called for international mediation as an „effective 
tool‟ to convince India to a negotiated settlement of Kashmir issue.72   
However successive Indian governments insist on seeing the Kashmir conflict 
differently as entirely of Pakistan‟s making and accuse it of “cross-border terrorism.”73 
According to Cohen, Indians argue that:  
Pakistan, a state defined and driven by its religion, is given 
to irredentist aspirations in Kashmir because it is unwilling 
to accept the fact of a secular India…Indians also point out 
to Bangladesh as proof that Jinnah‟s call for a separate 
religion-based homeland for the Sub-continent‟s Muslims 
was untenable. In contrast, India‟s secularism, strengthened 
by the presence of a Muslim-majority state of Kashmir 
within India, proves that religion alone does not make a 
nation.74     
 
While the never-ending story of Pakistan and India‟s conflicting claims and 
contradictory interpretations of the genesis of conflict in Kashmir continues to date, the 
fact is that, since the uprising in 1989, the situation in Kashmir has become a bloody 
stalemate. The region has seen three full-scale wars between India and Pakistan (1948; 
1965; and 1971) and countless border skirmishes. The current Indo-Pak thaw in relations 
holds little promise of a long lasting peace in Kashmir. At best it should be seen as the 
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beginning of the long over-due normalization process between the two sides which if 
sustained can materialize into a durable resolution of Kashmir conflict. 
The hard reality is that, “while Indian officials claim a decline in militancy”, 
international human rights groups and independent observers report little change, and 
within Kashmir the death toll mounts. Most of the Kashmiri population remains 
alienated, whether they are the Pandits (many of whom have fled their homes), or the 
Valley Muslims, bitterly divided and increasingly terrorized by the radical Islamic 
groups.”75 
Thus, the role and influence of radical Islamic groups known as “Jihadi groups” 
operating in Kashmir with their bases across the Line of Control (LOC) is another critical 
element of the infrastructure of terrorism within the country. These are the undeclared or 
unofficial elements of the state‟s Kashmir policy dubbed as “strategic tools”76 since 1989. 
The extent of Islamabad‟s influence and control over these elements remains quite vague 
and undocumented at the official level. Reading between the lines, President Musharraf‟s 
promise in 2003 to the United States that “Pakistan will assure that in future no cross – 
border infiltration takes place through LOC…, is an indirect admittance of the state‟s 
involvement and knowledge versus the Jihadi groups presently active in the Kashmir 
theatre.”77 Thus, the role and support of Jihadi groups (that involve indoctrination, 
logistic and material help) became critical in the calculus of national security 
imperatives.78 The positive outcome for the strategists in Islamabad of aiding non-state 
elements in Kashmir has been: 
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 The Jihadi groups enabled Islamabad to fight a proxy war 
inside Kashmir, tie up perhaps quarter of a million Indian 
troops and paramilitary police (a low estimate), and signal 
New Delhi that any settlement of the dispute could not be 
entirely on India‟s terms.79 
 
However, it is pertinent to note, that Pakistan‟s role was not the decisive factor in 
starting the uprising; rather it has been a critical factor in sustaining it. 
Pro-Pakistan groups like Lashkar-I-Taiba and Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen became as prominent in the Kashmir jihad as 
the largely Kashmiri Hezb-ul-Mujahideen. These groups 
became part of the network of Jihadi organizations 
operating outside the  Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands 
and using the camps in Paktia and Nangarhar in 
Afghanistan to train their guerrilla fighters. Kashmir 
became a new focus of the international jihad, where 
Pakistanis, Afghans, Arabs, Bangladeshis, and Indian 
Muslims fought alongside Kashmiris.80  
 
A friendly Afghanistan could provide a base where Kashmiri militants could be 
trained. “We support the jihad in Kashmir”, commented Mullah Omar in 1998.81 The 
extent of Pakistan‟s control and influence on the jihadis was proved by their withdrawal 
from Kargil, which took place days after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, made an appeal to 
them. For instance, Islamists were at the forefront during the Kargil crises of May-July 
1999, while the Pakistani troops, despite official denials were operationally supporting 
the Islamist fighters.82  
The combination of these factors caused the overlap between sectarian and jehadi 
organizations to grow around their common „world view‟ (discussed in the earlier part of 
the chapter). Admitting this, Naveed Ahmed, an activist of Sipah Sahaba, Jhang, said: 
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While Jihadi organizations are fighting against infidels on 
our borders we are putting an end to them in Pakistan. Both 
are jihad but we cannot bring our mutual connections to 
common knowledge due to certain constraints.83 
 
The key point to stress here is the meshing of internal and external security 
dimensions as a result of Islamabad‟s policies in Afghanistan (1979 onwards) and Indian 
administered Kashmir respectively. To quote Barry Buzan: 
By committing itself to the Saudi-backed Sunni cause in 
Afghanistan and by tolerating violence against its own Shia 
minority, Pakistan has made a strategic error of potentially  
the same gravity as that which lost it Bangladesh…Pakistan 
has been steadily dissipating  the political resources that 
gained it independence in 1947…Its army dominated 
political life whether  in or out of government, in the 
process contributing to the degradation of 
democracy…India-Pakistan is still largely a story of 
securitizations about military power, weapons, and political 
status…South Asia is clearly in the zone of conflict, where 
the traditional power- politics rules of international 
relations still  prevail.84 
 
The pertinent question is: How Pakistan‟s involvement in Afghanistan and 
Kashmir (Indian administered part) affected its security environment at the domestic and 
international level? 
Part Two 
2.1: Security Implications of Pakistan’s Involvement in Afghanistan and Kashmir 
Pakistan was instrumental in the retreat of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and 
later on played a critical role in installing the Taliban regime in Kabul in mid 1990s – all 
this was achieved at the cost of the shearing of its domestic social fabric by the extremist 
networks and their vision of “military struggle termed as Holy Jihad” at home and 
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abroad. By the end of 2000, Pakistan was home to fifty-eight religious parties and 
twenty-four armed religious militias,85 the latter category also popularly known as “Jihadi 
groups.” The term “Jihad” deserves a brief introduction as it signifies a sacred Islamic 
concept that today stands distorted and tarnished. A noted authority on Islam, Professor 
Javed Ahmed Ghamidi observes: 
Jihad literally means to strive for a cause and there are 
many kinds of Jihad and role of individual varies 
accordingly. The directive of using force is given to 
Muslims in their collective responsibility. All verses of the 
Quran which mention this directive do not address Muslims 
in their individual capacity. Thus, no person or group 
among them has the right to take a step on its own in this 
regard on behalf of the Muslims… It‟s only the state that 
has the right to declare „Jihad‟… Al-Qaeda and Taliban are 
misusing our territory (that is, Pakistan) for so-called Jihad. 
They have no right to lead us or fight in our name.86  
 
  More so, according to the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad (PBUH), “The best Jihad 
is speaking of a word of justice to a tyrannical ruler.” 87 However, modern-day religious 
extremists interpret Jihad primarily in terms of the use of force to impose their version of 
Islam on others and to fight the “infidels” in order to conquer the world. That is,  
They invoke Jihad to help Muslims who are in distress      
around the world, though their agendas are more political 
than religious. In  their view, even killing of innocent 
civilians for their higher cause is justified, though this is in 
clear violation of the established laws of Islamic warfare… 
Today‟s jihadi, however, is least concerned about such 
Islamic traditions. Furthermore, it is not only Hindus, Jews, 
and Christians who are their  perceived enemies, but even  
Muslims having views different from theirs are considered 
heretics and hence worth eliminating.88 
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In case of Pakistan, the notion of „Jihad‟ has been used as a medium of 
communication by the radicalized factions to forge nexus between the “so-called grieved 
and exploited Muslims” versus exploitative forces at the micro and macro level. The 
„military jihad‟ is considered as „farz-e-ain‟ (that is, primary duty, compulsory) to quote 
Jamaat ul Dawa (JD) head Hafiz M Saeed: 
 Muslims throughout the world have a bond of Kalma. From 
 Lahore to Srinagar, Kabul to Baghdad, Basra to Chechnya, 
 they are fighting under this Kalma, but the infidel world 
 does not like it and describe it as terrorism89 
 
Why do we engage in jihad?‟ Darul Anddalas, the department of media and 
publication of Jammat ul Dawa, published a booklet with this title in May 1999. It says 
that Lashkare Taiba is involved in jihad for the following reasons that have been taken 
from the Quran: 
 While there is evil, it [is] the duty of Muslims to fight it; It 
 is the   duty of Muslims to fight till the Faith of Allah is 
 supreme in the  whole world; Until the governments of 
 infidels in the world are not  defeated and do not start 
 paying Jazai(sic) (tax paid by non-Muslims to the 
 Muslim rulers) it is [the] duty to fight them; While  there 
 are people being oppressed in any part of the world it is a 
 duty to fight for their liberation; If an infidel kills a 
 Muslim, revenge is a duty; If any nation breaks an 
 agreement with Muslims,  fighting them is a duty; If any 
 nation attacks Muslims, fighting in  defense is a duty;If 
 any infidels occupy a land belonging to Muslims, it is 
 a duty to throw them out and restore Muslim 
 occupation.90 
 
The point to be noted here is that militants within and outside Pakistan with their 
dichotomous world view interpret the concept of “Jihad” to legitimize violent means. At 
times these groups received state patronage, particularly during General Zia‟s eleven 
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years‟ military rule, and, external assistance from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and 
other Western States (during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan). Thus, “Jihad is a 
mindset. It developed over many years during the Afghan war. The mindset cannot be 
changed in twenty-four hours.”91 The critical role of state and its policies versus its 
neighbors (as discussed earlier) at the cost of non-investment in the human development 
cannot be ignored. Riaz M Khan, a former foreign secretary contends, “Foreign and 
security policy cannot compensate for the internal weaknesses. Policy should be inclusive 
in nature.”92  
Most of the analysts and policy makers even prior to 9/11 WTC incidents were 
highly critical of the positive value of Pakistan‟s pro-Taliban policy. The negative 
security implications for Pakistan found expression in the following statement of a former 
Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Sardar Asif Ali: 
  
 We are proud of our contribution to the Afghan Jihad. We 
 must  remember that today‟s unipolar world; in no small 
 measure is the  result of the Afghan war. And yet in the 
 aftermath of the victory of  the Afghan Jihad, [we] were 
 left not with the sweet dish of victory, but the gifts of 
 drug trafficking, Kalashnikov culture, colossal 
 environment damage, social tensions and a host of other 
 painful legacies that flowed from the free use of our 
 territory for the fight  against Soviet occupation forces.93  
 
Generally, it can be said that Pakistan‟s support to Afghans for more than a 
decade against the Soviet occupation and acceptance of millions of refugees, has had 
critical implications for the country. The complex web of militant infrastructure remained 
operative even after the Soviet‟s retreat from Afghanistan. This had serious implications 
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for the terrorism as some of the military training camps and religious seminaries in 
Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan became the breeding grounds for ethnic and sectarian 
violence. The fact was well recognized by the government circles. Naseerullah Khan 
Baber, the then Interior Minister, identified the fallout on Pakistan from hosting the 
Afghan refugees as “drugs, terrorism and weapons… Afghanistan had become a training 
ground for terrorism that was being imported into Pakistan and other parts of the 
world.”94   
  Thus, Pakistan‟s role as the frontline state in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979 – 
1989) solidified the basis of violence and militancy within the country. The nexus 
between the Islamist outfits and the state secret agencies, primarily ISI, became well 
entrenched. This had critical security implications both at the internal and external levels.  
From 1989 onwards, sectarianism within Pakistan was no longer a matter of 
domestic security alone, it became a regional phenomenon. The major sectarian groups in 
Pakistan were the virulently anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), Harkut-ul-Ansar and 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) and the pro-Shia Sipah-Muhammad (SM). The SM aimed at a 
revolution of an Iranian type, while SSP and its brother groups would accept nothing less 
than the declaration of Pakistan as an orthodox Sunni state.95 The LJ was targeting Shia 
civil servants and killed government officers, particularly in Punjab.96 
For the SSP leadership, murdering Shias was pure Jihad and overtime it forged 
ties with the drug traders, local criminals to do the “needful”. This reproduced 
relationships between the militant groups and drug traffickers that had already evolved in 
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Afghanistan.97 The financial sources of these groups were no longer indigenous. Saudi 
Arabia started pouring money in too. For Saudi Arabia, the Iranian revolution and 
subsequent rise in Shia activism in Muslim countries like Pakistan was seen as a negative 
trend to its version of universal Sunni Islam. According to Vali Raza Nasr, a leading 
expert on the sectarian groups of Pakistan, the flow of these funds was primarily routed 
through the Pakistan military and ISI.98In 1990 the murder of Sadiq Ganji, the Iranian 
consul- general in Lahore changed the course of Shia-Sunni confrontation for the worse. 
A twenty-three year old SSP activist, Riaz Basra who accomplished this task became a 
hero among the party sympathizers, was  encouraged to repeat the performance. He was 
arrested in 1992 but escaped from custody in 1994 and found safe refuge in Afghanistan. 
In 1995-96, Basra was leading the SSP splinter radical group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Army 
of Jhangvi, hereafter called Lashkar) a terrorist group with the base camp in Afghanistan. 
 According to Hassan Abbas: 
 Lashkar distinguished itself as the most violent sectarian 
 force in Pakistan... It also started operating in Indian-
 controlled Kashmir but, keeping in line with its philosophy, 
 it embarked on this journey by starting to murder 
 Kashmiri Shia leaders before  targeting the Indian forces… 
 Lashkar also attempted to assassinate Prime  Minister  
 Nawaz Sharif on January 3, 1999... Lashkar  activists were 
 using Afghanistan as a sanctuary courtesy of the 
 Taliban…Riaz Basra developed a close working 
 relationship with Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.99 
 
Parallel to these developments, Iranian funding to Shia organizations also 
increased, making Pakistan a battleground for Saudi Arabia and Iran to settle their scores. 
No effective measures were taken by the Pakistan government to halt this slide into 
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chaos. The Iranian government in the wake of killing of nine Iranian diplomats in August 
1998 by Taliban forces in Mazar-I Sharif, held Pakistan partly responsible for this event. 
Iran‟s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khomeini demanded that Pakistan drop its support of 
the Taliban.100This Iranian demand was brushed aside by the Islamabad terming it  
counter productive to its strategic interests in the region. In fact, according to Samina 
Ahmed, “the army used the instability caused by sectarian violence to pressure the 
democratic governments.”101 The following tables give the breakdown of the incidents of 
sectarian terrorism in Pakistan from 1987 till 2002 in terms of venue and human loss: 
Incidents of Sectarian Terrorism 
Table 1: (1987 – March 2002) 
Year  Total Incidents Injured Dead 
1987 25 153 11 
1988 10 10 1 
1989 67 67 10 
1990 274 274 32 
1991 180 263 53 
1992 135 119 58 
1993 90 247 39 
1994 162 316 73 
1995 88 180 59 
                                                 
100  Note: The Taliban massacred hundreds of Shia Hazaras in 1998, enlarging the sectarian confrontation 
in the region. Also see, “Tensions Mount between Iran, Afghanistan‟s Taliban”, CNN, September 14, 1998. 
Available at: http: //www.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9809/14/iran.afghan.border. 
101 Samina Ahmed, “Centralization, Authoritarianism, and the Mismanagement of Ethnic Relations in 
Pakistan”, in Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific, ed., Michael E. Brown and 
Sumit Ganguly, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, pp: 107 –127. 





1996 71 210 83 
1997 97 175 200 
1998 36 80 132 
1999 21 45 53 
2000 24 90 37 
2001 54 180 154 
2002 10 39 21 
Total 1342 2450 1016 
 
Table 2: Shias and Sunnis Killed in Sectarian Terrorism 
(1990 – March 2002) 
Year Total Dead Shia Sunni 
Police/Workers 
of other Law 
Enforcing 
Agencies/Others 
1990 30 13 14 5 
1991 53 29 23 1 
1992 58 22 16 7 
1993 39 17 11 1 
1994 73 39 23 7 
1995 59 36 22 1 
1996 83 56 34  
1997 200 105 90 5 
1998 132 109 23  





1999 53 68 36  
2000 37 4 26 7 
2001 154 80 64 10 
2002 21 15 6  
     Total 994 593 388 44 
 
Table 3: Incidents of Sectarian Terrorism  
(1990 – March 2002) 
Year  Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan Islamabad 
1990 159 39 23 3 1 
1991 110 35 12 1  
1992 39 42 19   
1993 34 21 19 4 1 
1994 88 39 17   
1995 34 18 5 2  
1996 23 12 7 1  
1997 23 14  2  
1998 47 10 18  5 
1999 21 16 8   
2000 11 10 3   
2001 18 10 5 3  
2002 3  7   





Source: M Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, Lahore: Mashal 
Books, 2004, pp: 586 – 587. 
 
The key trend in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in late 1980s 
was the increased activity of the militant networks within Pakistan and beyond.  
The Afghan war (1979 – 1989) was understood as a Jihad within a traditional 
paradigm (of Deobandi Sunni sub-sect), part local, part national, part tribal, part ethnic. 
The Taliban rule in Kabul was seen as a model to be replicated in case of Pakistan by the 
radical Islamists. Some leading Deobandi clerics, such as Sami ul Haq from the famous 
Haqqaniya madrassa at Akhora Khattak in NWFP, have freely admitted that whenever 
the Taliban put out a call for fighters they closed down their schools and sent their 
students to Afghanistan.102 Similarly, in December 1998, Deobandis began a campaign to 
purge the Baluchistan capital Quetta of video rental shops, video recorders and 
televisions. The campaign has continued periodically ever since.  
In late 2000, a number of such campaigns were reported in the North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP) now Khyber Pakhtunkhawa. “This is an ongoing process”, 
said one radical activist, “We will continue to burn TV sets, VCRs and other similar 
things to spread the message that their misuse is threatening our religion, society and 
family life”.103 The establishment was unable to stem this tide of radicalization, and 
extremist Islamic groups continued to operate from Peshawar as before. In 2001 Interior 
Minister Moinuddin Haider during a visit to Afghanistan carried a list of 60 terrorists 
believed to be involved in sectarian killings in Pakistan who had taken refuge in 
Afghanistan. The Taliban government refused to sign an extradition treaty with Pakistan. 
                                                 
102 Quoted in, Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, op.cit, pp: 9 – 10. 
103 Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Islamic Jirga sets TV and VCRs on Fire in Mardan”, The News, 19 February 
2001. 





In short, the minister‟s empty-handed return established the linkage that existed between 
the thrust of the Taliban and sectarian killings in Pakistan.104  
The reality of highly galvanized radical sections of society in Pakistan resonates 
in the following words of Brigadier (Retd) A R Siddiqui: 
 Whether bonafide Afghans or Pakistani activists involved 
in the Afghanistan Jihad. Pakistan simply bristles with 
armed, battle-tested activists (call them terrorists, if you 
will) on the lookout for operational vistas and new battle 
grounds. Pakistan remains their sanctuary, their safe haven 
and ethnic base.105 
 
From the Islamists‟ perspective (reportedly also shared by Pakistani 
establishment) the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan and the subsequent collapse of the 
Soviet superpower was an enormous boost for the Ulema and, for many, a confirmation 
of the efficacy of the „Jihad model‟. The missing element in this perspective of „universal 
jihad‟ is the critical role of western assistance in terms of armaments, finances, Pakistan‟s 
role as essential link between the Mujahedeen and western world and above all the Cold 
War international milieu that legitimized Jihad against the Soviets. 
Waseem explains this in the following words:  
The involvement of Islamic militants in the wars in 
Afghanistan and Kashmir contributed to privatization of 
foreign policy and militarization of Islamic activists. The 
international Islamic networks finally provided a global 
agenda for the movement in terms of endemic anti-
Americanism... State policies, regional instability and non-
resolution of conflicts involving Muslims in the region and 
in the world at large are the leading determinants of the 
nature and direction of Islamic organizations in Pakistan.106   
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Against this backdrop, we will briefly sketch the contours of the most prominent 
jehadi organizations presently active in Kashmir – and supposed to be banned and no 
longer active on the Pakistan side of the Line of Control:  Harkat ul Majahideen (HUM); 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT); Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM). The key point to note is that there 
exist cross linkages and overlap between the Islamists or jihadis belonging to sectarian 
groups, religious parties, and those active in Kashmir and elsewhere and the element of 
the state being a nurturer or silent spectator of these trends cannot be overlooked. 
2.2: Harkat- ul - Mujahidin (HUM) 
Named as Jamiat ul-Ansar; Party of the Volunteers; Movement of Holy Warriors; 
formerly called Harkat –ul- Ansar. HUM is a Pakistan-based Deobandi jehadi militant 
organization that seeks reuniting Kashmir across LoC and creates an Islamic state in 
Pakistan. It was banned by America in October 2001 for its militant activities in Kashmir 
and Afghanistan. It emerged as an offshoot of Arcata Jehadul Islami in 1984 founded by 
Maulana Fazlur Rehman Khalil, to fight the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union 
in Afghanistan. According to Harkat records, important operations in Indian part of 
Kashmir  include; “the siege of Hazrat Bal, occupation of Charar Sharif, Zangli Camp 
encounter and operation to destroy a bridge in the Indian province of Assam.”107In 
December 1999, HUM hijacked an Indian airliner that resulted in the release of Maulana 
Masood Azhar, who had been imprisoned by India since 1994 for association with HUM 
attacks.108  
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After his release, Azhar broke up with the HUM and formed the new Jaish-e-
Muhammad (JeM), taking many HUM members with him. In 2001, after the HUM was 
banned by President Pervez Musharraf; Khalil renamed the group Jamiat ul-Ansar. 
At the moment there are around ten offices of Harkatul Mujahideen functioning in 
Azad Kashmir only. It used to have forty-eight offices in Pakistan of which twenty-four 
are working now countrywide. The Islamabad, Karachi and Muzzaffarabad offices have 
achieved central status after the crack down on jehadi organizations and are controlling 
the entire management. Earlier, HUM used to have four training camps in Afghanistan, 
and one each in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. With the end of the Taliban regime, the 
camps in Afghanistan were closed down. They were at Barhi, Ghund, and Kabul. The 
camp at Mansehra in Pakistan was closed temporarily while the one at Muzzaffarabad in 
Azad Kashmir is still working.109 
Despite signing Osama bin Laden‟s 1998 declaration against the United States, 
the group has not been known to target U.S. interests primarily. HUM remains focused 
against India in occupied Kashmir and Jammu. However, in 2002, Pakistani authorities 
arrested three members of an HUM subgroup, the al-Almi faction, which admitted to the 
June 14, 2002, bombing of the U.S. Consulate in Karachi that killed 11 people.110 HUM 
was also reported to be involved in a coup attempt, code-named Operation Khilafat, 
against the government of Benazir Bhutto.111Pakistani and U.S. intelligence agencies are 
now convinced that Harkatul Mujahideen retains an active liaison with the Taliban 
remnants and al-Qaeda operatives hiding in Pakistan.112According to CIA reports the 
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volunteers are recruited in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. HUM trains an international 
network of fighters to defend the rights of Muslims all over the world. It extended its 
activities to Jammu and Kashmir, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, 
Myanmar and the Philippines. HUM‟s Burma branch, located in the Arakans113, trains 
local Muslims in weapon handling and guerrilla warfare. In Tajikistan, HUM members 
have served with and trained Tajik resistance elements.  
The financial sources of Harkatul Mujahideen range from sympathizers not only 
in Pakistan and Kashmir, but also in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. The group 
allegedly also raises funds among Pakistani and Kashmiri expatriates in Europe, 
primarily Britain.114 It‟s fund raising in Pakistan though curtailed comes from jehadi 
funds from mosques, sale of skins of sacrificial animals and medicines, plus private 
donations. In sum, HUM represents a convergence of a local, territorially- based agenda 
aimed at Jammu and Kashmir with a global, anti-American, “international jihad” focus.  
2.3: Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) 
Named as Army of Mohammed or Khaddam ul-Islam, JEM is an important jehadi 
organization of the Deobandi sect based in Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan banned 
it on January 12, 2002. In spite of the ban, Jaish-e-Mohammed is operating freely in Azad 
Kashmir and many areas of Pakistan. JEM aims to end Indian rule in disputed Jammu and 
Kashmir (J&K), expel Indian security forces from the region, and unite J& K with 
Pakistan. Maulana Masood Azhar, its founder used the following words to describe the 
manifesto of JEM in the June 2001 issue of the fortnightly „Jaish e Mohammed‟:                
Jaish-e-Mohammed (PBUH) is an international Islamic 
movement created at this time on the principles of 
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Shariah…This movement is doing jihad against the 
enemies of the faith on the one hand and working to bring 
back the Muslims to the door of Islam on the other…What 
more can a Muslim want than being a claimant to Faith, a 
fighter in its cause prepared to offer all sacrifices? And the 
most important thing is having a heart enlightened with the 
yearning for Martyrdom.115  
 
JEM was established by Maulana Masood Azhar in March 2000 after being 
released from prison in December 1999 in exchange for 155 hostages aboard the Indian 
plane that had been hijacked by HUM militants. According to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI) Masood Azhar and Umar Saeed Sheikh went to Afghanistan after 
being released. They met with Osama bin Laden who financed them to launch Jaish-e-
Muhammed.116  
The JEM has targeted Indian officials, government buildings and soldiers as well 
as non-Muslim civilians in Pakistan and J&K.117The JEM is suspected of executing a 
suicide bomb attack outside the J&K state assembly on October 1, 2001, killing up to 38 
people. The group initially claimed credit for the attack, but later denied involvement. 
The Indian government also accused the JEM, in conjunction with Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, of 
carrying out a deadly attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001.118 
After President Musharraf outlawed the group in January 2002, JEM‟s leader and 
founder, Azhar, was placed under house arrest, but then he was released in December 
2002.119Experts describe JEM strategies and attacks as fidayeen (suicide) in nature. The 
JEM uses a variety of firearms, including light and heavy machine guns, and assault 
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rifles. JEM assailants have also used mortars, improvised explosive devices, and rocket 
grenades. According to Jaish sources, it conducted thirty-five fidayeen attacks in 
Occupied Kashmir in 2001 during which only twenty-three Mujahideen were martyred 
while India lost 250 officers and soldiers.  
The JEM was implicated in the February 2002 kidnapping and execution of 
journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Pearl, 38, worked as the South Asia Bureau Chief for 
the Wall Street Journal. He was on assignment in Karachi to interview members of 
militant groups and trace their possible links with alleged shoe-bomber Richard 
Reid.120Similarly, according to the investigations of the December 25 twin suicide attacks 
on President Musharraf‟s life in Rawalpindi, the suicide bombers were identified as 
Muhammad Jameel, a Jaish-e-Mohammad activist from Azad Kashmir and Hazir Sultan, 
a Harkat al-Jihad al-Islami operative from Afghanistan. 
The Jaish led by Maulana Masood Azhar and Harkat headed by Qari Saifullah 
Akhtar, are components of a five-member “Brigade 313” (equivalent to the number of 
companions with Prophet Muhammad PBUH at the Battle of Badr), launched in 2001 
after the US-led Allied Forces attacked Afghanistan. Three other Brigade components 
included Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Harkatul Mujahideen al-Almi. The 
Brigade leadership had pledged to target key Pakistani leaders who in their opinion were 
damaging the cause of jihad to further the American agenda in Pakistan. Experts believe 
that despite the ban, JEM‟s financial sources have not dried up yet and its network is 
spread over 78 districts in Pakistan. The manpower and infrastructure of the Jaish 
remains very much intact and has serious threat potential for internal stability of Pakistan, 
peace prospects with India and safety of American citizens and interests. 
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2.3: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) 
Known as “Army of the Righteous/Pure”, Jamaat al-Dawat, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 
(LT) is a radical Islamic group in Pakistan that seeks to establish Islamic rule throughout 
South Asia. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the militant outfit formed in 1990, is a subsidiary of 
major Ahle-Hadees organization, Markaz Dawat-ul-Irshad (MDI – Center for Religious 
Learning and Propagation; also called Jamaat al-Dawa), which was founded in 1987 by 
Mr Zafar Iqbal, Hafiz M Saeed, and Abdullah Azzam. MDI aspires to develop a jihadi 
culture by imparting Islamic education in a modern setting and at the same time 
providing military training to its activists. Since 1993, LT has become one of the largest 
and best-organized groups fighting in Kashmir against India.121 The Indian government 
accused LT of involvement in the December 2001 bombing of the Indian Parliament and 
charged the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) with supporting the group. President 
Musharraf banned the LT in January 2002, and the LT renamed itself Jamaat al-Dawat. 
The LT‟s leader, Hafiz M Saeed, was arrested in Pakistan in January 2002 but then 
released in December 2002.122 
Lashkar-e-Tayyeba was the first to introduce the concept of Fedayeen (suicide) 
missions in Occupied Kashmir. The group has used various types of firearms, machine 
guns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades. LT is not known to have 
conducted attacks against American citizens or American interests. A major accusation 
against LT has been the promotion of sectarianism and promoting the Ahle Hadees 
school of thought within Pakistan. To quote an analyst: 
The rise of Ahle Hadith and Deobandi Islam through the 
militias fighting in Kashmir is gradually transforming 
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Pakistani society. It is becoming more puritanical and less 
tolerant of practices it thinks are in violation of Islam.123   
 
    In March 2002, senior Al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah was captured in the LT 
safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, indicating that the group may be helping Al Qaeda 
members to move through Pakistan.124 There are also reports that members of LT have 
participated in conflicts in Bosnia, Chechnya, and the Philippines, suggesting that the 
group may have links to various other radical Islamic organizations. 
Financial strength has been a major factor behind LT expansion. In terms of 
funding, it receives grants from around the world, mostly from well-to-do Ahle-
Hadith/Wahhabi sympathizers, though their primary source has been contributions from 
Saudi Arabia.125 Regular fund-raising in local mosques as well as in Islamic centers in 
North America and Europe also takes place in the name of jihad for supporting Muslims 
who are victims in conflict zones worldwide. 
The proliferation of militant jihadi groups and the emergence of powerful Islamist 
movements like the HUM, LT and JEM can be described as the wages Pakistan has been 
collecting for assuming a “front-line state role” in the US-led campaign against the 
former Soviet Union in the Afghan Jihad of 1970s. These organizations eye Pakistan as 
the country which they can turn into an orthodox theocratic Islamic State to serve as the 
base for their violent missions abroad.126 This front-line phase also registered manifold 
increase in the number of religious seminaries with the funds flowing from the United 
                                                 
123 Rizwan Zeb, op.cit, p: 64. 
124 Dan Rothem, “CDI Fact Sheet: Lashkar-e- Taiba,” Center for Defence Information, updated August 12, 
2002.  
125 Jessica Stern, Terror in the name of God, p: 107. 
126 C. Christine Fair, “Military recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al- Qaeda and other 
organizations,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27 No. 6,July 2007. p: 491. 





States, Saudi Arabia, China, Egypt and so on to  train and indoctrinate „mujahidin‟ to 
fight  „the Godless communists‟. For instance, in 1971 there were only 900 Madaris in 
Pakistan but by the end of the Zia era, there were as many as 8,000 registered and as 
many as 25,000 unregistered Madaris.127 Reportedly, more than 25 million US dollars 
were spent by CIA in printing and distributing literature glorifying jihad and encouraging 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan to join political organizations promoting jihad.128 This 
helped raise a cadre of homegrown „jihadis‟ to serve the Muslim cause in distant lands 
and  whom the state could also use for its policies in Indian administered Kashmir.  
Following the end of the Cold War in 1989 when the Western alliance 
conveniently walked out of the theatre, Islamabad as if unaware of the radicalism the 
Afghan jihad had unleashed made no effort to bring it under control. At this juncture, the 
analysis of General Musharraf‟s pre-9/11 security outlook and policies at the domestic 
and international level requires deliberation. 
2.4:  Musharraf - Pre 9/11 Phase 
General Musharraf came to power on October 12, 1999 overthrowing the 
popularly elected Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1997-99). He managed 
to topple the government which had retired him as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) a few 
hours earlier. Pervez Musharraf announced a seven-point agenda, on October 17, 1999 
which included: 
Rebuild national confidence and morale; Strengthen the 
federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony and restore 
national cohesion;  Devolution of power to the grass roots 
level; Revive the economy and restore investor confidence; 
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Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice; 
Depoliticize state institutions; and, Ensure swift and across 
the board accountability.129 
 
The military take-over was initially greatly welcomed by the civil society leaders 
and leading politicians like Benazir Bhutto and Imran Khan.  At a press conference in 
London on October 19 Bhutto acknowledged that she had made contact with the army 
after the coup, seeking safe passage to return to Pakistan. Justifying the coup, she said: 
“Nawaz Sharif created conditions   for the military take over.”130  
The hopes were that Pakistan under the military ruler‟s seven-point reforms will 
be able to stabilize the economy, control rising sectarianism and put a check on mis- 
governance. The public disillusioned by the civil government‟s corruption and 
mismanagement welcomed military rule. Musharraf  was seen as a transitional authority 
to a more stable and secular democracy. “He was the messiah they'd been waiting for” 
says Ayaz Amir, a columnist with the Dawn newspaper, Pakistan's largest English-
language daily.  
However, on the international front General Musharraf‟s military coup on 
October 12, 1999 added to the country‟s diplomatic isolation: additional American 
sanctions were imposed and Pakistan was suspended from the Commonwealth. In effect, 
Islamabad had only two important allies left: China and Saudi Arabia.131 In external 
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affairs the old policy on Kashmir and Afghanistan, always an army domain, continued 
together with its close working relationship with the Taliban which remained unaffected 
even by the Taliban‟s rejection of Pakistan‟s efforts to save the   pre-Islamic Bamiyan 
Buddhas and refusal to hand over the Lashkhar-i-Jhangvi fugitives operating from 
Afghan sanctuaries. This was the threat of what came to be known as „Talibanization‟132 
that Islamabad ignored despite its knowledge of the close working relations the Lashkar  
had developed with Al- Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Lt. General (retd) Asad Durrani 
believes that Islamabad‟s influence on Taliban regime in Kabul was limited in reality. He 
contends that the “Taliban in Afghanistan used our logistics but hardly followed our 
orders.”133  
Yet because of the singular nature of relationship Pakistan had with Kabul, 
Islamabad faced constant international diplomatic pressure to seek Taliban‟s compliance 
with demands for closing terrorist camps and handing over Osama bin Laden to the US 
authorities. Musharraf sought refuge in his pet argument of “geo strategic compulsions” 
those days that critics of his pro-Taliban stance at home and abroad did not accept. He 
argued that “If we had broken with them, that would have created a new enemy on our 
western border, or a vacuum of power there into which might have stepped the Northern 
Alliance, comprising anti-Pakistan elements. The Northern Alliance was supported by 
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Russia, India and Iran.” 134 He was of the view that only through engagement the Taliban 
could be reformed. 
On the domestic front General Musharraf undertook a number of measures to put 
the house in order. In his very first address to the nation, he asserted: “Islam teaches 
tolerance not hatred… We must curb elements which are exploiting religion for vested 
interest and bring bad name to our faith. ”135 President Musharraf publicly condemned 
Islamic extremism well before 9/11 and envisaged Pakistan as a moderate Muslim state 
that would resemble Turkey rather than Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Addressing a 
gathering of religious leaders on June 5, 2001, President Musharraf warned that, “… our 
conduct internally and externally had led the world to regard us as terrorists.” 136 
To rein in the rising tide of sectarianism and restore law and order on 14 August 
2001, Musharraf banned Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) – Sunni radical outfit and Sipah-e-
Mohammed – Shia radical group, respectively. Similarly, on June 18, 2001 the „Pakistan 
Madrassa Education Board Ordinance 2001‟ was promulgated. According to this 
Ordinance, over 10,000 religious seminaries – Madaris were to be brought into the public 
education system through registration, curriculum reform and financial audit. This never 
materialized. President Musharraf himself admitted that his Madrassa reforms are being 
implemented slowly: 
There are about 10,000 of them (Madrassas) and there are 
about 1 million poor students getting free boarding and 
lodging. These madrassas are doing a welfare service to the 
poor. The negative side is that most of them are teaching 
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religion, so my belief is that we need to carry out reforms 
to reinforce their strengths and eliminate their 
weaknesses.137 
 
Similarly, General Musharraf backtracked on procedural changes he had made 
under the Blasphemy Law 295-C observing that “As it was the unanimous demand of the 
Ulema, Mashaikh and the people, therefore, I have decided to do away with the 
procedural change in the registration of FIR under the Blasphemy Law.”138 The 
Musharraf government also undertook several measures to put the economy back on track 
including 5 per cent cut in defense budget as part of his economic recovery plan.139 This 
paved the way for the Club of Paris to sign an agreement to reschedule Pakistan‟s 
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The process of evolution of the militant infrastructure in Pakistan has been a multi 
dimensional phenomenon. In this process successive governments both military and 
civilian, have contributed to infusing religion into the strategic policy of the state and 
using people as strategic tools to ensure territorial integrity and stability. The focus on 
human security has remained  rhetoric and this neglect has seriously damaged the 
cohesiveness of society. Too much focus on the traditional aspects of security has 
resulted in strengthening the military as the sole driver of Pakistan‟s security policy 
particularly in respect to Afghanistan and India. The state being a prime referent of 
security has thus become a prime source of „insecurity‟ for the people. The military has 
become the major crafter of the state‟s foreign and security policies particularly where 
the big powers (like United States) and the neighbors are concerned. The regime‟s 
survival has often been equated with the national security imperatives. 
 The security threats have been mostly externalized and the sources of insecurity 
within the state have remained unaddressed. As a result, the state has failed to take stock 
of the complex nature of the security threats encompassing both the traditional (that is 
military) and the non-traditional (that is, economic, social, ethnic, political, 
environmental, etc) factors.  
To quote Barry Buzan:  
The simple view that military power is positively correlated 
with national security is revealed as being of limited 
application, and several times of inverse correlations is 
made obvious. Conversely, the equally simplistic view that 
weapons are the prime elements in the national security 
problem is also revealed as deficient…National security 
problem defines itself as much in economic, political, and 
social terms as in military terms. Domestic, as well as 





foreign factors loom large in the matter and the military 
aspect of security is seen to be merely part of a bigger 
picture.141 
 
In the pre- 9/11 phase, Pakistan was faced with the unattended consequences of its 
role in the Afghan Jihad at the domestic level. Former ambassador Maleeha Lodhi 
observes: 
The explosive legacy of the Afghan jihad included 
militancy and violent extremism, millions of Afghan 
refugees, and the exponential growth of Madrassas, 
narcotics, and proliferation of arms. The most dangerous 
aspect of this legacy was that some 40,000 Islamic radicals 
were imported from across the Arab world to fight 
alongside the Afghan mujahedeen. They later became the 
core of al Qaeda.142 
 
The World Trade Center 9/11 attacks and events that followed began a new 
chapter in Pakistan‟s security policymaking necessitating a re-think on its earlier postures 
at home and abroad. Pakistan‟s decision to side with the US-led „War on Terrorism‟ 
began a critical phase in its security framework, blurring and meshing of external and 
internal security dynamics. This leads us to the next part of the study that explores: why a 
shift occurred in Pakistan‟s security strategy from being pro-Taliban to pro-US and anti-
Taliban; and what are the critical elements and challenges during this transition? 
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PAKISTAN AS US PARTNER IN THE WAR ON TERROR (WOT) – POST 9/11 
PHASE 
Introduction 
The most controversial of the decisions the Musharraf regime took was his 
agreement to make Pakistan the ―front-line‖ state in the US-led ‗War on Terror‘ in the 
immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks. How and why the Musharraf regime 
agreed to offer ―un-stinted‖ cooperation to the United States; what this decision meant 
and what was its impact on Pakistan‘s domestic and external security are the interlocked 
issues that this chapter would attempt to explore. 
The argument here is: Islamabad‘s decision to join the US-led ‗War on Terror‘ 
heralded a critical turning point in its approach towards security and  drove the country 
into initiating a counter-terrorism policy at the national, regional and international levels. 
Theoretically, this decision reaffirms Barry Buzan‘s argument that security is an essential 
mix of external and internal variables and decisions on one end register their impact on 
the other end, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Ayoob puts it differently when he 
says that developing states due to  their political, societal, institutional and economic 
shortcomings  are vulnerable to the developed state‘s (here, the US) influence, demands 
and pressure. That is, Islamabad‘s decision to follow the US lead is essentially the 
response of an unequal or weak partner that must make the best of the worst 
circumstances.  
The chapter is divided into three broad parts: the  first part deals with the genesis 
of Islamabad‘s decision to join the US-led ―Global War on Terror‖ (GWOT) as a mish-
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mash of realism, idealism and opportunism given the changed international politics; the 
second part of the chapter underscores the impact on Pakistan‘s security of  Musharraf 
regime‘s decision to be US ally against Afghanistan; the  third part dwells on the nature 
of support that Islamabad extended to the USA in the so-called ‗War on Terror‘.  
Part one:  
5.1: Why Musharraf Regime joined the War on Terror vis-à-vis Afghanistan and 
Al-Qaeda? 
The empirical data and the published accounts analyzing General Musharraf‘s 
decision to board the US-led international campaign against terrorism that centered on 
Afghanistan and Al Qaeda follow diametrically opposite viewpoints. On the one end of 
the spectrum are government exponents that label this decision as a rational, realistic and 
pragmatic response in view of the changed global scenario. On the other end is opinion 
that terms this decision as essentially personal and opportunistic contrary to the national 
interests of the country. 
The key point that is stressed in the following analyses is that there is no black 
and white explanation and the reality lies somewhere in between these two often 
conflicting and opposite lines of thinking.  The Musharraf regime‘s decision was the 
product of multiple stresses and strains that Islamabad faced in the aftermath of the 9/11 
World Trade Center (WTC) incident. These ranged from the threatening posture of the 
United States to the possibility of India assuming a lead role in Afghanistan and changing 
the geo-politics of the region. This line of reasoning fused well with General Musharraf‘s 
pre -9/11 reformist agenda based on the realization that Pakistan had been a victim, 
target, recruiting zone, safe-haven and transit-zone for the terrorists‘ groupings within 
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and beyond the national frontiers. The key finding of the research study is that Pakistan‘s 
decision began a new chapter in its security framework, blurring and meshing external 
and internal security dynamics. As a result, the need to have an integrated, sustainable 
and comprehensive national security policy became more critical. It was essentially a 
tactical decision based on rational calculation of the country‘s strategic priorities.  
Here the question that may well be asked is with regard to the factors that 
conditioned General Musharraf‘s response as events unfolded and the situation in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11 developed. To begin with, US deputy secretary of state, 
Richard Armitage told Pakistan‘s ISI head General Mehmood: ―You are either 100 % 
with us or 100 % against us. There is no grey area.‖1 Maleeha Lodhi who was at that time 
serving as Pakistan‘s Ambassador to the United States conveyed Washington‘s message 
to Islamabad and got an affirmative answer from General Musharraf asking officials to 
let Washington know that it would get ‗what it wanted.‘2  Terming the decision to be a 
key US ally as ‗dispassionate‘3 the former President of Pakistan maintains: 
 The decision was fairly easy. Technically it‘s government 
 job to  frame counter-terrorism policy…My case was 
 different as I wore  multiple hats at that time. That is, 
 being Army Chief, President and  Chief Executive, I had 
 influence over bureaucracy both military and civil, 
 political arenas, academic and intellectual community, 
 civil society…all segments that I briefed and 
 consulted on the decision.The decision was in the best 
 interest of the country.4  
 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Owen Bennet Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the storm, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p: 2. 
General Musharraf claimed in his Memoir, In the Line of Fire, Armitage told the director general ―not only 
that we had to decide whether we where with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the 
terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age‖p:201. 
2 Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi interview with the author, 10 August, 2008, Islamabad. 
3 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, London: Simon & Schuster, 2006, p: 201. 
4 General Musharraf interview with the author,  6 January, 2010, London. 
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The key inference here is, Islamabad‘s U-turn versus Taliban regime in Kabul 
was not an institutional and consensual based decision, rather it was essentially a 
‗personal and individual‘ decision of a military General in command. Ambassador 
Shamshad Ahmad‘s following observation echoes the same point of view: 
 No matter how necessary or justified the policy turnaround 
 was, it  only showed the ad hoc and arbitrary nature of the 
 decision- making process in Pakistan on national 
 security and foreign policy  issues during the days 
 following 9/11. This was also reminiscent of many  earlier 
 policy decisions, including the one of ―inventing‖  and 
 then recognizing and supporting the Taliban  regime.5 
 
To quote one of the key ex-military aides of Musharraf: 
 The decision was taken earlier and then corps commanders, 
 National Security Council members, and hand-picked 
 political advisers were consulted…In doing so, 
 General Musharraf missed  the complexity of the issues 
 involved…He should have drawn the line or limits  of 
 support to the United States.6 
 
So, what were the United States demands that General Musharraf readily agreed to? The 
US gave Pakistan a list of the following ‗non-negotiable‘ demands: 
1. Stop Al-Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, intercept arms 
shipments through Pakistan, and end all logistical support for Osama bin Laden; 
2. Give blanket over-flight and landing rights to U.S. aircraft; 
3. Give the US access to Pakistani naval and air bases and to the border areas 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan; 
4. Turn over all intelligence and immigration information; 
                                                 
5 Shamshad Ahmed, ―Foreign Policy of Pakistan and Policy Making Process‖, Moonis Ahmer, edit, 
Foreign Policy Making: A Case Study of Pakistan, Karachi, Department of International Relations, 2009, p: 
63. 
6Musharraf‘s ex- senior military officer‘s interview with the author, February 6, 2010, Rawalpindi. 
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5. Condemn the September 11 attacks and curb all domestic expressions of 
support for terrorism; 
6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban, and stop Pakistani volunteers from 
going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban; 
7. Note that, should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and the Al-
Qaeda network in Afghanistan, and should the Taliban continue to harbor him and 
his accomplices, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, 
end support for the Taliban, and assist the U.S. in the aforementioned ways to 
destroy Osama and his network.‖7 
Was Islamabad‘s assurance of ―unstinted cooperation‖ to Washington a tactical maneuver 
or a qualitative shift in its earlier Afghanistan (pro-Taliban) policy? General Pervez 
Musharraf in a public address to the nation on 19 September, 2001 proffered five reasons 
for choosing to offer unstinted co-operation to the US in its war against terrorism. The 
five reasons for choosing this course of action were: 
1. Secure Pakistan‘s strategic assets, 
2. Safeguard the cause of Kashmir, 
3. Prevent Pakistan from being declared a terrorist state, 
4. Prevent an anti-Pakistani government from coming to power in Kabul, 
5. Have Pakistan re-emerge politically as a responsible and dignified Nation.8 
The decision marked a U-turn in Pakistan‘s decades‘ long security policy with 
respect to Afghanistan and set in motion the redefinition of its strategic priorities 
                                                 
7 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 2005, p: 217. 
8 Quoted in Ahmed Farauqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan, UK: Ash gate Publishing Ltd, 




accompanied by the immense challenges on the home front. Terming the decision as 
matter of national survival, President Musharraf, in his nation-wide televised address on 
19 September, 2001, said ―… at this juncture I am worried about Pakistan only…I give 
top priority to the defense of Pakistan. Defense of any other country comes later.‖9 This 
clearly signaled Afghanistan under Taliban as more of a strategic liability than an asset 
for Pakistan in the post-9/11 strategic milieu. It‘s a documented fact that Islamabad prior 
to 9/11 faced international pressure to seek the Taliban‘s compliance with international 
demands. Specifically, the closure of militants training camps and the handing over of 
Osama Bin Laden. An eminent security analyst Syed Rifaat Hussain contends, the 
qualitative shift in Pakistan‘s pro-Taliban policy was based on several key 
considerations: 
 Come out on the right side of history; avoid American 
 retribution; prevent the emergence of an Indo-US axis 
 against Pakistan with  dire consequences for country‘s 
 survival; clear sense of gains: get  sanctions lifted, put 
 Pak-US ties back on track, gain international 
 legitimacy for his military regime and most importantly 
 create  political and social space for Pakistan to deal with 
 the ‗blow-back effects‘ of the Taliban controlled 
 Afghanistan on Pakistani society.10 
  
A critical point to be noted here is that though Islamabad abandoned its earlier 
pro-Taliban posture, it didn‘t amount to de-recognizing ―India‖ as a major security threat 
in its national security perspective. In fact, the Indian threat was quoted as one of the key 
reasons to justify Islamabad‘s pro-US role in the war in Afghanistan. The unofficial 
reports of Indian offers to the United States, allowing the use of its military bases situated 
                                                 
9 ―President General Pervez Musharraf Address to the Nation‖, 19 September, 2001. The News, 20 
September, 2001. 
10 Syed Rifaat Hussain, Chairman - Defense & Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-I-Azam University, 




at Avantipur in India-controlled Kashmir, Adampur in the northwest state of Punjab and 
Jamnagar in Gujarat bordering Pakistan,‖11 critically informed Islamabad‘s reading of its 
geo-strategic environment. That is, no real shift occurred in the ‗strategic mind box‘ of 
the Musharraf regime and Islamabad‘s threat perception with regard to Indian role in the 
region became more expansive. According to General Musharraf‘s key security aide: 
 Indian offer was motivated by a desire to ensure that 
 Pakistan does  not gain through an Indian default...Staging 
 ground troops in India could pose a challenge, 
 however, because India and Afghanistan do not share a 
 border. Any troops based in India likely would have 
 to be transported by air over Pakistan.12 
 
  Shireen Mazari over heading the Islamabad Institute of Strategic Studies also 
articulated this line of reasoning observing: 
 India‘s increasing presence in Afghanistan directly 
 aggravates Pakistan‘s security concerns – especially in 
 terms of low intensity conflict (LIC) in the provinces of 
 Baluchistan and the  NWFP. India has established two air 
 bases in Tajikistan and for Pakistan there is now the 
 possibility of a two-front multiple  level threat from 
 India.13 
 
Thus, General Musharraf‘s pro-US tilt in Afghanistan can be termed as a tactical 
move to end Pakistan‘s pre-9/11 problems relating to a faltering economy, diplomatic 
isolation and reining in the tide of political violence in the country, in addition to denying 
India strategic leverage and dominant role in the US led military campaign in 
Afghanistan. The decision was sold to public as a ―strategic necessity‖ driven by the need 
to reclaim Pakistan as a moderate Muslim state and safeguard its national integrity. This 
                                                 
11 ―India Offers Three Air Basis for US Aircraft‖, People’s Daily, September 19, 2001. 
12  Director General ISPR, General Shaukat Sultan, interview with the author, 6 September 2006, 
Rawalpindi.  
13 Dr Shireen Mazari, former Director General of Islamabad Institute of Strategic Studies, interview with 
the author, 7 August 2006, Islamabad.  
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narrative strengthened Musharraf‘s military rule and fitted well with his declarations of 
reforms prior to 9/11.  
General Musharraf had publicly stated economic revival of the country as one of 
the top priorities of his regime way back in 2000. He asserted: 
The economy is the key priority. Only with a viable 
economy will the security of Pakistan be guaranteed. 
Economic revival is the key to everything. Out of a nation 
of 150 million people, only 1 percent pays income tax. Our 
debt burden is $38 billion, and we have got to prioritize 
reducing it. My program, simply put, is to concentrate on 
reducing our fiscal deficit, improving our trade balance, 
and broadening our tax base. We also have to privatize our 
assets, which are being mismanaged, and revive our 
moribund industries.14 
 
Following Pakistan‘s decision to join the international coalition against terrorism, 
Pakistan was successful in altering its earlier most sanctioned status and internationally 
isolated, economically fragile image. Pak-US relations once again registered a high point. 
On the sanctions front, U.S. President Bush in two separate orders on 22 September, 
2001, and on 27 October, 2001 respectively, removed nuclear test related economic 
sanctions, democracy related sanctions on Pakistan and debt rescheduling through 2003. 
This removal of sanctions allowed Islamabad to receive $600 million in Economic 
Support Funds (ESF) from the US. In 2002, Pakistan received an estimated $624.5 
million in development assistance and ESF.15 
                                                 
14 General Pervez Musharraf interview quoted in Mary Ann Weaver, Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and 
Afghanistan, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002, p: 23.   
15  In 2000, Pakistan‘s fiscal deficit was 5.3 percent of GDP, against a desired level of 4.0 percent. The total 
debt including external and internal debt stood at 92 p% of GDP. 




The preceding discussion leads to the second part of the chapter which examines 
how professed goals of Islamabad (post- 9/11 U-turn on Afghanistan) turned into internal 
and external security challenges. 
Part Two: Goals Versus Challenges: Mishmash of Pakistan’s Internal and External 
Security Dimensions. 
 General Musharraf decision to join the US camp set in motion a challenging 
phase of rethinking and recasting the national strategy on nuclear safety and security, 
Kashmir, and Afghanistan. Each of the stated policy objectives entailed a complex 
process of redefinition that had implications at the national, bi-lateral, regional and 
international levels. 
5.2:  Secure Pakistan’s strategic assets 
General Musharraf rationalized his decision as critical to the security of national 
strategic assets. He argued that had Pakistan not joined US it would have amounted to 
providing ―an opportunity (to Americans) of an invasion to destroy such weapons. And 
India, needless to say, would have loved to assist the United States to the hilt.‖16  
President Musharraf reportedly ordered Pakistan‘s nuclear arsenal be redeployed to ―at 
least six secret new locations.‖17 This action came at a time of uncertainty about the 
future of the region, including the direction of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Islamabad‘s 
leadership was not certain that the United States would not target Pakistan‘s nuclear 
assets if the government did not assist the United States against the Taliban.18 
                                                 
16 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, op.cit, p: 202. 
17 Molly Moore and Kamran Khan, ―Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons – Musharraf  Says Arsenal is Now 
Secure‖, The Washington Post, November 11, 2001. 
18 Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin,  Pakistan Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Security Issues, 




Was this perception of threat to the national strategic assets real or merely a 
justification for the decision that was taken at a critical juncture?  This question has been 
debated at length. Most of the security analysts argue that chances of India taking an 
advantage of Pakistan‘s vulnerabilities can never be dismissed. Indian eagerness to join 
the ‗War on Terror‘ was an alarming condition that Pakistan could not have overlooked. 
At the same time, Musharraf‘s rationale of ‗threat to national strategic assets‘ led to more 
uncertainties being cast (primarily by the USA) at its nuclear safety and security 
infrastructure. An eminent security expert Naeem Salik terms Musharraf‘s citing of 
‗threat to nuclear assets‘ a big misadventure, that exposed its nuclear establishment  to 
undue suspicion and criticism of the international community. He asserts: 
 This was not a sensible argument to make since it created a 
 perception of vulnerability of Pakistan's nuclear assets 
 which has refused to go away and has allowed a 
 persistent assault by the US  media on the issue of 
 vulnerability of Pakistani nukes to a takeover by 
 Taliban/Al-Qaida types. The argument used by Musharraf 
 was probably aimed at exploiting the sensitivity of 
 Pakistani people towards their nuclear assets to enlist 
 their support for the  policy to side with the US in GWOT 
 and to ditch the Taliban. Apparently it was hoped that 
 the Pakistani public would be willing to sacrifice 
 anything in order to ensure the security of their crown 
 jewels. In fact, this argument reflected his lack of wisdom 
 and self confidence worthy of a nuclear weapons power. It 
 seems that the  deterrence value of nuclear weapons was not 
 taken into account.19 
 
Islamabad‘s apprehensions about India and Israel concerning the security of its 
nuclear assets, however, are not unfounded. A former high ranking official of the 
Strategic Plans Division (Islamabad), Brig (retd) Feroz Hassan Khan notes: 
 In 1986, Pakistani intelligence learned that India had 
 conceived plans to strike at Pakistan‘s nuclear enrichment 
                                                 
19 Brig (retd) Naeem Salik, interview with the author, January 9, 2008, Islamabad 
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 facility at Kahuta in an apparent attempt to emulate Israel‘s 
 attack on the Iraqi nuclear plant at Osirak…Two years 
 later, India planned a major operation code-named Brass-
 tacks…Once again, India contemplated executing plans 
 to strike at Pakistan‘s nuclear installation. In 1990,  the 
 Kashmir crisis once again brought Pakistan and India close 
 to war. By this time, the prospects of nuclear deployment 
 were  perceived to be real, prompting a mission by U.S. 
 Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates to the 
 region.20 
 
At this juncture, one must discuss the nature of concerns expressed by the western 
states, primarily the United States, regarding the safety and security of Pakistan‘s 
strategic assets. The fact is, ―for decades Pakistan‘s quest for acquisition of nuclear 
capability to match the threat from India was always a thorn in U.S.-Pakistan relations.‖21 
The Western press particularly, Guardian22, Financial Times23, Washington Post24 and 
Associated Press25 pointed out Al-Qaeda‘s intentions to procure weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) through Pakistan as a matter of time. This line of thinking relied 
heavily on evidence produced by US forces in the aftermath of military intervention in 
Afghanistan that confirmed that, ―Al-Qaeda had been investigating the possibilities of 
nuclear, radiological and biological attacks in its training camps and research facilities, 
                                                 
20 Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan, ―Pakistan‘s Nuclear Future”, Michael R. Chambers, edit., South Asia in 
2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances, November 2002, pp: 162. 
21 Brig (retd) Feroz Hassan Khan, ―The United States, Pakistan and the War on Terrorism: Enduring Allies 
or Uncertain Partners?‖ Institute of Regional Studies, edit., Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, 
Remedial and Countermeasures, Islamabad: IRS, 2006, pp: 357 – 382. 
22 Julian Borger, ―Al-Qaida videos show poison gas tests‖, The Guardian, 20 August 2002, p: 11. 
23 Haig Simonian and Mark Huband, ―Risk of al-Qaeda strike has reached new dimension‖, Financial 
Times, 6 November 2002, p: 8. 
24 Barton Gellman , ―Al-Qaeda near Biological, Chemical Arms Production‖, Washington Post, 23 March 
2003,p:2. Available at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/09/AR2006060900918.html. 
25 Edith M Lederer, ―UN Report Warns of Al-Qaeda WMD Risk‖, Associated Press, 15 November 2003. 
Also see: Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, ―Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?‖U.S.A: 





and might have had links to individuals who had been involved in the Pakistani nuclear-
weapon programme.‖ 26 As a consequence, the United States reportedly offered nuclear 
security assistance to Pakistan soon after September 11, 2001.  
Zulfiqar Khan senior Analyst, at Pakistan Ministry of Defense states that: 
 
 The international community‘s assistance to Pakistan in 
 bolstering security around its nuclear facilities would 
 go a long way towards strengthening its safety and 
 security apparatus and non-proliferation mechanisms. 
 Since 2001, the United States and  Pakistan reportedly 
 have been cooperating with each other on  nuclear (and 
 biological) safety and security, including the 
 provision of US support in the form of equipment and 
 training. 27  
 
However, another critical happening on the nuclear security front badly tarnished 
the image of Pakistan. In December 2004, US intelligence officials and the IAEA said:  
Iranian officials disclosed that Pakistani‘s were among 
middlemen who the Iranian said had aided Iran‘s nuclear 
program. US intelligence officials also said they believed 
that Pakistan had traded nuclear technology to North Korea 
in exchange for missile technology. The US further said 
that Pakistan was the source for designs of centrifuges used 
by Libya‘s in its recently disclosed nuclear program.28  
 
Islamabad‘s official investigations identified the corruption of individuals (Qadeer 
Khan ‗Pakistan‘s nuclear hero‘ – publicly accepted these charges) and venality as the 
motivation of such action.29 The Qadeer saga finally ended when the ―national hero‖ was 
                                                 
26 John Simpson and Jez Littlewood, ―A Framework for Assessing UK Responses to CBRN Terrorism‖, 
British International Studies Association 28th Annual Conference, 17 December 2003, The University of 
Birmingham, UK, p: 3. 
27 Zulfiqar Khan, ―Pakistan‘s Non-Proliferation Policy”, The Middle East Institute Viewpoints: The 
Islamization of Pakistan, 1979-2009, p: 53. 
28 Quoted in China Daily, 19 January, 2004. K. Alan Kronstadt, ―Pakistan‘s Nuclear Proliferation 
Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options‖, A 
Report for Congress (CRS) Order Code RL32745. May 24, 2005. 
29 The News, The Nation, Dawn,  19 January , 2004. 
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pardoned by President Musharraf, acting in the best interest of Pakistan. Granting pardon 
to Abdul Qadeer Khan for his proliferation activities, President Musharraf categorically 
stated: 
There will be no roll-back of Pakistan‘s nuclear and missile 
programs…The international community should take note 
of the underworld and Pakistan cannot be singled out for 
being involved in the issue. This underworld has a network 
in European and Asian countries and a number of countries 
have relied on developing their programs on this 
underworld… As President of Pakistan I have decided to 
pardon Dr A. Q. Khan, who is our hero but has committed 
mistakes that I regret…It is incumbent on all Pakistanis to 
keep Pakistan foremost and ahead of all considerations 
when it comes to critical national interests.30 
 
Though Musharraf government tried hard to dub A.Q. Khan‘s proliferation acts as 
‗personal acts of corruption‘, Pakistan‘s credentials as responsible nuclear state became 
questionable. Commenting on what all this means for Pakistan‘s security challenges, an 
analyst observes: 
For the future, the countries like Pakistan will be dragged 
into the Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD issue. For 
Pakistan, the issue is critical because this pretext could be a 
means of trying to target Pakistan‘s nuclear programme that 
sits uneasily with the US. And since WMD remains one of 
the rationalizations for the US pre-emptive doctrine, the 
present framing of the WMD issue impacts and aggravates 
Pakistan‘s security concerns.31 
 
Here one must take stock of the growth of Pakistan‘s national regulatory means in 
the nuclear field. The National Command Authority (NCA) was created in 2000 with the 
Strategic Plans Division (SPD) as its secretariat.32 Prior to this, a de facto nuclear 
command and control arrangement existed as part of the national military command 
                                                 
30 President Musharrarf quoted in, Pakistan Times, February 6, 2004. 
31 Shireen M. Mazari, ―Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan‖, Margalla Papers, 2004, op.cit, p.23. 




structure, which had provided and continues to provide guidance over conventional 
military operations.Tasked with the operational and development aspects of the nuclear 
capability, SPD also deals with the internal regulations of exports over and above 
clearance certification from the commerce Ministry. The organizational diagram of the 
NCA appears in the following graphic illustration: 
 
Source: Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Rawalpindi. 
According to the present and former officials of the nuclear security 
establishment, a stringent code of conduct is ensured to ward off any threat from ―non-
state radical elements within and around Pakistan as well as possible convergence 
between insiders and these terrorist elements.‖ 33 The history of Pakistan‘s nuclear safety 
goes back to early 1950s. Pakistan has consistently striven to fulfill its obligations under 
the diverse elements of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, including 
specifically with respect to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, 
                                                 
33 Brig (retd) Naeem Salik, interview with the author,  9 January , 2008, Islamabad.   
Note: For  the detailed analysis of evolution of Pakistan‘s safety and  security regime see, Naeem Salik, 




issued on 28 April , 2004. Consonant with UNSCR Resolution 1540, Pakistan instituted a 
host of non-proliferation legislation/measures.34  
The preceding discussion underscores Barry Buzan‘s conception of security as 
‗relational phenomenon‘.35 That is, the internal and external dimensions of national 
security in Pakistan are fuzzy. Thus, action on one front, either internal or external, often 
leads to reaction on other fronts. Musharraf‘s citing of ‗threat to strategic assets‘ was 
aimed at creating and instituting a firewall between Pakistan‘s role in the ‗War on Terror‘ 
and its nuclear policy. The events that followed (as discussed earlier) showed the non-
existence of such firewall in reality. The decision to join the ‗War on Terror‘ exposed the 
need to enhance and institute more stringent ‗safety and security measures‘ related to the 
nuclear assets both at the internal and external levels. To quote M Ayoob: 
Security in the Third World countries (that includes 
Pakistan as well) is state centered in character – in terms of 
both its territory and institutions – and to the security of 
those who profess to represent the state territorially and 
institutionally. In other words, security–insecurity is 
defined in relation to vulnerabilities –both internal and 
external–that threaten or have the potential to bring down 
or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, 
and governing regimes.36 
 
By declaring publicly that Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons and the Kashmir remain 
top priorities in the national security policy (in the post 9/11 phase), Musharraf aimed at 
defusing anti-regime currents on the home front and preventing the U.S. and others (such 
                                                 
34Zulfiqar Khan, ―Strengthened Export Controls: Pakistan‘s Export Control Experience, Current and Future 
Challenges and Options Safeguards against Illicit Transfers: Pakistan‘s Institutional Response‖ in 




35 Barry Buzan, op.cit, pp: 36-44. 
36 Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the 
International System, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, p: 9. 
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as India) from meddling into these aspects of Pakistan‘s security policy. Was that 
achieved? The result was mixed: Aims transformed into challenges given the state 
vulnerabilities and changed the regional and international context. 
5.2.1: To Safeguard the cause of Kashmir 
Support to the Kashmir cause remains a key national security imperative dating 
back to Pakistan‘s creation on 14 August 1947. All governments whether civilian, 
military or mix have used the ―Kashmir issue‖37 to enhance national unity, patriotism, 
and support for the government at the national and international levels. General 
Musharraf aimed at insulating Pakistan‘s strategic support to the ―Kashmir cause‖ from 
its key role in the US-led campaign in Afghanistan. He stressed the need to differentiate 
the ―right of self-determination‖38 of the Kashmiris from terrorism. Musharraf observed: 
‗the just struggles of a people for self-determination and liberation from colonial or 
foreign occupation‘ cannot be outlawed in the name of terrorism‖.39 He professed: ―… 
the Kashmiri cause is in our blood. And Pakistan will continue to support the cause 
morally, diplomatically, and politically.‖ 40 Pakistan also argued that India is perpetrating 
                                                 
37 For a detailed study of the genesis and evolution of the Kashmir dispute, see Robert G Wirsing, India, 
Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute, New York: St Martin Press, 1994; Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954; Mushtaqur Rahman, Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New 
Opportunities for India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri Problems, London:  Lynne Reiner, 1996; Summit 
Ganguly,  The Crises in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1997;  Sumantra Bose, The Challenge in Kashmir: Democracy, Self-Determinations and Just Peace, New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997.  
38 Note: The principle of self-determination is a basic principle of customary international law and is 
enshrined as one of the principles of the United Nations, stipulated in the Article 1: 2 of its Charter. Self- 
determination is seen within the context of people fighting against colonialism, foreign occupation and to 
enforce international commitments made to them by the United Nations. The United Nations Security 
Council adopted a resolution on April 21, 1948 calling for Plebiscite to resolve Kashmir dispute. This 
resolution stated: “… Both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and 
Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial 
plebiscite‖.   
39Masood Haider & Anwer Iqbal, ―Kashmir a threat to peace, warns Musharraf: world help sought for 
Indo-Pak talks‖, Dawn, 13 September 2002.   
40 Quoted in, Christophe Jaffrelot, edit., A History of Pakistan And Its Origin, London: Anthem Press, 
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‗state terrorism‘ in Indian held Kashmir (IHK) in the name of counter-insurgency 
operations.  
How far Pakistan in the post 9/11 phase succeeded in achieving the stated 
objectives on the Kashmir front? Or how 9/11 affected the Kashmir conflict and 
Pakistan‘s policy on this front? General Musharraf strived to disconnect Pakistan‘s 
support for the Kashmir cause from the changed posture on Afghanistan. Terming 
support for Kahmiris as ―Jihad-e-Hurriyat‖41 and labeling Al-Qaeda related militants as 
―terrorists‖, created contradiction and confusion in the policymaking circles as well as 
public at large. Musharraf in an interview with The Washington Post in 2002 made a 
distinction between various elements of Pakistan‘s militant problem and stressed that the 
militants fighting in Kashmir were freedom fighters. Musharraf said: 
There are three elements of terrorism that the world is 
concerned about, Number one, the Al-Qaeda factor. 
Number two is what (the Indians) are calling cross-border 
terrorism and we are calling the freedom struggle in 
Kashmir. Number three is the sectarian (Sunni vs. Shia) 
extremism and sectarian terrorism in Pakistan...The third 
one is more our concern, and unfortunately, the world is not 
bothered about that. We are very much bothered about that 
because that is destabilizing us internally.42  
 
This amounted to the regime‘s denial of the complex web of relationships that had 
been nurtured in the past decade or so between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani 
sectarian and militant elements who were trained in the military camps in Afghanistan for 
jihad in Kashmir, and its refusal to accept that the indigenous militant infrastructure 
                                                                                                                                                 
2002. p: 273. 
41 Professor Javed Ahmed Gamdhi, pre-eminent scholar on Islam recalls General Musharraf using this 
terminology numerous times. Professor Gamdhi mentioned this in the conversation with the author, 20 
August 2009, Lahore. 
42 General Musharraf‗s interview, The Washington Post, 28 March, 2002. 
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nurtured in the name of ‗Kashmir Jihad‘ had negative implications for internal cohesion 
and relations with the neighbors to a great extent.  
To quote an eminent expert on South Asia, Samina Ahmed: 
Musharraf‘s so-called strategic re-orientation is superficial 
in nature. That is, change in rhetoric only, very little 
operational change on ground. This continues to date. 
There are no clear divisions between Al-Qaeda, Sectarian 
and Jihadi groupings. Unless state acts on sectarian, jihadi 
groups simultaneously the chain of violence and terrorism 
within and outside Pakistan cannot be broken.43  
 
 Shaheen Akhtar another seasoned researcher at the Institute of Regional Studies 
(Islamabad) observes: 
The War on Terror has certainly put pressure on the armed 
struggle in Kashmir which was already facing pressures 
from different corners. India questioned Pakistan‘s 
credentials in becoming partner in US counter-terrorism 
strategy while being a ―source‖, ―hub‖ or ―epicenter‖ of 
terrorism and offered unconditionally to the US, all 
material and operational support for its military campaign 
against terrorism in Afghanistan. India further hardened its 
position on Kashmir.44 
 
As events proved, ―firewall instituted between the Kashmir and post 9/11 
Afghanistan policy became diffused and permeable overtime.‖ 45Following the 1 October 
, 2001 attack on the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly in Srinagar46, and the December 
13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, Indo-Pak relations reached very 
                                                 
43 Samina Ahmed, (International Crises Group – ICG) interview with the author, 27 April 2007, Islamabad. 
44 Shaheen Akhtar, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Regional Studies, interview with the author, 
12 May 2008, Islamabad. 
45 President General (retd) Musharraf interview with the Author, 6 January 2010, London. 
46 Note: The attack was reportedly carried out by the militants belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammed (Pakistan 
based Militant outfit) using a car bomb and three suicide bombers. 38 people and three fidayeen were killed 
in this attack. For more details see: ―Militants attack Kashmir assembly, BBC, 2001-10-01 ; ―Bombing at 
Kashmir assembly kills at least 29‖, CNN, 2001-10-01; ―World Briefing | Asia: India: Kashmir Mourns 38 
Attack Victims‖, The New York Times, 2001-10-01. 
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low ebb. The 2001 Indian Parliament attack was a high-profile attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba 
and Jaish-e-Mohammed (both militant/Jihadi organizations based in Pakistan) against the 
building housing the Parliament of India in New Delhi. The attack led to the death of a 
dozen people (five terrorists, six police and one civilian) and to increased tensions 
between India and Pakistan.47 This resulted in the year-long military standoff between the 
two sides, with the break out of full-scale hostilities becoming a very real possibility. The 
Indian government held Islamabad responsible for ‗cross border terrorism‘ in Indian held 
Kashmir despite Pakistan‘s strong and swift condemnation of such incidents. All this 
resulted in Washington playing a key role in diffusing the tensions between India and 
Pakistan with the aim of avoiding any conflict, since such a conflict could result in 
forcing Pakistan to withdraw its troops from the Afghan border and thus affecting the 
military campaign in Afghanistan adversely. The US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard 
Armitage, visited India and Pakistan in June 2002 as part of US peace diplomacy 
between the two sides. The visit of US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to Islamabad 
and Delhi followed this visit. Reflecting on the US crises management role in the Indo-
Pak military standoff, US Senator Richard Lugar observed that ―war was averted, barely 
thanks to intense, discreet diplomacy by the United States.‖48 
Diplomatic, air and road links, and economic relations remained suspended 
throughout this phase of strained Indo-Pak relations. President Musharraf, responding to 
India‘s rising war threats and Washington‘s pressure, announced on 12 January 2002, 
tough measures against extremists within Pakistan. He said: 
                                                 
47 For more details see: The News, Dawn, The Hindu, New York Times, 14 December 2001. 
48 Quoted in, Rizwan Zeb, ―US Interests in South Asia in Post 9/11 Era: Effects on Pakistan‖, Margalla 
Papers 2004, Islamabad: National Defense College, 2004, pp: 73-89. 
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Sectarian terrorism has been going on for years…The day 
of reckoning has come. Do we want Pakistan to be a 
theocratic state? Do we believe that religious education 
alone is enough for governance or do we want Pakistan to 
emerge as a progressive and dynamic welfare state…Today 
Pakistan is not facing any threat from outside But the real 
threats are posed from within…I would request that we 
should stop interfering with the affairs of others.49 
 
The speech reflected understanding of the intricate relationship between terrorism 
as an internal threat to Pakistan‘s security with the external concerns, primarily managing 
relations with India, Afghanistan, and USA. This fact explains the measures Musharraf 
announced on 12 January 2002: all Madrassas had to register with the authorities by 23 
March, just as foreign students were obliged to; speedy trial courts to punish those 
suspected of terrorist acts; above all, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, Sipah-i- 
Sahaba Pakistan, Tehrik-i- Jafria Pakistan and Tanzim Nifaz-i- Shari‘ah-i- Mohammadi 
were banned. Following this announcement, militant members of these movements were 
immediately targeted. Pakistan‘s Interior Ministry maintained that 1,900 activists were 
arrested and 600 organizational headquarters were closed down in four days.50 However, 
most of them were freed thereafter. Of these six banned extremist Islamic groups, two, 
Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and Jaish-e- Mohammed, were also designated as terrorist groups by 
the US State Department in January 2003.51  
                                                 
49 ―President Musharraf‘s Speech‖, quoted in, Christophe Jaffrelot, op.cit, p: 273. 
50 Ministry of Interior, Islamabad. 
51 Note: In the late 1990s the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen was designated as Foreign Terrorist Organization 
(FTO) and has remained on the US blacklist ever since. Following the attacks on the Indian Parliament and 
the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in 2001, the US banned the Lashkar-e-Tayyba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was named as FTO by the US State department in January 2003. This group is believed 
to be responsible for the January 2002 abduction and murder of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel 
Pearl in Karachi. Plus Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was also held responsible for the March 2002 Karachi bus 




Reportedly, leaders of these organizations were not only released but appeared in 
public processions calling for jihad. One of the foremost jihadi leaders, Hafiz Mohammad 
Saeed, released in November 2002 on the order of the Lahore High Court, embarked on a 
countrywide tour to motivate people for jihad in various cities of Pakistan. On one 
occasion he claimed to have recruited 7000 volunteers for jihad during a six-month 
period in 2003.52 Like Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, Masood Azhar, leader of banned Jaish-e- 
Mohammad was also released in 2002, on the basis of lack of sufficient evidence by the 
Lahore High Court. Consequently, he resumed his jihad campaign under the banner of 
Tehrik-e-Khudam-ul-Islam a new name for Jaish-e-Mohammad.53 Similarly, Fazlur- 
Rehman Khalil (the leader of Harkat-ul-Mujahedin) and Qari Saifullah Akhtar  (the 
leader of Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami), were released in 2004 by the Pakistan 
authorities.54Alongside these measures, the National Kashmir Committee was set up by 
Islamabad under the presidency of the moderate Mohammed Abdul Qayyum Khan, 
former President of Azad Kashmir. The objective of this Kashmir committee was to 
continue the Kashmir movement by ‗new means‘.  All this illustrates the significance of 
Kashmir as the basic security issue and challenge that affects security both within and 
outside the country. 
                                                 
52 Mir,A., ‗Foreword‘, in Rana, M. A., A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, Lahore: Mashal Books, 
2004, p:58. 
53 ‗LHC released Masood Azhar‘, The News (Karachi), 15 December 2002. 
54 HUM leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil was taken into custody on the charges of recruiting, training and 
sending militants to Afghanistan (2003-2004).  Qari Saifullah Akhtar (the leader of Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-
Islami) was charged for his involvement in number of terrorism related incidents inside Pakistan. 
According to Hassan, S. S., ‗Under wraps‘, Herald (Karachi), July 2005: ―Qari Saifullah Akhtar was 
allegedly linked with the attempted coup by some Islamist officers in 1995 against the government of 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. While the army officers involved in the coup attempt were court-
marshaled, Akhtar was freed. He was arrested in a Gulf state after the government began pursuing Islamist 
militants after Sep. 2001‖. 
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Musharraf government‘s policy remained a mix of deliberate obfuscation and 
restraint. General Musharraf also proposed a number of ―out of box‖ solutions to India 
for the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir conflict. Signifying a remarkable shift from 
Islamabad's stated stand on Kashmir, President Pervez Musharraf publicly said on 17 
December 2003 that even though ―we are for United Nations Security resolutions…now 
we have left that aside.‖ 55Similarly, on 6 January 2004, following the conclusion of the 
SAARC summit, India–Pakistan Joint Statement said: ―the resumption of the composite 
dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and 
Kashmir.‖ 56   
On 24 October 2004, General Musharraf suggested a three-phased formula along 
the ethnic and geographic lines. In December 2005, he suggested a four point formula 
that involved soft borders, demilitarization, self-governance and joint supervision 
mechanism for Kashmir. President Musharraf suggested the determination of seven zones 
of the disputed territory (Kashmir) based on linguistic, ethnic, religious, geographic, and 
political basis, followed by their demilitarization. The detailed map of General 
Musharraf‘s ―Seven Region Peace Proposal‖ is at Appendix One (of the present study). 
President Gen. Pervez Musharraf identified the following seven regions for this purpose. 
Two regions - Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas - are under the control of Pakistan 
whereas five regions are under Indian control. The first part comprises Jammu, Sambha 
and Katwa where Hindus are in majority. The second part also comprises Jammu but the 
areas include Dodha, Phirkuch and Rajawri where Muslim population is in majority 
which includes Gujars, Sidhans and Rajas who are also associated with Azad Kashmir. 
                                                 
55  President Pervez Musharraf‘s statement,  Dawn , 14 December, 2003. 
56 ―Pakistan, India Joint statement‖, Dawn, 7 January 2004.  
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The third part is the area of Kashmir Valley which also has Muslim majority. The fourth 
part is Kargil which has Shia and Balti population in majority and the fifth area is Ladakh 
and adjoining areas where Buddhists live.57  
Syed Rifaat Hussain terms the above mentioned gestures of General Musharraf as an 
attempt ―to create much-needed political space for New Delhi to substantively engage 
itself with Islamabad for finding a workable solution to the festering Kashmir dispute.‖ 58 
However, President Musharraf‘s initiatives were dismissed by India. Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh addressing the Indian Parliament said during his meeting with Pakistan 
President Pervez Musharraf in New York in September, 2004 they had agreed that 
"possible options for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the J and K issue should be 
explored in a sincere spirit and a purposeful manner.‖59  
Likewise on the home front, General Musharraf‘s bold rhetoric on Kashmir 
evoked mixed reaction. The religious right political parties led by Jamaat-i-Islami termed 
his initiatives as a ―one man show‖ and ―roll-back‖ of Pakistan‘s principled stance on 
Kashmir. Yehya Mujahid, spokesman of the Jamaat-e-Dawa Pakistan, formerly known as 
the Lashkar-i-Taiba, remarked:  
Musharraf bowed down to the US-Indian nexus, but the 
jihadis will continue their jihad…We will remain 
committed to the Kashmir cause. The government has 
slipped from its long-standing position on Kashmir. 
Musharraf has taken a U-turn on the Kashmir policy of the 
state.60 
 
                                                 
57  Syed Rifaat Hussain, ―Proposals for Resolving the Kashmir Dispute‖, PILDAT: Briefing Paper No: 19, 
Islamabad: PILDAT, 2005. 
58 Syed Rifaat Hussain, Chairmen of Defense and Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-i-Azam University, 
interview with the author, 16 May 2008, Islamabad. 
59 Quoted in,  Syed Rifaat Hussain, op.cit, p: 34. 
60 Aijazz Ahmed, ―Musharraf braced for jihadi backlash”, Asia Times Online, August 20, 2002. 
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Similarly, a former activist of the LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) termed 
Musharraf‘s policy of restraint in Kashmir as a ―temporary measure in the 
changed scenario… Jihadis are strategic assets of the state having an essential role 
to play in the past, present, and future.61 
 
It is worth mentioning here that back-channel diplomacy or Track-II linkages 
were used excessively in Musharraf‘s pragmatic approach on Kashmir conflict. 
Defending this line of action, Lt General (retd) Rashid Qureshi, former spokesperson of 
ISPR, maintains: ―Musharraf wanted Pakistan to be meeting point of Western and Islamic 
world… Musharraf came to the conclusion that Kashmir conflict cannot be solved by 
force. Hence, backdoor diplomacy was promoted‖.62 Pakistan‘s foreign minister, 
Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri, claimed in April 2007 that both countries were extremely 
close to reaching a settlement to the Kashmir dispute. Reportedly, New Delhi and 
Islamabad had reached a broad agreement on five elements of this settlement. The agreed 
points stipulated: 
No change in the territorial layout of Kashmir currently 
divided into Pakistani and Indian areas; the creation of a 
‗softer border‘ across LoC;  greater autonomy and self-
governance within both Indian and Pakistani controlled 
parts of the state; a cross-Line of Control LoC consultative 
mechanism; and the demilitarization of Kashmir at a pace 
determined by the decline in cross border terrorism.63  
 
Here, one can argue that Islamabad‘s changed rhetoric on Kashmir front reflected 
an understanding of the limitations imposed by the changing geo-politics of the region 
following 9/11 WTC attacks. That is, Pakistan‘s weak economic indicators, the need to 
                                                 
61 Author‘s conversation with the senior member of the LeT, December 2009, Islamabad. 
62 Lt General (retd) Rashid Quereshi interview with the author, 10 October 2009, Islamabad. 




behave as a responsible nuclear state, US pressure to abandon its forward policy in Indian 
held Kashmir and minimize the ‗blow back‘ effects of Kashmir Jihad on the home front – 
all culminated in the tactical reversal of the long held Kashmir policy.  However, all this 
did not amount to abandoning the ‗strategic tools (militant elements)‘ of Kashmir Jihad 
on ground, and in fact the purposefully created ambiguity as well that the changed rules 
of the game dictated. This thinking also resonates with the views of the strategic players:   
Duality was essential and productive‘ in the post 9/11 
phase. The double game was General Musharraf strength:  
The Kashmir cause is an article of our faith. We are on the 
right path. It (Kashmir) was denied to us. Our policy on 
Kashmir brought down Indian forces morale.64 
 
 Another keen observer of South Asian security issues, Lt General (retd) Talat 
Masood says: 
Delhi after 9/11 has exploited the transformed global 
situation to project the Kashmir problem essentially as 
terrorist related…This policy may have found resonance in 
Western capitals and was an expedient measure to keep 
pressure on Islamabad to stop supporting the Kashmir 
cause, but has not worked. This is because it fails to 
address the root cause for the deep alienation of the people, 
especially those living in the Valley and in Muslim 
majority districts of Jammu.65 
 
A critical inference from the preceding discussion is that General Musharraf‘s 
professed changed outlook on Kashmir did not amount to change of ‗military or 
establishment mindset‘ vis-à-vis India. The organic links between the jihad in Kashmir 
against India and the jihad of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban against the United States and the 
                                                 
64 Author‘s off-record conversation with the Ex-military General of the Musharraf era, 6 January 2010, 
Islamabad. 
65 General (retd) Talat Masood, interview with the author, 10 March 2007, Islamabad.  
Also see:Lt General Talat Masood, ―Pakistan‘s Kashmir Policy”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 
Volume 4, No. 4 (2006) p: 45-49. 
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West were persistently denied.66Most of the state officials continued to believe that 
banned Jihadi groups (active in Indian held Kashmir) like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) have 
not been involved in terrorism inside Pakistan but instead has been driving people and 
raising funds for ‗jihad‘ in Kashmir. The group has been banned only ―because of 
pressure from the US, which in turn is influenced by India‘s allegations that it is involved 
in terrorist attacks inside India and Indian-administered Kashmir.‖ 67Najam Sethi, a 
leading journalist based in Lahore, calls Musharraf‘s mentioning of ‗safeguarding the 
Kashmir cause‘ in his 19 September, 2001 televised address to the nation, as purely a 
tactical maneuver. That is:  
Musharraf defense of the liberation struggle in Kashmir 
was aimed not so much at warning India as it was at 
ensuring that the Kashmiris would not be demoralized by 
Pakistan‘s impending policy shift. And his demand for an 
implicit quid pro quo from India was aimed at the 
international community that has underpinned his policy 
retreat: de-escalation of Indian troops along the Pakistan 
border; reduction in India-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir; 
and initiation of a dialogue with a view to finding a just 
solution to Kashmir.68 
 
This leads us to the analysis of another stated aim of General Musharraf‘s switch 




                                                 
66Author‘s conversations with the ex and present officials of the institutions concerned with the Pakistan‘s 
Kashmir policy. 
67 Mansoor Khan, ―Ban Undone‖, Herald, December 2009. 
68 Najam Sethi, The Friday Times, Lahore, Pakistan, May 31-June 6, 2002. 
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5.2.2 :  A Peaceful and stable Afghanistan and deal with home-grown religious 
militancy 
For Pakistan 9/11 has been a watershed, not only because it enabled Islamabad to 
be readmitted into the international community, but it also forced Pakistan to rethink its 
earlier Afghanistan and Kashmir policies respectively. To quote Senator Mushahid 
Hussain: 
Pakistan‘s policymakers realized that the ‗Jihad Triangle‘ 
that had emerged since 1980s, with Pakistani volunteers 
training in Afghanistan to fight in other conflicts like 
Kashmir, Chechnya, Xinxiang, Uzbekistan or Tajikistan, 
was no longer sustainable.69 
 
President Musharraf, as mentioned earlier, had said in a televised address that ―… 
at this juncture I am worried about Pakistan only… I give top priority to the defense of 
Pakistan. Defense of any other country comes later.‖70Apparently, this meant that 
Afghanistan under Taliban rule was more of a strategic liability than an asset for Pakistan 
in the post-9/11 strategic milieu. In practice, the long-held tri-lateral strands of the army‘s 
concept of national security based on ―resisting Indian hegemony in the region and 
promoting the Kashmir cause; protecting and developing the nuclear program; and 
promoting a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan continued.‖71 
To achieve a friendly and stable Afghanistan, Islamabad initially tried to convince 
the US not to let the Northern Alliance72 emerge as a final victor in Kabul following the 
                                                 
69 Mushahid Hussain, Gulf News, January 7, 2004 .Available at: 
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/general/mushahid-hussain-apt-finale-to-a-year-of-foreign-policy-u-
turns-1.310294.Also See, Joshuat White, Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in 
Pakistan’s North-West Frontier, Center on Faith & International Affairs (CFIA),2008.pp:23-46. 
70 ―President General Pervez Musharraf Address to the Nation‖, September 19, 2001. 
71 Ahmed Rashid interview with the author, December 22, 2009, Lahore. 
72 Northern Alliance represented a wide mix of ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and opposed Taliban 
version of Islamic order in Afghanistan. While, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates supported Taliban, 
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fall of Taliban regime in November 2001. General Musharraf argued that the Northern 
Alliance composing of Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks did not represent the Pushtun 
majority in Afghanistan. And given its history of anti-Pakistan posture backed by India, 
Iran and Russia throughout the 1980s and 1990s, its coming to power meant another 
‗non-friendly‘ government in Kabul. As events unfolded, General Musharraf‘s concerns 
were not accommodated and Islamabad was pushed to embrace the US-backed interim 
government led by President Karzai in Kabul. This led to the stated goal of preventing an 
anti-Islamabad or pro-India government in Kabul from being transformed into a 
persistent security challenge for Islamabad. This goal has not changed. The policy that 
was adopted thereafter can be classified as ―double-dealing or two-track‖73 or the one 
aimed to protect ―our own national interest.‖74Reflecting on the positive contributions of 
Pakistan since 9/11 towards Afghanistan, Ambassador M Sadiq observes: 
Since 2001, Pakistan has also played an active, but 
unpublicized, role in Afghanistan‘s reconstruction and 
providing humanitarian assistance. Pakistan has committed 
US$330 million for reconstruction and assistance projects 
in Afghanistan. Some 52,000 Afghans crossed border with 
Pakistan everyday in 2009 for business, jobs, medical 
treatment, and education and to visit relatives…Pakistan is 
the largest trading partner of Afghanistan while 
Afghanistan is Pakistan's third largest export market…To 
enhance Kabul‘s connectivity to the world, Pakistan plans 
to improve its road links and develop rail connections with 
Afghanistan…A peaceful, stable and prosperous 
Afghanistan is in Pakistan‘s national interest while war and 
instability in Afghanistan is detrimental to our prosperity 
and stability. Contrary hypothesis promoted so assiduously 
by certain quarters is disingenuous.75 
                                                                                                                                                 
Northern alliance was supported by Iran, India, and Russia in the civil war period after the withdrawal of 
former Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989. 
73 Ahmed Rashid, Decent Into Chaos, UK: Penguin Books, 2008, p: 221. 
74 Pervez Musharraf, op.cit, p: 275. 
75 Pakistan‘s Ambassador to Afghanistan, M Sadiq, conversation with the group of academia, journalists 




Parallel to this, high profile visits remained a regular feature of the Pak-Afghan 
state-to-state relations despite the undercurrents of mutual distrust. The details of the 
high profile bilateral visits are given in Appendix-6.President Musharraf speaking on 
his second visit to Kabul in September 2006 alongside Afghan leader Hamid Karzai in 
a joint Press conference said: 
Pakistan and Afghanistan have to fight the scourge of terror 
and extremism together. If we don't trust each other, there 
is no moving forward. The only course left is to have trust - 
kill mistrust, don‘t blame each other.76                                                    
 
A Peace Jirga77 between Pakistan and Afghanistan was held in Kabul from 9 to12 
August 2007 to discuss the bilateral issues. The four-day peace talks, the result of an 
initiative by President Hamid Karzai and his Pakistani counterpart, Pervez Musharraf on 
27 September 2006, primarily focused on threats posed by Taliban, terrorism, and the 
narcotics trade in the region. This was the first historic event of its kind that opened a 
channel of people-to-people dialogue in which around 700 people including members of 
the parliaments, political parties, religious scholars, tribal elders, provincial councils, 
civil society and business community of both countries participated.78The main 
recommendations made by the first Joint Peace Jirga are summarized in Appendix-7. 
                                                 
76Quoted on, BBC News, 6 September 2006.  
Also See: Noor-ul-Haq, ―Fact File:Pak-Afghan Relations (2005-07)‖, Islamabad: Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute (IPRI). pp: 1-22. 
77Text of Pak-Afghan Peace Jirga, Daily Times, 13 August 2007. 
Also see, Mariam Safi, ―Afghan-Pak Peace Jirga: Possibilities and Improbabilities‖, IPCS Special Report, 
No.51, March 2008; Samuel Chan, ―Breaking the Impasse in Afghanistan: Problems with Neighbors, 
Brothers and Guests‖, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 6, No. 4 (2008) pp: 103-128. 





Here, it is pertinent to note that U.S. President Bush was also one of the critical 
forces in fostering positive momentum in the Kabul - Islamabad bilateral equation. 
President Bush hosted a  meeting followed by a working dinner with President Hamid 
Karzai of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and President Pervez Musharraf of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan at the White House on 27 September, 2006 Washington, 
DC. However, a critical point to note is that despite the official cordiality and regular 
exchange of visits, the undercurrents of mutual suspicions and distrust have kept the Pak-
Afghan relationship strained. The present research study argues that Musharraf regime‘s 
Afghanistan policy exhibited strategic realism in the changed geo-political environment. 
That is, maintaining regular contact with the Karzai government while overlooking the 
use of its territory as ‗sanctuary‘ by the Afghan Taliban and their associates 
respectively.79 The rationale for this so-called intelligent and pragmatic policy posture 
stemmed from the conviction that: 
The post - Taliban regime with the domination of the 
Northern Front in the foreign office and the intelligence 
agencies has tilted Afghanistan heavily towards India in 
matters that impinge on Pakistan‘s national security…India 
with its outsized ambitions has not helped expedite the 
peace process with Pakistan or re-establish the stability of 
Afghanistan by using its territory to destabilize FATA and 
Baluchistan…This leaves Pakistan in a very difficult 
dilemma; while it wants Afghanistan to be stable and at 
peace, it cannot accept hostile use of its territory.80 
 
                                                 
79 For an account and analysis of Pakistan‘s involvement in Afghan affairs, see Amir Mir, ‗Janus-faced 
counter-terrorism‘, Asia Times Online, 21 September 2005. Available at: 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GI21Df02.html. 
 See also, Ahmed Rashid, ‗Islamabad‘s lingering support for Islamic extremists threatens Pakistan-
Afghanistan ties‘, 23 July 2003. Available at:  
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav072303a.shtml. 
80  Rasul Bakhsh Rais, ―The Troubled States and Troubled Relations: Afghanistan and Pakistan After 
9/11‖, Moonis Ahmar, edit., Foreign Policy Making Process: A Case Study of Pakistan, Karachi: 
Department of International Relations, 2009. pp: 135 – 155. 
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A senior official of the Musharraf regime on condition of anonymity confided to 
the author that: 
We (Pakistan) have limited options in the changed 
scenario. We are in no position economically and militarily 
to be against US-led operations and later on occupation in 
Afghanistan…Influence in Kabul and Kashmir cause has 
been given up leading to internal problems…Tribals are 
extremely upset as their pride has been shattered. They feel 
incapable to challenge US onslaught…They support 
Pakistan government under pressure, otherwise - No.81 
 
Here, mutual distrust and divergent strategic priorities of Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and the United States (including ISAF and NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan) 
governments also explain the contradictory policies of one actor against another. To 
begin with, Islamabad‘s threat perception vis-à-vis Kabul needs to be viewed as part of 
its national and international security perception. That is, historically successive 
governments in Kabul leaving aside the Taliban regime (1990s) have been hostile to 
Pakistan. The issue of ―Durand Line‖82 and ―Pushtunistan‖83 plus Kabul‘s closeness to 
India and Russia cemented Islamabad‘s ―enemy image‖ of Afghanistan. As a result, 
                                                 
81 Author‘s off-record conversation with the senior official of the Ministry of Information, Islamabad, 2006. 
82 Note: 
 Durand Line Issue owes its origin to the Treaty establishing Durand Line as Boundary between British 
Imperial India and Afghanistan signed in 1893.Pakistan succeeded to that treaty in 1947. Successive 
Afghan governments claimed the treaty is no more valid. Pakistan establishment has long suspected 
Pashtun Nationalists on its side of Durand Line as agents of India and Kabul challenging its territorial 
integrity. Their demand for provincial autonomy was viewed negatively given their long-held relations with 
Indian National Congress.  
83 Note: 
Afghan government after Pakistan creation (August 1947) raised the issue of Pashtun rights by  objecting to 
the Durand Line and demanding that the Pashtun tribal regions be made into a separate state of 
Pashtunistan or be joined to Afghanistan on the basis of their right of self determination. Afghan backed 
fighters crossed the Durand Line from Afghanistan to openly combat the Pakistani military during 1950 to 
1955, and diplomatic relations severed during this tense period. Relations were resumed in 1951, but the 
issue of control of Pashtun areas remained unresolved. Pakistan maintains that historically Afghan 
government intentionally or unintentionally was encouraging secessionist activities in Pakistan. 
 Prominent Pashtun leaders like Abdul Ghaffar Khan also favored the Afghan line of thinking. India and 
Soviet Union also extended support to the cause of Pashtunistan against Pakistan. For more details see: 
 S.M.M Qureshi, ―Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan‖, Pacific Affairs, 
Vol. 39, No. 1 -2 (Spring –Summer, 1966), pp: 99 – 114. 
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Islamabad adopted an ―interventionist policy‖ aiming at installing pro-Pakistan elements 
in Kabul. According to political analyst, Dr Ijaz Khan: 
Pakistan‘s policy has been to keep India out of Afghanistan 
by supporting Taliban. Why? To counter Secular 
Nationalist Pashtun historically allied with Indian National 
Congress and an Afghanistan that refused to accept Durand 
Line and was friendly with India and Soviet Union…A 
Shia Iran could be countered by a Sunni Afghanistan…This 
was a continuation of Pakistan‘s earlier Afghan Policy with 
increased effectiveness in the wake of western withdrawal 
from Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal and 
collapse...Religious Slogans (that is, Islam) and forces 
(Taliban) as tools of Pakistani State Policy, maturing into 
Partnership in decision making in 1980s.84 
 
At this point the comments of a seasoned journalist Saleem Safi regarding 
General Musharraf‘s Afghan policy are worth noting: 
Situation in Afghanistan in the post 9/11 phase is extremely 
complex. All regional players plus non-regional ones are 
pursuing contradictory policies in this theater. Islamabad 
has always framed its Afghan policy through the Indian 
lens. As Musharraf regime concerns versus India‘s role in 
Afghanistan were not addressed by the Karzai and ISAF, 
Islamabad adopted ‗double-game‘. That is, giving 
sanctuary to the neutral Afghan Taliban on our side of the 
Durand Line and not limiting the use of logistics, and men 
crossing from this side…Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are 
caught in the historical web of mutual distrust. Other 
players such as Russia, Iran, etc are also nerved at the long 
time presence of US in Afghanistan and probably see 
Taliban as a strategic asset there.85   
 
  Efforts to counter the Indian influence in Afghanistan aside, strategic players in 
Islamabad during the Musharraf era also perceived ―Coalition forces as part of the 
problem. Their presence attracts Jihadis on both sides of the Durand Line particularly on 
                                                 
84 Ijaz Khan, Head of the International Relations Department, The University of Peshawar, interview with 
the author, 19 February 2007, Islamabad. 
85 Saleem Safi interview with the author, 12 March 2010. 
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Pakistan‘s side.‖86 Key policymaking elements believed that, ―India wants to turn 
Pakistan tribal areas into Kashmir. That is, to tie Pakistan forces in FATA like they 
(Pakistanis) did in Indian held Kashmir.‖87 Reflecting on Islamabad‘s non-declared 
policy of providing shelter to Afghan Taliban as a matter of strategic necessity, former 
head of ISI Lt.General (retd) Asad Durrani remarked: 
Afghanistan dependence on Pakistan is extra-ordinary. 
They (Afghans) supported Pakistan in wars with 
India…We exaggerate Indian influence in Afghanistan. 
Indians are definitely interested in Afghanistan. We need 
regional consensus, that is, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
and Iran...won‘t intervene in Afghanistan…We (Pakistan) 
need an indigenous policy on Afghanistan not the one 
dictated by US.88 
 
Here, the question arises: Why Islamabad turned a blind eye to the usage of its 
territory by the Afghan Taliban leaders such as Gulbuddin Hikmetyar, and Jalaluddin 
Haqqani? Gulbuddin Hikmatyar is the head of Hizb-e-Islami Party of Afghanistan. He 
has long-term relations with Pakistan‘s establishment since the days of Jihad (1979 
onwards) in Afghanistan. His group is perceived as pro-Pakistan and he is regarded as a 
neutral Afghan leader by the Pakistani establishment. Likewise, Jalaluddin Haqqani is a 
former mujahidin leader and a close aide of Mullah Omar. He is currently the head of the 
"Haqqani network." Haqqani is an Afghan and his "network" is located near Miramshah, 
                                                 
86 Former Governor of Baluchistan under Musharraf era and then Governor of NWFP Mr. Owais Ghani, 
interview with the author, 11 September 2009, Islamabad. 
87 Author‘s off-record conversation with the ex-official of Musharraf regime, Rawalpindi. 12 July, 2008,   
88 Lt General (retd) Asad Durrani, interview with the author, 12 May 2008, Islamabad.  
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North Waziristan.89  Pakistan‘s establishment regards him as a ―moderate‖ Taliban, who 
are seen as strategic asset for Islamabad.90 
According to Ijaz Khan, ―Pakistan‘s policy (is) geared towards salvaging 
whatever is left of its Afghan Policy. That was to keep out every other regional State, but 
specially India out of Afghanistan by supporting Taliban‖.91 In addition, providing shelter 
to the Afghan ‗moderate and neutral‘ leadership was essentially a tactical maneuver to 
retain Pakistan‘s influence in the contemporary and future political landscape in Kabul.92 
The key factor behind Islamabad‘s reliance on Pushtun elements in Afghanistan is the 
mutual history of suspicion. Imtiaz Gul observes: 
The  non-Pashtun Afghan population, led by Tajiks have 
always viewed Pakistan with suspicion, and since the 
Indians and the Russians traditionally remained closer to 
the non-Pashtoons, this unfavorable view served and serves 
as a permanent factor in Pakistan's threat perceptions as far 
as the western border is concerned. Musharraf's post 9/11 
policy was a mix of cooperation and deceit, a combination 
of helping out on the one hand and maintaining close 
contact with assets inside Afghanistan and in the border 
regions on the other. Kayani did bring about a qualitative 
change as far as the tribal areas was concerned and did go 
after the TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban – Pakistan).93 
 
The question is: How did the Musharraf regime respond to persistent bilateral and 
international apprehensions regarding its ‗inaction‘ and tolerance of the Afghan Taliban 
                                                 
89  For details see: Imtiaz Ali, "The Haqqani Network and Cross-Border Terrorism in Afghanistan," 
Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 6 (March 24, 2008), pp. 1-3; Waliullah Rahmani, "Jalauddin Haqqani 
Challenges Mullah Omar's Leadership of the Taliban," Terrorism Focus, Vol. 5, No. 25 (July 1, 2008), pp: 
3-4. 
90 Authors off-record conversations with the Pakistani Intelligence sources, 2007 - 2008. 
91  Ijaz Khan, Op.cit.pp:12-15. 
92 Authors off-record conversations with the officials and experts focusing on strategic policy of Pakistan. 
93 Imtiaz Gul, Executive Director of CRSS (Center for Research and Security Studies) Islamabad, interview 
with the author, 4 April 2010. He is a senior Pakistani journalist and author of The Unholy Nexus: Pak-
Afghan relations under the Taliban, 2002. 
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groups operating from its side against the Afghan and NATO troops on the other side of 
the Durand Line. To quote an American expert on South Asia, Rodney Jones: 
In American policymaking circles, Taliban resurgence in 
Afghanistan is seen as Pakistan making. Taliban have safe 
haven in Pakistan. U.S government feels General 
Musharraf is not dishonest, but he may not be in control. 
‗Do more‘ implies more effective monitoring of Pak-
Afghan border.94  
 
 Another leading American expert on Afghanistan, Professor Barnett Rubin, 
deposing before a US Congressional Committee in early October 2006 maintained: 
The universal consensus on the Afghan side of the border, 
among Americans, military and civilian, among Europeans, 
military and civilian, and Afghans, military and civilian is 
that the headquarters of the Taliban are in fact in 
Pakistan.95 
 
Similarly, Karzai government on numerous occasions leveled charges of ―double-
game‖ on Pakistan and held Islamabad responsible for the surge in Taliban operations in 
Afghanistan. President Karzai on a visit to Islamabad in April 2003 gave General 
Musharraf a list of Taliban commanders allegedly living openly in Quetta. This was 
strongly denied by President Musharraf and termed it ‗baseless‘.96 On 13 December 
2006, Afghan President Hamid Karzai accused Pakistan of being the trouble maker, 
saying: ―I tell Pakistan to stop its animosity towards the Afghans and the Pashtoons…In 
reality, these (suicide) attacks are a message from the Pakistan government to scare us.‖ 
97 
                                                 
94 Dr Rodney Jones, head of USIP South Asia program (in US), interview with the author, 12 May 2008, 
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95 Quoted in, The Friday Times, Lahore issue, 6-12 October 2006. 
96 Ahmed Rashid, op.cit, p: 229. 
97 The News, December 14, 2006. Noor-ul-Haq, ―Fact File:Pak-Afghan Relations (2005-07)‖, Islamabad: 
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  Another leading expert on Afghanistan Ahmed Rashid in his work entitled, 
Descent into Chaos claims: 
In post 9/11 phase it was impossible for ISI to both help the 
CIA and run the Taliban, whom the ISI had given 
sanctuary. This difficulty was resolved with the creation of 
a new clandestine organization that would operate outside 
the military and intelligence structure, in the civilian 
sphere. Former ISI trainers of the Taliban, retired Pashtun 
officers from the army and especially the Frontier Corps, 
were rehired on contract. They set up offices in private 
houses in Peshawar, Quetta, and other cities…Working 
under cover as coordinators for Afghan refugees, 
bureaucrats, researchers at universities, teachers at colleges, 
and even aid workers… There were no records, and 
logistics and expenses came through not the ISI but the less 
scrutinized offices of the Frontier Corps.98 
 
General Musharraf termed the above accusations against Pakistan as far removed 
from the realities on ground. In his memoir In the Line of Fire he maintains: 
While it is unavoidable, because of the terrain and the 
length of the border, that some terrorists – members of al-
Qaeda and the Taliban – must be sneaking across the 
Afghanistan from Pakistan side, it is mendacious to put the 
blame for all this on Pakistan…The reality is the most of 
the terrorist activity in Afghanistan is indigenous, even 
though some groups from Pakistan also sneak across.99 
 
Former Governor of the NWFP Lt. General (retd) Ali M Jan Orakzai in 
conversation with the author said: 
The Afghan Taliban insurgency is essentially becoming a 
‗National Liberation War‘ against the presence of the 
foreign troops… It is the joint responsibility of all, 
including Afghanistan, NATO, ISAF and Pakistan to check 
this movement. Pakistan has established 1000 check-posts 
along 2500 kilometer long border, whereas Afghanistan 
could only establish only 100. Peace and stability in 
                                                 
98 Ahmed Rashid, op.cit, pp: 221 – 222. 
99 Pervez Musharraf, op.cit, pp: 271 – 272. 
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Afghanistan is in Pakistan‘s national interest and will foster 
regional stability.100 
 
The key point here is the resurgence of Taliban insurgency within and beyond 
Afghanistan which must be contextualized ethnically, religiously, politically and socially 
across the Durand Line. The threats to the internal and external security of both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan are co-related and inter-dependent. Musharraf‘s policy of 
treating Afghan and foreign militants operating in Afghanistan as separate entities from 
the Taliban and militants on the Pakistan side led to the institution of ‗fire-wall‘ that 
never existed on ground. The fact is, there existed and continue to exist complex and 
multi-pronged linkages between the militants (no matter what you call them, Afghan 
Taliban, Al-Qaeda operatives, Pakistani Taliban or whatever) across the Durand Line on 
both sides that is, Pakistan and Afghanistan respectively. Parallel to this, Islamabad has 
been unable to convince and assure Afghanistan about its ‗non-interfering and neutral‘ 
policy since 9/11. Here, remarks of a key security aide of President Karzai on General 
Musharraf‘s conduct of Afghan policy are worth mentioning. He said: 
There is strong perception among the Afghan population 
that Pakistan has done more harm to the country by aiding 
Taliban regime in the late 1990s and providing them shelter 
later on…General Musharraf never treated Afghanistan as 
an equal and sovereign state. He looked down upon us… 
With the coming of elected civilian government in Pakistan 
that attitude seems to be changing.101 
 
What all this seems to suggest and point to is the need to address the element of 
mutual distrust that negatively impinges upon the realization of Islamabad‘s stated goal 
of peaceful and stable Afghanistan in the past, present and future. For Islamabad, there is 
                                                 
100 Governor NWFP, Lt General (retd) Ali M Jan Orakzai, interview with the author, 22 November 2006, 
Peshawar.  
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need to enlarge the ambit of Pak-Afghan relations moving beyond the ruling elites and 
investing in the people of Afghanistan irrespective of ethnic identity. That calls for 
―sustained efforts on both sides for effective and joint intelligence sharing, effective 
border coordination, and isolation of hardcore militants from people at large through 
human development on both sides of the Durand Line.‖ 102   
There is also the need to narrow down the divergence in security perceptions of 
all the regional and extra-regional actors involved in and around Afghanistan which 
remains an ongoing challenge, especially for Islamabad. A leading security expert Dr 
Rais notes: 
Pakistan and Afghanistan are far away from overcoming 
the difficulties of the past and evolve a new strategic 
relationship to meet the challenges of the Taliban and al 
Qaeda…Pakistan believes Afghanistan‘s territory is being 
used by India, in connivance with Afghan leaders and 
intelligence agencies, to interfere in the Baluchistan 
Province of Pakistan and in other trouble spots. 
Afghanistan has not ceased accusing Pakistan of 
intervention and using the Afghan Taliban as an instrument 
of Pakistani regional policy.103 
 
The mistrust between the two neighbors persists despite reassuring messages from 
time to time that are often interspersed by accusations and recriminations. The Pakistani 
establishment is adamant on its perceived self interest and sees things from the 
perspective of an Afghanistan in the post WOT period. These perceptions  inform the 
ensuing discussion about how Pakistan‘s contribution to the US-led ―War on Terror‖ 
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focusing on Afghanistan and its implications on national, bilateral, regional and 
international levels are to be seen. 
Part Three: Pakistan as Front-line US Partner in the WOT – Musharraf Regime  
General Musharraf‘s decision to support the US led Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) in late 2001, focusing on Afghanistan placed Islamabad under the international 
spotlight given its geo-strategic location, ethnic and religious bonding and its history of 
close relationship with the Taliban regime in Kabul. To play the role of ―US strategic 
ally‖ Islamabad provided support and cooperation  in tangible terms involving the 
physical usage of its territory to the sharing of intelligence sources, data gathering and 
setting up joint surveillance centers within its territory. This critical role has earned 
Pakistan both appreciations as well as criticism. For instance, Central Command General 
Abizaid appreciating Islamabad observed: ―Pakistan has done more for the United States 
in the direct fight against Al-Qaeda than any other country.‖104 Similarly, General 
Musharraf brushing aside the Western, and Afghan strategic community pressure ―to do 
more‖ as an ally in the War On Terror (WOT) said: 
If Pakistan is not doing enough, the whole world is asleep; 
because I think we are doing the most. We are doing the 
maximum. I challenge any other country which is doing as 
much or thinking as much, executing as much as 
Pakistan.105 
 
Deliberating on the critical role of Pakistan in the ‗War on Terror‘ Director 
General ISPR, Major-General Shaukat Sultan Khan in conversation with the author 
maintained: 
                                                 
104 Quoted in, Ron Laurenzo, ―Abizaid: Pakistan Best Ally in War on Terror‖, Defense Week, February 2, 
2004. 
105 General Pervez Musharraf‘s inaugural address in the  international Seminar on Global Terrorism: 
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Pakistan joined the international coalition against terrorism 
in its national interest based on principled stand to fight 
terrorism in all its guises and to rid the society of religious 
extremism... Since then, the country has paid a very heavy 
price in the political-economic and security fields. No other 
country has suffered more from Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) than Pakistan.106 
 
As mentioned in the earlier part of the chapter, United States officially conveyed 
to Islamabad to offer cooperation relating to air corridors, landing rights, sharing of 
intelligence, apprehending Al-Qaeda operatives entering or sheltering in its territory and 
cutting off diplomatic relations with Taliban. General Musharraf regime offered 
‗unstinted‘ cooperation in almost all these matters. The strategic aims of Pakistan‘s high 
command as partner in GWOT revolved around the following aims: 
Proactively pursue the end objective of elimination of 
terrorists and deny use of own territory as sanctuary for 
operations within Pakistan or across Pak – Afghan border 
through effective articulation of military, political and 
development measures…Our concept of operations aimed 
to prevent outflow of terrorists / miscreants and unwanted 
elements from entering into Pakistan and keep own internal 
dynamics stable. Preclude reason for Coalition forces to 
enter into Pakistan territory on the pretext of hot pursuit 
operations…Concept of Deployment aimed to seal the 
border effectively to check the cross border movement. 
Dominate the internal environment through saturation of 
troops in the area.107 
 
5.2.3 - A: Provision of Air Bases and Air fields 
The official account ( of Musharraf regime) of the air and land facilities given to 
US in the Operation Enduring Freedom and later on, sharply differs from the media 
accounts (local as well as international) as well as data published on the CENTCOM (US 
central command) official web portal. President Musharraf in his memoir In the Line of 
                                                 
106 Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan, Director General ISPR, interview with the author, 6 February 
2007. Rawalpindi.  
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Fire forcefully rejected the widely held Pakistan‘s public impression that ―blanket over 
flight plus landing rights and the use of naval posts, air bases, and strategic locations on 
borders‖108 were extended to the United States. Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi in 
conversation with the author also substantiates General Musharraf‘s line of argument 
observing: 
It is not correct that we (that is, Pakistan government) gave 
in to all US demands. We negotiated on ‗air corridor‘, 
made sure that ‗no combat operation‘ be launched in 
Afghanistan from our territory… It is a myth that Pakistan 
was passive, we preserved our core National interests.109  
 
However, in contrast to the above mentioned assertions, Federal Secretary of 
Defense, General (retd) Tariq Waseem Ghazi told the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
of the National Assembly that: 
Pakistan had provided four airports to the U.S. forces for 
logistic support including Pasni, Dalbadin, Shamsi (Kharan) 
and Jacobabad. Three of these airports, except Dalbadin, are 
still on the standby list for use by US in emergency 
situations.110 
 
Reflecting on the negative public reaction about the use of ‗Shahbaz Airbase‘ in 
Jacobabad for US operations in Afghanistan, another leading national news magazine, 
Newsline (January 2005) observes: 
The Jacobabad base located about 480 kilometers north of 
Karachi and southeast of Kandahar, was one of four 
Pakistani bases used by US and allied forces to support the 
'Operation Enduring Freedom' campaign in 
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Afghanistan…In early December 2001, Pakistan agreed to 
a US request for a long-term presence at Jacobabad, and 
permitted US Marines to renovate the base and build a 
concrete hangar for 50 large planes and air-conditioned 
barracks for troops…During that phase, all but a few 
Pakistani liaison officers were withdrawn from the 
base…Jacobabad was the scene of several protests by 
opponents of the US airstrikes on Afghanistan. The Jamaat-
e-Islami, a staunch opponent of supporting the US in its 
'war against terror' tried to march to the Jacobabad airfield 
on October 14, 2001, one person was killed and 24 people 
injured in clashes with police. By late October 2001, roads 
to the city were blocked for days to prevent the entry of 
protestors. But on 23 October , around 200 JI activists 
appeared in the city, and at least 100 protesters were 
arrested. Subsequently, the protests subsided.111  
5.2.4 - B: Sharing of Intelligence and Joint Anti-Terrorism Cooperation 
On the condition of anonymity a number of security officials confided to the 
author, ―presence of US counter-terrorism experts engaged in joint search and military 
operations to capture Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban from time to time‖.112 Feroz Hassan 
Khan maintains, ―In 2004, 44 military operations, each involving 6000-7000 troops were 
launched based on US satellite information. About 650 terrorists were killed by Pakistani 
troops and estimated 100 or so ran into high mountains.‖113According to the Inter 
Services Public Relations, Rawalpindi (ISPR) accounts, Pakistan deployed above, 
140,000 regular and paramilitary troops and established 821 border posts along the tribal 
belt bordering Afghanistan and Iran in support of US-led efforts to capture Taliban and 
Al Qaeda fugitives. 
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Pakistan‘s Minister of Interior, Moinuddin Haider, led the Pakistani delegation to 
the US for ―US-Pakistan Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism and Law 
Enforcement‖ meeting held on 8 May, 2002. In the group deliberations both sides 
focused on: ―bilateral law enforcement issues, encompassing counternarcotics, 
counterterrorism, extradition, money laundering, trafficking in persons, demand reduction 
and drug abuse control, alternative development and poppy eradication, police and legal 
system reform, plus the repatriation of Pakistani nationals held in the United States.‖114 
Likewise, interception and tracing of satellite telephone transmissions became an 
effective tool in joint U.S.-Pakistani efforts to trace Taliban and Al Qaeda elements in 
Pakistan. Reportedly, Americans trained and equipped sensitive counter-terrorist 
organizations within Pakistan to monitor internet traffic to curb ‗money laundering, 
online recruitment of would-be Al-Qaeda agents and so on. According to Pakistan‘s 
media reports in November 2001, on FBI post was set up at Karachi airport to monitor all 
out-going passengers. Pakistan allowed US and its ally‘s full operational facilities at 
Karachi airport for peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan.115Acknowledging the critical 
role of Pakistan in undertaking actions versus US labeled terrorists, the Congressional 
Research Report (CRS) of 2003 maintained: 
Islamabad has taken action against at least 185 of the 247 
US-designated entities operating on Pakistani territory, and 
has taken its own initiative to detain operatives and 
designate active groups suspected of financing terrorist 
activities…US officials continue to encourage stricter 
oversight and regulation and the United States has agreed 
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to provide technical assistance and training to Pakistani 
customs and finance officials as part of this effort.116 
 
Similarly, the arrest in Pakistan of al-Qaeda operative Mohammad Naeem Noor 
Khan, which subsequently led to the arrest of Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, revealed horrific 
facts about the kinds of attacks that al-Qaeda, was planning. Some extremely accurate 
information about targets in the United Kingdom and the United States was recovered 
from these individuals, and it is quite likely that an attack on the targets would have been 
carried out, had they not been arrested.117 
Though both sides that is, US and Islamabad (specifically under Musharraf 
regime) remained engaged in sharing of intelligence plus sensitive data on Al-Qaeda, 
mutual tensions and suspicions were always there.  Western media by mid 2002 reported 
of Pakistan‘s inaction against Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements actively grouping 
on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line.118 On the Pakistan side, media reported as early 
as July 2002 of US troops picking up 3 Pakistani tribesmen from Angoor Adda, and take 
them across the Durand Line in Afghanistan. In January 2003, Pakistan rejected US claim 
that it was allowed to pursue attackers of its forces in Afghanistan into Pakistan. 
Washington insisting that they reserve the right of ―hot pursuit‖ said its military has 
refrained from cross border operations. Reports of Pakistan and US-Afghan forces 
exchanging heavy fire at the Pak-Afghan border also appeared.119  
In the meantime, ―distrust and double standards‖ of the US and other external 
forces based in Afghanistan in respect of Islamabad were often highlighted within the 
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strategic circles in Pakistan. Syed Saleem Shahzad, editor of Asia Times online quoted a 
key security official: 
Over the past few months U.S. had been engaged in 
espionage operations, including the use of spy planes, in 
South and North Waziristan, Chitral, the Hindu Kush 
mountain chain, Zhob, and the mountain belt between 
Kandahar in Afghanistan and Pakistani Baluchistan. 
Tracking devices have also been installed in number of 
places to monitor movements in border areas.120 
 
5.2.5 - C: Logistic Support to ISAF/NATO in Afghanistan 
From the beginning of the Operation Enduing Freedom the US and ISAF /NATO 
forces operating in Afghanistan remained dependent on Pakistan for about 80 per cent or 
more of their logistic support. Logistic support involves a wide range of services and 
responsibilities involving storage, transport, distribution, transport of personnel; 
acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; acquisition 
or provision of services, and medical and health service support. Three-fourths of NATO 
supplies transited to Afghanistan through Pakistan‘s Khyber Pass, located west of the 
NWFP capital of Peshawar. Talat Masood, a security expert and retired general of the 
Pakistani Army remarks: 
This is the most traditional, most used land route to connect 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The same supply route was used 
to support the mujahedeen in their fight against the Soviet 
Union.121 
 
Khyber Agency in FATA remains a critical route through which majority of U.S.-
NATO supplies must move in order to resupply troops fighting in Afghanistan. 
Reportedly, supplies arrive in Pakistan‘s port city of Karachi, move north to Peshawar, 
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and head west before crossing into Afghanistan and arriving in Kabul. The rest of the 
supplies arrive via air or through the Chaman border crossing point in Baluchistan.122 To 
quote General Musharraf‘s spokesperson Major General Shaukat Sultan: 
In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan has played a role of front 
line state, in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). In this 
process of cooperation with the international community, it 
has provided critical support in the areas like: provision of 
logistics support through its territory from Arabian Sea to 
the Pak-Afghan border and sharing of intelligence with US 
and NATO forces operating in Afghanistan. In sum, 
Pakistan has gone all out to support the coalition partners in 
Afghanistan.123 
 
Pakistan as partner in the US-led War on Terror in Afghanistan pledged to ensure 
the safety and security of logistic supplies through its terrain. General Musharraf 
followed a twin track policy of pressure and conciliation to keep the inhabitants of the 
area away from attacking or blocking the logistic supplies transiting to Afghanistan. 
However, in early 2008, the militants inside Pakistan started attacking NATO convoys 
and transportation lines. The mile and a half long (strategic link to Afghanistan) Kohat 
tunnel was reclaimed by Pakistan‘s army after a fierce battle from the militants. This 
event placed Pakistan army in a challenging position, clearly reflected in the following 
statement of a senior security official: 
Pakistan has conceded to many of the [Pakistani] Taliban's 
demands for peace, such as the release of fellow tribesmen. 
But if they demand something like the closure of NATO's 
supply lines from Pakistan, it is beyond Pakistan's orbit. 
The Americans sought Pakistan's cooperation [in the war 
on terror] in return they pledged billions of dollars in aid. 
But they wanted steady supply lines for NATO forces in 
Afghanistan…Pakistan has stretched itself to the limit for 
the sake of peace in the country, it has even struck deals 
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with al-Qaeda for it to stop attacking Pakistan. But if they 
[al-Qaeda and militants] don't appreciate Pakistan's 
interests and compulsions, then...defeat is not an option.124 
 
According to a number of investigative media reports from Pakistan, militants 
(that is combination of Afghan, foreign and Pakistani elements) were all set to attack the 
support infrastructure of the NATO supply lines through Pakistan. A number of times 
incidents of sabotaging, looting and confiscating of trucks on way to Kabul were reported 
but no serious action were taken and the threat was underestimated by military high 
command. 
 In 2008, militants‘ attacks left 25 fuel trucks destroyed and at least a dozen trucks 
carrying Humvees and other supplies were hijacked at the Khyber Pass. This was 
followed by a U.S. Special Forces raid in the FATA in early September 2008. Pakistan 
authorities temporarily closed Torkham highway illuminating the need for coordinating 
actions on both sides for sustaining multilateral military efforts to the west. According to 
some analysts this action of Pakistan government was in response to US strikes in 
Waziristan. However, officially it was dubbed as: ―security measure to ensure the 
protection of vulnerable vehicles. Nothing to do with the situation in Waziristan or the 
US attacks. This is purely a security issue and we want no untoward incident to take 
place as far as supplies for ISAF are concerned.‖125Later on, oil and containers supply 
resumed to NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan via Khyber Agency. According to the 
Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies report: 
                                                 
124 Quoted in, Syed Saleem Shahzad, ―US homes in on militants in Pakistan”, Asia Times Online, January 
30, 2008. 
125The political agent Khyber agency Tariq Hayat, quoted in Afridi, ―Supply to NATO and ISAF in 




The main supply route through Pakistan has been under 
serious threat since December 2008 when Taliban militants 
mounted sustained attacks on NATO supply lines passing 
through Pakistan. …The Taliban have used multiple tactics 
to disrupt the main supply route through Pakistan. For 
instance, overnight raids and rocket attacks on the terminal, 
threatening and targeting the business outfits involved in 
the transportation of NATO‘s logistics, and blowing up 
bridges which connect Pakistan with Afghanistan have all 
been witnessed.126 
 
The key inference here is that there exists inter-connectivity between the 
insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This has affected the internal as well as external 
security dynamics on both sides and gradually shifted and expanded the war frontiers 
from Afghanistan into Pakistan. The threat to NATO supply line through Pakistan also 
has political connotations. To quote Owais Ahmed Ghani, the Governor of the Northwest 
Frontier Province: 
We are in a complex situation. Geopolitical compulsions 
cannot be ignored.   Presence of Coalition forces in 
Afghanistan are part of problem. The majority public 
sentiment must be behind Pakistan's participation on war 
on terror. That cannot be compromised. If the people turn 
against it, it will be very difficult for the government to 
ensure this [supply] line.127  
 
Apprehending Al-Qaeda Terrorists 
By all accounts the record of Pakistan‘s military; intelligence and security 
officials in capturing, killing and busting the Al-Qaeda elements remains a mix of both 
success and failure. President Pervez Musharraf claimed in his memoir In the Line of 
Fire: 
                                                 
126 Ryan Clarke and Khuram Iqbal, NATO Supply Lines in Central Asia: Expanding the Scope of Conflict? 
PIPS, Islamabad, 2009. 
127 Owais Ahmed Ghani, Governor of the NWFP (North West Frontier Province), interview with the 
author, 11 September, 2009, Islamabad. 
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We have captured 689 and handed over 369 to the United 
States. We have earned bounties totaling millions of 
dollars. Those who habitually accuse us of ―not doing 
enough‖ should simply ask the CIA how much prize money 
it has paid to the government of Pakistan.128  
Likewise, Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan, spokesman for Musharraf argues: 
Pakistan has provided consistent support to the United 
States, assigning 70,000 Pakistani troops to the border 
region and assisting in the capture or killing of 700 
members of Al Qaeda…The purpose behind moving 
security forces into the tribal area was to secure the western 
borders, to check the movement of people moving into 
Pakistan, to ensure that coalition operations in Afghanistan 
did not spill over into Pakistani territory, to nab the 
terrorists and to assist in development works in the 
FATA.129 
What is critical to note, there existed (and continue to do so) a nexus between Al-
Qaeda and number of indigenous sectarian, ethnic, political, jihadi groups in Pakistan. 
According to the law enforcement agencies as well independent media accounts, Al-
Qaeda‘s operational, logistics and recruitment networks encompass, Jandolllah, Harkat ul 
Mujahedeen al Alami, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Al-Badar, Lashkar-e-Omar, Hartkat ul Islami, 
HUJI, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), Jamiat al-Ansar and  Sipah-e-Sahaba, in Pakistan. These 
linkages go back to the period of Afghan Jihad followed by civil war and Taliban rule in 
Afghanistan. Reportedly, Fazl-ur-Rehman Khalil, the leader of Harkat-ul-Mujahedin 
(Movement of Mujahedin), co-signed the 1999 edict by Osama bin Laden which called it 
a duty of every Muslim to kill Americans and Jews. Jamaat-al-Dawa acquired its 77-
                                                 
128 Pervez Musharraf, op.cit, p: 237. 
129 Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan, Director General ISPR and President Spokesperson, interview with 
the author, 6 February , 2007, Rawalpindi. 
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hectare Muridke estate with the help of a donation from Abdul Rehman Sherahi, who was 
arrested because of connections with al-Qaeda.130 
The very arrests of high profile Al-Qaeda leaders from 2002 onwards testify to 
the reach of Al-Qaeda in the mainland plus FATA, NWFP and Baluchistan areas of 
Pakistan. For instance, Abu Zubaida (2002) was captured from a Lashkar-e-Taiba safe 
house in Faisalabad. Abu Omer and Abu Hamza (January 2003) were arrested from 
Sabiha Sharif‘s (a member of the Jamaat Islami) residence in Karachi. The number three 
in the al-Qaeda hierarchy, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad—along with Mustafa Hawsawi—
was arrested at the home of Abdul Qudoos, a Jamaat Islami supporter, in March 2003.  
Similarly, Waleed Muhammad bin Attash, a suspect in the October 2000 attack on the 
USS Cole, is reported to have claimed the recruitment of a dozen Lashkar-e-Taiba 
workers for suicide missions against US targets.131 
Likewise, Musaad Aruchi, a nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed with a $1 
million bounty on his head, was arrested in Karachi in June 2004. Tanzanian Ahmed 
Khalfan Ghailani was arrested in the city of Gujarat in July 2004. Pakistani intelligence 
agencies and security forces arrested Abu Faraj al-Liby, mastermind of two failed 
attempts on President Pervez Musharraf's life, in Mardan (May 2005).  Abu Hamza 
Rabia, an al Qaeda commander ranked the third most senior leader in the network, was 
killed in a tribal region of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan in December 2005.  Mushin 
Musa Matwalli Atwah (also known as Abdul Rehman), an Egyptian al Qaeda member 
                                                 
130 Aarish Ullah Khan, ―The Terrorist Threat and the Policy Response in Pakistan‖ SIPRI Policy Paper No. 
11, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, September 2005. 
131 Details in, Kronstadt, K. A., Terrorism in South Asia, CRS Report for Congress, Washington DC: Library of 
Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS): 8 Mar. 2004, p. 4. Also see, Tohid, O., ‗Prize catch‘, Newsline 
(Karachi), Mar. 2003; Hussain, Z., ‗Closing in‘, Newsline (Karachi), Mar. 2003. 
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wanted for involvement in the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kenya, was killed 
by Pakistani forces close to the Afghan border in April 2006.132 
According to the study published by Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies, from 
January 2002 to May 2006, more than 1,000 Al-Qaeda suspects had been arrested in 
Pakistan. The number of Al-Qaeda activists, killed in operations is above 1,000 in 
Pakistan. However, Pakistani media reported only 660 Al-Qaeda arrests.133  The 
nationality of the Al-Qaeda activists arrested is as follows: 
70 from Algeria, 86 from Saudi Arabia, 20 from Morocco, 
22 from United Arab Emirates, 11 from Libya, 7 from 
Kuwait, 20 from Egypt, 28 from Indonesia, 18 from 
Malaysia and 36 from the Western Asian Countries. Al-
Qaeda arrests also included western nationals: 5 from USA, 
2 from Australia and 11 from Great Britain.134  
 
 In March 2002, Pakistan deployed nearly 100,000 troops around Tora Bora to 
block fleeing Al-Qaeda fighters from crossing over into Pakistan territory.135According to 
official Pakistan figures, as of early 2003 more than 443 Al-Qaeda suspects belonging to 
18 different nationalities have been handed over to the US authorities.136 Why Musharraf 
regime handed over ‗Al-Qaeda fighters‘ plus Pakistani militants to US and not to their 
respective countries of origin remains a matter of debate within and beyond Pakistan. A 
senior intelligence official on condition of anonymity in conversation with the author 
maintains: 
It is a big misperception that we picked people (including 
Pakistani nationals) and handed them to USA without 
approaching their country of origin. We had people from 39 
countries and we called their Ambassadors but most of 
                                                 
132 Data obtained from Ministry of Interior, Islamabad. 2007. 
133 Mohammad Amir Rana and Mubashir Bukhari, Arabs in Afghan Jihad, Islamabad: PIPS, 2007, p: 160. 
134 Ibid. 
135 ‗Pakistan deployed over 100,000 troops‘, Dawn, 2 August 2002. 
136 Qudssia Akhlaque, ‗443 Al-Qaeda suspects handed over to US‘, Dawn, 6 January 2003. 
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them refused to take them back…We could not have 
interrogated and lodged them all as we lacked interpreters 
and infrastructure to house them. Most of the governments 
that we approached asked us to handover their nationals 
specifically ‗hard core Al-Qaeda operatives‘ to the United 
States.137 
 
In addition to the Al-Qaeda arrests, Pakistan government banned and froze the 
bank accounts of the Al-Qaeda affiliated welfare organizations, such as Al-Rasheed 
Trust, Al-Rabeta Trust, and Al-Akhtar Trust – these decisions were later challenged in 
the provincial High Courts by the supporters of these organizations.138 Pakistan 
government in its report to the United Nations mandated Al-Qaeda Counter Terrorism 
Committee maintained: 
Pursuant to UNSC resolutions 1267, 1333 and 1373, 
Pakistan has frozen the assets and accounts of a number of 
entities found involved in terrorist activities. The State 
Bank has issued directives and advisories toward this 
end.139 
 
However, there is considerable anecdotal evidence suggesting, Al-Qaeda related 
welfare or humanitarian organizations continued to operate under new identities despite 
official clampdown in Pakistan.140   
                                                 
137 Author‘s off-record interview with the former official of sensitive organization of Pakistan, October 
2009, Islamabad. 
138 Daily Times, March 17, 2005. 
139 Government of Pakistan, Report of the Islamic Republic Of Pakistan to the UNSC Counter Terrorism 
Committee on Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1373, January 2002. 
Note: The Rabita Trust was established in Pakistan in 1988 ostensibly to repatriate and rehabilitate stranded 
Pakistanis from Bangladesh. Its stated aims included  defense of  Islamic causes  and solve their problems 
plus refute false allegations against Islam, Funds from the trust were reportedly used for a number of al 
Qaeda related activities, including recruitment and training in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere. The 
Rabita Trust was run by Wael Hamza Julaidan, who the U.S. Treasury Department charged was an 
associate of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. He was designated by the U.S. and the UN as an al 
Qaeda associate in late 2002. 
140 Author‘s off-record conversations with senior ex-officials and financial analysts of the Musharraf 
regime, 2007.Also see: Victor Comras, ―Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups‖,  Strategic 





The key point to note is that the Al-Qaeda reach and influence has effectively 
eroded the firewall (from the government point of view) between the internal and 
external security dynamics of Pakistan. The military operations initially launched in 
FATA (discussed in detail in the next chapter) to apprehend the Al-Qaeda or Foreign 
elements uncovered the structural, ideological and political linkages with the indigenous 
militant infrastructure. Al-Qaeda and its affiliated militant organizations overtime 
emerged as direct threat to the state of Pakistan. Musharraf government deliberately 
boxed Al-Qaeda (Foreign militants) and local militants separately and denied the 
complexity of the terrorism threat facing the country.  
To quote another eminent observer belonging to the Frontier region, Brigadier 
(retd) Mahmud Shah: 
Al-Qaeda aim is to take over Kabul, Islamabad and Central 
Asia. Al-Qaeda is definitely a domestic threat for us and an 
indigenous policy to deal with it is missing…Musharraf 
policy is confused and lacks political will to assess the 
complexity on ground. It lacks focus and consistency.141 
 
The foregoing discussion points to the complex linkage between the domestic and 
international strands of Pakistan‘s security policy under the Musharraf regime. General 
Musharraf‘s decision to join the US-led ‗War on Terror‘ in Afghanistan set in motion a 
revision and rethinking of the earlier strands of Pakistan‘s security policy specifically 
related to nuclear security, Kashmir issue, and Afghanistan. This in turn affected 
Pakistan‘s domestic and external security dynamics in a decisive manner. The actions 
undertaken as response to terrorism, whether of political, institutional, or military nature, 
critically eroded the firewall between the so-called internal and external security 
challenges facing the country.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
141 Brigadier (retd) Mahmud Shah, former Secretary FATA Secretariat, interview with Author, 12 
November 2006, Islamabad.  
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 CHAPTER SIX 
 MILITARY RESPONSE TOWARDS TERRORISM: HOME FRONT? 
 
Introduction 
The army, as directed by the government, has the 
Constitutional duty to defend Pakistan against external 
aggression or threat of war, and, subject to law, to act in aid 
of the civil power when called upon to do so.1 
 
This chapter charts the trajectory of events following Pakistan‘s deployment of 
more than eighty thousand troops for the first time in Federal Administered Tribal Areas ( 
FATA)2, ―where no soldier, even the British did not go in the colonial period over 
centuries.‖3 The military operations were launched by Pakistani forces in support of 
United States-led ‗War on Terror‘ in Afghanistan with the aim to apprehend Al-Qaeda 
operatives and their Afghan associates seeking a place to retreat in this region. These 
actions snowballed into a religiously defined militancy led by a mix of foreign (Arab, 
Uzbek, Afghan and Chechen) and local tribal groups against the Pakistani state, the 
Karzai- led government in Kabul and International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) 
/NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan.  Operations were simultaneously carried out in 
the adjoining areas of the NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or KP) and on mainland 
Pakistan to capture Al-Qaeda operatives and their facilitators. At time, these operations 
involved Pakistan‘s police, intelligence personnel and United States CIA agents. 
                                                 
1 Text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Chapter 2, Paragraph 245 (1), National 
Assembly of Pakistan.  
2 Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) also known as the ‗Tribal Areas‘ located in a narrow belt 
which runs along the 2,400 kilometers long Pak-Afghan border, named by the British as the Durand Line. 
FATA comprises of seven political agencies (Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Khurram, North 
Waziristan and South Waziristan.) and six tribal areas known as ‗Frontier Regions‘ (that is, Tribal Areas, 
adjoining districts of Peshawar, Kohat,Bannu and Dera Ismail khan districts respectively). 




Pakistani intelligence agencies also picked up hundreds of its citizens on suspicion of 
being associated with the transnational terrorist networks. These nationals continue to be 
incarcerated quite often without due process of law.    
The following key queries are raised: Have the military actions by the Pakistani 
forces yielded positive results? If so, why and if not, what factors rendered the military 
actions ineffective or counter-productive? The chapter brings out the limitations of 
military driven counter-terrorism approach adopted by the Musharraf regime 
characterized by insensitivity to the political, social, cultural, and ethnic dynamics of 
FATA. The first part of the chapter defines the contextual parameters of FATA that 
serves as an ideal springboard to the indigenous as well as foreign militants to hide, group 
and launch their so-called ―just war‖ against the enemies of Islam, within and beyond 
Pakistan. The second part examines the military campaigns launched from time to time 
by Pakistani forces as well as joint or, at times, unilateral air and ground actions by the 
US and ISAF/NATO in this region. The last part of the chapter analyzes the impact of 
military actions on the people of the area and points out the missing links in the so-called 
‗holistic approach‘ of Musharraf regime towards terrorism. 
Part One:   FATA – A Unique Entity! 
More than a century ago, Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India said:  ―No Man who has ever 




                                                 
4 Quoted in James W. Spain , ―Pakistan's North West Frontier‖, Middle East Journal Vol. 8, No. 1,Winter, 
1954. pp: 27-40. 
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AREA 2576 SQ KM
POPULATION 0.74 M
NANGARHAR
POPULATION  3.138 M
AREA   27200 SQ KM
Federally Administrated Tribal 
Areas (FATA)
 
Source: Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), Rawalpindi, 2008. 
As per the Constitution of Pakistan, FATA is listed as the ―territories‖ of Pakistan 
(Article 1), represented in the National Assembly and the Senate but remains under the 
direct executive authority of the President (Articles 51, 59 and 247).5 The President is 
empowered to issue regulations for the ―peace and good government‖ of the tribal areas. 
FATA elects members to the federal legislature through adult franchise. The system of 
devolution introduced elsewhere in the country in 2001 by means of provincial Local 
Government Ordinances (LGOs) has not been extended to the tribal areas. A separate 
Local Government Ordinance (LGO) for FATA has been drafted and is awaiting 
promulgation. A system of partial local-level governance does, however, operate through 
                                                 
5 Text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, National Assembly of Pakistan. 
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councils in the tribal agencies and FRs (that is Frontier Regions). Elected councillors are 
involved in various aspects of development planning and decision making. FATA is 
divided into two administrative categories: ―protected‖ areas are regions under the direct 
control of the government, while ―non-protected‖ areas are administered indirectly 
through local tribes. In protected areas, criminal and civil cases are decided by political 
officers vested with judicial powers. In non-protected areas, cases are resolved through a 
local Jirga at the agency level.6 To quote an analyst, Iftikhar Durrani:  
 The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is a 
 political construct defined by its unique structure of 
 governance and its demography. As with the British, the 
 Government of Pakistan often viewed FATA as a buffer 
 zone and part of Pakistan only in the sense that was not part 
 of Afghanistan. For decades virtually no development 
 activity was undertaken. The writ of the government 
 in the area has never been strong and people of the area 
 were seen as primitive, wild and fractious. Areas of the 
 FATA close to Afghan border were  considered 
 ―inaccessible‖ until several years ago.7 
 
The Tribal Areas have a chequered history and a strategically important position. 
The British demarcated this region as a buffer zone against the threat of expansive Tsarist 
Russia and controlled the area indirectly through a special system of political and 
administrative structures. The Frontier Crimes Regulation Act (FCR, 1901) that the 
British enforced in FATA allowed local customary laws to prevail and Jirga (council of 
elders), Maliks, Sardars and political agents formed the system of governance.8 Later on, 
the Pakistan government retained and reinforced this system. Experts have called this ―an 
                                                 
6 Noor ul Haq, ―Islamabad Policy Research Institute IPRI: Fact File, 13 January 2008.Available at: 
http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ff94.pdf. Also See, FATA Secretariat, Peshawar, 2008.   
Available at: http: //www.fata.gov.pk.  
7 Iftikhar Durrani, ―The country and the territory‖, The News, 4 February 2007.  
8 Mohammad Amir Rana, The Seeds of Terrorism, London: New Millennium, 2005. pp: 216 – 279.  
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oppressive arrangement‖9 that empowers the few stakeholders like Political Agents 
(Pakistan government representatives), Maliks, and Tribal elders, at the expense of about 
six million tribal people. To quote a senior Peshawar- based journalist Rahimullah 
Yusufzai:  
The real power in the tribal agencies has historically rested 
with the political agents, who represent the federal 
government and maintain control through the colonial-era 
FCR. The regulations allow the political agent to impose 
collective punishment for crimes committed by an 
individual and to deliver prison sentences without due 
process or right of appeal…Individual tribesmen have 
limited rights while the political agents wield vast 
administrative and funding powers and collect and 
distribute revenue.10 
 
Most analysts argue that the lack of political reforms and continuation of the 
colonial era legal and administrative structures, such as FCR, are a source of resentment 
among the Tribal population. Only in 1997 was adult franchise extended to the area and 
FATA has representatives in the National Assembly and the Senate, but not in the 
Provincial Assembly of what is now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa KP (earlier known 
as North West Frontier Province – NWFP). Despite the presence of popularly elected 
tribal representatives, parliament can play no role in the affairs of the area. Article 247 of 
the constitution of Pakistan provides that no act of parliament applies to FATA, unless 
the President so desires. Only the President is authorized to amend laws and promulgate 
ordinances for the tribal areas. Although, the Federal Ministry of States and Frontier 
Regions (SAFRON) is technically responsible for FATA affairs, however, practically it 
                                                 
9 Imtiaz Gul, ―Military operations in FATA Since 2004: Achievements and Backlash‖ in Pervaiz Iqbal 
Cheema, et.al, edit, Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia, Islamabad: IPRI, 2006, pp: 29 – 36.  





has only a nominal role in the utilization of the federal funds routed through it. In a 
parliamentary form of government, this whole gamut of things has created a diarchic state 
of affairs between the President and the Prime Minister at the Centre as well as between 
the Federal Ministry of SAFRON and the Governor KP at the Provincial level.  
  The FATA Reforms Committee proposed extensive political, administrative and 
socio-economic reforms to mainstream FATA with the rest of the country. It proposed: 
the creation of an Independent Tribal Province; getting representation in the KP 
Assembly; establish an elected FATA Council  with women‘s representation; creating an 
independent FATA Secretariat; separate administrative and judicial powers; develop a 
formal system of retributive justice. 11These recommendations were not implemented by 
the government and no local ordinance was issued. Reflecting on the situation FATA 
Reform Committee‘s member Muhammad Zaman Khan maintained: 
We the people of FATA have always been deprived of our 
due rights as the citizens of Pakistan. Initially, government 
wanted FATA to be a part of North Western Frontier 
Province (NWFP) but we felt our people are not ready for 
this transition. Thus, we proposed introducing an elected 
FATA council so that people get accustomed to the new 
mode of governance. However, nothing has been delivered 
so far…Tribal people are die-hard Pakistanis and will 
always stand for the territorial integrity of the country. 
There is an urgent need to register them as equal citizens of 
the country and doing away of the ―suspicion and mistrust‖ 
of us (Tribal people) by the Federal and provincial 
governments respectively.12  
                                                 
11Note: 
Federal Government in 2000 created FATA – Reforms Committee. It comprised of two/three 
representatives each from the seven Tribal Agencies, two members from the six Frontier Regions (FRs), 
two members from the Tribal Areas Development Foundation (TADF) and two technocrats (experts on the 
subject) with a mandate to finalize a draft proposal for FATA in collaboration with the NRB (National 
Reconstruction Bureau), the Governor NWFP, and other related government departments in designing a 
broader framework of the Local Government Plan 2000 for the Tribal Areas. The committee‘s report was 
submitted on December 7, 2000.  
12 Engineer Muhammad Zaman Khan, Member of FATA Reform Committee, telephonic conversation with 




FATA lags behind the rest of Pakistan in almost all socio-economic comparisons. 
Per capita income is half that of the very low national per capita income of $500; some 
60 per cent of the population lives below the national poverty line. Per capita public 
development expenditure is reportedly one third of the national average.13 The literacy 
rate in FATA is just 17 per cent, well below the 45 per cent in Pakistan as a whole. Only 
three per cent of females receive any education. There is one hospital bed for every 2,327 
people, compared to one for 1,450 in Pakistan as a whole. Furthermore, there is only one 
doctor for every 8,189 people. Its total irrigated land is roughly 1,000 square kilometers. 
Natural resources, including minerals and coal, are nominally explored and exploited. 
Most locals depend on subsistence agriculture since there is little industrial development 
and few jobs. Only 43 per cent of its people have access to clean drinking water. 30 per 
cent  of FATA‘s area is inaccessible both politically and administratively.14  
FATA Secretariat in one of its publications concedes FATA‘s low level of 
development attributing it primarily to resource and capacity constraints, scarce 
economic activities and socio-cultural barriers and prevailing law and order situation. A 
number of projects were started under the FATA Annual Development Programmes 
(ADPs) over the years. However, meager financial allocations coupled with increased 
development cost have resulted in huge liabilities. FATA Annual Development 
Programmes (ADP) has thrown forward liabilities of more than Rs. 40 billion. With 
current level of funding by the federal government it would take at least four years to 
complete the ongoing projects of the FATA Annual Development Programmes (ADP). 
                                                 
13 Government of NWFP, ―FATA Development Statistics 2005‖, Peshawar: Bureau of Statistics - Planning 
and Development Department, 2005.  




Thus it leads to poor visibility and impact of development interventions. Even with 
increased allocation since 2002, the per capita government funded development 
investment in FATA (Rs. 905/- or US$ 11.30) stands very low against the national per 
capita government funded development investment (Rs. 2044/- or US$ 25.55). This issue 
is more compounded due to the fact that there is almost no private investment being made 
in FATA.15 
Though state run schools are present in the area, the influence of the Islamic 
seminaries called Madrassas has substantially increased in the region. The backwardness 
of the FATA has been recognized in all economic plans including the country‘s sixth 
five-year plan as the least developed area of Pakistan.16 Spending for education has 
consistently been low in FATA, with less than 1.5 billion rupees allocated annually prior 
to 2001, increasing to 2.7 billion in 2004–05. The Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 
(MICS) carried out in 2007 notes: 
FATA has remained one of the most insular and an isolated 
corner of the country, cut off from the mainstream of 
Pakistani society… Access to secondary education is low in 
FATA for males as well as females. The primary school (6-
10 years of age) Net Enrolment Rate (NER) was found to 
be 28.3%. The 10+-literacy rate was 21.4% in FATA. The 
overall literacy of 15+ years of age was 22% in FATA. The 
Gender Parity Index (GPI) for the primary school Net 
Enrolment Rate was 0.45 in FATA. Child registration is 
rare in FATA, where only 1% of the children below 5 years 
of age are registered at birth. The registration process is 
growing in urban areas with the introduction of proper 
offices and facilities. Around 5.6% of births were registered 
in urban areas. Of all children aged 5-14 years, 3.6% were 
involved in either economic or domestic work, while 1.5% 
                                                 
15  Planning and Development Department, Cost of Conflict in FATA, Peshawar: FATA Secretariat, April 
2009 .Available at: www.fata.gov.pk. 
16 Mohammad Amir Rana, Director – Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, interview with the author, 3 




worked outside their households. Just 0.1% was paid for 
their labor…Increasingly impoverished and marginalized; 
they (People of FATA) have also become vulnerable to 
exploitation at the hands of criminal and extremist 
elements.17 
 
Table of comparative social sector indicators Pakistan, NWFP and, FATA 
Indicator                         Pakistan                        NWFP                                  FATA 
Literacy rate                    43.92                           35.4                                17.42 
(Both sexes, %) 
Male literacy rate (% )    54.81                           51.39                              29.51 
Female literacy rate (%)  32.02                          18.82                              3.00 
Population per doctor     1,226                           4,916                              7,670 
Population per bed in     1,341                           1,594                               2,179 
 health institutions 
Road (per sq km               0.26                             0.13                                 0.17 
Source: Civil Secretariat FATA, FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2007– 15, 
Peshawar. 
  
 Holding the Federal government responsible for this situation, a former FATA 
member of the National Assembly, Latif Afridi comments:  
 FATA has been kept deliberately backward…By raising 
the bogus threat of Pashtun separatism; the central 
government has denied Pashtun their basic economic and 
political rights and kept a natural part of NWFP under 
federal control.18  
 
                                                 
17 UNESCO, WFP and Planning and Development Department, “Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas – Pakistan‖, Peshawar: FATA Secretariat, 2007. 
18 Quoted in International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 125 , ―Pakistan‘s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the 
Militants‖, 11 December 2006, p: 9. 
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Thus FATA is a unique political entity that is both a part of and apart from 
Pakistan. Tribal allegiance and Islamic brotherhood is a strong factor and national 
identity is very much secondary. The combination of ―religious conservatism‖ and 
Pushtun honor code called ―Pushtunwali‖19 ingrained in the tribal psyche have enabled 
the tribal groups to survive the external influences while sustaining a governance mode 
largely based on, ―Islamic Faith, Customs and Traditions.‖20 
The area has been a base of militancy for decades.21 North and South Waziristan 
served as a launching pad and supply line of Mujahedeen operations during the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan, with the support of the West (particularly USA), Pakistan, 
and Saudi Arabia. Reportedly, North and South Waziristan agencies were Osama bin 
Laden‘s base of operations versus the Soviets.22 Reflecting on the complexities that 
hindered Musharraf regime‘s counter-insurgency military operations in Waziristan, Chief 
of Waziristan Agency Malik Haji Nasrullah Kahn in conversation with the author 
contended: 
Musharraf‘s policy versus this area was abnormal from the 
very beginning. He supported United States against the 
people of the area…How is it possible to chop down a tree 
that Islamabad watered for more than two decades?  The 
support for Jihad is very deep and requires long-term 
educational, political, economic, constitutional and social 
reform in the area… People of the area continue to suffer 
and are in the cross-fire between militants and military.23  
 
                                                 
19 Note: Pushtunwali is a more than based on logic of violent reaction: vendetta, provision of sanctuary to 
fugitives, honor and cohesion against external interference of any kind. 
20 Rahimullah Yusufzai, interview with the author, 22 November 2006, Peshawar. 
21 Major General Shaukat Sultan - Pakistan Army Spokesman and Director General ISPR, interview with 
Author,6 February 2007, Rawalpindi. 
22 International Crises (ICG) Asia Report No 125, op.cit, p: 14. 
Note: Osama bin Laden was with the American in the Afghan Jihad vis-à-vis the Soviets, and he turned 
against America when it sent its forces into Saudi Arabia during the 1991Persian Gulf War.  




In July 2006, Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa approved a highly ambitious plan 
for sustainable development to be implemented by the Civil Secretariat - FATA in 
partnership with International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Pakistan. The 
aim of the Sustainable Development Plan (SDP) – FATA 2007 – 2015 was to secure 
social, economic and ecological well-being of the people by promoting a just, peaceful 
and equitable society.24 However, the successful implementation of FATA‘s Sustainable 
Development Plan (SDP) 2007 – 2015 continued to be hampered by the outdated 
governance mode; weak or non-existent writ of state in the areas concerned coupled with 
an unpopular repressive legal regime; conservative and rigid social order; low quality of 
social, economic, educational and health infrastructure, and increasing human deprivation 
in a fragile security atmosphere in the area.  
Following the Soviet Union‘s retreat from Afghanistan in 1989, though the United 
States lost interest in the area, the regional players (particularly, Pakistan, India, Iran, and 
so on) continued to interfere in the Afghan civil war by aiding one group against another. 
With the coming of Taliban to power in Kabul (1996) Afghanistan became a haven for 
local, regional, and global ―Jihadis‖. The International Crises Group (ICG)‘s in one of its 
reposts contends: 
The roots of Islamic militancy lie in the regional and 
international patronage of religious extremists during the 
anti-Soviet jihad, during the (Afghan) civil war and Taliban 
rule which radicalized the area.25  
 
The negative impact of radicalization of the region was inevitable for Pakistan. 
With the 4 million Afghan refugees camped in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and 
                                                 
24 Civil Secretariat FATA, FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2007 – 2015, Peshawar. Available at: 
http:www.fata.gov.pk 
25 International Crises Group - ICG Asia Report, No: 125, op.cit, p: 13.  
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Baluchistan, the Pak-Afghan border became a free zone for the activities of extremists, 
drug peddlers and smugglers that successive governments in Pakistan failed to check. 
Indeed Pakistan‘s reliance on non-state actors (particularly, the jihadis) and militant Islam 
as the informal tools of state security led to the brutalization of the society as a whole. 
With the popularity of the Taliban and by association al-Qaeda, anti-Americanism 
became the dominant sentiment in the Tribal areas, particularly in Waziristan. Tracing the 
present scenario of militancy to developments in the recent past an eminent analyst has 
observed: 
  
Taliban heavily influenced the politics of the area and the 
people were influenced by their Islamic ideologies... 
donations were showered on the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, a 
Pakistan organization ideologically associated with the 
Taliban movement, which then established a network of 
Islamic schools and had funds to operate them.26   
 
Following the ousting of the Taliban in December 2001 by the US-led coalition 
forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan‘s tribal areas particularly Waziristan agencies, became a 
retreating zone for the Afghan Taliban and scores of al-Qaeda members. According to 
Pakistani officials, some 500-600 foreign fighters (mostly Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens) 
sought shelter there following the US-led offensives against them in Spinghar (White 
Mountain) near Tora Bora in December 2001 and in Operation Anaconda in Shahikot 
valley, Paktika in March 2002.27 Due to the close proximity of religious and ideological 
views, the Afghan Taliban along with their foreign allies and the local militants, continue 
to use Waziristan agencies as the base for recruitment, regrouping, training and carrying 
                                                 
26 Amir Rana, The Seeds of Terrorism, London: New Millennium, 2005, p: 236.  




out cross-border attacks against the International forces and Afghan security personnel 
and officials. To quote Imtiaz Gul, a close observer of the developments:  
Most of these people, staunch believers in Islam with 
strong commitment to the tradition of shelter, and a 
propensity to side with all those who oppose the 
Americans, have been unable to reconcile with the new 
situation in which yesterday‘s Mujahideen and Taliban are 
being chased as terrorists. The hatred of the urban 
pragmatism (Pakistan‘s policy changes) and a dislike for 
America combined with an oppressive system all had 
combined to fuel anti-government and anti-military 
sentiment in the tribal areas and also provide ammunition 
to the militants. For them, al-Qaeda means being staunch 
Muslims and Pashtoonwali demands these brothers must be 
protected.28 
 
Sheltering the Taliban and al-Qaeda has not been without cost for tribal groups. 
Many have been reduced to hostages at the mercy of the various hard-line groups loosely 
labeled as the Taliban. These are a mixture of Afghan Taliban, foreign Jihadis (Arabs, 
Uzbeks, Chechen) and their local sympathizers. The weak writ of the Pakistan 
government and the role of the Political Agents have been greatly reduced. Reflecting on 
the sorry state of affairs, Zubair Mehsud a lawyer from FATA, in conversation with the 
author observed:    
In Waziristan, the Taliban are in complete control and run 
their own judicial system, collect taxes, and execute people 
allegedly involved in offences like murders, extortion, 
liquor, and narcotics trade.29  
 
In this state of unremitting fear, ―writing truth is equal to inviting your own 
death‖ maintains senior Peshawar journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai. ―In Wana in South 
Waziristan 26 journalists used to work, but now only one journalist Ashfaq is left. All 
                                                 
28 Imtiaz Gul, Chairman– Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), interview with Author, 27 
August 2008, Islamabad. 
29 Zubair Mehsud, interview with author, 19 February 2007, Islamabad.  
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others left Wana area due to hostile environment. Out of 25 journalists in North 
Waziristan only five are now working. Others have migrated to safer places in the settled 
districts such as Bannu and Peshawar.‖ 30  
It must also be noted that all tribal people do not voluntarily provide refuge to al-
Qaeda and Afghan elements, and many of them do that only reluctantly, often out of fear. 
The Shia tribal people in the Para Chinar area, because of their differences with the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda, have been helpful to Pakistani forces in operations against the 
militants. Reportedly, at least five major operations in Waziristan area were conducted on 
the basis of information provided by the Shia tribals. ―The tribes that have rendered help 
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda include sub-tribes of the Weirs known as the Zali Khel, 
the Kari Khel, the Yar Gul Khel, the Naziri Khel, and the Masood Zai and Ahmad Zai 
tribes. The tribes are spread through North and South Waziristan, Bajaur Agency, Bannu 
and Dera Ismail Khan.‖ 31 
The preceding discussion sketches the contextual (that is, geo-strategic location, 
constitutional status, legal system, social, educational and economic deprivation) 
dynamics of the FATA region that has made this area a favorite retreating zone, hiding 
place, and transit ground for recruiting, training, and launching terrorist activities within 
and beyond Pakistan. Reportedly, by the end of 2001:  
FATA became a shelter for offenders and drug-traffickers. 
No-one in the tribal areas is prevented from keeping 
modern and sophisticated weapons. Out of 16,988 
registered proclaimed offenders in the NWFP, 99 per cent 
                                                 
30 Rahimullah Yasufzai, “National Hearing, of Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and 
Human Rights” l 6 March 2007, Islamabad. 
Note: This hearing was also attended by Author. 
31 Amir Rana, op.cit, p: 253. 
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have taken shelter in Darra Adam Khel, Orakzai Agency, 
Kurram Agency and Khyber Agency.32  
The uniqueness of this area has been manipulated by the power brokers to deprive 
the people of the area to be full-fledged citizens of the country. That is, the state which 
has neglected its due role as the facilitator and provider of security for its people (one of 
the basic assumptions of this study) has often chosen a quick-fix approach to rectify an 
extremely complex situation – particularly in FATA. Ms Mossarat Qadeem, leading a 
community based empowerment initiative in FATA, vividly describes how the state has 
failed in its duty to the people of the region: 
In spite of their love and sacrifices, Pakistan rarely tried to 
integrate them (Tribal Area‘s people) and maintained a 
‗closed door policy‘ – a heritage of the colonial 
rulers…Thirty percent of FATA is still inaccessible both 
politically and administratively…Due to instability in the 
region economic development is still an answered (sic) 
question. Such a dearth of economic opportunities and 
deplorable socio-economic indicators can warrant no 
quality of life. And tribal‘s can easily subscribe to extremist 
ideas, gun culture and trafficking.33 
 
This leads us into the analysis of the force-based approach adopted by the General 
Musharraf regime vis-à-vis FATA in its capacity as a major ally of the US- led ‗War on 
Terror‘ in Afghanistan. 
Part Two: Military Actions – 2002 - 2010 
The stated aims of the military drive launched in FATA were: ―to eradicate 
terrorists and deny them sanctuaries; develop the area and integrate FATA into the 
national mainstream.‖34 To what extent Islamabad achieved its stated goals through 
                                                 
32 Sultan Shahin, ―Islamabad's Plan To Tame Tribal Areas‖, Asia Times Online, 28 November 
2001. 
33 Mossarat Qadeem, Executive Director of PAIMAN Alumni Trust, interview with Author, 20 December 
2008, Islamabad. 
34 Major General Shaukat Sultan – DG ISPR, interview with Author, 6 February 2007, Rawalpindi. 
198 
 
military actions and what variables accounted for mixed results of military operations? Is 
the question answers to which is sought in this part of the chapter. The military campaign 
to evict foreign militants (primarily Al-Qaeda and its affiliates) and target anti-state 
elements comprised actions, counter-actions, verbal and written peace agreements, 
amnesty, economic embargo, development plans, and resort to the Political Agents-the 
traditional tools of governance.   
According to the Inter Services Public Relations- (ISPR-Rawalpindi) data shared 
with the author, 27 Major Operations and 72 Minor Operations were conducted till April 
2010 in FATA.35ISPR sources classify Major military operations as ‗pre-planned and 
extensive military campaign‘ in an identified area and Minor military operations imply 
‗limited and reactive measures‘ in response to attacks on security check posts, ambushes 
and encounters.36 
OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IN FATA – UPTO 2010. 
  Year Major Operations Minor Operations 
   Up to 2004      11   35 
         2005                9   12 
       2006    1    17 
       2007    11    21 
                                                 
35 Data obtained from ISPR,  8 April 2010, Rawalpindi. 
36 Author‘s conversation with the ISPR official, 7 March 2010. 
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      2008    41   49 
      2009    61   121 
     2010 (Till April)    27    72 
     
   Source: ISPR, 8 April 2010. 
Pakistan‘s military actions were precipitated by developments following the 
Afghan jihad and the events of September 11, when many Taliban elements and foreign 
militants sought sanctuary in Pakistan‘s border regions. The region‘s difficult and 
treacherous terrain, cross-border ethnic complexion, porous and previously largely 
unmanned nature of Pak–Afghan border (approximately 2,750 kilometers) posed a 
daunting task for Pakistan‘s army. To quote former head of ISPR, Major General Shaukat 
Sultan: 
Pakistan army achieved its objective of opening up the 
hitherto ‗No Go Areas‘, without a shot being fired. For the 
first year and half, the focus of army‘s efforts was on 
sealing borders and undertaking development work. There 
was lack of information on presence of terrorists / 
unwanted foreign elements in the Tribal Areas, because of 
weak intelligence infrastructure, which was in process of 
being established.37 
 
In March 2002, Pakistan deployed nearly 100,000 troops around Tora Bora to 
block fleeing Al-Qaeda fighters from crossing over into the Pakistani territory.38 The 
most important campaigns since 2001 include support for the US-led Operation Enduring 
                                                 
37Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan, ―Pakistan‘s Struggle against Domestic and Global Terrorism in the 
Security Realm‖, P I Cheema, etall, edit., Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia, Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute: Asia Printers, 2006, pp: 20 - 28.  
38―Pakistan deployed 100,000 troops‖, Dawn, 2 August 2002. 
200 
 
Freedom (2001–02); Operation Al Mizan (2002–06); Operation Zalzala (2008); and 
operations Sher Dil, Rah-e-Haq and Rah-e-Rast (2007–09).  
Pakistan made two extremely important contributions to Operation Enduring 
Freedom. Firstly, it granted over-flight and landing rights for US military and intelligence 
units, allowed access to some Pakistani ports and bases, provided intelligence and 
immigration information, facilitated logistical supply to military forces in Afghanistan, 
and (temporarily) broke diplomatic relations with, and cut off most logistical support to 
the Taliban.39Secondly, Pakistan deployed units from the regular army, Special Services 
Group40, Frontier Corps and Inter-Services Intelligence directorate to the Afghanistan–
Pakistan border to conduct operations along infiltration routes from Afghanistan. The 
regular army employed two infantry brigades for border and internal-security operations 
for much of 2001 and 2002 and it established two quick-reaction forces from the Special 
Services Group in Kohat and Wana to provide local Pakistani commanders the ability to 
deploy troops quickly. In addition, approximately 4,000 Frontier Corps forces were used 
to conduct operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.41 
In December 2001, Pakistan employed a mixture of forces in Khyber and Kurram 
tribal agencies to support US operations at Tora Bora. In March 2002, Pakistan increased 
force levels in North and South Waziristan to target militants during US-led Operation 
Anaconda in the Shah-i-Kot Valley of Paktia Province in Afghanistan.42 Throughout 
2002, Frontier Corps forces raided weapons caches in South Waziristan; the regular army 
                                                 
39 Pervez Musharaf, In the Line of Fire, op.cit,  pp: 201–7 
40 C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, ‗Pakistan‘s War Within‘, Survival, No: 6, Vol: 51, December 2009-
January 2010. pp: 161–188. 
41 C. Christine Fair, The Counter terror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India, Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2004. Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG141.pdf. 
42 C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, ‗Pakistan‘s War Within‘, op.cit, p: 167. 
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assaulted al-Qaeda operatives during Operation Kazha Punga in South Waziristan; 
regular army troops entered areas in Khyber and Kurram Agencies to pursue al-Qaeda 
fighters fleeing Afghanistan; and Pakistani military, police and intelligence forces 
conducted operations against insurgents in Baluchistan Province.43 
Pakistan played a major role in capturing many senior al-Qaeda operatives and 
foreign fighters, including Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Sharib Ahmad.44 It 
remanded many of these to the US government, which temporarily billeted them in secret 
prisons in Kandahar, Bagram and elsewhere. In most cases, Pakistan retained captured 
Afghans or Pakistanis.45 US officials widely praised Pakistani contributions in this 
period.  A critical point to be noted is that Washington did not ask Islamabad to target all, 
or even most, militant groups and leaders operating in and from Pakistan, including 
senior Afghan Taliban figures and allies such as Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar. Rather, Washington sought Pakistani assistance primarily in capturing or 
killing al-Qaeda and foreign fighters, which Pakistan saw as in its own interest.46 Brian 
Cloughley while analyzing Pakistan‘s military operations in FATA points out the lack of 
planning and foresight on the part of US-led forces operating across the Durand Line in 
Afghanistan in underestimating the re-vitalizing capacity of Afghan and Al-Qaeda related 
militants. He observes: 
Given the commitment of fewer than 100 American 
personnel, U.S. forces proved unable to block egress routes 
from Tora Bora south into Pakistan, the route that OBL 
[Osama bin Laden] most likely took. Regardless, the defeat 
                                                 
43 International Crisis Group, ―Pakistan‘s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants‖, 11 December 2006, p: 14. 
Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4568&l=1&m=1. 
44 Zafar Abbas, ‗Operation Eyewash‘, Herald, August 2005, p: 64 
45 C. Christine Fair and Seth G. Jones, ‗Pakistan‘s War Within‘,op.cit, p: 168. 
46 Ashley J. Tellis, Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance 
Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,2008, p: 7 
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for AQ [Al Qaeda] at Tora Bora, coupled with the later 
defeat during operation ANACONDA, ensured that neither 
AQ, nor the Taliban would mass forces to challenge 
American troops in the field until 2006.47 
 
Operation Enduring Freedom was partially successful in its primary objectives of 
overthrowing the Taliban regime and capturing some al-Qaeda fighters crossing the 
border. But the United States and Pakistan failed to capture some key al-Qaeda figures, 
including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, which reportedly crossed into 
Pakistan. 
 6.2 Operation Al Mizan 2002–06: 
Operation Al Mizan comprised several smaller operations, such as Operation 
Kalosha II, which took place in South Waziristan. The March 2004 Kalusha operation 
concentrated on a 50 – square kilometer area near Wana, South Waziristan‘s district 
headquarters, around the villages of Shin Warsak, Daza Gundai, Kalusha, Ghaw Khawa, 
and Kari Kot.48 This area was under the control of five Islamist militants – Nek 
Mohammad, Noor-ul-Islam, Mohammad Sharif, Maulvi Abbas and Maulvi Abdul Aziz – 
suspected of harboring foreign terrorists and having links with the Afghan Taliban.  
Operation Kalosha II was successful in that it eliminated several local and foreign 
fighters, disrupted a major al-Qaeda command and control centre, and captured a network 
of tunnels containing sophisticated electronic equipment and supplies. But it also 
triggered attacks against nearby Pakistan army and Frontier Corps bases. The operation 
backfired, as local and foreign militants ambushed troops, inflicting heavy losses and 
                                                 
47 Brain Cloughley, Insurrection, Terrorism, and the Pakistan Army, Pakistan Security Research Unit 
(PSRU), Brief No: 53, 10 December 2009. p: 9. 
48 Owais Tohid, ―The new frontier‖, Newsline, April 2004.  
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took officials hostage.49 Reflecting on the Kalusha operation, former director general of 
Inter Services Intelligence , Lt General (retd) Asad Durrani said: 
Military action was taken in haste. Regular channels of 
conflict resolution and dialogue should have taken 
precedence over the use of military force, which 
undermined the capacity of the administration and local 
tribesmen to neutralize, contain and de-weaponise the 
militants through non-military means.50 
 
Another important operation took place in June 2004, when 10,000 army troops, 
along with US-trained Special Operations Task Force (a helicopter mobile battalion from 
Special Services Group) and Frontier Corps forces, attacked what was reported to be a 
force of more than 200 Chechens and Uzbeks, some Arabs and several hundred local 
supporters in the Shikai Valley, some 25km north of Wana. Nearly 3,000 soldiers 
established an outer cordon and the Pakistan Air Force struck at dawn, using precision 
weapons against nine compounds. Pakistan army forces used indirect artillery fire and 
precision rocket attacks by helicopter gunships. Helicopters dropped off Special 
Operations Task Force troops to search the compounds, and infantry initiated a 
simultaneous operation to clear the valley and link up with the task force. Later, an 
additional force of 3,000 troops was brought into the area to clear more of the valley.51 
6.3: A- Shikai Agreement – April 2004  
With public opinion running against military actions in South Waziristan, the 
army opted for an unwritten peace deal known as, Shikai Agreement with the pro-Taliban 
militants on 24 April 2004. The Shikai deal offered the local militants amnesty and 
                                                 
49 Rahimullah Yusafzai and Sailab Mahsud, ―Waziristan clashes death toll rises: 16 troops, 23 military 
vehicles lost‖, The News, 18 March 2004.   
50 Quoted in, ICG Asia Report no 125, op.cit, p: 15.  
51 Pervez Musharraf, In the line of Fire, op.cit, p: 165. 
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financial incentives in return for good behavior and pledges to renounce violence. They 
were also asked to surrender al-Qaeda and other foreign militants or register them with 
the authorities and ensure that they would not use Pakistani territory for cross-border 
attacks.52  
However, the Shikai agreement never fully materialized as foreign terrorists failed 
to register and surrender, aided by the local pro-Taliban militant support. In June 2004, 
Nek Mohammad who was said to be key link to al-Qaeda was killed in a suspected US 
missile attack.53 This was followed by Haji Omar becoming the leader of the Wana 
Taliban in South Waziristan. Haji Omar continued to house and shelter Uzbeks and 
foreign militants who focused more on attacking Pakistani government and military than 
to attack U.S. and NATO targets across the border in Afghanistan. This put them in 
conflict with the Taliban commander Mullah Nazir, who expelled them and their 
supporters, Haji Omar and Haji Sharif, by April 2007. The Uzbeks then sought refuge in 
the Mehsud-dominated areas of South Waziristan, where Abdullah Mehsud and Baitullah 
Mehsud had organized their own anti-Pakistan, anti-Western Taliban movements.  
As part of the force-based policy, economic sanctions were applied to the area 
under the collective responsibility clause of the FCR.54 The administration closed shops 
impounded dozens of vehicles and arrested Zalikhel (sub-clan of Ahmedzai Wazir) 
tribesmen, including thirteen elders.55 Along with this, military air strikes were renewed, 
targeting the militant sanctuaries in the Shikai area. Distributors of militant propaganda 
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54 ―Wana bazaar sealed, more tribesmen held‖, The News, 31 May 2004.  




were also targeted in one of the operations. Along with this, air strikes were renewed, 
targeting the militant sanctuaries in the Shikai area. Army spokesman Major General 
Shaukat Sultan maintained, ―During 2004-2005, foreign militants have been eliminated in 
South Waziristan, and the remaining small groups are on the run in North Waziristan.‖56 
6.4 – B: Sra Rogah Peace Deal – February 2005  
After the death of Nek Mohammed, Baitullah Mehsud emerged as a leader of the 
militants in South Waziristan. In February 2005, another six-point peace deal was inked 
between the defiant local pro-Taliban militant Baitullah Mehsud and the military through 
the mediation of the local Jirga. Baitullah Mehsud surrendered in Sra Rogah (February 
2005), with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) playing a central role and was given 
amnesty by the government afterwards. According to the terms of the agreement, 
Baitullah Mehsud and his associates would not attack government functionaries and 
forces, would not shelter and assist al-Qaeda and other foreign terrorists and would aid 
the government‘s war on terror. If they violated the accord, they would be punished in 
accordance with the local customs and existing laws. As with the Shakai deal, the army 
agreed to remove troops from Mehsud‘s territory, compensate the militants for human 
and material losses, and deploy Frontier Corps personnel to the five forts there.57 
  Despite the peace deals the situation remained quite unstable as cross-border 
infiltration, targeted killing of the pro-government tribal chiefs, plus attacks on the 
military check posts continued. The agreement of 2005 was more on paper than on 
ground. In fact, the pro-Taliban/Taliban commanders such as Baitullah Mehsud and Haji 
                                                 
56 Quoted in, Imtiaz Gul, op.cit, p: 30.  
57 ‗Accord in Bajaur to Curb Terrorists‘,Dawn, 31 May 2005; ‗The Bajaur Massacre‘, Dawn, 1 November 
2006; Mohammad Ali, ‗Peace Deal in Bajaur Soon, Says Aurakzai‘, Dawn, 24 February 2007. 
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Omar, who concluded the peace deals with the government in South Waziristan in 2005, 
publicly stated that: ―they will continue to wage their ―jihad‖ against the US-led coalition 
in Afghanistan.‖58 Reportedly, during 2005, in North and South Waziristan as many as 
108 pro-Government tribal leaders including four chief maliks or elders, at least four 
Government officials, informers and two local journalists, were assassinated by the  
militants. In the North Waziristan agency, during the later half of 2005, 25 bomb blasts, 
32 sniper and rocket attacks on FC (Frontier Constabulary) and Army camps were 
reported. Hundreds of houses were demolished for sheltering the militants in the military 
operations.59 
6.5 – C: Military Action and Peace Agreements in North Waziristan – 2006  
The year 2006 witnessed the re-grouping of the militants in North Waziristan, 
enhanced cross border attacks, and hit and run attacks on Pakistan‘s security forces. In 
March 2006, for instance, security forces targeted an alleged militant hideout in the 
border town of Danday Saidgi. The military claimed that 45 people, including 30 
foreigners, mostly Chechens were killed in the attack. The militants retaliated with the 
attack on a Frontier Corps convoy near Mirali town, two days later. As a result heavy 
fighting spread to Miramshah, North Waziristan‘s district headquarters. The cost of 
violence on the local population grew day by day. According to reports, ―the growing 
influence of militants and resultant insecurity have forced tribesmen in the restive North 
and South Waziristan agencies to migrate to adjacent districts of the NWFP.‖60 
                                                 
58 Rahimullah Yusufzai, ―Putting out the fire in Waziristan,‖ The News,19 January, 2007.  
59 Figures quoted in, Imtiaz Gul, op.cit, p: 34. 
60 Dawn, 18 January, 2006.  
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While this was going on, military planners in Islamabad began to revisit their 
strategy to handle the deteriorating situation in Waziristan. It was felt that the use of force 
was counter-productive and local youth were gravitating towards the Taliban.61 Thus, 
another peace initiative was launched by the newly appointed NWFP‘s Governor, Lt. 
General (retd) Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzai, in May 2006. Orakzai vowed: 
The agreement aimed to put out the fire that engulfed the 
entire Waziristan and turn it into a land of peace. The army 
operation had weakened al-Qaeda and dispersed them and 
that it was time for political dialogue, the government put 
together a Grand Jirga to hold negotiations with the warring 
elements for a truce.62  
 
Though criticized by the Western governments, media and think tanks as a 
―policy of appeasement‖, the deal was termed by Pakistan as ―historic‖ and 
―unprecedented.‖ 63 JUI-F parliamentarian Maulana Syed Nek Zaman who was also 
involved in the mediation process said: ―Misunderstandings between the administration 
and Pakistan‘s Taliban led to unpleasant moments but we are happy that a new beginning 
starts today.‖ 64 
  According to the translated text of the North Waziristan Peace Agreement,65 the 
Utmanzai Tribe of the North Waziristan (that also incorporated the militant‘s 
representatives, religious and local leaders) and the Government signed the peace deal on 
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5 September 2006 at Miranshah, in a move to establish enduring peace in the area. The 
critical elements of this deal are explained in Appendix No.18. 
How successful these deals have been in terms of the aims of the Pakistan 
government, in particular with respect to the denial of safe haven to the Taliban and al-
Qaeda can be gauged from this comment of senior journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai he 
made on the peace agreements and their aftermath: 
Such accords were signed as a necessity to reduce losses to 
the military and our people by employing traditional 
peacemaking methods such as jirga…The peace 
agreements need to be implemented in letter and spirit and 
regularly monitored and reviewed. The involvement of 
Pakistani fighters in the fighting between the Afghan 
government and Taliban is drawing Islamabad into the 
conflict and jeopardizing the country‘s security. Any 
sanctuaries for Taliban must be removed.66 
 
According to national and international media reports and Pakistan government 
officials, the situation on the ground remained tense in the later part of 2006 and 
continues to be so. The militants, who are no longer fighting Pakistani troops, are instead 
using the region as a hub for cross-border attacks. ―This is more than evident in the 
deaths of local militants during clashes in Afghanistan‖.67 According to the people 
belonging to the area, ―In North and South Waziristan, the writ of the government 
remains weak and most of the time it‘s absent. Excessive use of force by Pakistan Army 
has alienated the civilians.‖ 68  
The Peace Accord of September 2006 was heavily criticized in the Western media 
as an attempt to cut deals with the militants to protect Pakistan‘s troops while exposing 
forces operating in Afghanistan to harm. For instance, an international think tank 
                                                 
66 Rahimullah Yusufazi, ―Putting out the fire in Waziristan‖, The News, 19 January 2007. 
67 ―Bodies of four militants brought form Afghanistan‖, Dawn, 17 October 2006.  
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observed: ―The militants now hold sway in South and North Waziristan Agencies and 
have begun to expand their influence not just in other tribal agencies such as Khyber and 
Bajaur but also in NWFP‘s settled districts.‖ 69 Similarly, within Pakistan some political 
parties and groups criticized North Waziristan peace agreement as empowering the 
militants at the expense of the security of the common man. In its editorial, a major 
national daily stressed:  
On the face of it, the agreement reads as a breakthrough, 
but if one reads the finer print, it appears that the 
government has all but caved in to the demands of the 
militants. More ominously, the agreement seems to be a 
tacit acknowledgement by the government of the growing 
power and authority of the local Taliban.70  
 
6.6 – D: Military Actions, inactions, peace overtures and reactions in FATA; Swat, 
and; Mainland Pakistan: 2007-2008 
In the first three months of 2007, Waziristan continued to see-saw between 
tension, violence and uneasy peace. The Pakistan military claimed to have carried out 
two air strikes in Gurwek (North Waziristan) and in Salamat village of Shak Toi (South 
Waziristan) in January, to destroy the militants (foreign) hideouts. This perception runs 
against the commonly held view ―US military used its unmanned, CIA-operated 
Predators to fire the missiles that hit these targets inside Pakistani territory.‖71 The strikes 
led to violent protests in ―Tank‖ which serves as the gateway to South Waziristan and the 
protests spread to other areas as well. The air strikes were also widely condemned by the 
religious political stalwarts as well as secular and nationalist parties‘ leadership.  
                                                 
69 International Crisis Group Asia ICG Report No. 125, op.cit, p: 20.  
70 ―Back to square one?‖ The News, 7 September 2006.  
71 Rahimullah Yusufzai, ―Putting out the fire in Waziristan‖, The News, 19 January 2007. 
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In December 2007 indigenous Taliban militant groups formed the Tehrik-i-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP)72, an umbrella organization of dozens of Taliban groups 
throughout Pakistan, under the initial leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. Maulana Hafiz Gul 
Bahadur, a North Waziristan-based commander, was elected the first deputy chief, or 
Amir, of the TTP, while Maulana Fazlullah, head of the Taliban in the Swat region of 
North-West Frontier Province of NWFP (renamed Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa in 2010), was 
elected as secretary of TTP. Bahadur left TTP in 2008 and allied himself with the 
likeminded Mullah Nazir, primarily because he was against targeting Pakistani state and 
civilians as pursued by Baitullah Mehsud. The formation and composition of TTP 
demonstrated the overspill of militancy and violence into adjoining districts of NWFP. 
Most of the analysts testify, ―TTP has strong presence in all seven agencies of the FATA 
and in the settled districts of the NWFP: Bannu, Karak, Hangu, Kulachi, Dera Ismail 
Khan (D.I. Khan), Lakki Marwat, Doaba, Kohat, Dir, Buner, and to some extent Mardan, 
the Swat Valley, and Shangla district.‖ 73  
 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema an expert on Pakistan‘s security policy identifies three 
broad categories of militants from 2006 onwards in FATA:  
Al Qaeda elements, who desire ―regime change‖ in 
Pakistan, constitute the first type of militants. Those 
elements are primarily reacting to US Western policies 
perceived as anti-Muslim. The recent military occupation 
of Iraq and Afghanistan has fuelled this anti-U.S.sentiment; 
Afghan nationals in Pakistan—particularly those who are 
sympathetic to the former Taliban government and oppose 
Afghanistan‘s occupation by foreign troops—constitute the 
                                                 
72  Note: The TTP is an amalgam of 40 groups. One of its aims is that if security forces attack one 
group of Taliban then all TTP components would open new fronts for the forces in their respective 
areas to ease pressure on their attacked comrades. Another aim is to engage the military on many fronts in 
the NWFP and FATA. For more details see: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Pakistan Security 
Report 2008, Islamabad. 
73Syed Saleem Shahzad, Bureau Chief Asia Times online, interview with Author, April 25 2010, Islamabad.  
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second type of militants; Pakistan nationals—especially 
some Pashtuns in the NWFP plus FATA and from Punjab 
province as well. These are sympathetic to and supportive 
of the former two categories —constitute the third type of 
militants.74 
 
Ironically, as militancy branched further into FATA, its adjacent areas and 
mainland of Pakistan, tactics used by terrorists also evolved and became more lethal. 
According to Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) terrorists adopted the use of 
landmines, improvised explosive devices, rocket attacks and beheadings as means to 
counter Pakistan military actions against them.                                      
Table: Attack Tactics of the Terrorists - 2008                
Tactic  
Number of  
 
Incidents  
Suicide attacks  63  
Rocket attacks  381  
Beheadings  46  
Remote-controlled bombs  112  
Landmines  110  
Firing 451  
Sabotage, burn, Fire  116  
Improvised explosive devices  373  
Target killings  26  
Manually developed low   
intensity devices  298  
                                                 
74 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, ―Challenges Facing a Counter-Militant Campaign in Pakistan‘s FATA‖, (NBR): 
Analysis, Vo1:9, No: 3, United States of America: National Bureau of Asian Research, August 2008. p: 22. 
212 
 
Hand grenades  82  
 
Source: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Pakistan Security Report 2008, 
Islamabad. 
Throughout 2007, militancy and extremism continued across all agencies of 
FATA and adjacent area. In Bajaur agency, Taliban ran the show. Abdul Ghani Marwat, 
who headed the government's vaccination campaign in Bajaur, was killed in a bomb 
attack in February amid the Taliban-sponsored rumor that the Pakistani government-run 
polio vaccination drive was a United States plot to sterilize Muslim children termed as 
Taliban ―fatwa‖. According to government estimates which are always conservative, 
parents of around 24,000 children had refused to give them the polio 
vaccine.75Meanwhile, government tried to regain the trust of the local population by 
engaging the moderate elements and promising more development aid for the area.  
Facilitating formation of Lashkars (group of Tribal people) rising against foreign 
and local militants in support of the Army‘s operation was adopted as part of the military 
strategy in the region. In the Tribal Areas, the first anti-Taliban Lashkar was formed in 
Salarzai tehsil of Bajaur Agency. According to media reports, the Lashkar was formed 
when the Taliban ambushed and killed tribal elders Malik Bakhtawar Khan, Malik Shah 
Zarin and religious scholar Maulvi Sher Wali who were on their way home after a 
meeting with government officials in Khar where they had pledged to raise a Lashkar and 
sought government support for the purpose. The local tribesmen held the Taliban 
responsible for the killings and formed a Lashkar led by Fazal Kareem Baro. However, 
the Lashkar kept away from flushing out militants from their strongholds in Mula Said 
                                                 
75 Hassan Abbas, ―Pakistan‘s grip on Tribal areas is slipping‖, Jamestown Foundation, 2007. 
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Banda and Darra areas of Salarzai tehsil. ―In Mamond tehsil of Bajaur Agency, Malik 
Rahmatullah Khan and Malik Shahpar Khan formed a Lashkar. In Charmang tehsil of 
Bajaur Agency Malik Sherdad and Malik Tari Gul set up a Lashkar to contain the local 
Taliban.‖ 76 
In early 2007, clashes in the Azam Warsak area in South Waziristan between the 
foreign militants (mainly Uzbeks) and the local Tribesmen were characterized by the 
government as an attempt by the locals to evict the foreign militants from the area. The 
death toll recorded above 120, included 30 local tribesmen and the rest foreign, mostly 
Uzbekistani militants and their tribal supporters from the area and beyond.77 There were 
reports that the army may be pounding the hideout of foreign elements on behalf of the 
local tribesmen, though this is denied by the government .To quote an Islamabad based 
analyst Farhan Bokhari:  
A week of fighting between al-Qaeda loyalists and tribal 
militants in a remote Pakistani border region has almost 
completely destroyed camps used by a leading terrorist 
from Uzbekistan, Pakistani intelligence officials claimed on 
Thursday. There‘s no way to confirm if Yuldashev himself 
may be dead. But what I know or certain is that his group 
has suffered heavy casualties, said one Pakistani 
intelligence official. It‘s hard to imagine if the Uzbeks have 
any firepower remaining to carry on in the tribal areas.78 
 
 The fact is the challenge of militancy in the tribal areas was too complex to be 
resolved quickly. The people of the tribal area though fed up of militants present militants 
have had a long-term presence in the tribal areas. Abdul Sattar, Pakistan‘s former foreign 
                                                 
76 Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Pakistan Security Report 2008, Islamabad, p: 16. 
77 ―Toll 127 as clashes intensify in Waziristan‖, The News, 22 March 2007.  
78 Farhan Bokhari, ―Pakistan al-Qaeda camps destroyed‖, Financial Times, 22 March 2007. 
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minister said also acknowledged this fact observing: ―You can‘t get rid of them in one 
go.‖ 79 
6.7 Swat: Operation Rah-e-Haq in late November 2007 and July 2008 
 The roots of contemporary religious militancy in Swat can be traced back to the 
formation of Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) in 1989. Sufi 
Muhammad founded TNSM with an aim to enforce ‗Sharia‘ (Islamic Law) in Swat. 
Twice in the 1990s TNSM launched an armed rebellion demanding promulgation of 
Sharia in the region. On December 1, 1994, the Governor of NWFP enforced Nizam-e-
Shariat Regulation. Under this framework, courts and names of judges were ‗Islamized‘, 
a judge was a designated Qazi and an adviser was assigned to each Qazi to administer 
justice according to the Sharia. A new parallel judicial system was instituted where 
litigants had a choice in that they could opt for the ‗law of Pakistan‘ or the Sharia. The 
Nizam-e-Adl Regulation for the area was a continuation of the semi-Shariah laws that 
were already in force at the time of their merger in Pakistan. Qazi Courts already existed 
in the whole of Malakand division as a result of the previous Shariah and Nizam-e-Adl 
ordinances. The Nizam-e-Adl Regulation was enforced in Swat and the rest of Malakand 
division and Kohistan in 1994 and then, with some amendments, in 1999. But neither 
brought change nor redressed the people‘s grievances due to which TNSM‘s activities 
and demands for a change in the judicial system and enforcement of Islamic laws 
continued. Reportedly, three years prior to 9/11, Tehreek-e-Tulba was founded in the 
neighboring Orakzai Agency. This was the beginning of restrictions on women. Taliban 
started executions and banned TV usage as well as cinemas. 
                                                 




In April 2001, Sufi Muhammad leading TNSM activists again demanded the 
imposition of Shariah. Following the 9/11 WTC incidents and impending strikes on 
Afghanistan, Sufi Muhammad took an estimated 10,500 people to fight against the US 
forces in Afghanistan. On January 12, 2002, the government of Pakistan banned TNSM 
and he was arrested on his return from Afghanistan the same month. His son-in-law, 
Maulvi Fazlullah, replaced him as leader of TNSM and, was nicknamed ―Maulana 
Radio‖ for using FM radio station preaching Islamic revolution against the state.  Swatis, 
who were fed up with the inefficient Pakistani judicial system were attracted to his fiery 
sermons calling for justice, equality and calls to lead a ―pure Islamic‖ life. While 
encouraging his listeners to pray five times a day and avoid sinning, ―Fazlullah also 
preached anti-Americanism, focusing on U.S. forces fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
People particularly women collected and donated cash and gold ornaments to build a 
two-storey madrassa complex.‖80 For example, Fazlullah collected about 35 million 
rupees (Around $600,000) from supporters to build a two-storey madrassa complex; it 
was later destroyed by Pakistani security forces in the spring of 2009.81              
Government initially adopted a policy of ―wait and see‖ and failed to undertake 
preventative measures to check the extremist organization becoming violent and 
threatening innocent citizens to conduct their day to day life peacefully. Holding 
government responsible for letting Swat slide into war, Ziauddin Yousafzai, an educator 
heading ‗Aman - Swat Peace Council‘ told the author: 
Swat is a classic case of state failure to deliver good quality 
education and good governance to its people. Fazlullah was 
seen as a messiah by illiterate women, unemployed youth 
                                                 
80 Author‘s conversation with group of Women and Youth from Swat, 20 April 2007, Islamabad. 
81 Musa Khankhel and Mushtaq Yusufzai, "30 FC Men Die in Swat Blast," The News , I October, 2007. 
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and dejected males who will give them a better quality of 
life following Islamic injunctions of his narrow 
interpretation. But people in general suffered from all sides. 
They lived in fear under Fazlullah men and waited for state 
action.82 
 
Similarly, a number of media reports pointed out the growing affinity of TNSM 
with other anti-state and anti-western militant factions within and beyond Pakistan. 
Recalling his experience as a former ideologue of TNSM, a young man form Swat 
confessed to the author: 
I was part of both the worlds. In the morning I attended 
College and in the evening I was Talib in one of TNSM 
madrassa. There, we learned to make bombs, and how to 
preach and convince others to follow an Islamic path… I 
left this course realizing the danger of slipping into 
violence and was de-radicalized by peace activists in my 
area…State never did anything to check why the youth is 
turning towards TNSM agenda…Now I am peace captain 
and operate in a challenging environment. I am engaged in 
bringing youth of my area back to peaceful and tolerant 
path of life… I am convinced that through engagement and 
dialogue we can create and foster peace and stability in our 
area.83   
 
Finally in early 2006, the authorities blocked at least five illegal FM stations run 
by Maulana Fazlullah. On November 8, 2006 an army base in Dargai was attacked; 42 
soldiers were killed. On January 13, 2007, Malik Bakht Habibi of ANP (Awami National 
Party) was killed. People gathered in Mingora, Saidu Sahrif and Matta, and burnt the 
                                                 
82 Ziauddin Yousafzai, series of conversation on telephone and in person with Author, 2007- 2010, 
Islamabad. 
83 Adnan Shinwari, student of Masters in Economics (The University of Peshawar) belonging to Swat, 
interview with Author, 3 February, 2010.  
Note: Author has interacted with number of Youth groups engaged in Peace building efforts in Swat and 
FATA from 2006 -2010, being a ‗Peace Trainer‘ and volunteer of non-governmental organization called 
PAIMAN (meaning promise) engaged in de-radicalization, peace education , women empowerment and 
civic education across Pakistan. 
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electronic products. Girls schools were bombed and ―At least 150 hotels were shut down 
in Mingora alone; and 300 others in Sadda and Kalam.‖ 84  
The Musharraf regime pursued a policy of dialogue and engagement vis-à-vis 
TNSM as the best way to calm Swat. In May 2007 a nine-point ―Peace Agreement‖ 
between the Pakistan government and TNSM leader Fazlullah was inked. Its terms 
required Fazlullah to support the polio vaccination campaign and education for girls, as 
well as government efforts to establish law and order. He also agreed to shut down 
training facilities for terrorists, stop manufacturing weapons, and support the district 
administration in any operation against anti-state elements. Fazlullah's followers were 
also to stop carrying weapons in the open. In return, Fazlullah was permitted to continue 
broadcasting his illegal FM radio programmes and the government dropped criminal 
cases lodged against him. 
The Taliban promptly disobeyed the terms of the deal, and began to overrun 
police stations and enforce Sharia law in the district. The Taliban used the government's 
siege and assault on Islamabad‘s ―Lal Masjid‖ in 3-10 July 2007 as their reason for 
violating the peace agreement. But Fazlullah and his fighters had begun violating the 
agreement long before the Lal Masjid incident. Fazlullah's forces overran much of Swat 
and neighboring Shangla.                                             
In November 2007, military Operation Rah-e-Haq was launched. Pakistan sent 
about 2,500 paramilitary troops in October 2007 to re-establish its authority in the region.  
In the first phase of Operation Rah-e-Haq, local police led cordon-and-search operations 
to clear militants operating in the Swat Valley, but the militants gradually re-infiltrated 
                                                 
84 Dr Farrukh Saleem, ―Swat: Paradise Lost‖, Discussion Forum: Debate on Governance and Security, 
CRSS (Center for Research and Security Studies), Issue No: 1, 2009, Islamabad. 
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into key cities. The Pakistani Army was engaged in pitched battles with heavily armed 
insurgents. More than 200 policemen and soldiers were killed during fighting in Swat in 
2007.In December 2007 Fazlullah merged with Baitullah Mehsud's Tehrik-e-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP). The stated aim of the Operation Rah-e-Haq to restore the writ of the state 
and dislodge the Taliban rule from Swat remained unfulfilled.  
Once again a ―Peace through dialogue‖ policy came to the forefront. On May 21, 
2008 newly elected ANP-led provincial leadership concluded a ―Peace Deal‖ with the 
senior members of TNSM. In the agreement with Sufi Mohammad, the government 
accepted the right of every Muslim to ―peacefully‖ work for the enforcement of Shariat. 
TNSM dissociated itself from the elements attacking the security forces and a Fatwa was 
issued against attacks on security personnel as it was ruled to be against Islamic 
teachings. It also renewed its pledge to support the state institutions and enable the state 
to restore its writ in the region. The deal led to Sufi Mohammad‘s release after spending 
more than six and a half years in prison, although the government claimed that Sufi 
Mohammad was released unconditionally and the two sides came to an agreement 
subsequently. Immediately after the accord was signed, Swat valley was filled with black 
turbaned supporters of Sufi Mohammad, who was carried in a huge procession to Swat. 
This put pressure on Fazlullah to come to the negotiating table and he initially agreed for 
a ceasefire and finally accepted the peace deal. 
In the peace deal signed with Fazlullah on 21May 2008, the militants agreed that 
they would accept and honour the writ of the Federal and Provincial governments and 
would not malign the religion of other citizens. They assured that government personnel 
and properties will not be attacked, vaccinations will not be opposed and all foreign 
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militants will be handed over to the government. They also agreed to a ban on display of 
illegal weapons and FM broadcasts without due permission from the government and to 
cooperate with the government to investigate murder, robbery and other crimes. They 
consented to dismantling the training facilities for suicide bombers as well as explosives 
manufacturing facilities. The government on its part agreed to implement Shariat in the 
entire erstwhile Malakand Division in letter and spirit, compensate all victims for loss of 
life and property and to review all cases against militants in prison. It agreed that the 
Army would be sent back to the barracks gradually and an Islamic University would be 
set up at TNSM headquarters to be run jointly by the government and TNSM. It also 
agreed to take action against oppressors, bribe-takers, adulterers, thieves, dacoits and 
kidnappers in order to rid society of such elements. Finally an 11-member joint 
committee was set up to ensure the implementation of the deal.  
However, this situation could not last for long. The fragile peace punctuated with 
skirmishes between army troops and TNSM militants led to another phase of military 
operation in the area. In July 2008 the second phase of Operation Rah-e-Haq was 
launched and continued through the remainder of the year. Fighting was initially heavy in 
the northern part of the valley, and later spread to southern areas. Militants accused 
government of not withdrawing troops from the area as promised in the peace deal. 
Fierce clashes with militants made Swat a war zone.  
Hundreds were reported killed in heavy clashes. Reports of atrocities by militants 
increased - including the killing of women who declined to stop work and public 
beheadings of those accused of spying. Human rights activists say 60 per cent of Swat's 
1.8 million people fled Swat. Thousands of homes were reported damaged and 150 
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schools destroyed. Torching of girls schools grew as the Taliban banned girls‘ education 
altogether. Initially, the militants asked parents not to send their daughters to ‗un-Islamic‘ 
schools for western education and later started attacking girls‘ schools, especially in 
Swat. 
According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, in the five years preceding 
2008, Taliban destroyed around 100 girls‘ schools in the NWFP and FATA. The year 
2008 witnessed heightened attacks on schools as Taliban targeted 119 educational 
institutions, out of which 111 were girls‘ schools, mainly located in Swat. In the NWFP, 
the Taliban were reported to have attacked 95 shops in 2008, targeting 65 CD shops, 16 
barbershops, six mobile phone shops, two drugs stores and seven garments and cosmetics 
shops. Most of the attacks were reported in Swat. FATA witnessed 10 incidents of shops 
being attacked during the year. Five CD shops, three barbershops, a drug store and a 
grocery shop were targeted. In these attacks, 61 shops were completely destroyed, 
including 44 CD shops and music centers. 85 
The situation remained critical the activities of the militants which had multiplied 
in the shape of suicide bombings against the state agencies in retaliation against the Lal 
Masjid operation did not diminish. 
6.8 - Operation Silence on Jamia Hafsa and Red Mosque, 3-10 July 2007, Islamabad 
The siege of the Lal Masjid in Islamabad festered for over six months before 
President Musharraf decided to take the military action. Musharraf in a televised address 
to the nation following the 36-hour battle between militants and military commandos 
                                                 
85 Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Pakistan Security Report 2008, Islamabad. 
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said: ―Unfortunately, we have been up against our own people ... They had strayed from 
the right path and become susceptible to terrorism.‖86 
This fiasco was not the making of a few months and weeks. There is history to it. 
Lal Masjid was constructed by the Capital Development Authority (CDA) and funded by 
the Ministry of Finance in the 1960s. In 1966, Maulana Muhammad Abdullah was 
appointed its first Imam (prayer leader) by the then President Ayub Khan. During the 
Afghan Jihad period, Lal Masjid gradually came to serve as a major transmission belt for 
sending fighters to Afghanistan. There developed close links between Pakistan‘s 
intelligence agency (ISI) and Lal Masjid leadership that continued for decades.  Maulana 
Abdullah was a firebrand orator; from his pulpit he would preach the cause of jihad, and 
his sermons gained immense popularity among the military and civilian bureaucracy.87 
Maulana Abdullah was known for his hard-line views of Islam and had close 
association with the militant anti-Shia organization, Sipah-e-Sihaba (SSP).  Reportedly, 
he was assassinated by extreme anti-Sunni operatives inside the Mosque in 1998. This led 
to his two sons, Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Abdul Rashid, taking over the 
administration of the Red Mosque. Abdul Aziz became the chief cleric of Lal Masjid and 
Abdul Rashid his deputy.88 It must be noted here, that all heads of mosques in Islamabad 
are paid and appointed by the government. The ministry of religious affairs along with 
the administrative bureaucracy in the capital oversees the affairs of the mosques.                                                     
Lal Masjid leadership particularly Abdul Rashid Ghazi became a central figure of 
Pakistan's religious parties‘ alliance against the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and 
                                                 
86 Pervez Musharraf quoted in, The News, 13 July 2007. 
87 Syed Saleem Shahzad, ―The Taliban‘s brothers in alms‖, Asia Times, 14 March 2007.   
 Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IC14Df01.html. 




bitterly criticized Musharraf regime‘s decision to be key ally of the United States in this 
regard. In 2004, the mosque issued a Fatwa or religious edict which said: ―soldiers dying 
in the campaign (that is military actions in Tribal areas) should be described as ‗killed‘, 
while the militants' dead were to be called martyrs".89 Regarding the suicide bombings in 
and beyond Pakistan the Lal Masjid clerics said: 
We consider suicide attacks are right in Pakistan [sic] under 
a few circumstances while we consider them as absolutely 
justified in the context of Afghanistan and Iraq. We favored 
the Taliban not only in the past, we favor them even 
today.90 
 
This led to the dismissal of Maulana Abdul Aziz from service and government 
appointed another cleric who was to take over Aziz‘s role as Imam of Lal Masjid. But 
this was never followed in reality and Maulana Aziz continued to lead Friday prayers and 
run the mosque and its affiliated Madrassas. Ghazi family also continued to manage the 
mosque as well as Madrasa Faridia in the sector E-7 and 18 other madaris all built on 
encroached land in and around Islamabad. These include: Jamia Saida Samia G-7/3, 
Madrasa Fatima I 9/4, Madrasa Umme-Kulsum Bara Kahu, Madrasa Ruqayya Banni 
Gala, Madrasa Qabtia Chak Shehzad, Madrasa Khatija, Madrasa Hajra, Madrasa Khola, 
Golra for  women and Jamia Faridia E/7, Madrasa Zaid Bin Sabit Lal Masjid, Madrasa 
Saidna Umer Masjid Muzzamil, St 94 G/11-3, Madrasa RehmatullilAalamin Loi Bhair 
PWD Islamabad, Madrasa Usman Bin Affan, Madrasa Syedna Talha Bin Abdulla, Siri 
Chowk Bara Kahu, Madrasa Muaaz bin Jabal Bara Kahu, Madrasa Syedna Saddiq Akbar 
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Bani Gala for boys. These and some of the other affiliated madaris are built on state 
owned land worth billions of rupees.91 
In 2004, Abdul Rashid Ghazi (younger brother of Abdul Aziz) was accused by the 
government of procuring weapons and assisting Islamic militant outfits planning to blow 
up the President's house, the Parliament building and Army headquarters on Pakistan's 
Independence Day. Abdul Rashid Ghazi went underground, and the government 
presented an explosive-filled truck owned by him as evidence of his involvement to the 
media. Some time later the Federal minister for Religious Affairs, Ejaz-ul-Haq, stated 
press conference saying that ―Abdul Rashid Ghazi had not been involved in the plot and 
the real culprits had been arrested and charged. These were said to be men belonging to 
the tribal areas and included Uzbek militants. It had also been established, officials said, 
that they had regularly visited the Lal Masjid.‖ 92  Independent sources in conversation 
with the author confirmed Rashid Ghazi‘s close association with the high command of 
Al-Qaeda leadership, particularly Ayman Al-Zawahri as well as militants in Pakistan's 
tribal area of Waziristan, Swat and Punjab.93 
Ume- Hassan (Wife of Maulana Abdul Aziz) headed the adjacent girls madrassa, 
the Jamia Hafsa attached to the Lal Masjid. She was extremely critical about Musharraf‘s 
policy of counter-terrorism and raised the issue of missing people in Pakistan. She led 
madrassa girls‘ protests against the blasphemous Danish cartoons. Ume-Hassan 
spearheaded a campaign against the demolition of mosques in Islamabad by the capital 
                                                 
91 Data collected from The News, Dawn, The Nation, 3-10 July 2007. 
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authority. On her provocation, girls of Jamia Hafsa occupied a nearby Children Library 
and vowed to "fight to death" after the government threatened to evict them. In one of the 
video clips of her speech before a large gathering of burqa-clad students she announced 
that ―we women have entered the jihad battle.‖ 94 
 From March 2007 till the beginning of ―Operation Silence‖ in July same year, the 
Masjid undertook a number of unlawful activities: kidnapped alleged prostitutes; publicly 
set alight ―un-Islamic‖ videos and DVDs; set up Qazi courts based on the Sharia, 
abducted policemen in May 2007 who were to be released on condition that bail was 
granted to five Lal Masjid students being held in government detention at the time.95 
                                                 
94 Ume- Hassan - head of Jamia Hafsa statement, Available at: http://jamiahafsa.multiply.com/.  
95 Syed Irfan Raza, ―Hafsa clerics set up Qazi court in Lal Masjid,‖ Dawn, 6 April 2007. 
Note: The following is a Chronology of events that took place at Lal Masjid Jan – July 2007:  
January 22: Baton-wielding girl students took over the children‘s library to protest against the demolition 
of mosques and madrassas in Islamabad. 
March 25: The girl students picked up three women for allegedly running a brothel, who were later 
released when they promised to lead a pious life.  
April 6: The Lal Masjid administration set up a Shariah court inside the mosque and the chief prayer 
leader, Maulana Abdul Aziz, threatened to launch suicide attacks if the government tried to use force 
against them. 
April 9: The Lal Masjid Shariah court issued a decree against former tourism minister Nilofar Bakhtiar for 
hugging an instructor after a parachute jump in France. 
April 10: The government blocked the mosque‘s website and radio station in reaction to the Lal Masjid 
administration‘s provocative attitude. 
May 19: The Lal Masjid students kidnapped four policemen following the arrest of their dozen supporters. 
The students kidnapped another two policemen, but later set all of them free.  
June 23: The Jamia Hafsa students kidnapped nine people, including seven Chinese nationals (six women 
and a man) from an acupuncture clinic, claiming it was an undercover brothel. All were freed following 
protests from Beijing. 
July 3: The students snatched weapons from policemen deployed at a building facing the Jamia Hafsa. 
Troops and paramilitary forces cordoned off the Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa compound, leading to a tense 
standoff between the security forces and militants inside the Lal Masjid.  
July 4: The government imposes a curfew around the mosque complex. It says anyone who wishes to may 
leave the premises, but any armed militants will be shot on sight. The first two days of fighting leave at 
least 16 people dead and some 140 injured. Among the hundreds of people holed up in the complex are 
women students and children. 
Security forces capture Lal Masjid prayer leader Abdul Aziz while trying to leave disguised in a woman‘s 
burqa. This sparks an exodus, with some 1,200 people leaving the complex. 
July 5: New fighting breaks out around the mosque complex, with students inside throwing hand grenades 
and the army demolishing most of a surrounding wall. Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao accuses Abdul 
Rashid Ghazi of retaining women and children as human shields inside the mosque. 




Army was mobilized, Cobra helicopters started reconnaissance flights, APCs The 
assault combat called ‗Operation Silence‘ was aimed to restore the writ of the state and 
saving the lives of hostages who were trapped inside the mosque. As part of the 
Operation Silence, water, gas and power supply of the Masjid and seminary was cut off. 
Deadlines were announced for those present inside to come out and the students started 
exiting the mosque and seminary, more than 1000 male and female students exited and 
were offered safe passage to their homes. The head cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz was 
captured red handed while escaping disguised in a burqa (traditional long veil) attempting 
to leave the mosque along with a group of female students. 
The commandos raided the outer perimeter of the complex at midnight setting off 
explosives blasting holes through the boundary walls of the compound. 164 commandos 
                                                                                                                                                 
July 6: Heavy explosions are heard around the mosque complex. From inside, Ghazi announces that he and 
his followers would rather die than surrender. Officials say that several hundred students remain inside the 
complex, along with some 60 armed militants, but the figures cannot be independently verified. 
July 7: President General Pervez Musharraf said that all militants holed-up inside the mosque would be 
killed if they did not surrender.  
The government puts the death toll from clashes at 19, while Ghazi says 70 have been killed.  
Ghazi says he received a phone call from a man who claimed to have shot at Musharraf‘s aircraft on Friday 
in revenge for the siege. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz accuses the militants of holding hostages. Ghazi 
denies the claim. 
July 8: Security forces tighten the noose on the mosque complex, as a senior commando is killed in an 
operation to blast through the complex wall in a bid to allow women and children inside to flee. 
Religious Affairs Minister Ejaz ul Haq says militants have stripped Ghazi of control of the mosque. Haq 
calls the militants ―terrorists,‖ saying some of them are foreign. Another senior official says 15 militants 
have been given explosives-laden suicide jackets. 
Musharraf, Aziz and top officials meet to assess the government‘s options. The government puts the death 
toll at 24. 
July 9: Musharraf meets with key officials to determine the next step. He appoints PML President 
Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain to work with clerics to find a peaceful solution. Pro-Taliban militant 
commanders in Bajaur Agency tell 20,000 tribesmen that they must exact revenge for the siege. The 
tribesmen vow to wage ―holy war‖ against Musharraf. A delegation of ministers and clerics hold last-ditch 
talks with Ghazi using loudspeakers. The government offers Ghazi house arrest. Negotiations break down. 
July 10: The security forces launched a final operation against the Lal Masjid militants at 4am after all 
efforts to defuse the situation failed. Troops storm the mosque in a bid to free the women and children 
inside, sparking fierce gun battles with militants that leave at least 50 militants and eight soldiers dead, the 
army said. Ghazi is also killed in the operation. 
 





took part in the operation, 11 SSG commandos including Lt. Col Haroon ul Islam (who 
was leading the Operation), Captain Salman Farooq Lodhi was killed and 33 were 
wounded in battle with the militants. The cleric Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi leading 
the fight was reportedly  killed when he came out to surrender with his companions and 
was caught in the crossfire with militants who did not let him surrender, his mother who 
was ill also died of suffocation. According to various reports, security forces during 
search inside the basement of Jamia Hafsa and Lal Masjid recovered 27 women including 
the wife of Abdul Aziz Ume-Hassan and his daughter Asma Aziz and 3 children. 
Following the military operation on Lal Masjid, as per ISPR media briefing: 
The weapons which were recovered from the compound 
included AK-47 rifles.  Russian made RPG and Chinese 
variant RPG-7 rockets, PK machine guns, anti-tank and 
anti-personnel landmines, suicide bombing belts, three to 
five, 22 caliber rifles, RPD and RPK-74 light machine 
guns, Dragunov sniper rifles, SKS rifles, pistols, night 
vision equipment, over 50,000 rounds of various caliber 
ammunition. Three crates of petrol bombs prepared from 
green soft drinking bottles, gas masks, two-way radios, 
large plastic buckets held tennis-ball-size homemade 
bombs and knives were also displayed.96  
 
The aftermath of the Lal Masjid operation created an intense sense of insecurity in 
the country. The threats issued from the Mosque, ―There will be suicide blasts in the 
nook and cranny of the country. We have weapons, grenades and we are expert in 
manufacturing bombs. We are not afraid of death‖97- proved real to a great extent. 
There were 15 suicide strikes between July 14 and 31 (an average of one a day) – 
a horrifying revenge by any calculation. This was in addition to numerous clashes, 
                                                 
96 ISPR Press Release quoted in The News, 12 July 2007. 
97 Note: On April 12 2007, in an FM broadcast from the Lal Masjid‘s illegal FM station, the clerics issued a 
threat. Quoted in, Editorial, The News, April 24 2007. Islamabad. 
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including ambushes, rocket and gun attacks, between militants and security forces in 
Tribal areas. The Interior Ministry report on suicide attacks released in September 2007 
stated that the Lal Masjid military operation had caused an increase in suicide attacks on 
army and paramilitary forces, mostly in the North West Frontier Province and FATA.98 
On July 14 2007, a suicide bomber killed 26 soldiers in Miranshah; 13 died when a 
suicide bomber exploded outside a court in Islamabad on 18 July; in Hangu a police 
academy became the target of a suicide attack; and in Kohat a suicide bomber detonated 
inside a mosque on 19 July 2007.99 
Analysts and public perception to date remains divided in explaining the genesis 
of this crisis. Generally, it is seen as failure of effective intelligence, lack of preventative 
policy on the part of the Musharraf regime that treated the issue as ‗law and order‘ 
problem, mixed with the domestic politics of the country. At times, ―government accused 
the media of creating an issue for public consumption only and an attempt to weaken 
General Musharraf‘s government.‖ 100 
 Reflecting on the role of media vis-à-vis the Lal Masjid operation Maria Ahmed, 
GEO TV's correspondent, in conversation with the author maintains: 
The media made it a sentimental soap-opera with missing 
connections of research, background, context and rationale. 
Most importantly, the media failed to pay attention to a 
growing phenomenon: Lal Masjid exploded on our screens 
suddenly in July. The ignorance fueled more misguided 
anger and hatred as Lal Masjid crew was never able to tell 
their side of the story. Reporting on site is only 25% of the 
                                                 
98 Azaz Syed, ―129 army, FC personnel killed in 9 months,‖ The Daily Times, 18 September 2007. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Talat Hussain - Director Current Affairs, Aaj TV (Private news media channel), interview with author, 
10 April 2008, Islamabad. 
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job - without a history of connections, news does not make 
sense.101  
 
The fact is General Musharraf soft-pedaled an issue that needed clear and 
comprehensive response to begin with. Devoid of pro-active approach, General 
Musharraf regime underestimated the fanatical conviction of their rightness (ideological 
uniformity with the Deobandi school of thought), the linkages with other indigenous 
sectarian groupings, and the Masjid stalwarts association with the Al-Qaeda top 
leadership. Most of the time when the crises was building up, Islamabad‘s bureaucratic 
administrators were tasked to resolve the issue amicably – that in fact meant giving in to 
its clerics and students‘ unlawful activities most of the time.  
Pressure tactics were used in the form of bringing in ‗Khateeb of Khana Kaaaba‘ 
to convince the Lal Masjid leadership to give up its militant posture and follow the path 
of peaceful Jihad.  Similarly, Lal Masjid was publicly criticized by the ‗Wafaqul 
Madaris‘102 on behind the scene state insistence. Mufti Rafi Usmani of the Wafaqul 
Madaris‘ Majlis-e-Aamla in a press conference said: 
Islam is not the religion of force…It was illegal to build a 
mosque on encroached land but prominent members of the 
government, including Gen Zia ul Haq, had themselves 
prayed in Islamabad‘s Hamza Masjid; this should be 
considered an No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the 
government…the government should be cognizant of the 
fact that as a result of its policies, the 1,400 km border with 
Afghanistan now has 80,000 soldiers while previously the 
tribal areas provided ‗free‘ soldiers to guard the border.103  
 
                                                 
101 Maria Ahmad, Geo TV journalist covered the Lal Masjid operation, interview with author, 22 May 
2009, Islamabad. 
102Note:  Wafaqul Madaris Al Arbia is a most important Deoband madrassa board in Pakistan, which 
controls 10,000 seminaries across the country with 1.6 million students. 
103 Quoted in Daily Times, 15 April 2007. 
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 Qari Hanif Jalandhari, Secretary-General of the Wafaq-ul Madaris, in 
conversation with the author observed: 
We are against a policy of taking on the government in a 
head-on fight; as such a policy can only lead to damage. 
The Wafaqul Madaris members hoped that the Jamia Hafsa 
issues were settled through negotiations and talks.104 
 
Though innumerable media reports pointed to the growing radicalization of the 
Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa, state officials treated these as merely ‗emotional and short 
lived outbursts‘ and looked the other way. President Musharraf‘s underestimation of the 
lethality of the threat and belief that the state can turn around these extremists is reflected 
in his following comments, early April 2007: 
These few thousand girls are misguided. These misguided 
women wish to run the government though they know 
nothing…We don't want to kill them. We want to solve this 
issue with wisdom.105  
 
 Syed Saleem Shahzad a noted journalist observed: 
Al-Qaeda used Lal Masjid to defocus Pakistan army. 
According to the mole of Al-Qaeda, Bin Yameen, Al-
Qaeda‘s understanding was that when military strike is 
launched on Lal Masjid all Maddaris in Islamabad will rise 
against Musharraf regime… creating havoc against it.106 
 
Another leading journalist and TV anchor, Hamid Mir, believed that General 
Musharraf played politics with the Lal Masjid crises resulting in chaos. He said:  
Jamia Hafsa case was projected to divert the public 
attention away from the judicial crisis in Pakistan. General 
Musharraf is slow in responding to the crises because it 
serves his political agenda (of seeking legitimacy and 
ensuring his credibility) to ensure to the outside world, he 
                                                 
104 Wafaqul Madaris Al Arbia Pakistan‘s Secretary-General Qari Mohammad Hanif Jhalandari, 
conversation with the author, April 2007, Islamabad. 
105 Quoted in, Daily Times, April 8, 2007 
106 Syed Saleem Shahzad, , ―The Taliban‘s brothers in alms‖, Asia Times, 14 March 2007. 
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alone can tackle and wipe out extremism and militancy in 
the country.107 
 
Thus, Lal Masjid episode sparked a reactionary wave of sympathy that was 
particularly noticed in Swat.  Reportedly, Maulana Fazlullah, the head of the banned 
militant group TNSM in Swat, led a large rally of armed people at his Imam Dheri 
madrassa, to protest against Operation silence and vowed to take revenge.108 
The preceding discussion testifies to the present research study proposition that 
military action must be accompanied by strong public support. The military action was a 
delayed call and lacked holistic understanding of the whole issue of radicalization in the 
country. The violent aftermath of the operation demonstrated the need to adopt a pro-
active and multi-dimensional counter-terrorism policy. The force based approach was 
essentially a short-term fix and post –operation policy on sustainable footing was never 
there. Instead of de-radicalizing and engaging the militants of Lal Masjid, government 
further cornered them. This has led to re-vitalizing the earlier spirit of the Lal Masjid‘s 
cleric family and their followers. To quote Maria Ahmed, Geo TV correspondent: 
State‘s massive ―military‖ approach to the issue was too 
much and resulted in significant loss of public support in 
the end. I spoke to several female students when they were 
collected by their parents during the days of the military 
action. They declared that although their parents had come 
to collect them, they would come back until they either 
became martyrs or won the battle against the state.109 
 
On August 17, 2007, acting on a ―suo motu‖ notice, the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan took up the extrajudicial killings of the people at the Lal Masjid and Jamia 
                                                 
107 Hamid Mir, Head of Geo TV News and Current Affairs, interview with Author, 25 September 2007, 
Islamabad. 
108 Safdar Sial, ―Lal Masjid: aftermath and future repercussions‖, Pakistan Institute for Peace, 16 July 
2007. 
109 Maria Ahmed, Geo TV journalist covered the Lal Masjid operation, interview with author, 22 May 
2009, Islamabad.  
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Hafsa complex. Performance of the Islamabad administration attracted the reprimand of 
the court for its slow pace. The court was informed that 61 students were in custody, of 
them 39 on bail- able offences. The Chief Justice of Pakistan directed immediate release 
of 22 innocent people as recommended by a joint investigation team. Mohammed Ahsan 
Bhoon, President of the Lahore High Court Bar Association said, ―This issue could have 
been resolved through negotiations but General Musharraf intentionally spilled the blood 
of innocent people to please his foreign masters.‖ 110At this instance one must also note 
the growing rift between the executive (that is President Musharraf) and Supreme Court 
of Pakistan (under the Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry).  
Thus, the Lal Masjid assault prompted the pro-Taliban rebels along the border 
with Afghanistan to scrap a 10 month old peace agreement with the Pakistani 
government. This event triggered the Third Waziristan War which killed over 3,000 
people and marked another surge in militancy and violence in Pakistan. 
6.9- Operation Zalzala in South Waziristan - 2008 
In January 2008, Mehsud‘s men captured Sararogha Fort in South Waziristan and 
killed many members of the Pakistani security forces. That same month the Pakistani 
army launched the three-part Operation Tri-Star against the Pakistan Taliban in FATA, 
with Operation Zalzala (‗Earthquake‘) in South Waziristan as a principal component. 
Zalzala aimed to clear several areas held by forces loyal to Mehsud and capturing or 
killing key leaders of the Taliban faction, including Baitullah and the suicide bomb 
campaign chief, Qari Hussain.111 The army dropped leaflets urging locals to vacate the 
                                                 
110 Nasir Iqbal, ―Destruction of evidence annoys apex court: Lal Masjid-Jamia Hafsa case‖, Dawn, 18 
August 2007. 
 
111 Taliban Chief Ideologist Survives ―Zalzala‖‘, Daily Times, 26 May 2008. 
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area, and on 24 January launched attacks in several parts of South Waziristan. About 
200,000 residents of South Waziristan were displaced during this conflict. After about six 
weeks of harsh fighting, talks began toward a peace agreement with conditions similar to 
those of previous arrangements and the Pakistani army started to withdraw in May. 
Operation Zalzala cleared parts of South Waziristan, at least temporarily, and apparently 
disrupted some planned suicide attacks. ―Across Pakistan, there were 2,148 terrorist, 
insurgent and sectarian attacks in 2008, a 746 per cent increase from 2005.‖ 112 Pakistan‘s 
controversial use of collective punishment fostered deep animosity among locals who 
were loath to support the government‘s efforts. 
6.10 - Operation Sher Dil in Bajaur - 2008 
  Inter Services Public Relations in its Press release sketched the mixed outcome of 
the military action in Bajaur: 
Operation ―Sher Dil‖ which was started on 6 September 
2008, after gaining success in various parts of Bajaur 
Agency including control of Loi Sam has now started 
advancing towards Nawagai. Miscreants‘ strong holds have 
been destroyed and they have been mauled adequately. 
However, some pockets of resistance are still trying to fight 
it out.113 
 
Operation Sher Dil was launched after insurgent forces led by Qari Zia Rahman 
forcibly pushing out government-armed local tribesmen (referred to as Lashkars or 
                                                                                                                                                 
Note:   
Qari Hussain graduated from the Jamia Binoria madrassa in Karachi in 1994 and became an activist of 
anti-Shiite militant group, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), before joining the Taliban movement in 2004. 
He spearheaded a brutal campaign of suicide attacks across Pakistan, beginning around 2006. He trained 
hundreds of suicide bombers, some as young as 11 years old, to target Pakistani military and government 
installations as well as markets, funerals, hospitals, and other ―soft‖ targets. In 2008 alone, 965 people were 
reported killed in 66 suicide bombings across Pakistan, including police and army officials along with 
many innocent civilians. 
112 Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Pakistan Security Report 2008, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for 
Peace Studies, 2009, p: 3. 
113 Press Release, ISPR, 20 November 2008. 
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levies) out of their checkpoints at Loe Sam. By June, more than half of the 72 
checkpoints in Bajaur had been destroyed, and the civilian government had been 
disrupted through a major bank robbery and suicide bombings against officials. The 
military action was in response to an ambush of security convoy by local militants in Loe 
Sam. The primary objective of Sher Dil was to target militant groups that threatened 
Pakistan and to clear and hold Bajaur‘s population centers and lines of communication. 
By early December, over 1,000 militants and 63 security personnel had been killed. 
Pakistani forces found tunnel complexes used for hiding people and storing material such 
as weapons, ammunition, and radiofrequency lists, guerrilla-warfare manuals, 
propaganda and bomb-making instructions.114  
Major Gen Tariq Khan, the commander of military operations in five of Pakistan's 
seven tribal agencies, said his paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) had driven extremists out 
of Bajaur, where Pakistani forces have waged a six-month long campaign. He denied 
reports –and claims by a militant leader, Faqir Mohammad – that the military had struck a 
peace deal. He said that the Taliban had been defeated and that the Taliban's 
announcement of a ceasefire was propaganda.115 
Ismail Khan, quoting his conversation with the military sources stressed the 
complexity of inter-linkages between the internal and external dimensions of conflict in 
Bajaur, contended: 
Those who have been telling us to do more, we turn around 
and ask them to do more. Stop the reverse flow into Bajaur. 
It‘s coming. Heavy weapons are coming. The militants are 
coming and their travel starts from Central Asia; they cover 
the entire track of Afghanistan. You are not stopping them 
and they are coming into our country…We are in touch 
                                                 
114 Ibid. 
115 Isambard Wilkinson in Khar, ―Pakistan claims victory in Taliban Fight‖, Telegraph, March 1, 2009. 
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with the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) to 
make sure that no movement takes place…People 
themselves saw 200 men, mostly carrying rocket launchers, 
coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan. We have no doubt 
that they are supporting the fighters in Bajaur.116 
 
The fighting forced some 300,000 inhabitants to leave their homes, in what has 
been described as the greatest displacement in Pakistan's history.117 According to several 
sources, the 20 September 2008 Islamabad Marriott Hotel bombing may have been 
carried out in retaliation for the military offensive in Bajaur.118  
 Part Three: Impact of Military actions  
And the litmus test of a military operation is when it ends 
[and] a credible governance authority is fostered. Inability 
to deliver on this can unravel the military gains and lose 
critical local support… Terrorism is both local and global. 
Pakistan‘s counter-terrorism is affected by instability in 
Afghanistan and global politics. It requires international, 
regional and national effort simultaneously…Biggest 
failure has been to enlist public support.119 
The above mentioned views of former Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi explains the 
delicate balance between the ‗hard‘ and ‗soft‘ elements of counter-insurgency strategy – 
essential for sustainable and comprehensive approach towards terrorism. By the time, 
General Musharraf resigned from power (18 August 2008) the missing links in Pakistan‘s 
so-called comprehensive response to terrorism were quite obvious. According to 2008 
FATA residents survey conducted by Islamabad based Center for Research and Security 
Studies (CRSS) roughly 90 per cent are opposed to the Taliban‘s worldview and 
                                                 
116   Ismail Khan, ―No timeframe to call off operation‖, Dawn, 30 September 2008. 
117 "Army suspends operation in Bajaur", BBC. September 1, 2008. 
118 Ismail Khan, ―Battle of Bajaur‖, International Herald Tribune, 27 September 2008. 
119  Pakistan‘s former Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi, interview with Author, 10 August, 2008, Islamabad 
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activities. Twenty per cent acknowledge that foreign militants are present in the area and 
75 per cent are against the army presence in FATA.120 
The critical factor aiding public alienation in FATA stems from the credibility 
deficit on account of Pakistani state often following short-term policies in the region and 
not investing in the human resource development on a sustainable basis. Musharraf‘s 
policy was dominated by force-based tactics and deliberate ambiguity and double-speak 
on part of the government added to the misery of ordinary people in this area.  Most of 
the residents of FATA felt being treated as second-rate citizens, and their area used as 
strategic buffer zone separating Pakistan and Afghanistan 
It is therefore essential to end the isolation of Fata by mainstreaming it and 
bringing it into the normal nation building process where the grievances of the citizens 
are dealt with in the ambit of human and fundamental rights. They must also be treated 
with justice under the rule of law. Though Pakistan received more than $ 10 billion from 
the US for Pakistan‘s contribution to the War on Terror but the main beneficiaries of this 
bounty were not FATA and NWFP.   Khalid Aziz, a former chief secretary of NWFP also 
pointed out this fact, the cost of such a policy is the sacrifice of the well being of the 
people of Fata and NWFP. No wonder they are up in arms.121 
The critical need to gain public trust and confidence was also felt by the 
commanding officers engaged in the military operations within and beyond FATA. 
During conversations with the high command of the Swat operation, the author was told 
that ―to enlist public support, army is investing in organizing sports activities, updating 
                                                 
120 CRSS Survey of FATA, 2008, Islamabad. 
121 Khalid Aziz, interview with Author, 11 July 2008, Islamabad. 
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community recreation facilities, distributing sports equipment and so on. The aim is to 
build an image of army as protector of not only of territory but of people (‗s) safety and 
security in all aspects of life‖.122  However, initially the military actions there were seen 
by the people as ―too late and too little‖. Defense analyst Air Marshal (retd) Masood 
Akhtar pointing to the obliviousness of the military action to the human development side 
asked: 
Why should the public support the government on this 
issue (that is military actions), if the public is not informed 
as to what is the purpose of the war, what is the mission 
assigned to the army, what are our national interests at 
stake, what are the political and military objectives.123 
 Musharraf‘s military based approach versus terrorism achieved a mixed record of 
sorts. The main success seems to lie Pakistan capturing and handing over more than 700 
Al-Qaeda operatives to the United States, more than any other country. It deployed more 
than 70.000 troops in the tribal region all along the Durand Line. On the down side, the 
military suffered significant human and material losses in its campaign against the 
militants. Apart from the human cost in lives lost, the destruction of physical 
infrastructure and damage to the economy has been colossal. ―The economic cost of the 
militancy in FATA is estimated at roughly $119 million.‖ 124 The Non-governmental 
organizations, NGOs, especially in FATA and NWFP were specially targeted to stop 
their development work. This made the need for the military operation to be accompanied 
by reconstruction programmes even more acute and urgent. 
                                                 
122 Author‘s conversation with the Commanding Officers in Swat, 2008, Rawalpindi. 
123 Air Marshall (retd) Masood Akhtar, ―Swat Paradise Lost‖, CRSS Discussion Forum, 31 Jan 2009, 
Islamabad. 
124 Planning and Development Department Cost of Conflict in FATA, Peshawar: Fata Secretariat 2009. 
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Meanwhile on the international plane, the United States and international 
community which had earlier praised Musharraf‘s accomplishments against Al Qaeda,  
disapproved the ―Peace Deals‖ with the militants in FATA.  The commander of U.S. and 
NATO forces in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan accused ―FATA region was 
providing recruits to the militants from where the attacks had increased by about 30 per 
cent.‖ 125 This amounted to extending the war zone to the tribal belt of the country. The 
Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen directed that maps of the 
Afghan ―battle space‖ include the tribal areas of western Pakistan.‖ 126 
This led to the intensification of drone attacks into Pakistan‘s tribal areas. In the 
popular perception this was a violation of Pakistan‘s sovereignty though according to the 
United States research reports, ―three Predators are said to be deployed at a secret 
Pakistani airbase and can be launched without specific permission from the Islamabad 
government (Pakistan officially denies the existence of any such bases).‖ 127 Though 
officially denied by the Musharraf regime, it is generally believed that some sort of silent 
understanding was there. The drone attacks are said to have killed more innocent people 
of the area than taking out hardened Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants. These strikes have 
added to the credibility deficit of the Pakistan government and inspired revenge based 
suicide attacks against Military and civil targets in Pakistan.                  
  Likewise, Pakistan army as well as independent media sources maintains that 
drone attacks described by United States as an effective way to target militants have not 
been productive in reality. Because of the American insistence that Pakistan do more and 
                                                 
125 Quoted in, K Alan Kronstadt, ―Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. 
Policy‖, CRS Report for Congress, 21 November, 2008, p: 6. 
126 Ibid. 
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Pakistan holding it was already doing enough in addition to differences on drone attacks 
the trust deficit between the United States and Pakistan thus continued to widen. In the 
backdrop of the Pak-US trust deficit was also the non addressed Islamabad‘s concern 
with the Indian role in Afghanistan at times described as ―strategic encirclement.‖ In 
conversation with the author, General Musharraf stressed: 
Who suffered more, Pakistan or the United States or 
Afghanistan? No country in the world has done more than 
what we did in the fight against terrorism…Problem lies in 
Afghanistan. Had Karzai government and NATO adopted 
comprehensive counter-terrorism policy including the 
engagement of moderate Taliban, the situation could have 
turned more stable for both Afghanistan and Pakistan.128 
 
General (retd) Ehsan Ul Haq – former Joint Chief of Pakistan Army in 
conversation with the author maintained the complex situation in FATA was a 
consequence of protracted strife in Afghanistan. He did not expect the situation in 
Pakistan to normalize as long as there was conflict and de-stabilization in Afghanistan. 
He thought it was unrealistic to seek separate solution to the problem in isolation from 
overall environment in the region. He exhorted ―strategic patience and perseverance.‖ 129 
 
Conclusion 
The preceding discussion mapped the military prong of the Musharraf regime‘s 
response to terrorism that treated the insurgency in FATA and its adjacent areas 
essentially as a ―reaction‖ to the changed geo-strategic landscape of the region. Hence, a 
force-based approach was applied to clear the militants from the area. In doing so, 
political, ideological, social, cultural, religious and economic imperatives of militancy 
                                                 
128General (retd) Pervez Musharraf, interview with Author, 6 January 2010, London. 




were not addressed. Kinetic operations were seen as quick fixes and almost all operations 
ended in peace deals giving more oxygen to the militant factions. 
The Musharraf regime deliberately divided Islamist militants into three separate 
categories: the  Taliban as an ―Afghan problem - labeled as neutral‖; the Jihadis fighting 
in Kashmir as ‗freedom fighters‘, and the  international al-Qaida-type as ‗terrorists‘; plus, 
it denied the lethality of the  domestic sectarian terrorists. Such a conceptualization led to 
short-term, divided, reactive and often an incoherent counter-terrorism policy. As a 
result, while forcefully targeting Al-Qaeda elements, the ideological and logistical 
threads knitting the various categories of Islamist militants remained untouched.  
Alongside, Musharraf‘s marriage of convenience with the religious political 
parties against the mainstream political parties to lengthen his rule and bolster his 
―guided democracy‖– constantly served to dilute the effectiveness of his measures 
against the militants. An eminent security analyst comments that this policy of 
appeasement of the religious groups to keep out the mainstream parties was preventing 
Musharraf from reforming the madrassas and defeating his own fight against the terrorist 
and extremist groups.   
In order to maintain and expand his power, General 
Musharraf has made  pacts  with the devil in both camps 
of the war on terrorism. Support from the United States has 
facilitated his authoritarian rule…Support from religious 
parties like the MMA to achieve domestic goals  comes at 
the expense of Musharraf‘s anti-extremism campaign…The 
cause of defeating extremism will be best served by a 
Pakistan where the military is a professional institution, 
subservient to civilian rule, and not a preeminent political 
actor. 130 
 
                                                 




In sum, military operations conducted in the Musharraf era yielded mixed results 
and reflected an urgent need to focus on the public support as key to successful campaign 
against terrorism on sustainable footings. That is, a holistic take on the security needs 
should involve human aspects as well. This in turn, calls for the adoption of reformatory 
measures addressing the root causes that give rise to militancy in the first place. Here, 
Late Dr Mahbub Ul Haq‘s reflection on Pakistan is worth recalling: 
Investing in Human Development is likely to give us 
political and economic pay-off which no other investment 
can promise at present…We need to fashion today a new 
concept of human security that is reflected in the lives of 
people, not in the weapons of our country.131  
 
This leads us to the final part of the present research study that analyzes the reform-based 
approach of Musharraf‘s government as the means to counter terrorism in the country.   
 
                                                 
131 Dr Mahbub Ul Haq (1934 – 1998), Development with Justice, Islamabad: Mahbub ul Haq Human 































MUSHARRAF’S REFORM BASED APPROACH TO TERRORISM IN 
PAKISTAN 
 
 In Islam, Jihad is not confined to armed struggles only. 
 Have we ever thought of waging Jihad against 
 illiteracy, poverty, backwardness and hunger? This is 
 the larger Jihad. Pakistan, in my opinion, needs to  wage 
 Jihad against these evils.1 
 
This chapter critically analyzes the reforms instituted by the Musharraf regime to 
rein in the forces of terrorism in the country. These reforms cover steps taken at the 
educational, legal, social, political, economic and institutional levels. The success or 
failure of these measures has been seen in the perspective of human security. The 
discussion highlights the factors that widened the gap between policy objectives and 
actual achievements vis a vis their sustainability. The chapter stresses the critical need to 
reframe the “national security mind box” within the parameters of human security if a 
durable solution to the problem of terrorism in Pakistan is to be found.  
Part one of the chapter looks into the pro-active strands of Musharraf‟s 
educational reforms that were aimed at creating a “moderate and forward looking state.” 
While discussing these steps a number of human development initiatives are also 
highlighted.  
The second part of the chapter traces the adoption and strengthening of legal 
measures to prevent people from financing, sponsoring and providing logistical support 
to the activities of the terrorists. Along with this, the efficacy of the police reforms act 
                                                 
1Text of General Pervez Musharraf Speech, Pakistan Information Department: Islamabad. 





and the training of sensitive “law and order” agencies in new skills and equipping them 
with modern technology to combat terrorism is examined. The later part of the discussion 
builds on the earlier parts and points out the missing links in Musharraf‟s strategy in 
pursuing a pro-active counter-terrorism policy. The inability of the military dominated 
government of General Musharraf to bridge the  gap between  public perception of 
“national interest” and its official articulation is identified as the “critical missing piece” 
in the jig-saw of measures that were employed to counter terrorism.  
Part One 
7.1: Challenge of Reforming Education System in Pakistan 
Pakistan has a “demographic dividend” or a “youth bulge” with 57 per cent of its 
population in the age group of between 15 and 64 years with 41 per cent under 15. Only 
four per cent of the population is over 64. According to the United Nations Population 
Division estimates, Pakistan would overtake Brazil and Indonesia by 2050 to rank fourth 
in world population, almost doubling to 335 million from its current 180 million.2  The 
challenge is to make positive capital investments into this youth bulge and convert this as 
the critical mass of national power and a huge capital asset. On the other hand, if this 
“youth bulge” is not capitalized through sustainable investments in its educational, 
political, social and economic nourishment, it can turn into a “human liability” of a 
massive size that could lead to social chaos, instability and  the country‟s drift towards an 
insecure future. Already published data suggest that more than eighty per cent of the 
                                                 




“suicide attacks”3 in Pakistan are the work of economically and educationally backward 
„youth‟. In this trend no decline has been observed. 
Against this backdrop, Pakistan‟s extremely polarized education system divided 
along public and private and religious and what may loosely be called secular lines offers 
a grim future. Since the decade of 1979-1989 and thereafter, the quality of public 
education has been progressively deteriorating. Not only has the state failed in its 
constitutional duty to provide access to education to all children, but the quality of 
education also been declining significantly.4 Under General Zia‟s „Islamization drive‟ at 
home and his campaign in support of the Afghan Jihad across the Durand Line, the state 
promoted the concept of “Jihad”.  Zia infused an “Islamic overdose in public school curricula 
including science and gave unchecked financial support to madrasas.”5 All this resulted in 
furthering an unbalanced public and private education system in which the “Madrassas -
traditional religious mosque-based schools”6 flourished and mushroomed. This has led to 
                                                 
3 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, “Organizational Profiling of Suicide Terrorism: A Pakistani Case Study”, 
Defence Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000. pp: 409-453. 
 
4According to the Text of 1973 constitution, obtained from Ministry of Education , Islamabad: 
 “It is the primary duty of the government to remove illiteracy and provide free and compulsory secondary 
education within minimum possible period”. 
Education Minister Zobaida Jalal speaking at the Pakistan Development Forum, March 2004 noted: “There are 
155,686 public schools, 36,460 schools in the private sector, and more than 10,000 madrasas”.  
Source: Ministry of Education, Archives, 2004 – 2005.  
On the decline of Pakistan‟s education system see: 
International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Reforming the Education Sector, Asia Report No. 84, Brussels: 
International Crisis Group, October 7, 2004. 
5 General (retd) Javed Ashraf - Federal Education Minster, interview with Author, 11 November 2006, 
Islamabad. 
6 Note: In the context of Islamic history, Madrassas were the primary source of religious and scientific 
learning, especially between the seventh and eleventh centuries, producing luminaries such as Al-Biruni, 
ibn-Sina (Avicenna), Al-Khawaezmi, and Jabir ibn-Hayyan (jeber). At the time of Pakistan‟s birth, it had 
only 136 Madrassas but today it is home to around thirty thousand (according to unofficial media and 
think-tank reports). Following the rise of conservative Taliban regime in Afghanistan, extremist outlook of 
Pakistan –based Maedrassa network drew international focus (as many of the Afghan Taliban leadership 
had studied in this system).Similarly, after Sept. 11, 2001, the link between Pakistan's religious education 
system and international terrorist organizations came under intense criticism. 




a situation in which today the majority of government schools lack basic infrastructure.   
Tariq Rahman, an educationist, observes:  
The present education scenario is full of contradictions. On 
the one hand, there are dynamic, fast moving educational 
institutions charging exorbitant fees, while on the other 
there are almost free or very affordable government schools 
as well as religious seminaries, which are entirely free. The 
students of these institutions live in different worlds and 
operate in different languages.7 
 
Most critically, what is being taught at educational institutions whether private or 
public, western based, religious, or the combination of both, needs to be revised to raise a 
generation of balanced human beings who have a moderate temperament and are able to 
think intelligently. An eminent professor, A. H. Nayyar, analyzing the content of 
compulsory subjects, Urdu, English and Pakistan Studies at secondary schools (public) 
observes: 
In early 1980s, Curricula were redesigned and textbooks 
were rewritten to create a monolithic image of Pakistan as 
an Islamic state and Pakistani citizens as Muslims 
only...Four themes emerge most strongly as constituting the 
bulk of the curricula and textbooks of the three compulsory 
subjects: Pakistan is for Muslims alone; Islamiat is to be 
forcibly taught to all the students, whatever their faith, 
including a compulsory reading of Qur'an; Ideology of 
Pakistan is to be internalized as faith, and hate be created 
against Hindus and India, and; students are to be urged to 
take the path of Jihad and Shahadat (martyrdom).8 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Karachi: Vanguard Press, 2007. p: 
81. 
Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror, New 
Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005. p: 203.  
Samina Ahmed and Andrew Stroehlein, "Pakistan: Still Schooling Extremists", The Washington Post,17 
July  2005.  
7 Tariq Rahman, Education in Pakistan: A Survey, Strengthening Participatory Organisation, Islamabad, 
2003.  




Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy 9 in his path-breaking study on the roots of extremism 
in Pakistan pointed out the extreme choice of words and images being used ( in 2008) by 
some regular schools, as well as madrassas, associated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam 
(JUI), an Islamic political party that had allied itself with General Musharraf. The 
snapshots and nomenclature looks like this: 
 
 Alif” (A) for Allah                                                       (B) for bundooq (gun) 
  
                                                 
9 Pervez Hoodbhoy, Roots of Extremism in Pakistan: How Pakistan is being Saudized and what it means 






“Tay” is for takrao (collision) and “topi” (cap). 
                                       
“Jeem” is for jihad.                    “Zal” is for zunoob (an unfamiliar word even for native 
                                                    Urdu speakers, means sins). Note that even traditional 
                                                    Muslim musical instruments are worthy of the fire. 
Source: Pervez Hoodbhoy, Roots of Extremism in Pakistan: How Pakistan is being 





However, the above cited evidence from Pervez Hoodbhoy does not imply that all 
religious institutions or seminaries are fanning extreme version of Jihad. The author has 
numerous times been engaged in conversation with the scholars and peers of seminaries 
belonging to Madrassas in Islamabad, Mardan, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Lahore and 
Multan. All of them strongly opposed the use of violence to foster Islamic way of life 
within and beyond Pakistan.  The religious scholars were concerned about the „negative 
fallout on the religious schools in general because of the extreme behaviour of certain 
seminaries (like the one cited above) “viability of the reforms programme of the 
Musharraf regime”, and “demanded more transparency and flexibility in the policy.”10  
This means there is need to understand the complex role that madrassas play in a 
segregated society like Pakistan‟s. Masooda Bano who conducted an ethnographic study 
on a Deobandi madrasa argues: “a madrasa, even today, is primarily a social entity with a 
specific socio-economic role.” 11 
The deplorable state of the education system has been identified in innumerable 
academic and public policy accounts time and again as a critical variable in political 
violence in Pakistan. Fayyaz Ahmed, Joint Education Adviser in the Ministry of 
Education in conversation with the author said: 
An effective regulatory mechanism to monitor what is 
being taught in private and public education system 
including religious schools needs to be on 
ground…Because of political compulsions, divided 
political will and political compromises at the cost of 
                                                 
10 Observation is based on Authors‟ conversation and interaction involving the reading of published 
material from these seminaries from 2006 – 2009.  
11 Masooda Bano, “Beyond Politics: the Reality of a Deobandi Madrasa in Pakistan”, Journal of Islamic 
Studies, Vol. 18, No.1, 2007. pp: 43-68. Also see: 
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Tradition and Authority in Deobandi Madrasas in South Asia”, in Robert W. 
Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds., Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim 




national interest, an across the board accountability system 
is not pursued…We are a nation of ad-hoc reforms, to 
develop a sustainable, well coordinated and stable 
education system we must improve our standard of 
education, avoid duplication, and wastage of resources.12 
 
Thus a key inference here is, „healthy society needs healthy minds‟. That is, to 
counter militancy on sustainable footing the state needs to enlarge its basic ambit of 
security from state-centric focus to the well being of its people. To quote human 
development exponent, the late Mahbub Ul Haq: 
 Like the tale of two cities, Pakistan is a tale of two 
economies – one embarrassingly rich and the other 
desperately poor. The distance between the two economies 
is widening, not shrinking. What is more relevant than 
poverty of income is poverty of opportunity  which means 
denial of access to education, credit, and other economic 
and political opportunities…In Pakistan, such poverty of 
opportunity has reached staggering proportions… Pakistan 
stands at the lowest rung of human development today, 
having invested so little in education and health of its 
people…Pakistan needs to spend at least 5 per cent of its 
GNP on education, and to spread basic education to all and 
to create relevant technical skills, if it is to prepare itself for 
the global competition of the 21st century.13 
 
  Unofficial sources place Pakistan as one of only 12 world countries that spend 
less than two per cent of its GDP on education.14 This is disputed by the Education 
Ministry‟s statistical claim of 2.42 per cent of GNP recorded for 2007-0815 . The United 
Nation Development Programme‟s 2004 Human Development Report assigns Pakistan 
the lowest “education index” of any country outside Africa and it ranks 142 in terms of 
                                                 
12Dr Fayyaz Ahmed, Joint Education Adviser – Policy and Planning Wing, Ministry of Education, 
interview with Author, 13 November 2006, Islamabad. 
13 Mahbub Ul Haq, Development with Social Justice, Islamabad: Mahbub ul Haq Human Development 
Centre, 2007. pp: 8 – 11. 
14 International Crisis Group, op.cit.  




the UNDP‟s human development index.16 The fact is, the education sector in Pakistan has 
consistently suffered from neglect by all governments. Education indicators remain 
depressed, including those related to low public spending, literacy and enrolment levels, 
high drop-out levels, acute regional and gender inequalities, and budgetary inequities.17 
Government policies and reform efforts have clearly failed to address the economic, social 
and political dimensions of the problems in the education system.18  And to put the house in 
order, the overall system of education (public as well as religious) needs re-orientation as 
the youth exhibiting violent tendencies is not confined to madrassas alone. To quote an 
eminent development expert, Shahid Javed Burki: 
There is no doubt that madrasas need to be reformed but 
what is even more critical is the reform of public sector 
educational system. Due to the fact that vast majority of the 
students is enrolled in the public sector…This is the system 
that looks after the education of the large proportion of the 
school-going-age population. There are in all 155,000 
schools in the public educational system, most of them are 
poorly managed; impart education of poor quality, use 
poorly written textbooks and use curricula that are not 
relevant for the needs of the 21st century. Reforming the 
entire system, therefore, is of critical importance.19 
 
Promising to be a reformer, General Musharraf, well before 9/11, publicly 
disowned the “denial mode” regarding the indigenous religious radical trends spread 
                                                 
16 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2005, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005. 
17 Social Planning and Development Centre, “Social Development in Pakistan 2002-03: The State of 
Education", Karachi, 2003. p: 2. 
18 Dr Samina Ahmed, Head of International Crises Group (ICG) – Asia Program, interview with Author, 27 
April 2007, Islamabad.  
For more details see: ICG Asia Report N073: Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism, 16 
January 2004; and ICG Asia Report N°36: Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military, 29 July 2002.  
 





across the country. Addressing the 25th National Seerat Conference 2001, General 
Musharraf noted: 
How does the world judge our claim? It looks upon us as 
terrorists…Was Islam propagated like this? Did our 
Prophet do it that way? It is intolerance that holds our 
society in its grip. …Religious and sectarian harmony is 
therefore an inescapable necessity in Pakistan…Do not 
sully our glorious faith. I say this to all those who are guilty 
of it…My particular appeal is to all those Ulema who are 
sitting here to promote harmony among all sects so that we 
achieve unity in our ranks and are able to devote our entire 
energies towards economic uplift.20 
 
Following this, „Pakistan Madrassa Education Board Ordinance 2001‟ was 
promulgated on 18 June, the same year. According to this Ordinance, over 10,000 
religious seminaries – Madrassas – were to be brought into the public education system 
through registration, curriculum reform and financial audit. And a network of “model 
madrassas” was to be set up.21 Lt.General (retd) Moinuddin Haider, former Federal 
Interior Minister (in the pre-9/11 phase) in conversation with the author maintained: 
We were committed to reform both public school 
curriculum and mainstream religious seminaries as radical 
mindset are being produced from here…. We had limited 
success, given the stiff resistance from the religious 
schools… Education system in Pakistan must be 
overhauled to promote a just and stable society.22 
 
Following the 9/11 WTC incident, General Musharraf‟s government launched 
Education Sector Reforms (ESR) in December 2001. One of the key objectives of the 
programme was to increase the national literacy rate; provide universal education; reduce 
                                                 
20 Text of Address By  General Pervez Musharraf ,  25th National Seerat Conference,  Islamabad June 5, 
2001,  Ministry of Information, Islamabad. 
21Dr Fayyaz Ahmed, Joint Education Adviser  Policy and Planning Wing, Ministry of Education, interview 
with Author, 13 November 2006, Islamabad.  





gender disparity; improve education quality and initiate national curriculum reform. 
„English and Science subjects‟ were to be introduced in the Madrassas to mainstream 
these institutions. Education Sector Reforms (ESR) linked with four concurrent macro 
level initiatives, which included the Devolution and Local Government Plan 2000, the 
Interim-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2001-2004, Social Action Plan-SAP II 
restructuring, and the National Commission on Human Development.  In January 2002, 
government launched a five year $113 million plan to bring the teaching of „formal‟ 
(secular) subjects to 8,000 „willing‟ madrassas. In November 2003, the government 
decided to allocate about $50 million annually to provide assistance to registered 
seminaries, especially by paying the salaries of teachers hired to teach non-religious 
subjects.23 In conversation with the author General (retd) Javed Ashraf - Federal 
Education Minster maintained: 
Number of packages was announced from time to time to 
invest in religious and public education system to de-
radicalize future generations. The Education Sector 
Reforms (ESR) envisioned measures to enlarge enrolment 
into public schools as a means to curtail recruitment in 
madrassas that at times served as supply line of young 
Jihadis to militant outfits. This move was based on the 
realization that due to lack of education facilities and 
economic deprivation most families do not send their 
children to the mainstream institutions and prefer 
Madrassas where in addition to education boarding and 
lodging was also provided.  Under this plan it was decided 
that public- private partnership will be enhanced to deliver 
quality education through English medium.24    
 
                                                 
23 Ministry of Education, Islamabad.  





According to National Education Census which the ministry of education released 
in 2006, 1.5 million students were getting religious education in the 13,000 madrassas.25 
While independent sources put the number of Madrassas at between 18,000 and 22,000. 
President Musharraf in the face of increasing war threats from India and Washington 
pressure announced tough measures against extremists in an hour long speech on Jan 12, 
2002. He said: 
Sectarian terrorism has been going on for years…The day 
of reckoning has come. Do we want Pakistan to be a 
theocratic state? Do we believe that religious education 
alone is enough for governance or do we want Pakistan to 
emerge as a progressive and dynamic welfare 
state?...Today Pakistan is not facing any threat from 
outside. But the real threats are posed from within.26 
 
Following this speech it was announced that foreign students all Madrassas will 
be  registered  by March 23; speedy trial courts will be set up to punish terrorist acts; 
above all, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Tehrik-i- 
Jafria Pakistan and Tanzim Nifaz-i- Shari‟ah-i-Mohammadi stood banned.27 Of these six 
banned extremist Islamic groups, two, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, were 
also designated as terrorist groups by the US State Department.28 Discussing the 
madrassa reform initiative Dr Masooda Bano in conversation with the author said: 
                                                 
25“Punjab has 5,459 madrasas followed by NWFP with 2,843; Sind, 1,935; Federally Administrated 
Northern Areas (FANA),1,193;Baluchistan 769; AJK 586; Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (Fata), 
135, and Islamabad capital territory 77”. 
 Source:”National Education Census”, Islamabad: Ministry of Education, 2006.  
26 Text of General Musharraf Speech, 12 January, 2002. Obtained from, Ministry of Information, 
Islamabad. 
27 Note: Following this announcement, militant members of these movements were immediately targeted. 
Pakistan‟s Interior Ministry maintained that 1,900 activists were arrested and 600 organizational 
headquarters were closed down in four days. However, most of them were freed thereafter.  
28Note: Following the attacks on the Indian Parliament and the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in 2001, the 
US banned the Lashkar-e-Tayiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was named as FTO by the 
US State department in January 2003. This group is believed to be responsible for the January 2002 




The reforms have not won support from the religious elite. 
Six years on, the programme had failed to record noticeable 
success by 2007,only 250 out of the approximately 16,000 
registered madrasas had accepted the reform programme. 
The main reasons for this are: weak credibility of 
Musharraf regime and its close association with the United 
States, lack of clarity and political will on part of the 
government and mutual distrust on both sides.29 
 
 The madrasa system in Pakistan has a three-tier structure that parallels the secular 
education system, Primary (Abtadia/Amma), Secondary (Thatani/Khasa)) Wustani/Aliya 
(bachelors degree), and Masters Degree (Fooqani/Almiya). It is organized by five 
education boards called Wafaqs, which represent the five main Islamic schools of thought 
in Pakistan. That is: Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Salafia (Ahl-e-Hadith); Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-
Arabia (Deobandi); Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Shia (Shia); Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Ahle-
Sunnat-wal-Jamaat (Barelvi); Rabita-ul-Madaris Al-Islamia (Jamaat-i-Islami). Nearly 
three quarters of the madrasas and nearly 90 per cent of all students come under the 
auspices of the Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Arabia, which is part of the Sunni Deobandi 
tradition. The wafaqs‟ most important function is to develop a standardized curriculum, 
hold annual examinations for bachelors and masters‟ level degrees and issue degree 
certifications, but they also register all madrasas in a given school of thought and 
coordinate their activities. 30  
 However, in conversation with the senior representatives of the five madrasa 
education boards the author came across highly negative perceptions about the Madrassa 
reform package. They termed the measures as “discriminatory on behest of United States, 
                                                                                                                                                 
was also held responsible for the March 2002 Karachi bus bombing that killed 15 people, including 11 
French technicians. The LJ is also reported to have links with the Al-Qaeda.  
29 Masooda Bano, Human Development expert, interview with Author, 12 October 2008, Rawalpindi.  
30 For more details see: Masooda Bano, “Contesting Ideologies and Struggle for Authority: State-Madrasa 




and bent on destroying the only cohesive and successful education system left in the 
country.” 31 
  What was the outcome of the above mentioned policy pronouncements and 
measures which remained a distant goal and the „radicalization trend‟ continued its 
upward surge? Answering this question one must note the contextual factors -- ranging 
from credibility and political legitimacy deficit, Pakistan‟s military actions within the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), number of „Peace Deals‟ (with the 
militants), and „instability in the neighborhood that is Afghanistan, plus US Drone attacks 
that killed innocent civilians  all these elements added to further polarization of the public 
against state policy and institutions. Generally, a sense of pessimism prevailed among the 
silent majority while the ranks of „militants‟ swelled resulting in increase in „suicide 
attacks‟ across the country. An eminent analyst, Dr Hassan-Askari Rizvi, reflects on the 
Musharraf regime‟s policies to curb extremism within the country in the following words: 
Some half hearted efforts were made by General Pervez 
Musharraf‟s government (1999-2008) to moderate religion 
oriented trends and check militancy. However, the 
imperative of staying in power led his government to 
accommodate the MMA (the coalition of six Islamic parties 
that sympathized with the Taliban and advocated religious 
orthodoxy and militancy) and not to push hard line all the 
way against religious hard liners and militant groups. They 
were given enough space to continue pursuing their 
religious-cum-political agendas.32  
 
But it is as if the government was not aware of these factors and believed in the success 
of these measures as reflected in the following words of General Musharraf: 
                                                 
31 Observation based on Author‟s participation twice in roundtables with the Madrassa leaders, 2007- 2008, 
Islamabad. 
32 Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Radicalization and the Political System of Pakistan”, National conference on 




We pursued and were successful on five points. That is, 
misuse of mosque; proscribing militant and sectarian 
literature; reining in and banning extremist militant 
organizations; initiating dialogue with religious seminaries 
stalwarts, and, reviewing school curricula…Our success 
was 70 per cent versus militant literature, 50 per cent  
versus banned militant outfits, 80 per cent in curriculum 
revision,60 – 70  per cent in registering Madrassas, and 95 
per cent in deporting foreign students(without prior official 
approval) from religious seminaries…The situation was 
very complex and we operated against all odds.33 
 
  Now we come to the legal measures that were adopted to check the rising tide of 
terrorism in Pakistan. 
Part Two  
7.2 - A: Legal and Institutional Measures to Counter Terrorism 
Literally speaking, anti-terrorism (sometimes abbreviated as AT) generally refers 
to passive, defensive, protective, or legal measures against terrorism. Efforts to deter 
terrorism may take the form of severe penalties under anti-terrorism laws, such as 
circulating descriptions or photographs of terrorists in the media, offering rewards for 
information, or resort to putting pressure on the kin of terrorists. For more than three 
decades the government has been introducing “special” legal measures to deal with 
certain terrorist offences outside the regular criminal justice regime. The government 
since the 1970s has interpreted political and sectarian violence, nationalist movements, 
and certain criminal offences as acts of terrorism and thus instituted a parallel legal 
system to try those who commit these crimes. The regular criminal justice system was 
                                                 
 




deemed incapable of delivering justice swiftly.34 Very often the laws under the garb of 
“anti-terrorist measures” that dealt with anti-state elements were in fact used for political 
purposes. Z A Bhutto government adopted Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special 
Court) Act of 1975 wherein “special” laws and courts dealing with “terrorism” or 
“terrorist acts” became the norm.  
Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997 was the brain child of the Nawaz Sharif 
government that sought to “impart timely and inexpensive justice by establishing a 
parallel legal system.”35 ATA was preceded by many years of sectarian violence and 
terrorist incidents across the country. The law included “special” measures to expedite 
trials. It had the expanded objective of preventing “terrorism and sectarian violence” and 
providing “speedy trial of heinous offences.” 36 
The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) law aimed at acting as a deterrent to would-be 
terrorists by incorporating the broader definition of terrorism and rigid deadlines to 
ensure speedy justice. The Act defined terrorism as: 
Whoever, to strike terror in the people, or an any section of 
people, or to alienate any section of the people or to 
                                                 
34 Note: Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan promulgated „Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) 
Act, in 1949 aimed to curb political violence. Under General Ayub Khan‟s military rule Public Offices 
(Disqualification) Order of 1959, PODO aimed to silence political activism against the military rule. Like 
wise, Electoral Bodies (Disqualification) Order of 1950, EBDO sought to eliminate and silence political 
dissent terming these elements as “anti-state” and consolidate military rule of the General Ayub Khan. Z A 
Bhutto introduced the words „terrorist activities‟ in legislation for the first time and established special 
courts to try such offenses. For more derails see: Mian Ghulam Hussain, Manual of Anti-Terrorism Laws in 
Pakistan, Lahore: Afsari Printers, 2006.  
35 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif quoted in DAWN, 29 November 1997.  




adversely affect harmony among different sections of the 
people, does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or 
other explosive or inflammable substance, or firearms, or 
other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or 
chemical or other substances of a hazardous nature in such 
a manner as to cause the death of, or injury to, any person 
or persons, or damage to, or destruction of, property or 
disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of 
the community or display firearms, or threaten with the use 
of force public servants in order to prevent them from 
discharging their lawful duties commits a terrorist act.37 
Concurrently in 1997, special “anti-terrorist courts” were created under the ATA - 
a departure from the existing judicial system and an attempt to create a parallel system 
directly staffed and monitored by the executive rather than the judiciary. Following 
Supreme Court intervention, ATA 1997 was amended, and on  24 October 1998 the Anti-
Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance was issued. Under this ordinance, anti-terrorism 
courts remained in place and the judges of such courts were granted tenure of office; 
special Appellate Tribunals were disbanded and appeals against the decision of the anti-
terror courts would henceforth be submitted to the respective High Courts; and 
restrictions were placed on ATA 1997‟s provisions regarding trials in absentia to accord 
with regular legal procedures.38 
Pakistan Armed Forces (acting in aid of civil power) Ordinance -34- (PAFO) was 
promulgated on November 20, 1998, following the spree of ethnic killings that gripped 
Karachi in October 1998.The targeted killing of Hakim Said, a well-known philanthropist 
and a former Governor of Sindh, on October 17, 1998, led to the imposition of 
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Governor‟s Emergency Rule in Sindh province. The military was called in to restore law 
and order in the province under PAFO‟s broad judicial powers. The Ordinance was 
criticized by human rights activists, media, and opposition parties. Opposition Senator 
Aitzaz Ahsan questioned the definition of “civil commotion” and observed: 
Actions of publishing handbills or wall-chalking or going 
on strike for economic crises have nothing to do with 
Terrorism. Intent of law is to suppress all expressions of 
opposition to government of Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif…It betrays the real face of the government. They 
talk of democracy; they come to the Parliament talking of 
democracy but this is one of the most amazing documents 
of legislation they have produced. Obviously, [the new 
laws] are intended to strengthen the grip of the government 
of the political activity in the country.39 
The Supreme Court‟s unequivocal decision in the case of Liaquat Hussain versus 
Federation of Pakistan 1999 wholly repudiates the impugned ordinance, declaring it to 
be “unconstitutional, without legal authority, and with no legal effect.” The unanimous 
decision of the full nine-member bench also rejected the government‟s contention that the 
ordinance was expedient and defensible under the so-called “doctrine of necessity.”40 The 
Supreme Court recorded in its judgment that civilians cannot be tried by military courts; 
the special courts cannot perform parallel function to those assigned to regular courts, and 
the military powers with regard to “aid to civil authority” do not extend to the creation of 
courts or the exercise of judicial functions. On August 27 1999, the Nawaz Sharif 
government made yet another amendment to the ATA 1997 to allow for the creation of 
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anti-terrorism courts in any province of Pakistan.41This was the last revision in the anti-
terrorism legal regime by the Nawaz government before he was ousted by the military 
coup led by General Musharraf on 12 October of the same year. 
In the pre-9/11 phase, the Musharraf regime had enacted two amendments in the 
anti-terrorism ordinance on 2 December, 1999 expanding the definition of the act of 
terrorism and enhanced the ambit of the anti-terrorism courts to include several other 
provisions of Pakistan‟s criminal code. Bypassing the regular court system that otherwise 
could have delayed the proceeding of Sharif‟s case enabled the anti-terrorism court (ATC 
– Karachi), on 6 April 6 2000, to convict Sharif of conspiracy to hijack the PIA flight and 
sentenced him to life imprisonment.42 That life imprisonment sentence imposed on Sharif 
under the amended ATA never fully materialized, as a deal was struck between the 
government and Sharif‟s family. In December 2000, Sharif and his family were allowed 
to leave the country for Saudi Arabia.43 
                                                 
41  Anti Terrorism - Second Amendment 1999 Ordinance PLD 2000 Central Statues 2. 
42 Note: According to the first amendment, the courts‟ extended jurisdiction would now include: (1) Section 
109 – abetment of offense; (2) Section 120 – concealing of a design to commit an offense; (3) Section 120 
B – criminal conspiracy to commit a crime punishable by death or with the imprisonment greater than two 
years; (4) Section 121 – waging or attempting to wage war against Pakistan; (5) Section 121 A – 
conspiracy to commit certain offenses against the state; (6) Section 122 – collecting arms with the intent to 
wage war ; (7) Section 123 – concealment with the intent to facilitate waging of war; (8) Section 365 – 
kidnapping ; (9) Section 402 – being one of the five or more persons assembled for the purpose of 
committing dacoity ; (10) Section 402 B – conspiracy to commit hijacking.[42] The 2 December1999, 
amendment set up two new special courts to be empowered to “transfer, claim, or readmit any case within 
that province.” These courts also served as Appellate Tribunals for the anti-terrorist courts.  For details see: 
The News, 7April 2000; Dawn, 7April 2000.  
43Note: under the terms of the deal, Sharif agreed to abstain from politics and remain outside Pakistan for 
10 years or so. Additionally, the Sharif family was fined more than 20 million rupees ($400,000) and 
agreed to the forfeiture of property worth in excess of 500 million rupees ($10 million) as part of the deal.  




The remaining pre-9/11 phase was marked by further deterioration of law and 
order, and incidents of sectarian nature became a regular feature on the home front. Anti-
Terrorism (Amendment) Act issued on 15 August 2001, expanded the purview of the 
anti-terrorism courts and instituted clauses to proscribe militant sectarian outfits and 
freeze their financial assets. The Amendment Act empowered the Federal government to 
ban an organization:  
If it has a reason to believe that organization is concerned 
in terrorism defined as an organization that: commits or 
participates in the act of terrorism; prepares for terrorism; 
promotes or encourages terrorism; supports and assists any 
organization concerned with terrorism;  patronizes or 
assists in the incitement of hatred or contempt on religious, 
sectarian or ethnic lines that stir up disorder; fails to expel 
from its ranks or ostracize those who commit acts of 
terrorism and presents them as heroic persons is otherwise 
concerned with terrorism.44 
Following the enactment of the amended ATA, the government banned two 
sectarian organizations, namely: Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) and Sipah-i- Mohammed (SMP), 
both militant off-shoots of the Tehrik-i-Nifaz–i-Fiqah-i-Jafferia and Sipah-i-Sahaba, 
respectively. Additionally, hundreds of activists belonging to these two militant 
organizations were also rounded up. In January 2002, Anti-terrorism (Amendment) 
Ordinance was promulgated. This enhanced the single bench to three members of the 
anti-terror courts and introduced “military personnel” as a third member. The government 
held that this step was taken “to speed up the lengthy adjudication process.” 45 In yet 
another bid to strengthen the legal regime and ensure rule of law, the government issued 
                                                 
44 Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 15 August, 2001 , Section 11 A. 




the Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance on November 16, 2002. This Act enhanced 
the powers of the police to deal with terrorism. By inserting the Fourth Schedule into the 
ATA of 1997, clauses were added regarding the “security of good behavior” to be 
fulfilled by the activists of the organization or person whose name is recorded in the 
Fourth schedule list. The Act also provided law enforcement agencies to hold a suspect 
for up to one year without challenge.46 
The ATA legislation that had been on the statute well before 9/11, but had never 
been vigorously enforced except by one governing political party against rivals, was put 
into effect. Following the ATA clauses, the government said it could take actions against 
banned organizations:  their offices, if any would be sealed; their assets and accounts 
would be frozen; all literature and electronic media material would be seized; the 
publication, printing or dissemination of press statements, press conferences, or public 
utterances by or on behalf of, or in support of, a proscribed organization would be 
prohibited. The proscribed groups would also be required to submit accounts of their 
income and expenditure for their political and social activities and disclose all funding 
sources to those relevant authorities designated by the federal government.47  
 Musharraf‟s regime like its predecessors also extended the umbrella of anti-
terrorism goals into the political arena seen by government opponents as political 
victimization.48 Though the public fundraising, recruitment, and propaganda of the 
                                                 
46 Anti Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, November 16, 2002. 
47 Mohammad Amir Rana, The Seeds of Terrorism, London : New Millennium, 2005. p: 66. 
48Note: The Political Parties Order of June 28, 2002, adversely affected the rules of politics in the country. 




banned outfits were supposed to be curtailed, organizations found innovative ways to 
survive and flourish such as adopting legitimate business covers like health, education 
and real estate. This placed government in a bind as no law (or effective procedure) exists 
that bans former members of a militant organization to engage in charity and 
humanitarian work.49   
Further amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 were added in November 
2004. The maximum jail term for supporters of militants was increased from 14 years to 
life imprisonment. The aim was “to strike at the support network of the terrorism and 
deter those who are providing financial, logistical and infrastructure support to the 
terrorists and remove loopholes in the Anti-Terrorism Act.” Sub-sections 4-A and 4-B 
were added to Section 25 of the Act of 1997; victims and their heirs obtained the right to 
appeal against the acquittal of accused by an anti-terrorist court. Another amendment to 
the ATA authorizes the government officials to seize the passport of anyone charged 
under the law. 
Along the same lines, government enacted the Anti-Terrorism (Second 
Amendment) Act on January 10, 2005. This Act provided for the constitution of Special 
Benches consisting of no less than two judges for disposal of appeals. The act allowed the 
transfer of cases of terrorism from one province to another. It also enhanced the 
jurisdiction of the courts -- dealing with abduction and kidnapping for ransom, finding 
                                                                                                                                                 
hatred or animosity; (2) bearing a name as a militant group; (3) imparting any military or paramilitary 
training to its members or other persons”. Section 4 also requires that every political party maintain an 
official manifesto. And Section 15 provides for dissolution of any political party that is “foreign-aided” or 
is found “indulging in terrorism.” 
49 Author‟s off-record interviews with the officials of Interior Ministry as well as Law Ministry experts 
pointed out this aspect of Law. Officials recommended effective post-banning mechanism to be followed in 




and use of explosives in places of worship and court premises -- to be exclusively tried by 
Anti-terrorism Courts.50 
ATA is silent on the issue of extra-judicial detention of Pakistani citizens and 
deportation to the third country (primarily the United States) commonly referred to as 
“missing persons.”51 Most of the senior legal experts believe the state cannot violate the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution of the country. Being picked by the 
intelligence agencies (that is establishment) and kept in „safe houses‟ for interrogation 
(that often involves torture) purpose without due process of law amount to violation of 
basic human rights and conducting an act of illegal captivity. State agencies must be held 
accountable and principle of „rule of law‟ should be observed in all 
circumstances.52According to the 2007 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) 
report: 
Approximately 1,600 persons were missing. Then-chief 
justice Chaudhry heard a petition filed earlier in 2007 by 
HRCP and 41 other petitions on behalf of 198 persons and 
in August ordered the government to find and release all 
the missing persons. They were picked up on suspicion of 
involvement in terrorism and released shortly thereafter. 
The rest were kept in different places in the 
country…Though law prohibits arbitrary arrest and 
                                                 
50  Text of Anti-Terrorism Second Amendment Act- Provision13, pp: 6 – 10, 2005. 
51Note: Missing Person implies „enforced disappearance‟ by the Pakistani secret service (ISI) between 2001 
- 2008 in the framework of US-Pakistani counter-terrorism policy. According to the Government, during 
this period around 1,600 people has “disappeared”, but some civil organizations place the number much 
higher. 
52Note: Article 9 of the Pakistan Constitution states: “no person shall be deprived of life or liberty, save in 
accordance with law.” Article 10 further guarantees: “no person shall be arrested and detained for a period 




detention; however, the authorities did not always comply 
with the law.53 
In response to the above mentioned situation, the Crises Management Cell 
officials at the Ministry of Interior maintained, following the judicial orders an active 
policy to locate the reported missing cases is underway. And “out of 2390 (total reported 
missing cases) 310 missing persons have been located and 1291 remain missing (cases 
are still pursued) as of 22 August 2009.”54 The situation is certainly of a complex nature 
and the inability of investigative agencies to present credible evidence to the courts 
remains a strong reason for by-passing the due process of law. Babur Sattar, an interested 
lawyer suggests: 
Parliament must introduce a legislative framework that 
defines the mandate of the intelligence agencies, identifies 
the limits of extraordinary powers that they are vested with 
(such as wire-tapping), specifies the processes they must 
follow to ensure that such power is not abused (such as 
prior approval by judicial officers), facilitates cooperation 
between intelligence agencies and civilian law-enforcement 
bodies, provides a mechanism for the civilian executive to 
give policy input, and for parliament to seek information 
and provide bipartisan oversight. And until that happens, 
the judiciary must not shirk its obligation to firmly clamp 
down on the excesses of the intelligence agencies.55 
Chairperson of Defense of Human Rights Ms Amina Masood Janjua in 
conversation with the author termed General Musharraf‟s counter-terrorism policy a 
gross misconduct of fundamental human rights. She said: 
My husband Masood Janjua was picked on 30 July 2005 by 
the intelligence agencies and has been kept in illegal 
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detention to date. No warrant was issued and due process of 
law was not followed…We are still unaware of the charges 
framed against him…We have been running from post to 
pillar but no explanation by the state has been given to date. 
In 2007 Supreme Court issued directives to the interior 
ministry to produce the accused before the court but the 
ministry says it is trying to locate the suspect. 56 
 
At this juncture it is pertinent to note that in the post-9/11 phase, Islamabad tried 
to fulfill the obligation of being a United Nations member and ensure the implementation 
of the UN Resolution 1373 (2001), UN Resolution 1624 (2005), and submit periodic 
reports to the U.N. Security Council‟s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) from time to 
time.57 In other words, anti-terrorism ambit enlarged from a national enterprise and 
upgraded to be in line with guidelines formulated by the U.N. At first a Special 
Investigation Group (SIG) was established as a counter terrorism unit under the 
supervision of Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) during July 2003. The purpose of this 
group was to identify arrest, investigate and prosecute the most wanted terrorists. The 
group was meant to deal with cyber terrorism investigation, data collection about 
terrorists and money laundering cases and also provides training courses for police 
departments.58Further, the Prevention and Control of Human Trafficking Ordinance 2002 
was promulgated to prevent and control human trafficking.  
                                                 
56 Amina Masood Janjua – Defense of Human Rights, interview with author, 22 March 2010, Islamabad. 
57UN Resolution 1373 (2001) was adopted by the Security Council at its 4385th meeting on September 28, 
2001. It called on States to “work together to prevent and suppress terrorism through all lawful means and 
obliges all states to criminalize assistance to terrorist activities, deny financial support and safe haven to 
terrorists and share information about groups planning terrorist attacks”.UN Resolution 1624 (2005) called 
on States to ensure prohibition of incitement to commit terrorist acts. For more details see, Http: 
//www.un.org/sc/ctc/resolutions.html. 
58 Government of Pakistan -Special Investigation Group (SIG) Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). More 




Alongside these measures, in compliance with legislative requirements necessary 
to implement U.N. Resolutions 1373 and 1624, a draft of the Anti-Money Laundering 
Bill (2005) was approved by the Federal Cabinet but its enactment was delayed for a long 
time. The Anti-Money Laundering Bill aimed “to make the financing of terrorism a 
predicate offense for money laundering; extend the banking and financial laws and 
alternative money transfer systems; and, regulate charitable, religious, and other non-
governmental organizations.”59The bill was finally approved in January 2010, by the 
Parliament of the country. Under the Anti-Money Laundering Bill, a punishment of 
rigorous imprisonment of not less than one year and up to 10 years, along with fine, will 
be awarded to anyone who acquires converts, possesses or transfers property, knowing or 
having reason to believe that such property is proceeds of crime.60 
In the same vain, Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act was enacted as an 
ordinance by President Musharraf in December 2007.This act aimed to prevent any 
action against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of electronic systems, 
networks and data as well as the misuse of such systems, networks and data by penalizing 
such actions and providing mechanism for investigation, prosecution and trail (sic) of 
such offenses.61Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) was made center point to investigate, 
and prevent cyber crimes defined under the law. Before this ordinance, Electronic 
                                                 
59“Pakistan Report to United Nations CTC Counter Terrorism Committee 2005”.Http: 
//www.un.org/sc/ctc/country reports/report. 
60 Text of the Anti-Money Laundering Bill, Dawn, 28 January 2010. 
61Ministry of Law, justice and Human Rights, Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act – 31December 2007, 
Ordinance L XXII of 2007. Available at: Http: www.fia.gov.pk/electronic_prevention_orde.pdf. 
For more discussion see: 
 Saba Noor, “Evolution of Counter-Terrorism Legislation in Pakistan”, Conflict and Peace Studies, No. 1, 




Transaction Ordinance (ETO-2002) was being used by FIA to deal with Cyber Crimes. 
Keeping this in view the National Response Center for Cyber Crimes (NR3C) was 
established under Federal Investigation Agency to deal with such types of crimes. Former 
Director General FIA, Tariq Pervez in conversation with the author said:  
This center aims to develop liaison with international 
organizations especially against online internet frauds, 
email threats, plastic money frauds and other financial 
crimes. NR3C is committed to build local capabilities in 
incident handling and security intelligence. When this 
capability is achieved it will be integrated internationally 
to monitor global security issues.62 
At this juncture, the Musharraf regime‟s efforts to reform the police as a 
preventative tool to counter terrorism on a sustainable footing need to be discussed.  
7.2 - B:  Police Reforms under Musharraf 
Police and local governments are provincial issues but the former military ruler 
had made them federal subjects by promulgating two ordinances “The local Government 
Ordinance 2001 and the Police Order 2002.63 During the Musharraf regime Police order 
2002 was established to reconstruct and regulate the police. The law came into force in 
the whole country except the federal capital territory. Initially, Police reforms formed a 
part of the military government‟s devolution scheme and replaced the colonial-era 
legislation, the Police Act of 1861, which had governed the functioning of the police 
since independence, with the Police Order 2002.64 It aimed at addressing public 
grievances vis-à-vis the police department by introducing a significant shift from a 
                                                 
62 Mr. Tariq Pervaiz former Director General FIA,  heading NCTA (National Counter Terrorism 
Authority), interview with Author, 20 April 2009, Islamabad. 
 For more details on the achievement of National Response Center for Cyber Crimes see: Http: 
www.nr3c.gov.pk/achievements.php 
63 The News, 24 February 2010. 





coercive organ of the state to a public service organization, which envisaged 
establishment of effective mechanisms of public accountability and institutional checks 
and balances.65 In the Police Order 2002, operational autonomy was emphasized by 
giving security of tenure to officers, by giving powers of ex-officio secretary to the PPO 
(provincial police officer), by getting panels of PSP officers forwarded by the NPSC 
(National Public Safety Commission) to the government for posting as PPO and by 
providing officers an opportunity of hearing and recourse both against illegal orders and 
pre-mature transfers.66 Shoaib Suddle, one of the co-drafter of Police Act 2002 said: 
This act aimed at depoliticizing police, improving police 
professionalism through a merit-oriented system of 
recruitment and career progression, and making police 
more accountable to citizens. If properly implemented, 
these radical reforms can bring about a fundamental 
transformation in the quality of policing, and make  police 
a people-friendly public service, particularly for the poor 
and disadvantaged.67  
 
However, politics came in the way of successful implementation of the Police 
Reform Act.68 To quote Afzal Shigri, an ex-Police official: 
 
 In the name of public interest Police Order 2002 was 
amended in 2004 even before its implementation. A check 
on unrestrained powers of the executive was unacceptable 
to elected political governments in the Provinces. As a 
result, Civilian oversight through a neutral body has been 
compromised by changing the composition of the district 
and provincial public safety commissions…Politicians, 
bureaucracy and police - all three collaborated to destroy 
this law for different reasons. Politicians without the option 
of misuse of police to deal with their political opponents 
felt weakened and therefore were averse to external 
oversight by civil society, bureaucracy feels that failure of 
                                                 
65“Police Reforms: New Legal Framework and Issues in Implementation”, available at: 
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66 Ibid. 
67 Federal Tax Ombudsmen - Dr Shoaib Suddle, former Inspector General Police - Baluchistan, Ex Director 
General - Intelligence Bureau (IB) interview with Author, 26 November 2009. Islamabad. 





the reforms will help in restoration of their all powerful 
DM and police just did not like the stringent provisions of 
swift and meaningful accountability of their misdeeds.69 
The positive outcome of the Police reforms became obvious as by August 2005 
the government had converted 25 of Baluchistan‟s 27 districts from "B areas" controlled 
by local levy forces who obeyed local tribal chiefs to "A areas" controlled by the police. 
Nearly 3,000 of the 3,560 levy forces in 2006 were converted to police, and nearly 1,500 
local youth were inducted into the newly formed police force.70General Musharraf‟s 
spokesperson recounting the regime„s effective measures at the domestic end by 2006 
stressed: 
Police Reforms have been introduced to make Police force 
more effective and professional. Better training facilities 
are being initiated such a PISCES (Personal Identification 
Secure Comparison and Evaluation System), a border 
control system designed to monitor the exit and entry of 
travelers at the ports of embarkation and disembarkation. 
Forensic laboratories, structuring of CIDs, establishment of 
Anti-Terrorist units, Machine Readable Passports, 
establishment of Help Line and E-mail facility, are all 
police related measures…Plus a fully equipped National 
Crises Management Cell has been set up in Ministry of 
Interior. The Provincial governments have also set up 
similar Crises Management Cells at the Provincial level. 
These centers are tasked round the clock collection and 
collation of information of all incidents occurring in any 
part of the country for reporting to higher authorities.71 
However, all the institutional steps by the Musharraf government could not bring 
the desired improvement in the police force. The Transparency International‟s “Global 
Corruption Barometer  released on 6 December 2007, placed  police as the most corrupt 
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public sector agency in Pakistan. It has only 350,000 police for a population of around 
172 million, a ratio of 1:477.72 Hassan Abbas‟ in-depth analysis of the factors inhibiting 
the counter-terrorism role of police points out, lack of coordination between police,  
civilian-run Intelligence Bureau, and military-run intelligence agencies, poor data 
collection skills plus double standards in government policy versus militants as key 
factors responsible for limited success of police in pursuing terrorist and militant 
organizations in Pakistan. 73 
According to the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative‟s research report, due 
to the backlash from the provinces, the bureaucracy and certain segments of the policing 
community, the reforms passed in 2002 were significantly curtailed by amendments that 
were introduced between 2004 and 2007. Over a period of four years, eight ordinances 
were promulgated to introduce scores of substantive and hundreds of minor amendments 
to the original Police Order. Most notably, the Police Order (Amendment) Ordinance, 
2004, amended or replaced 73 of the 187 articles found in the original Police Order, 
2002.74 The report acknowledges that, even though the Police Order, 2002 was not 
perfect, its proper implementation would have shaken up a moribund system that is in 
desperate need of reform. 
Thus making police effective and efficient in dealing with terrorism which has 
been the objective of these reforms remains to this day an elusive reality. The present 
study argues that given the indigenous nature of terrorism in Pakistan, a pro-active role of 
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police in collaboration with community mobilization can be a viable way out. That is, the 
police can pre-empt many of the terrorist activities with better resources and intelligence. 
Here, the missing link of public support to cushion an effective policing merits 
discussion. 
Part Three 
7.3 – A: Musharraf’s Political and Social Measures in the name of counter 
Extremism in Pakistan 
Musharraf‟s official rhetoric of introducing political reforms beginning with the 
Local Government Ordinance 2000 was to rectify a personalized and politicized state of 
decision-making and alarming levels of corruption resulting in low quality of governance 
and propagate sustainable democracy for the good of the people and state of Pakistan. In 
reality, political measures were meant to carve out a new political constituency to 
legitimize his extra-constitutional and dictatorial rule and give it the cover of a sham 
democracy.  
Through holding a national referendum in early 2002 Musharraf secured a term of 
five years as President of the country thus creating a legitimate cover to perpetuate his 
power. This step made his presidency beyond the reach of the federal Parliament and 
Provincial assemblies, which were elected in October the same year and were 
constitutionally meant to select both the President and Prime Minister respectively. 




complete democratic reforms, combat corruption, address Pakistan's widespread poverty 
and quell religious extremism.”75 
Under his plan to reform the political system in Pakistan it was decided to lower 
the voting age to 18 years, increase the number of seats for women in the parliament and 
create a reserved quota of seats for the minorities. It was further decided that only 
university graduates could contest the national assembly and senate elections, Moreover 
no one could serve as prime minister or president more than two terms in office.76 In 
reality, this last restriction was directed to bar Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto from 
returning to power through elections. The two major political parties of the country, 
PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz) and PPP (Pakistan Peoples Party) were 
sidelined by the military regime using “accountability matrix” and the PML –Q (Pakistan 
Muslim League – Quaid -i-Azam) largely composed of the PPP and PML-N splintered 
groups was propped up in the name of “sustainable democracy”. Along with this the 
creation of another group comprising an amalgamation of six religious parties called the 
MMA (Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal)77 was facilitated which emerged as the third largest 
political force in the elections organized by Musharraf. The party position according to 
election results was as follows: 
                                                 
75Quoted in Seth Mydans, “A Nation Challenged: Pakistan - Musharraf Plans a Referendum to Let Him 
Stay in Power” New York Times, 6April 2002. 
76 Pervez Musharraf, In The Line of Fire, New York: Free Press, 2006, pp. 164-180. 
77 Note: MMA emerged as the third largest political force after the election. Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal 
(MMA) was a composition of six religious parties, Jamiat-ul Ulema-i- Islam (Fazlur Rahman Group) 
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Ahle-Hadith (JAAH) and Islami Tehrik-e-Pakistan (ITP). Six Religious groupings contested election under 
MMA name and emerged as the third largest political force in post 2002 election phase. MMA components 
were known for anti-American sentiments and pro-Taliban leanings. Most of the analysts also trace the 






Source: Source: International Crisis Group, Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military, ICG 
Asia Report 49 Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003. pp: 17–18. 
According to the Election Commission of Pakistan, MMA got 11.3 per cent of the 
total polled votes at the national level, while it swept NWFP with 45.5 per cent of votes 
and 29 seats. In Baluchistan the MMA bagged 16.1 per cent of the polled votes and 6 
seats. However, it fared poorly in Punjab with only 5.2 per cent of votes and 3 seats only. 
In Sind, it fared slightly better, by capturing 10.5 per cent of votes and 7 seats.78  
Mossarat Qadeem, a political and development expert from Peshawar, explains 
the rise of MMA as follows: 
MMA gained high degree of political strength because of 
the major political engineering undertaken by the military. 
The negative campaign conducted by the military led 
regime against the secular PML-N and PPP provided 
opportunity to the MMA to fill the vacuum…The vote for 
the MMA was thus actually not a vote for a MMA but a 
vote against the US, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif 
…The religious parties had been given a free hand. For 
more than a year since September 11 attacks on the US, the 
religious parties had had a field day in the name of 
Afghanistan Defense Council to mobilize their workers. 
They made use of the infrastructure provided by mosques 
and madrassas to gain votes. Therefore, when the elections 
were announced the MMA was the only alliance, which 
was ready for the electoral battle, while the other political 
parties looked around in desperation for partners and seat 
adjustment.79 
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 Thus, for the first time an alliance comprising religious parties formed a 
government on its own in the NWFP.80 The only other time when a religious party ruled 
in the NWFP was in 1970 when Maulana Mufti Mahmud, father of the present JUI (F) 
leader, was the chief minister, heading a coalition government with the National Awami 
Party (NAP). Mufti Mahmood had resigned in protest when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
dismissed the NAP government in Baluchistan in 1973. In Baluchistan, Pakistan Muslim 
League – Quaid-I-Azam (PML-Q) and Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) formed a 
coalition government while at the center too the MMA became a major coalition partner 
of the PML-Q led government. Thus, Musharraf‟s ostensibly liberal regime to remain in 
power was willing to support and work with MMA which maintained ideological (and at 
times structural) linkages with the extreme militant outfits within and beyond Pakistan. 
Musharraf secured the MMA‟s support at the center to add Article 270-AA to the 
constitution on 24 December 2003, which validated all his actions since his 1999 coup in 
exchange for his willingness to shed his uniform by 31 December 2004. This meant 
giving legal stake to the armed forces in the government's formal decision-making 
process.  Accordingly, the constitutional amendment ensured:  
The Proclamation of Emergency of October 14, 1999, all 
President's Orders, Ordinances, Chief Executive's Orders... 
shall not be called in question in any court or forum on any 
ground whatsoever…General Musharraf will be president 
until 2008. President will have the authority to dismiss 
Pakistan's national and provincial assemblies without first 
consulting the Supreme Court. The President‟s decision to 
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dissolve the National Assembly under Article 58 (2) (b) 
would be referred to the Supreme Court within 15 days; the 
President would seek vote of confidence from the electoral 
college; the President would consult the Prime Minister on 
the appointment of armed forces chiefs, although he would 
not be bound by the advice of the Prime Minister; A 
National Security Council to be set up under an act of the 
Parliament rather than as a constitutional body.81  
 
 To quote  Samina Ahmed, head of International Crises Group – Asia programme: 
President Musharraf's lack of domestic legitimacy has led 
him (that is, military) to rely on alliances of convenience 
with the religious right, based on the politics of patronage. 
In the absence of international support, moderate, secular 
and democratic parties will remain in the political cold. The 
choice that Pakistan faces is not between the military and 
the mullahs, as is generally believed in the West; it is 
between genuine democracy and a military-mullah alliance 
that is responsible for producing and sustaining religious 
extremism of many hues.82  
  
The fact is that political bargaining and partnership with the religious right (that is 
MMA) clouded Musharraf‟s stance against the terrorists goading him to backtrack on a 
number of decisions that could have firmed his hand against the extremist. Selective and 
often reactionary operations (military, administrative, legal, etc) were conducted with an 
element of designed ambiguity to fend off indigenous and western criticism of the grey 
areas in the regime‟s counter-terrorism policy. Musharraf justified his decision to sack 
Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Pakistan and proclaimed Emergency rule and issued 
Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO)83 on 3 November 2007 stating: 
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There is visible ascendancy in the activities of extremists 
and incidents of terrorist attacks…posing a grave threat to 
the life and property of the citizens of Pakistan…Some 
members of the judiciary are working at cross purposes 
with the executive and legislature in the fight against 
terrorism and extremism, thereby weakening the 
government and the nation‟s resolve and diluting the 
efficacy of its actions to control this menace…Some hard-
core  militants, extremists, terrorists and suicide bombers, 
who were arrested and being investigated, were ordered to 
be released. The persons so released have subsequently 
been involved in heinous terrorist activities, resulting in 
loss of human life and property…I hereby, order and 
proclaim that the Constitution of the Islamic  Republic of 
Pakistan shall remain in abeyance. This Proclamation shall 
come into force at once.84 
This was essentially  a move to gloss over the institutional and administrative 
differences between the Executive and Judiciary that culminated in the forcible  removal 
of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammed Chaudhry from the office of the Chief Justice of 
Pakistan in November 2007 on charges of "misconduct and misuse" of authority. The real 
reason was the Executive‟s (that is, General Musharraf) fear that the Supreme Court 
would prevent President Musharraf from retaining his position as Chief of the Army and 
running for President in 2008. Further, the Musharraf regime was also uncomfortable 
with the „judicial activism‟ of Justice Chaudhry since taking over as Chief Justice in June 
2005.85 The Supreme Court judicial activism was evident with reference to its steps 
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against the issue of “forced disappearances”86, “privatization of Pakistan Steel Mill”87, 
and scrapping the unconstitutional parts of the “Hasba Bill”88  
In August 2006, the Supreme Court ruled against the government and prevented 
the sale of Pakistan Steel, to private investors, based on allegations of kickbacks.  Chief 
Justice Chaudhry ruled inter alia that: 
While exercising the power of judicial review, it is not the 
function of this Court, ordinarily, to interfere in the policy 
making domain of the Executive. However, the process of 
privatization of Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation stands 
vitiated by acts of omission and commission on the part of 
certain State functionaries reflecting violation of mandatory 
provisions of law and the rules framed there under which 
adversely affected the decisions qua prequalification of a 
member of the successful consortium, valuation of the 
project and the final terms offered to the consortium which 
were not in accord with the initial public offering given 
through advertisement.89 
 
Similarly on the Hasba Bill adoption, the Supreme Court declared a number of 
provisions concerning moral policing as unconstitutional and it asked the Governor of the 
province not to sign the bill and thus avoid making it into law.90 Thus, Musharraf played 
politics with the issue of terrorism facing Pakistan and used the cover of this threat to 
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perpetuate his personal rule. The issues that were dubbed as „national challenges‟ were 
most of the time „political challenges‟ to his illegitimate rule. 
This led to further polarization among the public and confusion within the 
government ranks. Refusing to recognize the gaps and failures of the regimes‟ highly 
reactionary counter-terrorism strategy, Musharraf portrayed himself as the only credible 
savior to rein in militant and extreme forces in Pakistan. In fact, he along with his „inner 
club‟ fabricated a scenario for the international and domestic consumption where the 
country can only be saved under Musharraf or it will fall into pieces or under extreme 
fundamentalist groupings. Musharraf‟s ideological formula to reverse the tide of Islamic 
radicalism within the Muslim world was couched in the concept of Enlightened 
Moderation. 
7.3: B - Concept of Enlightened Moderation  
In 2002, President Musharraf chose the venue of OIC Conference held in 
Malaysia to unveil his “Strategy of Enlightened Moderation.” In his words:  
The world has been going through a tumultuous period 
since the dawn of the 1990s, with no sign of relief in sight. 
The suffering of the innocents, particularly the Muslims at 
the hands of militants, extremists and terrorists has made it 
all the more urgent to bring order to this troubled scene. It 
is in this spirit that the “Strategy of Enlightened 
Moderation” is being put forward.91 
 Musharraf‟s enlightened moderation narrative consisted of two prongs. First one 
concerned the Muslim world to break from the path of militancy, extremism and focus on 
socio-economic. The second one focused on the Western world specifically the United 
States to just role in the resolution of lingering Islamic world issues and also contribute 
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towards the underdeveloped Muslim states. Plus this concept stressed unity among all 
member states of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in reclaiming true 
Islamic image as an ultimate way towards emancipation. This concept of “Enlightenment 
through moderation” was well received by the Muslim leaders and added to Musharraf‟s 
international image building campaign. His former spokesperson, Lt.General (retd) 
Rashid Qureshi in conversation with the author said: 
General Musharraf was a visionary leader. He was 
conscious of dilemmas facing us and the Muslim world. He 
came to the conclusion that issues such as Kashmir cannot 
be resolved through force. So, best way is to adopt a 




 However, on home front to bolster the concept of enlightened moderation the 
tradition of Sufism in Islam was exploited and several programmes were started to 
publicise Sufism. The aim of these programmes was to counter the extremism of the 
religious clerics who use the mosques to spread ill-will against the West and invite people 
for militant jihad. The idea was to highlight “divine love, peace and tolerance” that is the 
core of Sufi teachings as the alternative to “militant ideology”. The National Sufi Council 
was launched by President Musharraf at a grand ceremony in the historical city of Lahore 
on the occasion of Iqbal‟s birthday on 9 November 2006. In the same month, an 
International Sufi conference was organized by the Punjab Institute of Languages, Art 
and Culture (PILAC) under the direction of the Chief Minister of the province, Chaudhry 
Pervaiz Elahi. The Sufi ideology of love and peace was promoted to combat the 
exclusivist slogans of the mullahs.  
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However, these actions were not well received by the majority of the Sufi and 
political community. Imran Khan, former cricketer turned politician, called these steps as: 
“sound-bites by military ruler to appease the Americans. Military rule under Musharraf 
nullifies the spirit of democracy that is essence of Enlightened Moderation in reality.” 93 
 
 The government‟s move of relying on the “Sufi norms” of the country, further 
confused the public and gave another strong point to hard-line religious groupings that 
Musharraf was “against Islam”. There emerged a big gap between the stated 
“enlightenment drive” given the credibility and legitimacy deficit (discussed earlier) of 
the Musharraf regime primarily on the home front. Senator Mushahid Hussain former 
cabinet member under Musharraf rule reflecting on this contradiction observes: 
 Short-term decisions and short-cuts were adopted by the 
Musharraf government to reform education sector and 
madrassas (not all) that promote extremism…No long-term 
pro-active counter-terrorism policy was implemented in 
letter and spirit… President Pervaiz Musharraf‟s concept of 
“enlightened moderation” is not alien to Islam or to the 
indigenous traditions of Sufism in the subcontinent. The 
essence of Islam, is against extremism…But the fight 
against repression, like in Iraq or Kashmir, has to be seen in 
the context of politics and not as something that‟s linked to 
Islam…If the state gets involved in promoting this or that 
kind of Islam, as it did when it played footie with the 
extremists in the 1980s, it will make a mess of it.94  
   
7.4: C - Promoting the Soft Image of Pakistan 
Innumerable media reports and research accounts indicate that government 
measures to re-direct youth and public from reading “militant literature” and project the 
“soft image” of Pakistan had mixed results. For instance, an international marathon rally 
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was organized in Lahore during January 2005. Religious organizations, mainly Muttahida 
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), vowed to disrupt the marathon, which it said will promote 
“nudity and obscenity”. Hundreds of MMA protesters were arrested. Again on 14 January 
2007, an international marathon was held in Lahore. This time segregated races were 
organized in the face of strong criticism from the religious political parties. In this some 
30,000 men and women athletes participated from Pakistan and 15 other countries. The 
marathon carried a cash prize of $115,000. President Musharraf talking to newsmen after 
the marathon‟s inauguration said: 
 The huge participation of people in the marathon has sent a 
message to the extremists that most Pakistanis do not see 
eye to eye with them on their hatred against healthy 
activities. This event has helped in creating a soft image of 
our country.95 
 
Musharraf tried to re-design Pakistan‟s image as a modern and progressive 
society as against its growing reputation abroad as an extremist conservative country. 
Promotion of arts and cultural activities like Bassant (an old Indian festival featuring kite 
flying, celebrated to observe the arrival of spring) were promoted. These celebrations 
were opposed by civil society groups, and political parties on account of accidental 
deaths during kite flying contests and wastage of millions of rupees on the festivities.        
The celebration of the Bassant festival was exploited by religious political parties against 
Musharraf who was accused of promoting unIslamic activities and accepting cultural 
domination of India.  
Musharraf further acknowledged and highlighted the role of women in society 
and encouraged their participation in public and political affairs. For that purpose his 
                                                 




government introduced the National Gender Reform Action Plan (GRAP). The overall 
aim of this project was to promote women‟s access to economic, political and social 
empowerment, at the national, provincial and district levels. GRAP aimed at developing 
and implementing a coherent gender reform agenda, to align policies, structures and 
procedures, for enabling the government to implement its national and international 
commitments on gender and equality issues.96 During his tenure, women gained 
exceptional rights such as more representation in parliament, appointments in federal 
cabinet, public services and even in armed forces. In November 2006, Pakistani Military 
Academy at Kakul, admitted women for the first time in history. 
7.5: D – Musharraf’s Media Measures: Freedom versus Repression 
The media industry grew at a fast pace and private television channels 
mushroomed. These were positive trends in Pakistan in the early years of Musharraf‟s 
regime. Musharraf is recognized by many for opening up the media and following a 
liberal news policy. However, in the last year of his rule, Gen Musharraf did take some 
undesirable steps accusing electronic media of non- objectivity. Government grew hostile 
towards the media. There were instances of intimidation, censorship, assaults on 
journalists and attacks on media properties. Journalists were arrested and kidnapped 
while media houses were warned they would be closed if they did not behave. During 
2007, Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Pemra) Ordinance - 2007 was 
introduced to suppress the voice of dissent. The objective of the ordinance was to stifle 
private television channels which were told that under the ordinance violators of the rules 
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could be prosecuted, sent to jail for three years and/ or fined Rs one million. Using the 
cover of „national interest‟ Musharraf‟s aim was to suppress the criticism of his policies 
and stop the discussion of unsavory facts. It was made compulsory for private channels to 
take permission from Pemra before airing live talk shows and current affairs 
programmes.97 
But while his government was trying to gag the independent media, the print and 
electronic media in control of extremist groups thrived unchecked. The persistent growth 
of „radical or militant media‟ networks despite Musharraf‟s clamp-down on militant 
organizations and their support structure could not be curbed. 
One of the in-depth studies of the genesis of media growth in Pakistan notes:   
Pakistan has always had religious media, but in the 1980s 
a new type of radical Islamist media came into existence 
that was established in order to support the call for Jihad 
in Afghanistan and building support for Islamist 
movements. This has now become a parallel media 
industry…The number of radical publications runs into 
hundreds. Six major jihadi outfits print more than 50 
newspapers and magazines alone. The Urdu monthly, 
Mujalla Al-Dawa, has a circulation of approximately 
100,000. It is published by the Jamaat ud-Dawaa, an 
organization run by Lashkar-e-Taiba which also publishes 
the weekly paper, Ghazwa, claiming a circulation of 
approximately 200,000. Glorification of the Mujahedeen 
and disparagement of the US and its allies are the 
dominant features of these publications. They criticize the 
government of Pakistan and encourage true believers to 
die for Islam. Militant activities are highlighted and 
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glorified as are calls for the Umma to unite against the 
enemies of Islam.98 
 
To quote Amir Rana, why Musharraf government partially succeeded in rolling 
back militant media: 
Following the ban on Jihad organizations and their 
publications,  they have found new method to circulate 
their products. Banned publications are now sold outside 
mosques after Friday prayers or are available only 
designated points, such as madrassas and selected 
newsstands…When a banned publication reappears, the 
process to ban it again takes more than eight months….In 
August 2006, the federal Interior Ministry banned 90 books 
containing sectarian or hate material…A code of ethics for 
religious publications should focus on banning appeals 
soliciting donations and advertisements attracting youth 
towards jihad.99   
 
The jihadi and other radical organizations also actively used electronic media. The 
author‟s conversations with civil society activists, students, lawyers from Swat, and 
FATA areas point out that, hundreds of underground Jihadi radios in FATA and Swat 
were the most effective tool of radicalization. In Swat Mullah Fazlullah set up an illegal 
FM radio station, known as Fazlullah FM in the late 2001 and early 2002.  Initially, he 
focused on reforming lives of the Muslims in accordance with Shariah laws and 
broadcasting recitation of the Qur‟an and Hadith. Women were particularly impressed by 
his rhetoric and became the major fund raiser for his campaign to build religious 
seminaries. They donated their jewellery for this purpose. Overtime, Fazlullah became 
critical of President Musharraf‟s alliance with the United States and started attacking 
state institutions in a bid to enforce Islamic rule. People of the area nick-named him 
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„Mullah Radio‟. He also advised the destruction of television sets, CDs and VCRs, which 
he said were sources of immorality.  “When this was happening the state either turned a 
blind eye or jammed his radio network off and on.” 100 
No effective state clampdown on electronic means of radicalization like 
distribution of propaganda CDs, pamphlets, night posters, letters of warning, audio 
cassettes and even threatening phone calls by the radical Islamic networks was 
implemented.101 As a result of government efforts, the religious scholars led by Chairman 
Tanzimul Madaris Pakistan and chairman Ruet-e-Hilal Committee Mufti Munibur 
Rehman, issued a Fatwa (edict) on May 19, 2005 stating that Islam strictly forbade 
suicide attacks on Muslims and those committing such acts at places of worship and 
public congregations ceased to be Muslims.  It was meant to discourage suicide bombings 
being carried out at places of worship in Pakistan; many believe the decree was part of 
the official campaign to sell a soft image of the country to the West. Some members of 
the civil society also opened a few radio stations with government‟s tacit approval to 
counter the propaganda of the extremist broadcasts. But this did not produce any tangible 
result. Thus, whatever steps the government took and the policies it adopted were 
characterized by lack of firmness rooted in its confusion with regard to religious parties it 
had remained aligned with and the desire to soft pedal its policies with the aim not to 
annoy the religious sensibilities of the common people as well as keeping the War on 
Terror commanders satisfied. 
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7.5: E- Human Resource Development as part of Enlightened Moderation under 
Musharraf 
Civil society leaders working in Swat and Tribal areas in conversation with the 
author stress the need to enlarge the counter-terror prism of the government and invest in 
the „soft elements of national power‟. That is, economic well being, politically 
representative system, accountable mode of governance and education plus social uplift 
of the area.102 A number of empirically tested studies and research carried out in FATA 
and Swat testifies to this view. To quote the CAMP (Community Appraisal and 
Motivation Programme) moving spirit, Naveed Shiwari:  
Our polling of 1,050 FATA residents demonstrates a desire 
for change and continuity. Change in FATA should respect 
tribal culture and religious sentiment…39 per cent want the 
Frontier Crimes Regulations that enforce a collective 
approach to justice across the FATA amended, while 31 per 
cent want to abolish it…There is strong desire for elected 
politics in FATA…There are mixed views on the cause of 
“Talibanisation”, although nearly half consider illiteracy to 
be major factor, with the Afghan conflict, poor governance, 
poverty and unemployment also cited. People expressed a 
strong desire for more jobs…17 per cent of those polled 
support armed Jihad, while some 57 per cent of the 
population think Jihad is about learning the Quran, not 
fighting, and 24 per cent think it is about peaceful 
resistance. Only 3.6 per cent consider the Taliban to be 
terrorists…Over 50 per cent of those polled believe that 
Islamic Law, Sharia, brings peace in the FATA. 103  
 
To quote General Musharraf: “The concept of Enlightened Moderation set the 
strategic direction of the Pakistan to concentrate on human security of the people of 
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Pakistan.” 104 Though most of the independent sources point to the macro-economic 
turnaround of the Musharraf regime that salvaged Pakistan from being declared as 
bankrupt, the trickle down effect of this change to the lower strata of economy remained 
negligible. That is, the remarkable GDP growth failed to lessen income inequality. 
Pakistan Economic Survey 2007 – 2008 notes: “The ratio of the highest to the lowest 
income quintiles has jumped from 3.76 in 2001 to 4.15 in 2005 and further to 4.2 in 
2005-06.” 105 
 Recalling the economic turnaround of Pakistan, former Prime Minister Shaukat 
Aziz said: 
We were the second fastest economically growing country 
in Asia. We launched comprehensive economic reforms 
following pro-active fiscal, monetary and exchange rate 
policies. Wide ranges of reforms were introduced focusing 
on taxation, trade and tariffs, banking and finance, industry 
and agriculture, deregulation and privatization, fiscal 
transparency and governance. Poverty Reduction Strategy 
was put into practice…All this resulted in broad-based 
economic recovery.106 
 
A number of economic initiatives to address the widening gap between the rich 
and poor were taken from time to time.107 Khushal Pakistan Programme108, food support 
programme, micro credit, zakat distribution and President‟s Rozgar program109- all aimed 
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to put the „strategic direction‟ of Musharrf‟s Enlightened Moderation concept into reality. 
Dr Ishrat Husain, former Governor of State Bank of Pakistan, in 2005 observed:  
Khushal Pakistan Program has generated economic activity 
in the country through local public works. The provinces, 
in close collaboration with the local authorities and 
communities, completed almost half a billion dollars of 
small projects creating about 1 million job opportunities 
along with essential infrastructure in rural and low income 
urban areas. The program has resulted in the construction 
of farm-to-market roads, rehabilitation of water supply 
schemes, repair of existing schools, small rural roads, 
streets, drains, and storm channels in villages.110 
The political mileage that President Musharraf aimed to gain out of the so-called 
pro-poor economic and human development initiatives was too apparent to miss the 
public eye. For instance, in case of Rozgar (meaning Employment) Programme launched 
in 2006, a renowned economist, S M Naseem remarked: 
The much-trumpeted President‟s Rozgar scheme is actually 
a misnomer, for it does little to alleviate poverty and 
unemployment and smacks strongly of an electioneering 
gimmick to distribute patronage among prospective voters 
and to improve the bottom lines of predatory commercial 
banks, especially the National Bank of Pakistan, which has 
been assigned a lead role in the implementation of the 
scheme…. Centralized decision-making which seems to 
revolve around Presidency, political expediency, rather 





Moeed Yusuf in his analysis of Musharraf‟s limited success of anti-poverty measures 
notes: 
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Related to anti-poverty programs is the issue of poverty 
targeting. A large proportion of the actual recipients are the 
„non-poor‟, ones who are not supposed to be targeted by 
these programs. This perverse targeting outcome is a result 
of leakages in the system. Specific programs for technical 
assistance could be a potential avenue for U.S. 
involvement. In addition, grants specifically designed to 
allow the development of poverty-targeting mechanisms 
could be tied to tangible outcomes in terms of streamlined 
methodologies for all programs within the country.112 
 
Conclusion 
The key inference here is, the pro-active elements of the counter-terrorism policy 
under Musharraf lacked coordination and followed a piece-meal pattern. The concept of 
enlightened moderation was no doubt a comprehensive response to the challenge of 
extremism within Pakistan and the Muslim world at large but missed the complexity of 
the situation on ground. The political imperatives took priority over its broad aim and 
short-term gestures became the normal substitute for policy implementation. 
An important point here to take note of is that poverty itself does not necessarily 
result into terrorism. It is one of the contributing factors that in another mix of 
circumstances would not play such a role. There are poorer societies in the world which 
have other problems bur not terrorism.  What is critical for the state is to treat its citizens 
as viable referent of its security in an all-round manner. That is: 
National security is still paramount, but its attainment is 
linked more and more with human security. It is widely 
recognized that national security cannot be achieved in a 
situation where people starve but arms accumulate; where 
social expenditure falls and military expenditure rises.113 
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The role of the state as facilitator and regulator of the people‟s aspirations needs 
to be re-defined on pro-active basis. Musharraf crafted this role under a one man 
dominated system and was unable to rein in the popular dissent against his lop-sided 
policies. The obvious failure of the Musharraf regime‟s counter-terrorism policy was 
visible in the   swelling of ranks of the “would-be suicide bombers.” One such attack 
claimed the life of one of the most celebrated pro-democratic leader and twice Prime 
Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.114 The tragic state of affairs is 
aptly reflected in the following lines: 
There is a virtually endless supply of extremist recruits. 
Any military fighting an insurgency must shut off the 
avenues by which new recruits join enemy ranks. In the 
tribal belt, poor socioeconomic conditions, youth 
unemployment, a pervasive gun culture, and most 
importantly the remarkable success of the mullahs in 
hijacking the popular discourse bolster extremist outfits.115 
 
By the time Musharraf resigned from the office of President of Pakistan on 18 
August 2008, he was extremely isolated (politically) and unpopular among the masses. 
The need for a coherent counter-terrorism policy embracing holistic vision of security as 
this study proposes was felt more acutely than ever before.  
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The conclusion summarizes the main findings of the thesis, offers reflections on the 
subject matter bringing out the possible gaps and suggestions for future research. The 
study offers a deconstructive reading of the government policy-making, highlighting 
the contextual imperatives and the complex linkages between the internal and external 
dimensions of security vis-à-vis the scourge of terrorism. In doing so, an integrated 
theoretical framework based on the works of Barry Buzan1, Mahbub ul Haq 2 and M 
Ayoob 3 is conceived and applied to critique the strategic mindset and discuss the 
missing links within General Musharraf‟s response to terrorism. The conceptual 
framework helps identify the fuzziness and absence of watertight boundaries in 
analyzing the strategic decisions taken on external front with implications for the 
internal front, thereby complicating the threat matrix of the country.  
 The central research contribution of this thesis is the very conception of 
security in the holistic terms, situating „state‟ as key player in line with the „people‟ as 
legitimate „referent‟ of national security. This runs in contrast with the numerous 
narratives both of western as well as non-western origin focusing on Pakistan 
                                                        
1 Barry Buzan, People States & Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, UK: 
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whereby comprehensive security framework is seldom employed and event-based 
analysis remains the preferred medium.  
 The primary question that this study has raised and attempted to address is 
how did Pakistan under Musharraf regime respond to the threat of terrorism in the 
aftermath of post-9/11, why did it respond the way it did, and whether such response 
was a continuation of Pakistan‟s  traditional national security policy or a deviation 
from it. The secondary research questions, essential to unravel the primary question, 
included (i) why did Pakistan evolve as a national security state with religion playing 
a predominant part in the policy, (ii) what are the primary aims of Pakistan‟s national 
security doctrine and has the threat of terrorism over the last decade changed them, 
(iii) why did Pakistan become an ally in the US war on terror, and whether Pakistan‟s 
external security policy is a continuation of Pakistan‟s traditional national security 
doctrine and interests, (iv) what security, political, social, economic and cultural 
reforms were introduced by the Musharaf regime that constituted his internal security 
policy and reform agenda, and (v) Were the linkages between external security, 
internal security and the socio-political and economic realities of Pakistan recognized 
by the Musharraf regime in crafting his response to terrorism? 
 The approach has been to (i) delineate from a historical perspective Pakistan‟s 
national security sensibilities, policies and strategies rooted in realities surrounding 
Pakistan‟s creation and track how religion and national security informed the 
evolution of Pakistan into an ideologically motivated national security state, (ii) 
describe Pakistan response to terrorism in face of the changed geo-strategic 
environment in the region after 9/11 and US decision to attack and fight Al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban in Afghanistan, (iii) identify the contours of the Musharaf regime‟s 
anti-terrorism policy and strategy that informed Pakistan foreign and defense policies 
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on the one hand and the internal security and socio-political reform policies on the 
other, and (iv) analyze how there has always remained a gulf between the state‟s 
concept of national security and related strategic objectives on the one hand and 
physical security of Pakistani citizens on the other, and how the Musharaf regime 
opted to pursue the former at the expense of the latter in an environment where it 
wished to appease its external benefactor while remaining focused on entrenching 
itself in power within Pakistan.  
 Pakistan is believed to be one of the two ideological nation-states in 
contemporary history (the other being Israel). The country was founded in the name 
of religion and there has raged a heated debate since its creation whether it was meant 
to be an Islamic state or a merely a state created for the Muslims of the Indian 
subcontinent. The proponents of the former view point out that Pakistan was created 
on the basis of the two-nation theory (i.e. the Hindus and Muslims of the Indian sub-
continent are two separate nations), and Islam lies at the foundation of the two-nation 
theory as well as the demand for Pakistan. The advocates of the latter view quote 
Mohammad Ali‟s Jinnah‟s speech delivered to the Constituent Assembly on the eve 
of Pakistan‟s creation where he said that, “you are free; you are free to go to your 
temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this 
state of Pakistan…You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing 
to do with the business of the state.”4 
 While the debate on whether Pakistan was meant to be an Islamic State or a 
Muslim State continues, the Constitution declares Pakistan to be an Islamic Republic 
and Islam as the state religion. Given that Pakistan was created out of India with a 
                                                        
4 Mr. Jinnah‟s presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947. 
(Dawn. August 14, 1999). 
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view to ensure that the Muslims of India are not relegated to the status of a permanent 
minority in an independent India, and that the principal external security threat 
Pakistan has faced since its creation has been a Hindu-dominated India, religion has 
not only informed the state‟s identity but also its conception of national security. The 
second important historical reality that defined Pakistan‟s national security concept 
was the sense of insecurity the country was born with. When Pakistan won its 
independence it was widely believed that India wished to undo its sovereign 
existence, which made survival a challenge.5 
 The issue of accession of princely states, lingering territorial disputes and use 
of force in resolving them shaped Pakistan‟s threat perception, and underscored the 
need for strong armed forces to compete with India and find a favorable solution to 
the Kashmir dispute. The first Kashmir war between India and Pakistan in 1948 
entrenched the view that India was Pakistan‟s archenemy and as the smaller country 
Pakistan needed to bolster its defense and security capabilities to protect itself against 
India. Pakistan also believed that the Radcliffe Award was unfair and the resulting 
inequitable division of assets, especially military hardware, between India and 
Pakistan was aimed at weakening Pakistan‟s defenses against external aggression. 
Consequently, a financially vulnerable Pakistan not only allocated a disproportionate 
part of its resources to develop its defense and security, but also came to depend on 
international alliances such as SEATO and CENTO and foreign military aid to 
compete with a larger, stronger and more resource-rich India. 
 This historical perspective highlights how religion, a perceived threat from 
India, the need to focus on defense capability at the expense of other aspect of 
national development, and reliance on financial and military assistance from 
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international allies, came to define the national security sensibilities of the state soon 
after Pakistan‟s creation. In response, starting with the first limited Kashmir war in 
1948 and two full-scale war between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 – the latter 
resulting into the disintegration of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh – Pakistan 
national security policy was defined by two primary components during the first few 
decades of its existence: threat of aggression from India; and facilitating the liberation 
of Indian-held Kashmir. With the emergence of India‟s nuclear weapon program in 
the 1970‟s, Pakistan‟s developed its own nuclear weapon program aimed at creating 
credible deterrence against India and retain a strategic parity of sorts. Since the 
genesis of the nuclear weapons program, developing, sustaining and protecting this 
program has constituted an essential component of Pakistan‟s national security 
doctrine. 
 Then came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the first Afghan war, 
during which Pakistan emerged as the frontline state against Soviet-controlled 
Afghanistan, with US backing, material and financial support. Pakistan‟s national 
security interest at the time was to avoid being caught in the „nutcracker‟: a hostile 
India on the eastern border and a hostile Afghanistan on the western border. Once the 
Soviets had invaded Afghanistan and a civil war had erupted there, Pakistan had a 
security interest in ensuring that the Soviets were ousted and the successor 
government was pro-Pakistan and not pro-India. Other than the alarming specter of 
protecting both the eastern and western borders against simultaneous threat of 
aggression, having a friendly government in Kabul was important for other reasons as 
well: Pakistan and Afghanistan share a long porous border which is difficult to man; 
the Durand line dividing the two countries since British times has never been formally 
accepted by Afghanistan as the international border; there are tribes that are spread 
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across the border territories belonging to Afghanistan and Pakistan and neither 
recognize the state boundary lines nor are subject to immigration controls of either 
country. 
 Thus since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, installation and 
retention of a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan came to constitute another 
vital component of Pakistan‟s national security doctrine, together with an India-
centric defense policy, facilitating Kashmir‟s independence and continuing to develop 
and protect Pakistan‟s nuclear weapons program. As the basis of liberating Muslim-
majority Kashmir from a Hindu-dominated India, religion continued to justify this 
pivotal national security objective and also provide inspiration for realization the 
same. Likewise, the indigenous struggle of Afghans against the Soviet invasion and 
Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan also came to be seen and known as the 
Afghan jihad. And both the US and Pakistan joined hands to attract ideologically 
inspired Muslim fighters from around the world, and then finance, train, equip and 
organize them to wage jihad in Afghanistan. This further entrenched the use of 
religion-inspired non-state actors within the national security thinking and strategy of 
the Pakistani state. 
 Pakistan‟s decision to support and patronize the Taliban once they emerged as 
the predominant political and military group after a prolonged civil war in 
Afghanistan was the natural outcome of a national security policy focused on backing 
a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul and limiting India‟s role within its western 
neighbor. The US interest in Afghanistan dissipated after the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan, and so did its material and financial support for Pakistan-
backed jihadi groups in Afghanistan. While Pakistan‟s national security interests 
linked to Afghanistan remained unchanged even after the ouster of the Soviets from 
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Afghanistan, the international support and financing for the pursuit of such interests 
vanished. While this transferred the financial burden of trying to engineer power play 
within Afghanistan from the US to Pakistan, the Pakistani state‟s view of having a 
pro-Pakistan government in Kabul and its approach to the non-state actors or jihadi 
groups as national security assets remained unfazed. 
 It is in this historical context that this study aims to describe and analyze 
General Musharraf‟s response to terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. In siding with the 
US once it decided to attack Al-Qaeda and Taliban within Afghanistan, the Pakistani 
state understood that terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors was the new form of 
antagonism that would inform and influence power play within the international 
nation-state system. In continuing to support and patronize the Taliban government in 
Kabul that had refused to submit to US demands of handing over Osama bin Laden 
and other Al-Qaeda members operating out of Afghanistan, Pakistan would 
immediately attract a direct threat of aggression from the US and the expanding war 
theatre could have extended into Pakistani territories. In the event that Pakistan had 
stood on the wrong side of the US war on terror, especially as it was unfolding in 
Afghanistan, the possibility of the US undertaking preemptive operations to neutralize 
Pakistan‟s nuclear weapon program and assets would have become real. 
 Further, even if the doomsday scenarios about being directly attacked by the 
US were a little far fetched, the refusal of Pakistan to join the US war on terror as an 
ally would require the US to rely more heavily on other regional partners, especially 
India that already had a close relationship with the Northern Alliance – the US 
Afghan partner in ousting the Taliban. A partnership between the US, India and the 
anti-Taliban Afghan groups lead by the Northern Alliance controlling Afghanistan 
and developing its institutional, governance and power structures would not only 
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create an immediate security threat on Pakistan‟s western border, but also 
compromise its medium to long-term national security interest of ensuring a pro-
Pakistan government within Afghanistan. Pakistan was therefore loath to provide 
India such window of strategic opportunity that would erase Pakistan‟s leverage and 
influence due its extensive engagement with Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion.  
 Thus, potentially all of Pakistan‟s traditional national security interests – 
strengthening itself against India; facilitating Kashmir‟s independence; developing 
and protecting its nuclear weapons program; and ensuring a pro-Pakistan government 
in Afghanistan – could potentially be compromised had it elected not to side with the 
US and withdraw its recognition of and support for the Taliban government in Kabul. 
Pakistan‟s support for the Taliban was not an end in itself, but a means to protect its 
traditional national security interests linked to having a pro-Pakistan government in 
Afghanistan that secured its western border against external aggression and 
strengthened its position as a regional power broker. Given the changed geo-strategic 
realities, open support for such government in its fight against a US-led international 
military and diplomatic alliance would have jeopardized Pakistan‟s defined national 
security interests as opposed to furthering them.  
 In view of the aforesaid it is a finding of this study that Pakistan‟s U-turn on 
Afghanistan in 2001 was neither a deviation nor a break from the past, but a 
continuation of the same national security policy goals that had previously dictated 
Pakistan‟s policy toward Afghanistan, including its support for the Taliban. As a 
nation-state primarily interested in its national security and survival and bolstering its 
military capabilities against its arch-rival on the east, becoming an ally in the US war 
on terror provided Pakistan with an opportunity to remain a major player within 
Afghanistan, while also providing it with an opportunity to overhaul its military 
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capabilities due to the revived access to US military and financial assistance that had 
been turned off after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Protecting itself against 
immediate external military threats, acquisition of military and financial resources and 
remaining relevant in regional power play realistically explain the external security 
policies and choices vis-à-vis the US and Afghanistan that General Musharaf made 
after 9/11. 
 General Musharraf‟s approach to terrorism was a combination of realism, 
opportunism and confusion: the external security policy, strategy and tactics 
employed by the Musharaf regime in the post-9/11 milieu was a product of realism; 
and the internal security policy as well as political and socio-cultural reforms 
introduced within Pakistan in response to terrorism were an outcome of opportunism 
and confusion. Even after joining the US war on terror in Afghanistan, Pakistan 
continued to press the US-led coalition to ensure that the US-backed government was 
not dominated by the Northern Alliance, was reflective of the demographic realities of 
Afghanistan and representative of the power structures within the Afghan society with 
Pushtuns recognized as the predominant players. Once the US refuses to adhere to 
Pakistan‟s advice and did not induct powerful Pushtun groups within the US-backed 
Afghan government, the Musharaf regime elected to protect Pakistan‟s national 
security interests by relying on double-speak: Pakistan would to remain a formal ally 
of the US in its fight against Al-Qaeda, but would not treat the Afghan Taliban as an 
enemy of Pakistani state. 
 As the US war on terror in Afghanistan continued, there emerged at least there 
distinguishable militant groups: Al-Qaeda, largely comprising non-Afghan and non-
Pakistani militants, that had declared war on Afghanistan and General Musharraf‟s 
government; the Afghan Taliban, who were fighting against coalition forces in 
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Afghanistan that they viewed as occupation forces, and were likely to regain influence 
within Afghanistan, and especially the provinces bordering Pakistan, as soon as US-
led ISAF forces withdrew; and Pakistan‟s home-grown Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP) that had declared war on Pakistani state and its armed forces and law 
enforcement agencies. Pakistan continued to pursue and fight Al-Qaeda, as the 
Pakistani state shared the US view of it being a terrorist organization and a foe that 
needed to be defeated. But when it came to the Taliban, Pakistan drew a distinction 
between the Afghan Taliban (who were fighting against the US forces in Afghanistan 
but not the Pakistani state) and the TTP that was challenging the writ of Pakistani 
state and had declared a war against it.  
 Pakistan‟s national security policymakers were not convinced that the US 
would succeed in routing the Taliban or remodeling the power relations between 
ethnic communities within Afghanistan. There was a sense that the Taliban and the 
Pushtoon militant groups that fell within their influence would remain relevant to the 
future of Afghanistan. Consequently, not only would Pakistan be forced to deal with 
them once the US-led coalition forces withdrew from Afghanistan, but being 
Pushtoon and distant from Indian influence, the Taliban still remained the best means 
of protecting Pakistan‟s traditional national security interests linked to the future of 
Afghanistan. Given General Musharraf‟s inability to influence the US policy toward 
the preferred composition of the Afghan government, together with the estimate of 
Pakistan‟s national security policymakers that (i) US was unlikely to outmaneuver the 
Taliban and extinguish their influence within Afghanistan, (ii) targeting Taliban 
sanctuaries within Pakistani territory would create a fresh external security threat for 
Pakistan if the Taliban regained control of Kabul or even the provinces bordering 
Pakistan, (iii) Taliban and linked Pushtoon militant groups remained Pakistan‟s best 
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bet of discharging the role of a pro-Pakistan government on Kabul, Pakistan opted for 
what came to be seen as its double-dealing with the US.  
 While it remained a US ally in its war on terror, it distinguished between 
„good‟ and „bad‟ Taliban: Afghan Taliban and others not fighting the Pakistan state 
being the former, and TTP and others having declared a war on Pakistan‟s military 
and law enforcement agencies being the latter. Although such duplicitous external 
security policy pursued by the Musharaf regime has been severely criticized for being 
deceitful and unethical, it is understandable as the realistic response of a smaller and 
weaker nation-state unable to either defy or influence the policies of the world‟s sole 
superpower, while trying to simultaneously protect its immediate term and medium-
to-long term national security interests.  
 It was in the Musharaf regime‟s failure to appreciate the integral link between 
Pakistan‟s external security, internal security and defense and foreign policies toward 
Afghanistan and India that highlighted the confusion of his approach toward 
terrorism. And it was (i) General Musharraf‟s refusal to enforce with conviction and 
seriousness of purpose the broad-based socio-cultural reform plan announced with 
much fanfare, and (ii) his eagerness to enter into political alliance with religious 
parties that defeated his much trumpeted reform agenda, that exposed his willingness 
of play politics with terrorism at home and abroad and plagued his anti-terrorism 
program with opportunism and personal ambition. As a consequence Pakistan‟s 
response to terrorism was kneejerk instead of being comprehensive and holistic.  
 While the Musharaf regime undertook firefighting operations within Pakistan 
to fight militant groups within Pakistan when they flexed their muscle against the 
Pakistani state, there was no significant change in the policies, priorities and 
institutional structures of the Pakistani state aimed at confronting the scourge of 
303 
 
terrorism. General Musharaf did not carry through the policy initiatives meant to 
address the roots of terror for personal and political reasons. The view of non-state 
actors as strategic assets was not discarded. And thus without the required change in 
state policies that continued to allow intolerance and militancy to be nurtured within 
Pakistan and without revamping the state‟s national security mindset and strategic 
thinking that continued to consider more effective ways to control militant groups 
instead of eradicating them, all that the Musharaf Government was left with was 
short-term military approach to quell violence wherever it got out of control. The Lal 
Masjid episode in 2007 and the Swat Operation against militants in 2009 were 
evidence of this conundrum. 
 The Lal Masjid exposed the lack of General Musharraf‟s focus on the brewing 
militancy and terror outfits within Pakistan. With militants holed-up and carrying our 
vigilante actions in the heart of Pakistan‟s capital, General Musharaf continued to 
soft-peddle the issue and project himself internationally as the last obstacle preventing 
the Talibanization of Pakistan. In delaying the required security operation against the 
Lal Masjid mullahs and using the episode to gain political mileage, he allowed the 
situation to get out of hand and finally the operation was carried in a manner that 
claimed the lives of at least five soldiers and almost 100 other individuals holed up 
within the mosque, polarizing the country further and provoking sympathy and 
support for the Lal Masjid warriors. The manner in which the Lal Masjid crisis was 
handled reflected General Musharraf‟s lack of understanding of the deep and 
uncontrollable ideological conviction of the Lal Masjid mullahs and other militant 




 Similarly, the Musharaf regime allowed Mullah Fazlullah to build his militia 
in Swat and run a parallel government, tax collection and court system that 
undermined the writ of the state. It was only after the Taliban brutality in Swat 
extended beyond ordinary people and extended to personnel of the law enforcement 
agencies, and the political government that succeeded the Musharaf regime had tried 
all measures including failed peace treaties with Fazlullah and his father-in-law Sufi 
Mohammad, that Operation Rah-e-Rast was carried out by the military to reassert 
state control in Swat and oust Fazlullah and his faction of TTP. The examples of Lal 
Masjid and Swat and the need for the state to carry out violent and extensive military 
operations to assert control over areas taken over by the militant groups years after 
General Musharaf enlisted Pakistan as a US ally in its war on terror, establishes that 
Pakistan‟s response to the internal security challenge posed by terrorism that came to 
be seen as an existential threat for the state remained ill-considered, inadequate and 
negligently confused. 
 This study concludes that while Musharaf government‟s policy response to 
tackling the roots of terrorism within Pakistan seems comprehensive at first glance, 
General Musharaf lacked the will to implement the reforms announced and in fact 
used these reforms and compromises made in relation to them to forge political 
alliance at home and entrench himself in power. Three aspects of his policy response 
amongst many described in Part III of this stuffy confirm such thesis: the Madrassa 
reform program; police reforms; and reform of the anti-terrorism legal framework. 
General Musharaf introduced the Pakistan Madrassa Education Board Ordinance 
2001 as part of his education sector reforms. As Pakistan has a young population that 
if left uneducated or inculcated with radical intolerant views and ideologies become 
attractive recruitment targets for militant groups. While the object of the Madrassa 
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reform program was to subject the curriculum of religious madrassas to government 
oversight and ensure that madrassas did not become recruitment posts for militants, a 
majority of the madrassas refused to abide by the reform policy and General Musharaf 
decided to look the other way to keep MMA – the alliance of religious parties – in 
good humor. 
 Police reforms initiated by the introduction of the Police Order 2002 were 
confronted with similar fate. The long-felt need to transform the police force into an 
efficient and citizen-friendly law enforcement agency acquired a sense of urgency 
with the growing internal security threat confronting Pakistan. Police Order 2002 then 
sought to de-politicize the police by guaranteeing the security of tenure of police 
officers, separating the watch and ward function of police from investigation, and 
introducing checks and balances to prevent abuse of police power by subjecting them 
to the scrutiny of citizen-led boards. But then politics got in the way and under 
pressure from his political allies who wished to continue to use and abuse the law 
enforcement agencies as an instrument of politics, 73 out of the 187 articles of the 
Police Order 2002 were amended through amendments introduced into the Police 
Order in 2004, wiping out the most progressive aspects of the police reform and thus 
reverting to the status quo. 
 In 2002 amendments were also introduced to Pakistan Anti-Terrorism Act to 
bolster the legal framework to prosecute terrorists. While this law was used to 
persecute the political opponents of General Musharaf such as former Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif, it was never employed and enforced effectively to confront the threat 
of terrorism. Part III of this study traces the historical evolution of the anti-terrorism 
regime in Pakistan and how it remained driven by a desire to promote domestic 
political ends of the ruling regimes and produce instant judicial verdicts as opposed to 
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overhauling all components of the criminal justice system and clamping down on the 
militant groups that continue to subject the ordinary citizens of Pakistan to terror. 
General Musharaf continued in the stead and played politics with terrorism: while Al-
Qaeda operatives were captured and handed over to the US, Pakistan‟s homebred 
militants were apprehended initially under international pressure but released later for 
want of evidence against them. 
 General Musharraf‟s lack of a comprehensive response to terrorism at the 
home front was also reflected by (i) his inability to introduce institutional structures 
that would enable civil and military law enforcement and intelligence agencies to 
work in tandem to address the threat posed by terrorism, and (ii) his refusal to 
reevaluate the national security mindset focused on state security as opposed to 
protection of citizens and revamp state policies to reduce the chasm between state 
security and citizen security. While the Musharaf government felt no need to 
introduce an institution that could coordinate the anti-terror operations being carried 
out by the police and IB on the one hand and the army, ISI and MI on the other, it was 
during the tenure of the successor government that efforts started to be made to 
establish National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) as a high-powered body to 
devise counterterrorism strategies and coordinate operations in Pakistan. 
 It is also a finding of this study that the traditional concept of state security in 
Pakistan has not translated into enhanced security for citizens, and the state has 
continued to pursue policies that seem to be defending the traditional notion of state 
security at the expense of citizen security. The decision of the Pakistani state to alter 
its Afghanistan policy and join the US war on terror as an ally while retaining an 
equivocal approach toward militant outfits  it categorizes and targets foreign and 
home-bred militants within Pakistan not on the basis of their ideology, legitimacy or 
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tactics, but on the basis of whether or not they are hostile toward the Pakistani state 
and whether they can serve as assets in promoting Pakistan‟s traditional national 
security interests  is understandable and justifiable within the domain of realism.  
 But the external security plank of the national security policy has also exposed 
the gap how the traditionally defined security interests of the state undermines 
internal security and is not necessarily in consonance with the interests of citizens. 
While Pakistan under General Musharraf‟s rule lost almost 30,000 soldiers and 
citizens to terrorism, the national security mindset did not undergo a change so as to 
start treating such loss as unacceptable. Likewise, the non-allocation of resources for 
education, health and social welfare of citizens under General Musharraf‟s rule and 
his refusal to implement reforms necessary to resuscitate a functional and effective 
system of governance established that there was no serious effort made to treat the 
causes of terrorism within Pakistan. It is a finding of this study that unless the very 
notion of security is revisited and the national security mindset is altered to embrace 
national security goals in such manner that maximize the security of individual 
citizens and devise state priorities and policies accordingly, Pakistan might succeed in 
securing its traditional national security interests while making its citizens more 
vulnerable to violence and terror emanating from within. 
 Following the empirical lens based on interviews with over a hundred and 
twenty stakeholders stretched across the strategic community in Pakistan this study 
concludes that Pakistan has moved away from the path of moderation, peace and 
tranquility as espoused by the founder of the country, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The 
critical challenge is to reclaim Jinnah‟s vision of Pakistan based on „peace within and 
beyond‟. This implies security and insecurity of state and its people comes both from 
within and outside. The state role goes beyond ensuring the territorial sovereignty of 
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its frontiers and human element that composes the state deserves equal attention. 
„Human capital‟ ought to form the basis of strategic foresight and planning 
accompanied by actions on sustainable footings. Unless, national security perception 
strikes a fine balance between pursuing „hard‟ (that is, traditional military and 
defense) and „soft‟ (that is, political stability, economic and social well being of 
citizens) elements of national power, sustainable peace within and beyond will remain 
elusive.  
 This study undertakes an analytical exploration of the contextual elements 
particularly geopolitical scenario as well as domestic realm that slide Pakistan into the 
complex web of religious extremism, sectarianism, and terrorism. In doing so, the 
indigenous variables promoting militancy within the country, the role of successive 
governments in using „human element‟ as tool of security policy vis-à-vis its 
neighboring states, and the negative implications of adopting „hard core‟ tunnel 
approach to national security is exposed. Further, the state manipulated the role of 
religion to achieve national integration, suppress dissent and dissident movements and 
used as regime survival formula.  In doing so, the national identity discourse became 
„Islamic‟ leaving a room for penalizing minority citizens primarily on the basis of 
religion. This in turn solidified the basis of religious, sectarian, ethnic political or 
grievance based groupings to be in race for political clout in the country. Thus, 
securing and perpetuating personal power of particular ruler (civilian or military) 
became the accepted mode of politics and policymaking. As a result, institutions 
became weak and liable to exploitation by the personally motivated or interest-based 
regimes. Though all military rulers who captured power unconstitutionally professed 
to „protect national honor and dignity‟ and portrayed military as a „savior‟, they ended 
up promoting factionalism and religious polarization in the country. Thus disconnect 
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between the „people‟ and „state‟ widened further fracturing the political and strategic 
fabric of the Pakistan.  
 Following the historical analysis of successive governments privatizing 
security and using „human capital‟ as strategic tool vis-à-vis external security 
challenges resulted in following a shortsighted national security framework. Parallel 
to this, costs of unresolved Kashmir dispute and involvement in Afghan Jihad paired 
with failure to have an accountable and representative form of governance produced a 
force-based narrow national security conception. As a result sources of insecurity 
within state remain unchecked adding to the grievances-based national character. This 
study has examined the history of militancy in Pakistan to explain how the process of 
how security policymaking fell within the exclusive domain of military institutions. 
This trend continues to date and was most obvious during General Musharraf‟s rule. 
The military-driven national security policy continually focused on adding hardware 
to bolster the traditional conception of security and refused to treat the mushrooming 
of militant infrastructure both in the physical and ideological sense within the country 
as a national security threat. This „denial mood‟ permeated the strategic mindset and 
unwittingly transformed Pakistan into a transmission belt of men and material from 
across the world to staff Jihad-outlets in Pakistan‟s neighborhood.  
 The key inference is that security ought to be approached as a 
multidimensional concept with equal focus on the citizen and the state. Thus apart 
from aiming to protect territorial integrity and sovereignty the state must ensure 
economic and educational uplift plus social and political stability within its frontiers. 
The analysis underscores an urgent need to reinvent the role of state as the regulator 
and facilitator of security not only in the traditional sphere but also in the non-
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traditional realm. As military action forms only one component of the counter-
terrorism initiatives, it must be augmented with the political, social, developmental 
and economic measures. In case of Pakistan, the need to adopt an integrated security 
paradigm with equal focus on the „hard‟ (that is military) and „soft‟ (that is, economic, 
political stability, social and cultural development) elements of national power cannot 
be overemphasized. Unless, the basis of social contract between the state and the 
citizens is upheld with an emphasis on the centrality of the interest of citizens, 
counterterrorism initiatives will neither address the root causes of violence and 
terrorism nor be sustainable. 
 Pakistan‟s national security policy and mindset, which informed the country‟s 
response to 9/11 and the US war on terror, is a product of its ideological origin, 
geography and historical experiences. Given its peculiarities Pakistan is a unique 
nation-state, and its responses to 9/11 and the external and internal security threats 
emanating from terrorism are of limited relevance to other states. Territorially, 
Pakistan shares borders with India, Afghanistan and Iran and its ethnic communities 
Punjabis, Kashmiris, Pathans and Baloch spill across territorial boundaries, which 
entwines its security and foreign policy with those of these neighboring countries as 
any security threats leading to redrawing of boundaries would have unpalatable 
consequences for these neighboring states. Historically, Pakistan is an ideological 
state created to accommodate and secure the religious identity of Muslims of the 
subcontinent. And Pakistan enjoys close affinity with not only the Arabic speaking 
Muslim states, but also Turkey and other Asian countries. On the one hand, it has the 
potential to function as a bridge between Islam and the West at a time of religious 
polarization around the world, and on the other the same polarization and a growing 
sense of being victimized due to lingering conflicts such as Palestine and Kashmir and 
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the US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan infuses renewed zeal within 
religion-inspired militants within Pakistan contributing to its national security 
challenges. 
 Pakistan‟s national security consciousness is driven by the incidence of its 
birth, when it was carved out of India, together with the continuing state of 
belligerence with India that resulted into multiple wars, inspired Pakistan to develop a 
nuclear weapons program to develop minimum deterrence capability and strategic 
parity with India. This makes India the driver of Pakistan‟s national security thinking 
and growing Indian influence in Afghanistan is seen as upsetting the delicate of 
balance of power in the region that Pakistan considers vital to protect its sovereignty 
and linked national security interests. Add to this the fact that Pakistan has actively 
reached out to the US, initially through its membership of CEATO and SENTO and 
later by becoming the front-line state against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, 
essentially to enable Pakistan to develop and expand its military capability to ward off 
the Indian threat.  
 During its involvement in the Afghan jihad against Soviet Union, Pakistan, 
backed by the US, not only nurtured, trained and sheltered jihadi groups then freedom 
fighters and now violent non-state militants  comprising Afghans, but raised jihadis 
from within Pakistan and also facilitated Muslim fighters from the world over to join 
the Afghan jihad. While the Soviet Union crumbled and the US interest in 
Afghanistan dissipated, the civil war in Afghanistan did not end, the jihadis 
deliberately nurtured as part of the policy to defeat the Soviet Union continued to 
operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan‟s border areas and consequently Pakistan 
remained deeply embroiled in Afghanistan. The fact that the top Al-Qaeda leadership 
had been extended refuge by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan placed Pakistan in a 
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perilous position after 9/11, given that it was a neighbor of the country the US-led 
forces was going to attack, it was one of the few states to have recognized the Taliban 
government, and it continued to treat religion-inspired non-state militants as national 
security assets and any reversion of the country‟s foreign and security policy vis-à-vis 
Afghanistan would generate an internal security challenge for Pakistan.  
 Thus, caught between the immediate external security threat posed by the US 
if Pakistan refused to ally itself against the Al-Qaeda/Taliban duo in Afghanistan and 
the internal security challenge that would emanate from such alliance given Pakistan 
porous border with Afghanistan and presence of Islamic militants within its own 
territory, Pakistani state walked a tight rope to deflect the immediate security threats 
while crafting an equivocal policy vis-à-vis the Taliban and the future of Afghanistan 
that would create room to protect Pakistan‟s traditional national security interests. 
Given these unique ideological, historical and geographical realities of Pakistan, its 
response to 9/11 is neither comparable to any other state nor is the Pakistani 
experience relevant for other distant states in determining their own policies to 
address the evolving threat of terrorism being posed by violent non-state actors to the 
Westphalian concept of sovereignty and inter-state relations. While Pakistan‟s 
historical experience can be relevant for others to understand the nature of this 
evolving threat and how it can exacerbate the external and internal security challenges 
for a state caught in the eye of the storm, the choices that Pakistan has made might be 
of limited utility for other states in auditing their own policy choices. 
 As the research problem this study sets out to address is how General 
Musharraf‟s government responded to 9/11 and the US war on terror and whether or 
not that was a continuation of Pakistan traditional national security policy, the 
response to the question posed ought to be descriptive and not prescriptive. This study 
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doesn‟t seek to undertake a comparative policy analysis of how various nation-states 
responded to 9/11 or how they should have. As a single nation-state remains the unit 
of analysis, the responses of Pakistan have been described and analyzed within the 
realm of realism without challenging the view that Westphalian concept of nation-
state continues to define and characterize global politics, inter-state relations and the 
power driven interests of individual states. And as only Pakistan and a comparison of 
its contemporary policy with its traditional policy is the object of research, and neither 
determining the promise of constructivism and its added focus on discursive power as 
opposed to the traditional focus on military and economic power in explaining 
international relations better nor questioning whether the traditional notion of nation-
state embraced by the theories of realism remains a viable concept to understand and 
analyze inter-state relations amid the evolving security threats being posed by non-
state actors.  
 It is out of the need to understand the response of the Pakistani state to the 
new external and internal threats of terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 to its perceived 
national security interest and compare it with the manner in which such national 
security interest had been defined and protected by Pakistan in the past, that the lens 
of realism has been used for descriptive purpose. And further an integrated framework 
comprising the theoretical models posited by Barry Buzan, Mahbub-ul Haq and 
Mohammed Ayoob has been proposed to critique Pakistan‟s national security 
paradigm and assert that the manner in which the Pakistani state perceives and defines 
its national security interest continues to expand the gulf between state security and 
citizen security in Pakistan. But in view of the content and findings of this thesis, the 
concept of failing state can be studied further to ascertain whether terrorism poses a 
challenge to traditional notions of sovereignty and whether the interests of responses 
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of states categorized as failing are inherently different from those assumed about 
states under the Westphalian notion of nation-state and sovereignty.  
 This study highlights how terrorism has posed multidimensional challenges to 
Pakistan: external security threats, internal security hazards, malfunction of 
governance system, breakdown of socio-cultural institutions of authority and 
radicalization of the society. But the evolving concept of terrorism doesn‟t fall within 
neat compartments. It can be a product of or be exacerbated by the policies of other 
states but a state‟s response to the threats of terrorism linked to other states cannot be 
fashioned under established disciplines within international relations and international 
law. Terrorism has serious internal security consequences for states and its citizens, 
yet given its transnational nature the traditional concept of crime within municipal 
law is inadequate to devise a response to such threat. Pakistan‟s experience shows that 
the threat of terrorism posed by non-state militants can neither be captured by concept 
of war as understood in inter-state relations not the concept of crime as understood 
within the domestic legal system of a state. Thus, further research can be done to 
determine if confronting transnational terrorism ought to emerge as an exception to 
the traditional concept of state sovereignty and what international norms and 
institutions need to be developed to ensure that this doesn‟t become an instrument in 
the hands of the predominant states to justify intervention into the affairs of other 
states and establish their hegemony. 
 This research and its findings also highlight the need for further focused study 
using Pakistan as the unit of analysis. The thesis deliberates in length on the critical 
value of the public support for a comprehensive, proactive and sustained counter-
terrorism response.  The essential role of media in building public consensus against 
terrorism remained untapped during the Musharraf era. What factors contributed to 
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the failure of using media as a proactive tool of counter-terrorism is a subject that 
needs further enquiry and research. Additionally, the exploration of the factors that 
have led to the vibrant militant media networks should form a parallel analytical 
pursuit. This study has argued that Pakistan‟s failure to invest in its human resource 
has contributed to the lop-sided growth of the state and society. The elitist and state-
centric view of security oblivious to public needs has expanded the gap between the 
state and society. While General Musharraf kept reminding the US and the west to 
understand the roots of terror as well as Muslim rage, his counter-terrorism approach 
failed to win the hearts and minds of the people at home. This descriptive thesis 
creates room for a prescriptive study aimed to drawing the contours of a national 
security policy that is driven by the object of securing the life, liberty and dignity of 
individual citizens and if Pakistan had evolved such national security outlook as 
opposed to the one it did, would it have induced a different response from Pakistan in 
the aftermath of 9/11. There is need to prescribe ways to ensure that the mindset of 
Pakistan‟s strategic policymakers becomes sensitive to the factors compounding 
Pakistan‟s security challenges ranging from political and economic instability, and 
social and cultural exclusion to religious polarization and growing intolerance.  
 The description in this thesis of the security conceptions shaping Pakistani 
state‟s policies keeps alluding to the need for security sector reforms and a more 
focused study can squarely address all aspects of SSR that need to be addressed and 
reformed. Such research can question whether Pakistan‟s civil-military imbalance has 
resulted in a certain view of national security and what institutional and structural 
changes ought to be introduced within Pakistan to induce a people-focused conception 











12 October 1999: Karachi Airport under Pakistan army control 
 
12 October 1999,lslamabad: Pakistan Army troops rush towards the Pakistani Television 
studios in Islamabad, Pakistan, The army, under the control of the armed forces 
commander Gen. Pervez Musharraf, ousted the administration of Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif. 
 
12 October, 1999-Gen Musharraf addresses the nation as chief executive of the country 
 
12, October, 1999, Pakistani army launched a coup, and took control of the country. The 
coup was led by General Pervez Musharraf, who soon after appointed himself as the 
Chief Executive of the country. This change in status was brought about by a 
proclamation of emergency in the country and issuance of a number of orders by the 
Chief Executive. 
 
12, May, 2000- Supreme Court validates coup ;On May 12, 2000, Pakistan's 12 member 
Supreme Court unanimously validated the October 1999 coup and granted Musharraf 
executive and legislative authority for 3 years from the coup date endorsing his 
governance. 
 
20,June 2000 - Gen Musharraf  compels President Rafiq Tarar to quit his office June ,20 
,2000 Musharraf declares himself President after the incumbent, Mohammad Rafiq Tarar, 
resigns 
 
December 2000 -Ex-Prime minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif in Attock Jail December 
2000 Sharif is freed from prison on hijacking and corruption charges, exiled to Saudi 
Arabia and banned from returning to Pakistan for 10 years. 
 
 
14th August 2001 -Local Govt system; The provincial governments promulgated the 
Local Government Ordinance, 2001 in their respective provinces to install a new 
integrated Local Government System with effect from 14th August 2001 to function 
within the provincial framework and adhere to the Federal and Provincial laws. Direct 
elections on non-party basis were held in five phases for members of Union Councils, 












11, September, 2001- Musharraf drops support for Taliban and allies Pakistan with 
Washington after 9/11 attacks. 
 
 
30, April, 2002- Musharraf wins controversial national referendum on his rule. And takes 
oath for next 5 years  
 
 
10, October, 2002- Pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League-Q wins general elections. 
 
December, 2003, Gen Musharraf Motorcade: December 2003 Musharraf escapes two 
assassination attempts, one by Islamist military officers and the other by al Qaeda. 
January 1, 2004- Musharraf wins parliamentary vote of confidence affirming his 
unelected rule until 2007. 
 
 
February2004- Musharraf pardons nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan for leaking 
nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya. 
 
 
30, December - Musharraf reneges on promise to quit as army chief. 
 
 
9, March, 2007 -Musharraf sacks chief justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry over 




10, July, 2007- Pakistani troops storm the Red Mosque in Islamabad, killing scores. 
and Jamia Hafsa. Many political non political parties believe, he did it only to please 
America just to have President Bush support for his falling popularity government. At 
least 105 people are killed. Militant attacks and suicide bombings follow. 
 
 
6, October, 2007- Parliament elects Musharraf to another five-year term as president in a 
vote boycotted by the opposition. This was before dissolution of parliament for the 
following general election to be held in 2008. The Pakistani legislature elected incumbent 




18, October, 2007 Benazir Bhutto returns from exile welcomed by unsuccessful 
assassination attempt. Bhutto returned to Pakistan on 18 October 2007, after reaching an 
understanding with President Pervez Musharraf by which she was granted amnesty and 
all corruption charges were withdrawn.  
  
3, November, 2007 Musharraf imposes state of emergency, sacks chief justice, and 
suspends constitution. 
 
22, November, 2007 - Commonwealth suspends Pakistan. 
 
25, November, 2007- Sharif returns from exile.  
 
 
28, November, 2007 Musharraf steps down as army chief and hands control of military 
to General Ashfaq Kayani. 
 
15, December 2007 - Musharraf lifts state of emergency, restores constitution. 
 
 
27, December 2007 Benazir last public appearance just before she was assailed. She was 
assassinated on 27 December 2007, after departing a PPP rally in the Pakistani city of 
Rawalpindi, two weeks before the scheduled Pakistani general election of 2008 where 
she was a leading opposition candidate. 
 




24, March, 2008: Parliament elects Bhutto aide Yousuf Raza Gilani as prime minister. 
 
 
7, August 2008: Coalition says Musharraf to face impeachment.  
 
18, August, 2008- Musharraf announced resignation on Aug 18th 2008 in address his last 
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Sabotage, burn, fire 
Improvised explosive devices 
Target killings 




Data compiled from public sources: ISPR (Inter Services Public Relations, Rawalpindi); 
Crises Management Cell (CMC) Ministry of Interior Islamabad; The News; Amir Rana 
and Rohan Gunaratna, Al-Qaeda Fights Back inside Pakistani Tribal Areas, Pak Institute 
of Peace Studies (PIPS) 2007; Moonis Ahmar Violence and Terrorism in South Asia: 
1971-2004, Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution, Department of IR, 






Map of Kashmir: Musharraf seven region formula 
 
 
Source: Dr Rifaat Hussain, Proposals for Resolving the Kashmir Dispute, PILDAT 
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7 Tehrik Nifaz-e-Fiqah Jafaria 
 
14-01-2002 
8 Tehrik Nifaz-i-Shariat Muhammadi 
 
14-01-2002 
9 Tehreek-e-Islami (ExTJP) 
 
14-01-2002 
10 Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (Ex SSP) 
 
15-11-2003 
11 Khuddam-ul –Islam (Ex JM) 
 
15-11-2003 






14 Jamiat-ul Ansar 
 
20-11-2003 






17 Khair-un-Naas International Trust 
 
27-10-2004 
18 Balochistan Liberation Army 
 
07-04-2006 
19 Islamic Students Movements of Pakistan 
 
21-08-2006 
20 Al Akhtar Trust 07-06-2009 
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23 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan 
 
25-08-2008 




Source: Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. 
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Sufi Mohammad Deobandi Sunni 
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Sharia, opposed to the 
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Afghanistan 
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school of thought; 
inspired by the Afghan 
Taliban  supreme 
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enforcement of 
Islamic sharia in 
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Sources: Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan 2010; The News International; 
Dawn International ; Imtiaz Gul, The Al- Qaeda Connection: Taliban and Terror in 
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Sources: Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan 2010; The News International; 
Dawn International ; Imtiaz Gul, The Al- Qaeda Connection: Taliban and Terror in 
Pakistan’s Tribal Areas, London: Penguin, 2009. 
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Source: Imtiaz Gul, The Al- Qaeda Connection: Taliban and Terror in Pakistan’s Tribal 
























Pakistan- Afghanistan Bilateral Visits: 2004-07 
 
Timeline Visits to Pakistan by 
Afghan President 
Visits to Afghanistan by Pakistani 




President Karzai visited 
Pakistan in August 2004, 
focus was to seek Pakistan’s 
help for holding of peaceful 
election in Afghanistan. 
 
President Musharraf visited 
Afghanistan on November 6, 2004 to 
congratulate President Karzai for being 
elected as President . 
 
2005 
Karzai visited twice that year, 
in March as a special guest to 
attend Pakistan Day Parade 
on 23rd March and on October 
24 shortly after the 
Earthquake to convey his 
condolences.  
Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz visited 
Afghanistan on July 24, 2005. 
 
2006 
A three day visit to Pakistan 
from 15-17 February, focus 
was to enhance security 
cooperation. 
Musharraf visited on September 6th  and 
Prime Minister visited Afghanistan on 
September 14, 2006. 
 
2007 
Two day visit from December 
26-27 to discuss bilateral 
issues. 
Two visits of Shaukat Aziz that year. 
On January 4, 2007 and August 2007 to 
attend Peace Jirga. Similarly, President 
Musharraf attended the final session of 
the Jirga on August 12, 2007. 
 











Pakistan- Afghanistan 1st Joint Peace Jirga: 9-12 August 2007 
 
Main Recommendations: 
1. The Joint Peace Jirga strongly recognizes the fact that terrorism is a common 
threat to both countries and the war on terror should continue to be an integral 
part of the national policies and security strategies of both countries. The 
participants of this jirga unanimously declare to an extended, tireless and 
persistent campaign against terrorism and further pledge that government and 
people of Afghanistan and Pakistan will not allow sanctuaries/training centers for 
terrorists in their respective countries. 
2. The Joint Peace Jirga resolved to constitute a smaller Jirga consisting of 25 
prominent members from each side that is mandated to strive to achieve the 
following objectives: 
a) Expedite the ongoing process of dialogue for peace and reconciliation with 
opposition.  
b) Holding of regular meetings in order to monitor and oversee the 
implementation of the decisions/recommendations of the Joint Peace Jirga. 
c) Plan and facilitate convening of the next Joint Peace Jirgas.  
d)  Both countries will appoint 25 members each in the committee. 
3. The Joint Peace Jirga once again emphasizes the vital importance of brotherly 
relations in pursuance of policies of mutual respect, non-interference and peaceful 
coexistence and recommends further expansion of economic, social, and cultural 
relations between the two countries. 
4.  Members of the Joint Peace Jirga in taking cognizance of the nexus between 
narcotics and terrorism condemn the cultivation, processing and trafficking of 
poppy and other illicit substances and call upon the two governments to wage an 
all out war against this menace. The Jirga takes note of the responsibilities of the 
international community in enabling Afghanistan to provide alternative livelihood 
to the farmers.  
5. The governments of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, with the support of the international community, should implement 
infrastructure, economic and social sector projects in the affected areas.  
6. The comprehensive and important recommendations made by the five working 
committees of the Joint Peace Jirga for implementation are annexed and form part 
and parcel of this joint declaration. 
 








Missing Persons from 3 March 2008 - 22 August 2009 
 
 
















































































































































































































































































































Terrorist Killed/Injured/Arrested in Pakistan 









2 2007 38 402 51 
3 2008 830 2033 516 
4 2009 6359 4009 938 
 Total 7348 6668 1574 
 



























































Government of Pakistan: Lists of Publications Banned and their 




Name of Party/Author/Press 
 
Name of Publications (Weekly, 












Al-Safee and Mehdi Kuwait 
 




A. Sámi Khan/ Agha Saifullah 
 














 Mr. Mannan 
 











Gohar Shahi Faction 
 
Hatif-e- Mehdi (Monthly) 
The Voice of Mehdi (Monthly) 
9 Mehdi Foundation Pakistan  Jihad Kay Nam Par Tauhenn-
e- Islam (Booklet/Pamphlet) 
 Riaz Gohar Shahi Imam 
Mehdi (Booklet/Pamphlet) 
 Mehdi Foundation Pakistan 
(Booklet/Pamphlet) 
 Mehdi Foundation 
International Pakistan The 
Goharian Philosophy of 
Divine Love and global 
Peace  (Booklet/Pamphlet 
10 
 
Mr. M Hanif Raza 
 














Mr. Mufti Muhammad Abdul Hafeez 
Qadri of Hyderabad 
 
Controversial Fatwa (Pamphlet) 
 
13 Lachmandas Keshwani Bhopal India Challenge (Weekly) 
14 Mr. Mirza Hairat Dehlvi Majeeda 
Kutab Khana Loc Outside Bohar 
Gate Multan 
 Kitab-e- Shahadat (MIP) 
(Book/Booklet 
 Paigham Umat-e- Musliman 




15 Mr. Tahir Jhangvi/ Dehlvi Majeeda 
Kutab Khana Loc Outside Bohar 
Gate Multan 
Naghmaat-e-Tahir Jhangvi (MIP) 
(Book/Booklet) 
Shiat Ahadees Nabvi Ki Roshni Main 
(MIP) (Book/Booklet) 
16  Mr. Abu Rehan  
Mr. Allama Zia-ur- Rehman Farooqi 
( Ashaat-ul-Muaraf Loc Fly road 
Faisalabad 
Sipah-e- Sahaba main har Muslim ki 





Mr. Mehmood Iqbal 
Ashaat-ul-Muaraf Loc Fly road 
Faisalabad 
 
Shiat ke Sath Ommat-r- Muslima ka 




Mr. Mehmood Iqbal 
Maqtaba khalafat-e- Rashida Vahari 
Road Hasilpur City Bhawalpur) 
 
 
 Shia Sunni Bhai Bhai 
(Book/Booklet) 
 Shiyun ka Quran par 
Jarehana hamla 
       (Book/Booklet) 
 shia ki Islam say Baghawat 
       (Book/Booklet) 
 Shiyun ka Khulefa-e- Salasa 
per Jarehana Hamla 
(Book/Booklet) 







Mr. Mehmood Iqbal 
Maqtaba khalafat-e- Rashida Vahari 
Road Hasilpur City Bhawalpur) 
 
Rishta Farooq-o- Ali (Book/Booklet) 
 
20 Mr. Maulana Abdul Shakoor 
Lakhanvi (Maqtaba khalafat-e- 
Rashida Vahari Road Hasilpur City 
Bhawalpur) 
 




21 Mr. Maulana Zia-ur- Rehman 
Farooqi  (Maqtaba khalafat-e- 
Rashida Vahari Road Hasilpur City 
Bhawalpur) 
 Khamini Islam Aur Islam 
(Book/Booklet) 
 Syedana Ameer Moavia 
(Book/Booklet) 
22 Mr. Maulana Habib-ur-Rehman 
Qasimi (Maqtaba khalafat-e- Rashida 
Vahari Road Hasilpur City 
Bhawalpur) 
Khaminiyyat Asr-e-Hazir  
 (Book/Booklet) 
23 Qari Atta-ur-Rehman (Maqtaba 
khalafat-e- Rashida Vahari Road 
Hasilpur City Bhawalpur) 
Shia ko chalees Kufarya Abbadat  
(Book/Booklet) 
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Appendix 12 - A 
 
Suicide Attacks in Pakistan 






























































































































































































Appendix 12 - B 
 
Suicide Attacks- 01 January 2009 - 13 September 2009 
 

























































































































































Details of Actions against Militant Organizations by the Government of 
Pakistan till 2010 
 
  Offence Total Cases registered 
  
 S.#. 































detained under ATA 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 Misuse of 
Loudspeaker 
46 7507 1196 118 223 9090 
3 Hate Literature 20 156 45 7 20 248 
4 Chanda Collection 0 114 4 3 2 123 
5 Khateebs Fanning 
sectarian Hatered 





0 12 4 0 0 16 
7 Display/Brandishing 
of Arms 
0 436 230 7394 807 8867 






  Offence Total Persons Arrested 
  
 S.#. 































detained under ATA 
4 109 40 49 33 235 
2 Misuse of 
Loudspeaker 
61 7105 349 103 93 7711 
3 Hate Literature 14 131 40 7 19 211 
4 Chanda Collection 0 130 6 4 1 141 
5  Khateebs Fanning 
sectarian Hatered 





0 13 4 0 0 17 
7 Display/Brandishing 
of Arms 
0 597 144 7370 802 8913 
















  Offence Total Persons Released 
  
 S.#. 































detained under ATA 
4 106 40 40 25 215 
2 Misuse of 
Loudspeaker 
60 7105 142 75 92 7474 
3 Hate Literature 13 123 1 6 0 143 
4 Chanda Collection 0 128 0 2 0 130 
5  Khateebs Fanning 
sectarian Hatered 





0 12 0 0 0 12 
7 Display/Brandishing 
of Arms 
0 549 0 7128 3 7680 









  Offence Total Persons still in Custody/Arrested 
  
 S.#. 































detained under ATA 
0 3 0 9 8 20 
2 Misuse of 
Loudspeaker 
1 0 207 28 1 237 
3 Hate Literature 1 8 39 1 19 68 
4 Chanda Collection 0 2 6 2 1 11 
 5 Khateebs Fanning 
sectarian Hatered 





0 1 4 0 0 5 
7 Display/Brandishing 
of Arms 
0 48 144 242 799 1233 


















  Offence Total persons Challenged 
  
 S.#. 































detained under ATA 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 Misuse of 
Loudspeaker 
43 7102 505 103 93 7846 
3 Hate Literature 14 131 16 7 19 187 
4 Chanda Collection 0 130 2 4 1 137 
 5 Khateebs Fanning 
sectarian Hatered 





0 7 0 0 0 7 
7 Display/Brandishing 
of Arms 
0 593 162 7370 751 8876 
  Total 64 8114 686 7484 865 17213 
 
Activists detained under Anti Terrorism Act (ATA) : 20                                                                                                        
Persons under arrest for other offences like hate material, misuse of loud speaker  
:1565. 
 




















Source: Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, Pakistan Index Tracking Variables of 












Source: Committee to Protect Journalists, ―Journalists Killed in Pakistan‖.  






Annual Pakistan Government Spending on Education, as % of GDP and Total Budget, 









Source: Khawar Ghumman, ―Education to be allocated seven percent of GDP‖, Dawn, 
















Source: Pakistan Ministry of Finance, ―Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09‖, p. 159. 















The critical elements of North Waziristan Peace Agreement  
5 September 2006 
 
Clauses to be fulfilled by the Utmanzai Tribe:  
 
 No attacks shall be launched against Law-enforcement personnel, Armed Forces, 
and Government institutions. Also there would be no ―Target Killing‖ 
  Parallel Administration shall be set up in NWA (North Waziristan Agency) and 
the writ of the Government of Pakistan would be accepted. The Political 
Administration would be approached for the solution of the local problems and all 
issues shall be solved under the ―Riwaj‖ (Law of the land) and the Frontier 
Crimes Regulation (FCR) with the cooperation of the Utmanzai Tribes and their 
Elders. 
  Nobody shall be allowed to cross border to take part in military operations in 
neighboring Afghanistan. However, there will be no ban on traveling to 
Afghanistan in line with the existing traditions and law for trade purposes or 
meeting relatives.  
  No interference shall be carried out in Settled Districts adjoining North 
Waziristan and no effort shall be made to establish parallel administration there.  
  Foreigners shall leave North Waziristan. Those unable to do so will have to live 
peacefully in the area and respect the existing laws as well as the terms of the 
Peace Agreement.  
 All Government assets including vehicles, weapons, wireless sets, etc captured 
during fighting shall be returned. 
 
Commitments to be fulfilled by the Government of Pakistan 
 
 All those persons arrested during the military operations shall be freed and will 
not be re-arrested under the same cases.  
 All privileges and benefits allowed to the tribes in the past shall be restored. 
  New check posts set up on roads by the Army shall be dismantled. While only 
―khassadras‖ and Levies shall man the old check posts as was the practice earlier.  
 All confiscated vehicles, weapons, and other assets shall be returned to the 
tribesmen.  
 Once the agreement is signed, the government shall halt all ground and aerial 
military operations and in future resolve all issues under the terms of tribal 
customs and traditions.  
lviii 
 
  All innocent victims of the military operations shall be compensated for human 
and material losses. Owners of properties that were damaged shall also be paid 
compensation.  
  There shall be no ban on carrying arms in keeping with the existing tribal 
traditions and practices. However, the ban on heavy weapons shall continue.  
  Implementation of the peace agreement shall begin with shifting of Pakistan 
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